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PREFACE
Taxation has been integral to politics for a long time. Consisting as it does of the 
compulsory confiscation of resources by the government for its own purposes, tax is 
inevitably a disputed issue in politics as well as an important constituent part of the 
sort of society we live in. Even in non-democratic times feelings about taxation are 
thought to have contributed to the downfall of governments - the English and American 
Revolutions are two familiar examples - but in democracies the means by which tax 
may influence the fate of governments is via the ballot box. Whether tax does influence 
election outcomes, and if so in what way, is the subject of this thesis. It is a subject 
about which there have been many theories but relatively few convincing empirical 
findings, and it is with the hope of adding to this slim canon that I have undertaken my 
investigation.
However at this point a critic might question whether such an investigation is 
really necessary. We already know what the electoral effects of tax are, he or she might 
argue: people don't like tax, and vote accordingly. But is this true? What about the 
presumably contrary effects on electoral outcomes of the improvements in government 
services that tax increases make possible? If tax cuts are made, wouldn't any positive 
electoral dividend for the government be likely to be offset by the negative effects of the 
service cuts that would be necessary to finance the tax cuts, or by negative perceptions 
of the consequent blow-out in the budget deficit if service cuts are avoided by resort to 
borrowing? Indeed the post-war record in OECD countries of steady rises in taxation 
both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP might imply that tax rises help 
governments rather than harm them. And if people do vote against tax, is it what they 
actually pay in tax that they vote on, or do they rather vote on more or less accurate 
perceptions gained from the media? Do people simply react to the government’s record, 
or to policy differences between parties on tax? Do tax promises made during election 
campaigns have any effect? These are just some of the questions that arise: the 
relationship between tax and elections is problematic, and one that needs careful 
analysis before firm conclusions are drawn.
My method is comparative, historical and statistical, and for reasons of 
manageability I concentrate mainly on the evidence of the last thirty years in Sweden 
and Australia: the 11 Swedish elections between 1958 and 1988 and the 13 Australian 
elections between 1958 and 1987 are few enough to examine individually in their 
historical context but numerous enough to allow statistics some sort of grip if used
iv
sensitively. Sweden and Australia are chosen because they have similar electorates but 
different levels and systems of taxation (as will be argued further in Chapter 2), as 
this permits a number of theories to be tested by contrasting the patterns of electoral 
change in high-tax Sweden with those in low-tax Australia - a 'most similar' 
comparative approach1. Most empirical studies to date relate to single countries 
considered in isolation or else to a number of countries analysed statistically, but as 
far as I know this is the first study of tax and elections to systematically compare two 
countries using both historical and statistical approaches.
But again it may be objected that such a procedure is superfluous, because the 
fact of Sweden having so much higher tax than Australia shows that Swedes like tax 
more (or dislike it less) than do Australians. However this assumes that elections 
result in the reliable translation of voter demands into public policy, whereas there is 
ample evidence that this is not necessarily the case, and that governments regularly 
pursue policies which are not approved of even by a majority of their own party 
supporters2, a phenomenon which led Philip Converse to compare elections to "a 
steering mechanism that is partially loose, gets a slow response to its directives, and is 
susceptible to tampering, to boot"3. Thus whether Swedes like tax more or less than 
Australians is not immediately apparent simply from inspecting the relative levels of 
tax in the two countries: if the electoral mechanism is loose enough, Sweden might have 
high taxes despite the wishes of the electorate. (And no conclusions are to be drawn 
either from the curious fact that the English word 'tax’ is the exact phonetic reverse of 
its Swedish counterpart, 'skatt'.)
The plan of the thesis is as follows:
In Chapter 1 I set out and examine recent theories and findings as to the 
electoral impact of tax. There is a wide range of these, but my focus is on those which 
state or imply specific hypotheses which can be empirically tested.
Chapters 2-5 set out the historical evidence in Sweden and Australia as to the 
connection between tax and election results. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the main
1As expounded in G.K. Roberts (1978), The explanation of politics: comparison, strategy and 
theory', in The Practice of Comparative Politics, ed. Paul G. Lewis, P. David, C. Potter, & 
Francis G. Castles, Longman, London, p.293.
2 For numerous Australian examples of this see Murray Goot (1969), Policies and Partisans: 
Australian Electoral Opinion 1941 to 1968, Department of Government and Public 
Administration, University of Sydney.
3 Philip Converse (1975), 'Public opinion and voting behavior', in Handbook of Political 
Science, v.4, ed. N.W. Polsby & F.l. Greenstein, Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, p.77.
Vpolitical, economic and social features and trends in Sweden and Australia since these 
countries became fully democratic in order to put the subsequent investigation into 
context. In Chapters 3-5 the historical evidence is examined election by election right 
up to 1987 in Australia and 1988 in Sweden. Chapter 3 deals with the elections 1958- 
1972, when Sweden and Australia were dominated by governments of opposite 
persuasions; Chapter 4 concerns the elections 1973-1983, a period during which 
both countries were ruled first by governments of the Left and then by governments of 
the Right; and Chapter 5 deals with the elections in the period 1984-1988, when Left 
governments were again in office in both countries. The evidence examined consists 
largely of the findings of election studies and opinion polls.
In Chapters 6-8 I employ statistics on aggregate economic and electoral data to 
test several hypotheses as to how tax may have influenced election results. Chapter 6 
tests the hypothesis that changes in overall levels of taxation influence election 
results, Chapter 7 examines whether legislative changes to the tax system have 
electoral effects, Chapter 8 tests hypotheses that party strategy matters, and Chapter 9 
concerns the possible impact of tax as a media issue. The method used is multiple 
regression analysis, and each of the models includes a number of economic control 
variables.
Finally, in Chapter 10 the historical and statistical evidence is brought together 
and conclusions are drawn as to the extent and manner in which tax has affected election 
results in Sweden and Australia over the last thirty years.
I would like to thank all those many people whose assistance made my 
investigation both possible and fruitful. In particular, I wish to thank my supervisors, 
Frank Castles, Don Aitkin and Don Rawson, who were always there when needed. I would 
also like to thank those people who helped me on the Swedish side of my research: Hans 
Kuhn, who convinced me that I could learn to speak Swedish quickly and then taught me 
how; the Swedish Embassy in Canberra and the Swedish Institute in Stockholm, whose 
efficiency made my visit to Sweden much easier than it would otherwise have been; 
Swedish political scientists Axel Hadenius and Nils Elvander of Uppsala University, and 
Sören Holmberg, Bo Särlvik and Kent Asp of Gothenburg University; party officials 
Gunnar Stenarv and Asa Larsson of the Social Democrats, Ake Petterson and Torsten 
Bengtsson of the Centre Party, Lennart Nordfors of the Liberals, and Göran 
Lennmarker of the Conservatives.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to test a number of hypotheses concerning the 
electoral impact of tax by undertaking a historical and statistical analysis of the 
relevant evidence in Sweden, a high tax country, and Australia, a low tax country, over 
the period 1958 to 1988. My results give some support to all the major hypotheses 
tested: Sweden's higher tax levels were associated with higher tax aversion than in 
Australia; the largest tax rises were associated with incumbent governments losing 
votes at the next election; and the introduction of major new taxes was also associated 
with incumbent governments losing votes at the next election. Furthermore, national 
differences seemed to be important in that tax rises overall were associated with vote 
gains by the Left in Sweden but the Right in Australia. In addition, when the Right 
outbid the Left on promising to cut tax, the Left tended to gain in Sweden but the Right 
gained in Australia. In conjunction with the statistical finding that expenditure rises 
appeared to benefit the Left in Sweden but the Right in Australia, and that Swedes are 
more supportive of progressivity and income equalization than Australians, this 
implies that voters in Sweden were more inclined than Australian voters to focus on the 
benefits of increased taxation, namely expenditure and income equalization, and that in 
electoral terms this tended to offset the generally greater tax aversion in the Swedish 
electorate. One reason for this difference between the two countries is that the Left- 
Right party distinction on tax is much sharper in Sweden than in Australia both in 
reality and in the minds of the electorate. This is possibly linked to conservative 
control of the media in Australia, which inhibits the general dissemination of pro-tax 
arguments and forces Labor to compete more vigorously on tax cuts than is necessary 
for the Social Democrats in Sweden, where social democratic ideas do find expression in 
the media. The Australian media may also have contributed to the rise in tax aversion 
over time in Australia. My general conclusion is that although actual tax changes did 
help to explain election results, these effects were strongly conditioned by essentially 
political factors, in particular differences between the two countries concerning the 
nature of party competition on tax and the partisan complexion of the media.
1RECENT THEORIES AND FINDINGS
1.1 Introduction
Election surveys in Sweden and Australia as elsewhere report that most citizens 
vote according to long-standing party affiliation, and that those voters who are open to 
influence by issues such as tax constitute a fairly small minority of the electorate, 
although a citizen's attitude to tax may be part of what binds him or her to a particular 
party.
For an issue to affect an election result, two broad conditions need to be met.
First, the issue must affect the party choice of a significant number of voters. 
Preconditions for an issue such as tax to affect a person's vote, as the authors of The 
American Voter pointed out, are that he or she is aware of it, cares about it, and 
perceives one party's policy on it as being better than the other parties' policies1. In 
addition, because other attitudes may be more important in determining how he or she 
votes, to actually affect a person's vote, tax as an issue must be decisive in tipping the 
balance of the vote decision from what it otherwise would have been.
Second, to affect an overall election result the numbers of voters changing in 
each direction on the issue must be uneven if the effects at the individual level are not 
to cancel each other out. However even then the election will also be influenced by other 
issues, by replacement of the electorate (deaths, coming of age, and migration), and by 
changes in participation in voting (movements towards or away from abstaining).
It can be seen from this that it is not obvious that tax must regularly affect 
election results, and that it is possible that it never does so. Rose and Karran, for 
example, assert that at least for Britain electoral studies "consistently find that 
taxation does not have a significant influence on voting behavior"2.
1 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes (1960), The 
American Voter, John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp.170-171.
2Richard Rose & Terence Karran (1987), Taxation by Political Inertia: Financing the Growth 
of Government in Britain, Allen & Unwin, London, p.167.
2However many analysts have disagreed with this view, and their theories of how 
tax might affect election results can be roughly categorized into five main groups: tax 
aversion theories, theories which counterpose expenditure attraction to tax aversion, 
fiscal illusion theories, theories relating to attitudes to government, and media power 
theories.
1.2 Tax aversion
The first group of theories takes its point of departure from the assumption that 
most people don't like tax, and posits that citizens will vote against tax rises and for tax 
cuts.
The first variant of this general view is that, as Richard Rose puts it, "the level 
of (taxpayer) resistance is likely to be greater when taxes are high rather than low"3, 
which implies that taxation should have a bigger impact on elections in Sweden than in 
Australia. Clearly this theory must be true at extremes - taxation of 100% of income, 
for example, would obviously provoke greater resentment than no income tax at all - 
but is it true of the levels of taxation prevailing in Sweden and Australia over the last 
thirty years? Cross-national studies conducted by Wilensky4 and by Coughlin5 
concluded that tax/welfare resistance was not related to total levels of taxation. Taken 
as referring to individual taxes, however, this theory implies that, given equivalent 
overall taxation, taxpayer resistance will be greater where there are a few high taxes 
than where there are a greater number of lower taxes. It also implies that individuals 
who pay comparatively more tax, such as high income earners, will object more to 
taxes than individuals who pay relatively little.
Second, Groenewegen (among others) argues that taxpayers adjust less easily to 
rapid rises in taxation than to slow rises, which implies that governments which raise 
tax rapidly will do worse at the polls than governments which raise tax more slowly, 
or not at all6. Elder, Thomas and Arter also argue in this way, maintaining that the 
unexpected success of the anti-tax Progress Party in the Danish election of 1973 was
3Richard Rose (1984), Understanding Big Government - the Programme Approach, Sage, 
London, p.122.
4Harold L. Wilensky (1976), The 'New Corporatism', Centralization, and the Welfare State, 
Sage, London, p.27.
5Richard M. Coughlin (1980), Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy, University of 
California, Berkeley, p.151.
6Peter Groenewegen (1985), Everyone's Guide to Taxation in Australia, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p.59.
3due largely to the very steep increase in personal taxation that had taken place in the 
previous five years7. Similarly, most observers agree that one of the main reasons for 
the 65-35% passage by referendum in California in 1978 of a measure which 
significantly cut property taxes, Proposition 13, when several previous attempts had 
failed, was the rapid increase over the previous few years in property tax due to the 
introduction of standard assessments, a housing boom, inflation, and especially the 
release just prior to the poll of sharply increased property tax assessments for the Los 
Angeles area8. However while there is evidence that large and rapid changes to taxation 
have an electoral effect, it is still not clear whether changes of more normal magnitude 
also have consistent effects on election results.
Third, there is the view that the electoral impact of tax depends upon prevailing 
economic conditions. Heidenheimer et al, for example, argue that growing tax was 
tolerated in many OECD countries during the 1950s and 1960s due to automatic 
revenue increases brought about by high economic growth and moderate levels of 
inflation, but that in the 1970s a combination of low economic growth and high 
inflation meant that taxes rose more quickly than real incomes, leading to a tax 
backlash9. The squeezing of real disposable income between 1973 and 1977 while 
government spending increased is also cited by Boskin as a reason for the passage of 
Proposition 13 in 19781 °, although the survey carried out by Sears and Citrin the 
following year found that those feeling financially worse off were only marginally more 
likely to support Proposition 13 than those feeling financially better off11. One 
specific version of this view is that tax aversion is associated with home ownership: 
Kemeny points out that high rates of home ownership are roughly correlated with low 
levels of government expenditure and revenue, and suggests that this could be due to the 
high housing costs incurred by new home-owners12. This implies that Swedes, with 
much lower home ownership, are less tax averse than Australians.
7 Neil Elder, A.H. Thomas, & D. Arter (1982), The Consensual Democracies? - The 
Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States, Martin Robertson, Oxford, p.92.
8See, for example, Richard A. Musgrave (1979), 'The tax revolt', Social Science Quarterly, 
v.59/4, pp.697,700; and Frank Levy (1979), 'On understanding Proposition 13', Public  
Interest No.56, pp.69-88.
9Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo & Carolyn Teich Adams (1983), Comparative Public 
Policy, second edition, Macmillan, London, chapter 6.
10Michael J. Boskin (1979), 'Some neglected economic factors behind recent tax and spending 
limitation movements’, National Tax Journal, v.32/2, Supplement.
11 David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, p.136.
12Jim Kemeny (1980), 'Home ownership and privatization', International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Development, v.4, pp.381-383.
4Empirical findings in regard to the impact of tax levels, and of changes in tax 
levels, are mixed. Meitzer and Vellrath, for example, found in their analysis of 
Presidential voting in the United States at the state level from 1960 to 1972 that 
neither nominal per capita state tax, nor the deviation from the national average of the 
rate of change of each state's nominal per capita net tax, had a statistically significant 
effect on the vote, although increases in taxes relative to transfers from the Federal 
government did appear to hurt the Republicans13. Similarly, Pomper’s analysis of 
gubernatorial elections in 37 American states between 1948 and 1972 failed to find 
any significant connection between changes in state taxes (variously measured) and the 
deviation of each party’s state gubernatorial vote-change from the national median 
gubernatorial vote-change14, and Li's study of Congressional elections also found no 
clear relationship between taxing and voting15. Niskanen, on the other hand, analysing 
data from 20 Presidential elections from 1896 to 1972, found that "a 10% increase in 
real per capita federal tax revenues appears to reduce the popular vote for the 
candidate of the incumbent party by around 1.4% of the popular vote", which suggests 
that in Presidential voting at least, Americans are tax averse16.
Finally, another variant of the tax aversion theory focusses on legislative 
changes to taxation, rather than on actual changes to overall levels of taxation, and 
argues that legislated increases harm the incumbent at the polls. This view receives 
some support from the findings of Eismeier's study of legislated tax increases in 
American states, which concluded that the larger the legislated tax increase, the more 
damage was done to the vote at the subsequent election for the incumbent governor17 .
1.3 Expenditure attraction versus tax aversion
If it were true that people always vote against tax, however, it is hard to see 
how democratic states would have come to have taxation in the first place, which points
13Allan H. Meitzer & Marc Vellrath (1975), 'The effects of economic policies on votes for the 
Presidency: some evidence from recent elections', Journal of Law and Economics v.18, 
pp.781 -798.
14Gerald Pomper (1970), Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics, 
Dodd Mead & Co., New York, chapter 6.
1 5Cited in Theodore J. Eismeier (1979), 'Budgets and ballots: the political consequences of 
fiscal choice', in Public Policy and Public Choice, ed. Douglas W. Rae & Theodore J. Eismeier, 
Sage, London, p.124.
16William A. Niskanen (1979), 'Economic and fiscal effects on the popular vote for 
President', in Public Policy and Public Choice, ed. Douglas W. Rae & Theodore J. Eismeier, 
Sage, London, pp. 110-111.
17Theodore J. Eismeier (1979), 'Budgets and ballots: the political consequences of fiscal 
choice’, in Public Policy and Public Choice, ed. Douglas W. Rae & Theodore J. Eismeier, Sage, 
London, p.134.
5to the fact that taxation has benefits as well as costs: the revenue raised by taxation is 
(mostly) returned to the community by way of transfers, services and employment. 
These are of value not only to those who receive them, but also to those who, for 
whatever reason, approve of such expenditure even though it is on others rather than 
on themselves. Thus for each person there may be a tradeoff between the perceived 
benefits due to government expenditure and the perceived losses due to taxation - or, as 
Pigou put it, the optimum public sector is reached when the utility of public goods is 
equal to the disutility of taxation18.
The relevance of public expenditure considerations to citizens' views on tax 
becomes quite clear when one considers the large differences between responses to 
questions about tax alone and responses to questions that mention connections between 
tax and the benefits it finances. A survey carried out in Britain in 1978 by Harris and 
Seldon, for example, found that the proportions of those respondents with an opinion 
who favoured/opposed reducing taxation to a definite limit in a hypothetical tax 
referendum was 79-21%, but that when the question was amended to suggest that 
services might be cut as a consequence the majority in favour dropped to 55-45%. 
When asked whether they were prepared to reduce tax if service cuts were certain, the 
proportions in favour/against were 34-64%19. Other surveys, such as those carried 
out in Sweden by Vogel in 196920 and by Hadenius in 1981-8221, which are 
considered in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, found a similar pattern of 
responses.
A corollary to this is that citizens would be more likely to vote against tax if 
convinced that to do so would not lead to service cuts, and Rabushka and Ryan among 
others argue that this was a principal reason for the passage of Proposition 13: only a 
quarter to a third of voters feared service cuts, due to a belief in the existence of a 
large state surplus which could be used to bail out local governments if property tax 
was cut (property tax being a local government responsibility in California), plus a 
belief that a lot of money could be trimmed from programs by cutting waste and 
inefficiency rather than service delivery itself. The only program that a majority of
18Cited in Alan Lewis (1982), The Psychology of Taxation, Martin Robertson, Oxford, p.13. 
19Ralph Harris & Arthur Seldon (1979), Over-ruled on Welfare, Institute of Economic 
Affairs, London, pp.24-34.
20Joachim Vogel (1974), Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of recent 
survey data', National Tax Journal v.27, pp.499-513.
21 Axel Hadenius (1986), A Crisis of the Welfare State? Opinions about Taxes and Public 
Expenditure in Sweden, Wiksell, Stockholm.
6citizens wanted cut was welfare, by which term Americans mean social assistance22. 
Two years later, however, Californians were not convinced either that there was a big 
state surplus or that efficiency measures would permit cuts in expenditure but not 
services, and Proposition 9, which was designed to cut income tax rates substantially 
and then index them, was decisively rejected23. Similarly, Courant and his colleagues 
found that some of the strongest support for Michigan's 1978 successful Headlee 
Amendment, which limited State revenues to a constant share of State income, came 
from those who thought that taxes could be cut without cutting expenditure as well24.
Insofar as tax is decisive for people’s votes, the electoral effect of taxation 
would depend upon the relative proportions of tax voters - people for whom the tax 
issue is decisive for the way they vote - and expenditure voters. Thus in one set of 
circumstances a tax rise might lead to vote losses, whereas in other circumstances it 
might lead to vote gains. The question then becomes, under what expenditure conditions 
do real or promised tax rises (cuts) lead to vote losses (gains) for parties? Various 
answers have been given to this question, some explicit, some implied.
First, the electoral impact of tax may depend upon its magnitude relative to 
expenditure, which would mean that voters are less negative towards tax when the 
national budget is in deficit than when it is in balance or in surplus, since deficit 
financing postpones part of the cost to taxpayers of expenditure to the future. Such a 
theory receives some support from the results of a study of Swedish economic data and 
opinion polls by Hibbs and Madsen, who found that a change of one standard deviation in 
the tax gap - that is, in the growth rate of post-tax, post-transfer income less the 
growth rate of pre-tax, pre-transfer income - led over four quarters to a 1.3% loss 
in support for the government25 .
Second, there is the theory that how tax changes influence election results 
depends upon what the taxation revenue is spent on. Former Swedish Prime Minister 
Olof Palme, for example, argued that welfare programs must be universal in order to 
maintain taxpayer support, for if the people paying tax did not participate in welfare
22 Alvin Rabushka & Pauline Ryan (1982), The Tax Revolt, Hoover Press, California, pp.26- 
36.
23Alvin Rabushka & Pauline Ryan (1982), The Tax Revolt, Hoover Press, California, pp.ISO- 
181 .
24P.N. Courant, E.M. Grämlich & D.L. Rubinfelt (1980), 'Why voters support tax limitation 
amendments', National Tax Journal 33, pp.1-20.
25Douglas A. Hibbs Jr., & Henrik Jess Madsen (1981), 'The impact of economic performance 
on electoral support in Sweden, 1967-1978', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.4/1 (new 
series), pp.33-50.
7themselves but looked for private solutions, at the same time as taxation revenue went 
on so-called safety nets for the least privileged, this would undermine social solidarity 
and encourage taxpayer revolts26. Similarly, other Social Democrats such as Esping- 
Anderson argue that restricting transfer payments to those most in need, by devices 
such as means tests, must lead to greater opposition to the welfare state, since fewer 
voters are eligible for benefits27. Castles argues that Australia’s residual welfare 
system makes promising more welfare of limited value for political parties: the Left 
wins few votes by promising more to the poor, since most vote Labor anyway, while the 
rises in direct tax needed to finance such an improvement (due to lack of social 
security contributions) antagonize both swinging voters and other Labor voters. The 
Right has no motive to promise more since their supporters would pay but not 
benefit28. This argument receives some empirical support from a Californian survey 
carried out by Sears and Citrin in 1979 following the passage of Proposition 13, which 
found universal programs such as fire services to be more popular than selective 
programs such as public housing29. On the other hand, it is possible that any lessening 
of tax aversion due to the existence of universal rather than selective welfare 
programs is counterbalanced by electoral dislike of the much higher taxation cost of 
universal programs.
Third is a demographic model, namely that electorates of countries with a large 
proportion of people dependent upon state expenditure may be less antagonistic towards 
taxation than electorates of countries with fewer so dependent. Countries with a large 
proportion of aged people, for example, may be less antagonistic towards tax, since aged 
people tend to be beneficiaries of expenditure rather than victims of tax, and over time 
the ageing of the population might lead to a reduction in the proportion of the electorate 
who are anti-tax. Thus the Swedish electorate would be expected to be less tax-averse 
than the Australian electorate, because it has a considerably higher proportion of its 
population aged over 6030. However the view that tax aversion is inversely related to 
dependence on government services and benefits was not supported either by the 
results of Wilensky's cross-national study, which found that tax-welfare backlash was
26Gunnar Fredriksson (1986), Olof Palme, Swedish Institute, Sweden.
27Gösta Esping-Anderson (1985), Politics Against Markets - the Social Democratic Road to 
Power, Princeton UP, Princeton, pp.33-34, 245.
28Francis G. Castles (1982), The Working Class and Welfare, Allen & Unwin, New Zealand,
pp .100-101.
29David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, p.49.
30OECD, 'OECD in figures 1989 edition', OECD Observer, No.158 (June-July), pp. 8-9.
8not in fact associated with the percentage of the population aged over 6531, or by the 
results of the study of Proposition 13 by Sears and Citrin, which found that receipt of 
government services was not linked to opposition to Proposition 1332.
Another relevant variable may be the proportion of the workforce employed in 
the public sector, who Sears and Citrin found to be strong opponents of tax limitation in 
the case of Proposition 1333. Other social trends, such as increasing affluence, may 
increase tax aversion in the electorate, as more affluent people have less need of 
government services - particularly if there are private alternatives, which are more 
prevalent in Australia than in Sweden, for example in the fields of health, education and 
retirement support.
Finally, a more general view is taken by Musgrave, who looks at taxation and 
expenditure from the point of view of redistribution and argues that:
"As the size of the public sector expands, the marginal voter who is 
just on the losing side of the redistribution moves down the income scale, 
causing the available majority for further redistribution to decline"34.
The implication of this is that tax resistance increases as the size of the public sector 
increases, which implies in turn that anti-tax sentiment should be stronger in Sweden 
than in Australia, and stronger later in the period than earlier. Meitzer and Richard go 
a step further in arguing that although it is in the interests of the median voter to tax 
above-average incomes, since the median income is less than the average income, the 
effect of redistribution on incentives leads in the long run to lower incomes than would 
otherwise be the case, so that voters previously on the margin become net losers in 
that they forego more in current and future income than they gain in additional benefits 
from redistribution. As redistribution increases, therefore, more voters will favour 
lower tax rates and smaller government35. As mentioned earlier, however, studies by
31 Harold Wilensky (1976), The 'New Corporatism', Centralization, and the Welfare State, 
Sage, London.
32David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, pp.115,150.
33David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, pp. 114,152-153.
34Richard A. Musgrave (1979), 'The tax revolt', Social Science Quarterly, v.59/4, p.701,
35A.H. Meitzer & S.E. Richard (1978), 'Why government grows (and grows) in a democracy', 
The Public Interest, v.52, pp. 116-117.
9Wilensky36 and by Coughlin37 do not support the view that tax resistance rises as the 
overall level of taxation increases.
1.4 Fiscal illusion
The proponents of the 'fiscal illusion' approach argue that the electoral impact 
of tax depends upon the nature of the tax system itself. While writers in this tradition 
mainly address themselves to the question of why budgets are the size they are, they 
explain this largely in terms of public preferences translated through a democratic 
electoral system, so their discussions often have direct implications for the question as 
to the electoral impact of tax.
Puviani, who originated this approach around the turn of the century, was 
interested in the question of how dominant elites would try to minimize tax resistance 
and discontent among the dominated by making tax seem less burdensome, and benefits 
greater, than they actually are38. Stratagems to this end could either be planned and 
deliberate, or simply eventuate from following the path of least resistance. Puviani and 
his modern successors such as Buchanan and Wagner start from a view of electors as 
rational actors in pursuit of economic self-interest but foiled by lack of information 
both about what is really going on in the field of taxation and about the relationship 
between taxation and expenditure, which leads them to fall prey to various sorts of 
fiscal illusion.
Abundant empirical evidence that taxpayers are generally ignorant about tax is 
provided by surveys of income tax consciousness such as those carried out in the US by 
Enrick in 196339 and 196440 and in Britain by Lewis in 197841, all of which found 
a large degree of error among respondents' estimates of tax rates. These errors were 
mainly in the direction of underestimation, although in his earlier paper Enrick also 
cites a finding by Schmölders that taxpayers tended to over-estimate their income tax,
36Harold L. Wilensky (1976), The 'New Corporatism', Centralization, and the Welfare State, 
Sage, London, p.27.
37Richard M. Coughlin (1980), Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy, University of 
California, Berkeley, p.151.
38Puviani's theory is described in James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic 
Process, University of North Carolina Press, US, pp.128-136.
39Norbert Lloyd Enrick (1963), 'A pilot study in income tax consciousness', National Tax 
Journal, v.16, pp. 169-173.
40Norbert Lloyd Enrick (1964), 'A further study of income tax consciousness', National Tax 
Journal, v.17, pp.319-321.
41 Alan Lewis (1978), 'Perceptions of tax rates', British Tax Review, pp.358-366.
and among previous studies cited by Goetz is a finding by Wagstaff that while those on 
higher incomes underestimate income tax, those on lower incomes overestimate it42. In 
addition, many people favour both spending rises and tax cuts43, which implies that 
their attitudes to tax and spending are somewhat compartmentalized. When the fiscal 
connection between taxation and expenditure is pointed out, of course, the proportion 
supporting rises in spending tends to fall, just as the proportion supporting tax cuts 
falls when the connection to spending is made clear. Similarly, Kristenson found that 
many people will support expenditure rises in individual programs while opposing the 
rises in total spending that would result from the sum of their preferences44. As 
mentioned earlier, Sears and Citrin reported that despite the passage of Proposition 13 
majorities favoured expanded services in all areas apart from welfare45, and 
referendums tying proposed spending increases to tax increases were not as successful 
as those not mentioning tax increases46.
Buchanan and Wagner argue that, given the circumstances, such tax ignorance is 
rational:
"There is no incentive for anyone to come back to the taxpayer and 
present him with estimates as to the actual ex post estimates of his cost 
share. Nor does the taxpayer himself have an incentive to invest time and 
resources in making accurate estimates" because "there is no assurance 
that the independently acting individual can, himself, secure net gains 
from such behavior. He is only one participant, one voter, one 
constituent in a many-person polity ... He will be fully rational in 
remaining misinformed, fully rational in allowing his own fiscal choices 
to be subjected to the whims and fancies of his own perceptions as 
influenced by the institutions of payment. ... Furthermore, the costs of 
determining individual shares would be prohibitive in many cases. Even 
professional economists are often unable to agree on the consequences of 
changes in the institutional means of extracting resources from 
citizens."47
42Charles Goetz (1977), 'Fiscal illusion in state and local finance', in Budgets and 
Bureaucrats: the Sources of Government Growth, ed. Thomas E. Borcherding, Duke UP, North 
Carolina, pp.177-180.
43See, for example, Richard E. Wagner (1976), 'Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and public 
choice', Public Choice 24, pp.45-61; and Jack Citrin (1979), 'Do people want something for 
nothing? Public opinion on taxes and government spending', National Tax Journal, v.32/2 
(June), Supplement, pp. 113-129.
440le P. Kristenson (1982), 'Voter attitudes and public spending: is there a relationship?' 
European Journal of Political Research, v.10, pp.50-51.
45David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, p.47.
46James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, University of North 
Carolina Press, US, p.204.
47James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner (1977), Democracy in Deficit: the Political Legacy 
of Lord Keynes, Academic Press, New York, pp.132-133.
According to fiscal illusion theorists there are a number of different ways in 
which fiscal illusion may lead voters to underestimate the level of taxation and thus the 
cost of government services.
First, Wagner argues that the more complex the revenue structure, the harder 
it is for citizens to judge accurately the price of public output, which will tend to lead 
to underestimation of tax costs because people fail to notice all the revenue sources1. In 
addition, "complexity has the effect of weakening the cost signals", and here the 
psychological literature on information processing is cited as finding that "the degree 
to which any message is understood varies directly with the strength of the particular 
signal to be received and inversely with the noise present at the time the signal is 
transmitted"2. Examples of diversifying revenue sources include instituting numerous 
small levies rather than a few large ones, charging fees for government services such 
as licensing, and using profits from public enterprises to finance tax cuts. Wagner’s 
survey of 50 US cities found that expenditure did indeed increase more rapidly in cities 
with relatively complex revenue systems than in those with relatively simple 
systems3. This implies that resistance to tax rises may be greater in Australia than in 
Sweden, since Australia's tax system is simpler than Sweden's (see Chapter 2).
Second, increased revenue due to the introduction of new taxes will be resisted 
more strongly than the same revenue increase coming from already existent taxes. An 
old tax is a good tax from the government's point of view, because a new tax means a 
"loss of psychic income". Thus revenue programs that automatically increase revenue 
at a greater rate than existing expenditure increases - such as progressive income tax, 
corporate income tax, and excises on items with high elasticities - make expenditure 
increase relatively more likely. Once taxes are raised in an emergency such as war, 
taxpayers are generally willing to keep them there, as no new costs are involved4. 
Similarly, Rose argues that of the three determinants of tax revenue - namely the law 
defining the tax rate and base, administrative enforcement, and the economic activity 
defined as the tax base - changes to the law or to its enforcement arouse opposition
1 Richard E. Wagner (1976), 'Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and public choice', Public 
Choice 24, pp.45-61.
2James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner (1977), Democracy in Deficit: the Political Legacy 
of Lord Keynes, Academic Press, New York, pp. 130-131.
3Richard E. Wagner (1976), 'Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and public choice', Public 
Choice 24, pp.45-61.
4James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, University of North Carolina 
Press, US, pp.58-65. For a similar argument see Alan T. Peacock & Jack Wiseman (1961), 
The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, Princeton UP, US, pp.26-28.
from those whose interests are threatened, so that tax rises (cuts) due to legislative or 
administrative action will be punished (rewarded) by the electorate to a far greater 
degree than will tax rises (cuts) due to changes in economic activity. This view is 
supported by Rose's finding that between 1955 and 1982 economically buoyant taxes 
such as income tax, social security taxes and VAT/sales taxes increased from 51% to 
71% of tax revenue in the OECD as a whole, 55% to 82% in Sweden, and 42% to 52% 
in Australia5. In addition, in studies of American states Goetz found that expenditure 
increased more quickly in states with a tax elasticity of greater than one6, and 
Penniman found that those states with a heavy emphasis on income tax increased 
expenditure more than did states which emphasized sales tax7. Furthermore, the 
buoyancy of progressive taxes can also be due to inflation increasing nominal incomes, 
which increases the effective average tax rate by pushing the taxpayer into a higher 
marginal tax bracket despite the fact that no increase in real income has taken place. 
Thus Wagner argues that "during inflationary periods, individuals will object less 
strenuously to an increase in public expenditure when that expenditure is financed by 
progressive income tax than when it is financed by proportional income taxation", 
because the revenue from the progressive income tax will increase more rapidly8.
Third, rises in direct tax such as income tax will be resisted more strongly than 
rises in indirect taxes such as VAT and excises, because direct taxes are visible to the 
taxpayer but indirect taxes are usually concealed in the prices of goods and services. 
More precisely, "indirect taxation ... is characterized both by weak signals regarding 
revenue extraction by government and by a lot of noise stemming from the 
simultaneous transmission of tax rates and commodity prices"9. Wilensky finds a high 
reliance on 'visible' direct taxes to be linked to tax/welfare backlash10, and Coughlin 
reports that:
5Richard Rose (1985), 'Maximizing tax revenue while minimizing political costs', Journal of 
Public Policy, v.5/3, pp.308-311.
6Charles Goetz (1977), 'Fiscal illusion in state and local finance', in Budgets and Bureaucrats: 
the Sources of Government Growth, ed. Thomas E. Borcherding, Duke UP, North Carolina, 
p. 184.
7Clara Penniman (1976), 'The politics of taxation', in Politics in the American States, ed. 
Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines, third edition, Little Brown & Co., Boston, p.455.
8Richard E. Wagner (1976), 'Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and public choice', Public 
Choice 24, pp.45-61.
9James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner (1977), Democracy in Deficit: the Political Legacy 
of Lord Keynes, Academic Press, New York, p.132.
10Harold Wilensky (1976), The 'New Corporatism', Centralization, and the Welfare State, 
Sage, London, p.25.
“Those nations which tend to rely most heavily on 'direct' taxes on 
incomes and profits all show higher levels of public resistance to 
increasing taxing and spending than those nations where the burden is 
more evenly distributed across taxes on goods and services and social 
security contributions."11
Notice, however, that these findings partly contradict those previously cited which 
suggested that tax resistance is less for buoyant taxes, of which progressive income 
taxation is one.
Fourth, social security taxes may be relatively acceptable due to the often 
misleading impression they give of being insurance contributions12: Wilensky points 
out that workers will often accept heavy social insurance deductions from pay but 
oppose increases in direct tax, and that increased employer contributions are generally 
passed on to the consumer13. Accordingly one might expect Swedes to be less tax- 
averse than Australians, as there were no social security taxes levied in Australia until 
a health levy was briefly introduced between 1976 and 1978 and reintroduced in 
1983.
Fifth, Buchanan argues that the use of corporate tax leads taxpayers to 
underestimate their tax burden, as it apparently falls upon companies but is actually 
passed on to consumers14.
Sixth, the use of withholding taxes (taxing at source) and periodic payments 
(such as pay-as-you-earn income tax) may lead to underestimation of tax, as they 
render the payment of large amounts less painful15.
Finally, a different variant of fiscal illusion theory applies the free-rider 
principle to argue that governments create an electoral bias towards increasing 
expenditure by taking advantage of the fact that program improvements can be more 
accurately targeted than tax cuts:
11 Richard M. Coughlin (1980), Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy, University of 
California, Berkeley, p.153.
12James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, University of North
Carolina Press, US, pp.58-65.
13Harold Wilensky (1975), The Welfare State and Equality, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, pp.59-60.
14James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, University of North
Carolina Press, US, pp.58-65.
15James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, University of North
Carolina Press, US, pp.58-65.
"If the benefits of an action are concentrated and well-defined while the 
costs are diffuse and generalized, we can predict that individuals will,in 
many circumstances, act without due regard to the costs involved."16
Thus the voters targeted for benefits tend to vote for the government as a consequence, 
but the government is not punished for the increased taxes necessary to pay for the 
program improvements because the extra taxation is spread thinly over the electorate 
as a whole, or over large portions of it. Because these impositions are therefore fairly 
small on a per capita basis compared with the benefits received by the targeted group, 
voters paying the extra tax don't notice it, and therefore don’t vote accordingly. 
Similarly, Kristenson argues that policy decisions attract those who would be affected, 
so that there is a bias towards benefits at the micro level17.
However the view that fiscal illusion results solely in underestimation of tax is 
not unchallenged.
First, Buchanan also uses the above targeting argument in reverse, and argues 
that the success of Proposition 13 was largely due to the fact that its proponents 
specified precise tax cuts while opponents only issued "generalized threats" in regard 
to consequent spending cuts18.
Second, Anthony Downs argues that voters tend to act as a brake on expenditure 
growth because they can always think of programs which they disapprove of, because 
the benefits are remote and/or uncertain, and which they therefore consider could and 
should be cut in order to make room for tax cuts19 .
Third, Wicksell considered that government expenditures would be larger if 
each expenditure was tied to its own tax, as this would make the benefits received from 
taxpaying more obvious20.
16James M. Buchanan (1979), The potential for taxpayer revolt in American democracy', 
Social Science Quarterly, v.59/4, p.692.
1 7Ole P. Kristenson (1982), 'Voter attitudes and public spending: is there a relationship?', 
European Journal of Political Research, v.10, p.38.
18James M. Buchanan (1979), 'The potential for taxpayer revolt in American democracy', 
Social Science Quarterly, v.59/4, pp.693-694.
1 9Anthony Downs (1960), 'Why the government budget is too small in a democracy', World 
Politics, v. 12, pp.541-563.
20Cited in Dennis C. Mueller (1979), Public Choice, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, p.91.
Fourth, Buchanan also argues that income tax progressivity creates a 
pessimistic illusion due to the tendency of people to think in terms of marginal rates 
rather than average rates21.
Finally, Goetz argues that the political furore surrounding tax decisions taken 
by governments may lead to overestimation of tax22.
1.5 Attitudes to government
All the theories considered up to this point tend to presuppose that voters are 
motivated primarily by narrow economic self-interest, and that they are rational 
enough for their vote decisions to reflect this. However both of these assumptions can 
be questioned23.
First, even a cursory glance at psychology reveals that human motivation is 
much more diverse and complex than the economic self-interest model suggests, and 
that people are moved by sentiments the objects of which are not simply their own 
narrowly-defined economic interests, for example in the political sphere by moral 
ideals pertaining to how society ought to be, such as freedom, equality and justice.
Second, it is clear that voters' thought processes do not always conform to the 
calculating means-end cognition model inherent in the view of the voter as rational 
actor. In his critique of the economic model of human behavior, Alan Lewis points out 
that people have limited cognitive capacities, choose according to past learning and 
habits, are selective in attention, and make choices in a social context of families, 
peers and workmates24, and Murray Edelman argues that the mass public tends to react 
to symbols rather than to reality25. That is, people may act rationally in the sense 
described above, or they may not.
21 James Buchanan (1967), Public Finance in Democratic Process, University of North 
Carolina Press, US, pp.139-142.
22Charles Goetz (1977), 'Fiscal illusion in state and local finance’, in Budgets and 
Bureaucrats: the Sources of Government Growth, ed. Thomas E. Borcherding, Duke UP, North 
Carolina, p.184.
23For good critiques of the self-interest approach see Alan Lewis (1982), The Psychology of 
Taxation, Martin Robertson, Oxford; and Leif Lewin (1988), Den Gemensamma Bästa, 
Carlssons, Sweden.
24Alan Lewis (1982), The Psychology of Taxation, Martin Robertson, Oxford, p.32.
25Murray Edelman (1976), The Symbolic Uses of Politics, University of Illinois Press, US.
In this and following sections I consider a number of theories concerning the 
electoral impact of tax that are not so closely tied to the picture of voters as rational 
actors calculating where their economic self-interest lies. This section deals with 
theories that relate to attitudes to government.
First, attitudes to taxation may be linked to voters' views as to the proper scope 
of government: voters who consider that government should do a lot may be less tax 
averse than voters who consider that governments should do as little as possible. Since 
these positions correspond closely with the traditional positions taken by parties of the 
Left and Right, it is not surprising that, for example, conservatives and Republicans 
were more likely to vote for Proposition 13 than were liberals and Democrats26. This 
implies that the greater the proportion of voters with right-wing ideas, the greater the 
tax aversion in the electorate as a whole. This is consistent with Wilensky's finding 
that tax-welfare backlash is related to working class weakness27, on the assumption 
that the relative strength of the working class is linked to the relative proportions of 
left-wing and right-wing voters in the electorate. It may also be the case that the 
relative proportions of Left/Right voters are also influenced by the prevailing climate 
of national and international elite opinion, which appears to have been conservative in 
the 1950s, more sympathetic to government intervention in the 1960s and early 
1970s, and conservative once again from the late 1970s.
In regard to Sweden and Australia in particular, Castles argues that Sweden is 
permeated by a social democratic image of society created over a period of decades by a 
strong and united labour movement which has not only dominated the government but is 
also represented within the state apparatus itself to a greater extent than elsewhere. 
Radio, television and schools reflect the prevailing political balance and thus 
perpetuate this social democratic dominance, which is underpinned by a tradeoff 
between the government and the unions of full employment and welfare expansion in 
return for industrial peace and union cooperation on economic policy, including wage 
restraint. It is also facilitated by a divided Right28. In Australia, on the other hand, 
since 1910 the Left has often been divided while the Right has generally remained 
united and has dominated government. In addition, until recently the unions have not 
pursued a tradeoff strategy with the government but have remained focussed mainly on
26David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, p.166.
27Harold Wilensky (1976), The 'New Corporatism', Centralization, and the Welfare State, 
Sage, London, p.44.
28Francis G. Castles (1978), The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routiedge & Kegan 
Paul, London.
the protection of wages. This in turn, argues Castles, has led to a residual welfare 
system which, as pointed out earlier, has not encouraged the parties to highlight 
welfare promises as part of their electoral strategy and arguably results in greater tax 
aversion than would be the case with a universal welfare system29. Thus Australia 
might be said to be dominated by a liberal image of society, in contrast to the social 
democratic image of Sweden, which implies that Swedes are less tax-averse than 
Australians.
Second, attitudes to taxation may be linked to the degree to which voters are 
alienated from government as such. Tarschys, for example, argues that attitudes to 
taxation are related to the perceived legitimacy of the government. If the state's 
sovereignty and identity are well-established, and its rulers considered to be 
representative of the people, acceptance of taxation is likely to be greater than 
otherwise, and Tarschys argues that this may be facilitated by peaceful political 
development and a homogeneous national culture. Conversely, tax aversion may be 
greater to the extent that government is perceived as being corrupt and/or inefficient, 
and to the degree to which politicians are distrusted30.
Some empirical evidence for this alienation theory is provided by a study by 
Ladd and Wilson of a 1980 tax referendum in Massachusetts, which found that 
perceptions of inefficiency and waste in government, plus the expectation that tax 
limitation would reduce this, was strongly related to voting 'yes' to tax limitation31 . 
In addition, the Swedish study carried out by Axel Hadenius in 1981-82 found that tax 
discontent was strongly associated with distrust of politicians and authorities32. 
Similarly, a test of eight competing explanations of the 'tax revolt' by Lowery and 
Sigelman, using discriminant analysis of data from the 1978 American Election Study, 
and preferences for or against a Proposition 13 type tax cut as dependent variable, 
found that the best predictors of support for tax limitation were whether people felt 
cut off from the political decision-making process and to what degree they were cynical 
about political leadership, looked upon political institutions as being unresponsive to 
their needs, and were dubious of their own political effectiveness. However it should be
29Francis G. Castles (1982), The Working Class and Welfare, Allen & Unwin, New Zealand. 
30Daniel Tarschys (1975), 'The growth of public expenditures: nine modes of explanation', 
Scandinavian Political Studies, v.10, p.24.
31 Helen F. Ladd & July Boatwright Wilson (1982), 'Why voters support tax limitations: 
evidence from Massachusetts' Proposition 21/2', National Tax Journal, v.35, pp. 121-148.
32Axel Hadenius (1986), A Crisis of the Welfare State? Opinion About Taxes and Public 
Expenditure in Sweden, Wiksell, Stockholm.
pointed out that this model explained only 5.7% of the variance33. Bishop argues that 
evidence exists to suggest that the 'crisis of confidence' in government is due to the 
development of a more critical media than existed in the past34, and Robinson identifies 
the rise of TV news in particular as having produced cynicism and declining trust in 
government due to its focus on governmental shortcomings35, although empirical 
findings in this regard are mixed36.
If the alienation theory is accurate, it may imply that Swedes are less tax- 
averse than Australians, as Sweden has a longer history as a sovereign nation, arguably 
less divisive politics, and is more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than 
Australia. In addition, government in Sweden may be perceived as less corrupt than in 
Australia, which has a long history of corruption at the State level. Finally recent 
developments in the media may have indirectly strengthened tax aversion, which would 
thus be expected to be becoming stronger as time goes on, but this effect may be less in 
Sweden than in Australia due to Swedish public control of the electronic media.
Third, in regard to tax in particular, Klein suggests that perceived fairness may 
enhance tax acceptability37, which implies that the distribution of the tax burden may 
be important in influencing attitudes to tax, in particular the system's perceived 
vertical and horizontal equity. This may imply in turn that heavy taxation of the rich 
helps to legitimate tax, as those with the greatest ability to pay are seen to be doing 
their bit. Taxation concessions, on the other hand, may lead to cynicism and opposition 
on the part of ordinary taxpayers if they are seen as favouring the rich, but to greater 
acceptance of the tax system if they are seen as compensating for circumstances that 
necessarily entail greater expenditure, such as having a large family.
Finally, Sears & Citrin argue that in regard to taxation people react to symbols 
more than they make real evaluations of the role of the public sector in order to judge 
where their self-interest lies, and suggest that "the more specific and concrete the 
symbols describing the government output, the more favorable the public’s response to
33David Lowery & Lee Sigelman (1981), 'Understanding the tax revolt: eight explanations', 
American Political Science Review, v.75/4, pp.963-974.
34George F. Bishop (1981), 'Survey research', in Handbook of Political Communication, ed. 
Dan D. Nimmo & Keith R. Sanders, Sage, US, p.609.
35M. Robinson (1977), 'Television and American politics: 1956-1976', The Public Interest, 
v.48, pp.22-29.
36Cliff Zukin (1981), 'Mass communication and public opinion', in Handbook of Political 
Communication, ed. Dan D. Nimmo & Keith R. Sanders, Sage, US, pp.379-381.
37Rudolf Klein (1976), 'The politics of public expenditure: American theory and British 
practice’, British Journal of Political Science, v.6, p.421.
it". That is, voters have "a rather reflexive response to the relevant affectively loaded 
symbols", and while most will agree that government is too big, fewer consider that 
government services should be cut, fewer again think that specific service areas such 
as police should be cut, fewer still want to cut specific programs such as library 
opening hours on Tuesday mornings, and very few want to cut programs that impinge 
upon them personally, such as social security in the case of the elderly. This implies 
that the degree of tax aversion in the electorate depends largely on the specificity of the 
tax-related symbols current in political discourse, so that the more abstract the 
symbols, the more tax-averse the electorate. At the same time, however, attitudes to 
the more abstract symbols are more changeable than attitudes to more specific 
symbols, as abstract symbols are more remote from actual experience38.
1.6 Retrospective voting versus policy voting
Perhaps the most common view of tax voting is that voters react to the tax 
record of the incumbent government. According to this theory, if voters are tax averse 
but the government raises taxes, the government will be punished. This is the model 
examined by most of the statistical studies of tax voting cited earlier: retrospective 
voting39.
However it is also possible that in reacting to the incumbent government's tax 
record voters also take into account the policy positions of the contending parties, in 
particular the high-tax orientation of the Left and the low-tax orientation of the Right. 
That Left governments are high-tax and Right governments are low-tax is attested to 
by Cameron's finding in a cross-national study of a correlation of +.65 between 
average revenue as a percentage of GDP and Left control of the government over the 
period 1965 to 198140. Thus voters who understand this and who want tax cuts may 
not punish governments of the Right for increasing taxation, just as voters who want 
increased taxation, for example to improve social services, may not punish a 
government of the Left for failing to deliver. Instead, tax rises may lead to a swing to 
the Right regardless of whether it is in government if the electorate is on balance tax 
averse, but to a swing to the Left if on balance the electorate prefers better services
38David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982), Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, pp.64-65, 82, 65-66, 68.
39Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, Yale University 
Press, New Haven & London.
40David Cameron (1985), 'Does government cause inflation? Taxes, spending and deficits', in 
The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation, ed. Leon N. Lindberg & Charles S. Maier, 
Brookings, Washington, p.257.
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and benefits and therefore implicitly higher taxation (and conversely for tax cuts). 
Such policy voting, as Alt and Chrystal term it41, would be consistent with Rattinger's 
'clientele hypothesis', which posits that Left parties benefit from increasing 
unemployment regardless of whether they are in power, since the Left is seen as more 
likely to reduce unemployment, while Right parties benefit from increasing inflation 
because the Right is perceived as being more likely to restrain rising prices. Evidence 
from his ecological study of the 1976 German election supported Rattinger's 
hypothesis42, as did a time-series study of economic voting in France by Rosa43.
Finally, if voters take party policies on tax into account when they vote, rather 
than voting solely on the incumbent government's record, then it is also possible that 
specific party election appeals on tax have an effect on election results. If the electorate 
is tax-averse, therefore, this would be expected to benefit that party which promises 
to cut tax most, other things being equal. While this party would generally be expected 
to be of the Right, it need not necessarily be so. In addition, party strategy in regard to 
many of the other factors which may affect tax aversion, such as targeting of tax and 
expenditure, may also have an effect.
1.7 Media power
Since most of the information which shapes our view of the political world 
comes via the mass media, several theories posit that variations in political coverage 
by the media play a part in influencing election results.
First, there is the theory that media coverage affects not so much what people 
think as what people think about, so that the media influence election results via their 
role in agenda-setting. A study by Kent Asp of the role of the media in the campaign 
leading up to the referendum on nuclear power in Sweden, for example, found that the 
attention given by voters to the political world mirrored the attention given by the 
media, and that in general media attention led to voter attention rather than vice versa. 
Furthermore, Asp found that media exposure increased the number of voters who 
acquired or retained an attitude pro or anti nuclear power, and that alterations of these
41 James E. Alt & K. Alec Chrystal (1983), Political Economics, Wheatsheaf, Britain, pp.153- 
1 56.
42Hans Rattinger (1981), 'Unemployment and the 1976 election in Germany: some findings at 
the aggregate and individual level of analysis’, in Contemporary Political Economy, ed. D.A. 
Hibbs & H. Fassbender, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
43Jean Jacques Rosa (1980), 'Economic conditions and elections in France', in Models of 
Political Economy, ed. Paul Whiteley, Sage, London.
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attitudes were correlated with media content. His conclusion was that the media affects 
people's votes via influencing the picture of reality to which voters applied their 
evaluations44. However it is clear that agenda-setting and information effects are 
contingent not only on media content but also on factors such as media exposure, 
gratifications sought (such as for surveillance of the political environment, guidance 
as to how to vote, or enjoyment of the 'horse race' aspect of politics)45, and audience 
sensitivity to particular issues46.
Budge and Farlie apply the agenda-setting model to argue that issues such as tax 
influence the electorate in proportion to their salience during the election campaign, 
and posit that in general tax as an issue favours the Right, since people don't like tax 
and the Right is the low-tax side of politics. Thus the more people pay attention to tax 
and to other Right issues, the greater the Right vote. Budge and Farlie tested this 
proposition using statistical analysis of the relationship between issue salience and 
election results in 23 countries, in which issues were allocated as Left or Right issues 
and scored for salience, and concluded that if Right issues such as tax are election 
issues, parties of the Right do gain and parties of the Left do lose. On the other hand, if 
the redistribution for which tax revenue is used is an issue, this favours the Left47.
Next, the electoral effects of many of the other factors affecting tax aversion 
may be magnified to the extent that taxation is a major media issue in the election, 
quite apart from any effect of salience as such. If media attention is focussed on the 
rapid rise in taxation, for example, one would expect that any electoral consequences of 
this rise would be greater than they would be without such media coverage.
Finally, Kaid argues that political advertising as well as news can have a 
significant effect in putting across political information, and possibly some agenda­
setting effects (although the direction of causality between the results of opinion polls 
and the content of political advertisements is difficult to determine), but that evidence
44Kent Asp (1986), Mäktige Massmedier, Akademilitteratur, Stockholm.
45Garett J. O'Keefe & L. Erwin Atwood (1981), ’Communications and election campaigns', in 
Handbook of Political Communication, ed. Dan D. Nimmo & Keith R. Sanders, Sage, US, pp.336- 
338.
46L. Erbring, E.N. Goldberg & A.H.Miller (1980), 'Front-page news and real-world cues: a 
new look at agenda-setting by the media', American Journal of Political Science, v.24, pp.16- 
49.
47lan Budge & Dennis J. Farlie (1983), Explaining and Predicting Elections - Issue Effects and 
Party Strategy in Twenty-Three Democracies, Allen & Unwin, London.
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in regard to any affective effects of such advertising is mixed48. This implies that 
party strategy in regard to tax may have an effect independent of its news coverage.
1.8 The Wilensky model
One of the most sophisticated model of tax politics is that constructed by 
Wilensky on the basis of his statistical study of cross-national aggregate data. Although 
some of his findings have been mentioned above, it is worth looking briefly at his model 
as a whole.
Wilensky's multiple regression analysis focussed on national public resistance 
to the welfare state as expressed in anti-taxing, anti-spending or anti-bureaucratic 
sentiments and in actions directed against welfare state programs in cash and kind, and 
found that the most important factor associated with high tax-welfare backlash was 
high tax visibility, that is, high direct taxation as a proportion of total revenue, which 
mediated the effects of a weak working class, weak corporatist linkages, and the 
dominance of long-established parties. Conversely, intense backlash was never 
associated with a combination of strong corporatist linkages, heavy taxes and low tax 
visibility. Corporatism was hypothesized to dampen backlash by providing the basis of 
an organized consensus on important issues including tax, while old parties were 
hypothesized to encourage tax backlash because their lack of adaptability tended to 
bottle up discontent, so that backlash was worse when it finally did break out.
Factors not associated with backlash one way or the other included the degree of 
government centralization, the percentage of the population aged over 65, religious 
cleavages, and ethnic-linguistic cleavages. His conclusion was that countries with old 
party dominance and high visible taxes invite backlash, and specified Sweden and 
Australia, which he placed in the same tax-welfare backlash category about midway 
down the table of backlash severity, as exceptions that he would fall into line in the 
future49.
1.9 The Sears & Citrin model
The other most sophisticated tax voting model is that constructed by Sears and 
Citrin on the basis of their 1979 survey of Californians following the success of
48Lynda Lee Kaid (1981), 'Political advertising', in Handbook of Political Communication, ed. 
Dan D. Nimmo & Keith R. Sanders, Sage, US, pp.262-264.
49Harold Wilensky (1976), The 'New Corporatism', Centralization, and the Welfare State, 
Sage, London.
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Proposition 13 in 1978. Sears and Citrin found that the most important proximal 
attitudes associated with support for Proposition 13 were a desire for smaller 
government and/or reductions in spending on government services, and perceptions of 
waste in government and/or that public employees were overpaid. Although self- 
interest did play a part in explaining citizens' votes, in particular the size of the tax 
saving expected and whether respondents were public employees, symbolic 
predispositions were generally more important. Of these the strongest predictor of 
support for Proposition 13 was symbolic racism, measured by attitudes to busing and 
to government special efforts for minorities, other important factors being 
conservatism, Republican party identification, and political cynicism50.
1.10 Hypotheses to be tested
Of the theories and findings reviewed above, most lend themselves to the 
formulation of hypotheses which can be compared against the experience of the last 
thirty years in Sweden and Australia. Of these I have selected seven on which to focus.
Each of these hypotheses posits either an effect on the share of the vote won by 
the incumbent government, on the theory that voters react to the government's record, 
or an effect on the Left/Right vote distribution, on the theory that voters are aware of 
Left/Right policy differences on tax. They also deal with both total taxation and direct 
taxation, on the theory that even if reactions to total taxation are not found, voters may 
still react to direct taxation because it is more visible. All four of these theories - 
incumbency versus policy voting, and total tax versus direct tax voting - can be 
considered to be additional hypotheses, but for ease of presentation are dealt with in the 
context of the seven main hypotheses considered below.
1. Tax level hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the overall level of 
direct and/or total taxation, and is directed either at the incumbent government 
or at the Left/Right policy difference on tax;
2. Tax change hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the magnitude 
of changes to the overall level of direct and/or total taxation, and is directed 
either at the incumbent government or at the Left/Right policy difference on 
tax;
3. New tax hypothesis: tax aversion increases when new taxes are introduced 
and decreases when old taxes are abolished, and is directed either at the 
incumbent government or at the Left/Right policy difference on tax;
50David O. Sears & Jack Citrin (1982) Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California, 
Harvard UP, Massachusetts, p.209-211.
4. Tax rate hypothesis: tax aversion increases if tax rates are raised and 
decreases if tax rates are cut, and is directed either at the incumbent 
government or at the Left/Right policy difference on tax;
5. Party strategy hypothesis: promises to cut taxes win votes and promises 
to raise taxes lose votes;
6. Media power hypothesis: if tax is an election issue, the Right will gain votes 
and the Left will lose votes;
7. National differences hypothesis: the electoral impact of tax is different 
in Sweden and Australia due to differences between the two countries.
While my investigation concentrates on these seven theories, there are also a
number of other hypotheses which will be considered at least in passing:
8. Economic hypothesis: tax changes affect election results via their effect on 
real disposable incomes;
9. Complexity hypothesis: tax aversion is inversely related to the complexity 
of the tax system;
1 0. Buoyancy hypothesis: tax aversion is inversely related to the buoyancy of 
the tax system;
1 1. Budget hypothesis: tax aversion increases to the extent that the budget is in 
surplus and decreases to the extent that the budget is in deficit;
1 2. Demographic hypothesis: tax aversion is inversely related to the proportion 
of the electorate dependent on the government for their incomes;
1 3. Selectivity hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the degree to 
which government spending is selective in character;
1 4. Home ownership hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the level 
of home ownership;
1 5. Symbol hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the degree of
abstraction of the symbols used in current discourse which refer to taxing, 
spending and the public sector;
1 6. Fairness hypothesis: tax aversion is inversely related to the degree to which 
the tax system is perceived to be fair;
1 7. Role of government hypothesis: tax aversion is inversely related to voters' 
perceptions of the proper scope of government;
1 8. Alienation hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the degree of 
alienation from government in the electorate;
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1 9. Waste hypothesis: tax aversion is positively related to the degree to which 
government is perceived to be wasteful and inefficient.
Having stated the hypotheses, I turn now to the evidence.
2SWEDEN AND AUSTRALIA: OVERVIEW
In this chapter I put my examination of Swedish and Australian elections from 
1958 to 1988 into context by giving an overview of, first, the history of taxation and 
elections in the two countries from the coming of universal suffrage until the mid- 
1950s; second, the main economic trends between 1954 and 1988; third, the nature of 
the party systems and electorates in the two countries; and, finally, the main trends in 
levels of tax and expenditure between 1954 to 1988.
2.1 Historical background
In Sweden the first election under universal suffrage took place in 1921. At this 
time total taxation in Sweden amounted to about 12.0% of GDP, having risen sharply 
during World War I, of which central government taxation composed about half. At the 
turn of the century taxation had been about 7.6% of GDP and 80-90% of national tax 
revenue had come from customs and excise duties, but in 1902 progressive income tax 
was introduced, and this was followed by company tax and wealth tax in 1910, and by 
taxes on inheritances and gifts in 1914.1. The 1921 election2 3 was held under a 
system of proportional representation, and set the pattern for the Swedish party 
system for the next 67 years: the parties which gained representation in 1921 
monopolized representation until the Greens broke through in 1988, although splits 
and reunifications did occur from time to time. These parties were the Social 
Democrats, the main political voice of the labour movement; the Liberals 
(Folkpartiet), an urban liberal party which had cooperated with the Social Democrats 
in the struggle for democracy; the Conservatives (Högern), who represented the old 
ruling elite; the Farmers' Party (Bondeförbundet), a rural-based party which had 
emerged during World War I; and the Communists, who had split off from the Social 
Democrats in 1917.2
 ^Swedish taxation information in this section is drawn from Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den 
Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, unless stated otherwise.
2Although Sweden had a bicameral system until 1970, I have concentrated on elections for 
the Lower House, the Riksdag, because that is where governments were made and broken 
apart from a brief period in 1957 and 1958 when the Social Democrats were able to rule as a 
minority government because their majority in the Upper House allowed them to pass 
appropriation and expenditure Bills on a joint vote of the two Houses.
3General historical information for Sweden is taken from Dankwart A. Rustcw (1955), The 
Politics of Compromise, Princeton UP, New Jersey, unless specified otherwise.
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In 1932, after a decade of minority governments and shifting coalitions, during 
which taxation as a percentage of GDP declined slightly, the Social Democrats came to 
power with a program designed to combat the Depression, during which unemployment, 
which had remained fairly high throughout the 1920s, rose to 30% of the urban 
workforce, while in rural areas poverty worsened. After a heavy electoral defeat in 
1928, the Social Democrats replaced references to socialism in their party platform 
by the idea of 'the people's home' (folkhemmet), which involved an emphasis on 
consensus rather than class conflict, cooperation with business, and economic 
rationalization4. Although the socialist ideal did not disappear, the notion of the planned 
economy took the place of nationalization as the means to socialism. The crisis program 
of Finance Minister Wigforss was designed to increase employment by pumping up 
demand via the state employing people at market wages5. It involved, among other 
things, higher taxation6, and the Social Democrats were able to pass it through the 
Riksdag due to an agreement with the Farmers' Party. The success of this early 
application of the Keynesian-style economics of the 'Stockholm School', plus the Social 
Democrats' ability to detach the Farmers' Party from the Liberals and Conservatives, 
arguably laid the basis for the Social Democrats' long dominance of Swedish politics, 
although the fortuitous upturn in export prices shortly after the Social Democrats 
came to power also played a large part in Sweden's rapid recovery from the 
Depression7. This period marked the beginning of the consistent use of taxation as an 
instrument of economic policy, to which the Liberals were converted by 1938 and the 
Conservatives after 1944.8.
During the 1930s taxation of income and wealth became heavier and more 
progressive9, and taxation rose from 9.8% of GDP in 1929, just prior to the 
Depression, to 13.2% of GDP in 1938. The Social Democrats, who had ruled as a 
minority government since 1932, entered a formal coalition with the Farmers’ Party 
following the 1936 election, which had been preceded by a 3 month minority Farmers' 
Party government. During the 1930s popular support for the Social Democrats rose
4James Fulcher (1987), 'Labour movement theory versus corporatism: Social Democracy in 
Sweden', Sociology, v.21/2, pp.235-236.
5Leif Lewin (1985), Ideologi och Strategi: Svensk Politik under 100 är, Norstedts, second 
edition, Sweden, pp.176, 172.
6lrene Scobbie (1972), Sweden, Ernest Benn, London.
7C.G. Uhr (1977), 'Economic development in Denmark, Norway and Sweden', in Scandinavia at 
the Polls: Recent Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, p.220-222.
8See Hugh Heclo (1974), Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, Yale UP, New Haven 
& London, p.127.
9Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige efter 
1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, BonnierFakta, Stockholm, p.137.
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from 41.7% of the vote in 1932 to 45.9% in 1936 and 53.8% in 194010, while 
social reforms included housing loans, maternity benefits, unemployment insurance, 
and pension improvementsI 11 as well as massive housing programs. In 1938 company 
tax was made proportional rather than progressive, and the basis for peaceful 
industrial relations was laid by the Saltsjöbaden agreement between LO, the peak blue- 
collar union organization, and SAF, the peak employer body.
The first Australian election under universal suffrage (with the symbolically 
but not numerically important exception of most Aborigines) was held under a system 
of single-member constituencies in 1903, 18 years earlier than in Sweden12. At this 
time the national government, which had only come into existence with Federation and 
substantial independence from Britain in 1901, relied for revenue mainly on the 
newly established federal tariff, of which three quarters had to be returned to the 
States for the first ten years of Federation13. At this stage total taxation was about 
6.8% of GDP, and thus appears to have been slightly lower than the estimated Swedish 
level of 7.6% of GDP, although figures for this period are not directly comparable. 
Much of this, including income tax, was levied by the States14.
For the first few years three parties were represented in Parliament, namely 
the Free Traders, Protectionists, and Labor, but in 1908 the Protectionists, a 
generally liberal party which had made common cause with Labor in the struggle for 
democracy and on issues of social reform (such as the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court in 1904 and of aged and invalid pensions in 1908) 
combined with the more conservative Free Traders to form the Liberal Party15. 
Electorally, however, this may have been a mistake, as in 1910 the Labor vote jumped 
from 37% to 50%, and Andrew Fisher became the Prime Minister of Australia's first
I °Election figures in this section are taken from Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn 
Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th 
edition, BonnierFakta, Stockholm, pp.344-345.
I I  Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, BonnierFakta, Stockholm, p.136. 
12Although Australia has had a bicameral system ever since Federation, I concentrate almost 
exclusively on the Lower House, the House of Representatives, because that is where 
governments were formed and defeated apart from in 1975, when the Governor-General 
dismissed the Whitlam government due to the Senate's blocking of its budget despite its 
retaining a majority in the House of Representatives.
13F.K. Crowley (1974), '1901-14', in A New History of Australia, ed. Frank Crowley, 
Heinemann, Melbourne, p.275.
14Unless otherwise specified, taxation information for Australia is drawn from Peter 
Groenewegen (1985), Everyone's Guide to Taxation in Australiat Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
pp.44-46.
15W.K. Hancock (1930), Australia, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, p.228.
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majority government16. In the same year the new Fisher government enacted a land 
tax, and this was followed by estate duty in 1914, federal income tax in 1915, and 
entertainment tax in 1916.
In 1916 Labor split over conscription, and the then Labor Prime Minister, 
William Morris Hughes, became Prime Minister of a Nationalist government composed 
of the Liberals and Hughes' followers. Hughes continued as Prime Minister until 1922, 
when the newly formed Country Party forced his replacement by Stanley Melbourne 
Bruce as the price of coalition. The entry of the Country Party completed a pattern that 
has endured almost unchanged ever since, namely an effective two-party system 
consisting of Labor on the Left and a conservative coalition on the Right. Since 1919 
elections have been conducted under a system of preferential voting (retaining single­
member constituencies), and voting was made compulsory in 192417. Total taxation 
rose substantially due to the war effort, and by 1918/19 had reached 9.3% of GDP.
In 1929 the Scullin Labor government succeeded the Bruce Nationalist 
government and introduced a sales tax in 1930 in order to compensate for declining 
customs revenue due to the Depression. Labor also raised taxes generally as part of its 
retrenchment plan to cope with the Depression, an approach almost diametrically 
opposite to that taken by the Swedish Social Democrats. By 1929/30 tax had reached 
about 13.7% of GDP, considerably higher than Sweden's 1929 figure of 9.8%. Then in 
1931 Labor split over economic policy, and Treasurer Joseph Lyons and his followers 
defected to combine with the Nationalists to form the United Australia Party. In the 
subsequent election Labor was routed, and Lyons became Prime Minister of the new 
United Australia Party/Country Party government. The UAP continued in office under 
Lyons, Robert Gordon Menzies and (briefly) Arthur Fadden until 1941, when Labor 
under John Curtin regained power. As one of its last acts the Menzies Government 
introduced a payroll tax to finance child endowment payments.
Meanwhile in Sweden the first 'Red-Green' coalition between Social Democrats 
and Farmers was succeeded in 1939 by a National Coalition of all major parties apart 
from the Communists, following the Soviet invasion of Finland. During World War II 
taxation rose from 14.6% of GDP in 1939 to 18.0% of GDP in 1945 despite Sweden's 
lack of direct participation, due largely to a 5% general sales tax introduced in 1940. 
However although World War 2 led to a decline in the standard of living, demand for
16Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, p.4.
17Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 23rd edition, 1986, pp.372- 
373.
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Swedish products in the postwar years ensured practically full employment18, and by 
the 1950s Sweden had become one of the richest countries in the world19.
By the mid-1940s both the Liberals and the Conservatives had accepted the 
extension of government measures to ensure full employment20 and social welfare21 , 
but in 1945 the National Coalition broke up over policy differences following the 
adoption by the Social Democrats in 1944 of a radical program involving large-scale 
economic planning plus some nationalization22, and was replaced by a single-party 
minority Social Democratic government. Nevertheless there was general agreement on 
expenditure programs, such as improvements to the basic universal pension in 1946 
(the Social Democrats wanted means-tested additions, but accepted the Conservative 
demand for the same rises without means tests23) and the replacement of tax 
deductions for children by cash allowances (opposed only by the Conservatives).
However this consensus did not extend to financing, apart from abolition of the 
general sales tax. In 1947 the Social Democrats increased income tax progressivity, 
with a top marginal rate of 70%; introduced new taxes on wealth, gifts and estates; and 
raised company tax from 32% to 40%24. Their aims, according to Rodrigues, were a 
more elastic taxation system, stabilization, and redistribution25, but it was the 
distributive aspect that the bourgeois parties most opposed26, and the result was one of 
the most heated debates in Swedish political history. This set the scene for a bitter 
election campaign in 1948, during which the bourgeois parties attacked the 
government over regulation, the economy, taxation, and socialization. However despite 
the controversy the Social Democratic government survived, with its vote dropping 
only 0.6% to 46.7%, while the Liberal share of the vote rose sharply from 12.9% in
18C.G. Uhr (1977), 'Economic development in Denmark, Norway and Sweden', in Scandinavia 
at the Polls: Recent Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, pp.222-224.
1 9Leif Lewin (1985), Ideologi och Strategi: Svensk Politik under 100 är, Norstedts, second 
edition, Sweden, p.263.
20Leif Lewin (1985), Ideologi och Strategi: Svensk Politik under 100 är, Norstedts, second 
edition, Sweden, p.205.
21 Donald M. Hancock (1972), Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change, Dryden Press, 
Illinois, pp.121-127.
22Leif Lewin (1985), Ideologi och Strategi: Svensk Politik under 100 är, Norstedts, second 
edition, Sweden, p.215-217.
23Hugh Heclo (1974), Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, Yale UP, New Haven & 
London, p.230.
24Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Stockholm, 
pp.27-37.
25Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, p.38.
26Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.319.
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1944 to 22.8%. The main losers were the Communists. Despite their victory, 
however, the Social Democrats dropped the rest of their radical program after the 
election because they feared that an economic crisis would result if implementation was 
attempted without business cooperation27. By 1948 tax had reached 19.5% of GDP.
In Australia the wartime Curtin Labor government passed uniform income tax 
legislation in 1942, whereby the States vacated the income tax field in favour of the 
Federal government. Thus the Federal government became responsible for three 
quarters of total government revenue in Australia but only about half of total 
government expenditure, which made the States even more dependent on the Federal 
government for grants than they had previously been. In addition, taxes rose as a 
consequence of the war effort, and by 1948/49 total tax revenue had reached 24.1% of 
GDP, somewhat higher than in Sweden.
However Morgan Gallup polls taken during the 1940s show a clear majority 
against increasing taxes in order to increase welfare:
Table 2.1 Opinion on tax in Australia during 1940s
1 944
%
1 945 
%
1 948 
%
1 949
%
Increased social services 33 36 24 24
No increased taxes 53 53 -
Reduced taxes - - 70 67
Don't know 1 4 1 1 6 9
Balance favouring increased social services -2 0 -1 7 -4 6 -4 3
Sources Rodney Smith & Michael Wearing (1986), 'Public Opinion and the Australian 
Welfare State 1940-1985’, 1986 SAANZ Conference Paper, University of New 
England, p.23 (1944, 1945); Morgan Gallup Polls 31.1.48 (1948), 5.2.49 (1949).
During the 1940s Labor governments headed by Curtin and then by Ben Chifley 
embarked on a reform program that included the establishment of Australia's present 
social security system (which helped legitimate extending income tax further down the 
income scale28), increased expenditure on health and education and, in 1947, 
nationalization of the banks. As in Sweden at this time, nationalization and the extension
27Leif Lewin (1985), Ideologi och Strategi: Svensk Politik under 100 är, Norstedts, second 
edition, Sweden, pp.243-247.
28For an account of the interrelationship between Labor’s economic policy and the 
introduction of its social security programs see Rob Watts (1987), The Foundations of the 
National Welfare State, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
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of government enterprise was very divisive electorally, other divisive issues including 
the introduction of the 40 hour week and the introduction of a national health scheme, 
but partisan divisions over whether to cut taxes or improve social services were not as 
deep29. Bank nationalization in particular was met by bitter resistance, and was ruled 
by the High Court to be unconstitutional. Unlike their Swedish counterparts in 1948, 
however, Labor was unable to weather the storm, and lost office in the election of 
1 949.
In Sweden the political temperature dropped somewhat after the 1948 election, 
but the opposition continued its attacks on high marginal rates of income tax and the 
new taxes on wealth, gifts and estates, and their views dominated the tax debate until 
1956. In 1951 the Social Democrats entered a second coalition with the Farmers’ 
Party, and in 1952 a bipartisan tax reform cut marginal rates of income tax and raised 
the exemption level for wealth and estate taxes30. In the election that followed later in 
1952 the Social Democrat vote remained steady at 46.1%, but the Farmers' Party vote 
dropped from 12.4% to 10.7% and the Liberal and Conservative shares of the vote 
rose, while the Communists again lost support.
Between 1952 and 1956 the main tax changes were a major reform of the 
company tax system; the introduction of a levy for universal health insurance in 
1955; and cuts in income tax oriented towards low income earners and designed to 
offset to some degree the effects of inflation, which came into effect on 1 January 
195731. The tax debate revolved mainly around whether the cuts should benefit low 
income earners proportionally more than other taxpayers, the size and nature of the 
area deduction (which varied according to where taxpayers lived), and to what extent 
emphasis should be given to tax cuts or increases in child allowances32. By 1956 
taxation had reached 26.7% of GDP.
At the 1956 election the government parties ran mainly on their record, and 
the Social Democrats promised to extend the range of compulsory pensions and to 
shorten working hours, while the Conservatives emphasized tax cuts and the Liberals 
focussed attention on the continuing housing crisis33. On taxation the Social Democrats
29Murray Goot (1969), Policies and Partisans: Australian Electoral Opinion 1941 to 1968, 
Department of Government & Public Administration, University of Sydney, p.79.
30Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjogren, Sweden, 
pp.320, 73-83.
31 Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, pp.39-44. 
32Niis Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-70, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.94. 
33lmpressionistic observations from N.C.M. Elder (1957), The Swedish election of 1956', 
Political Studies, v.5, p.66.
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appealed to the principles of justice and capacity to pay, and promised to reduce taxes 
gradually as the business cycle and state finances permitted starting with the cuts to 
national income tax on 1 January 195734. Meanwhile the Farmers' Party pressed for 
the abolition of estate duty and of the extra income tax deduction for 'expensive 
areas'35. The Liberals promised not only income tax cuts but also further significant 
reductions in tax in coming years, and pledged to abolish estate duty, property tax, car 
excise, the new investment levy and the recent increases in company taxas, well as to 
increase a range of income tax and wealth tax deductions. The Conservatives promised 
big cuts to income tax, less progressivity, the reintroduction of tax deductions for 
children, the introduction of income tax deductibility for wealth tax payments, the 
abolition of estate duty, and the abolition or reduction of wealth and inheritance 
taxes36. The Communists proposed to increase tax progressivity, and opposed what they 
saw as a plan to introduce a broad-based turnover tax after the election.
The 1956 election result continued a downward trend in support for the Red- 
Green Coalition, although it retained a majority of votes: the Social Democrat vote 
declined 1.5% to 44.6% and the Farmers' Party vote dropped 1.3% to 9.4%. While the 
Liberal vote remained almost unchanged on 23.8%, the big winners were the 
Conservatives, whose vote rose 2.7% to 17.1%. The Communist vote rose slightly to 
5.0%. The result was to make the Social Democrats dependent on the Farmers for a 
Riksdag majority, as their main alternative possibility, a Social Democrat-Communist 
combination, no longer commanded a majority.
1956 was clearly an election dominated by tax, as a survey found that when 
asked what the 3 or 4 major issues were, 60% nominated tax, compared to 49% 
housing shortage, 48% basic pensions, 28% shorter working week, and 15% 
supplementary pensions37. Social Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander 
considered that the government suffered from being outbid in tax cuts by the 
Conservatives38. Two other widely canvassed explanations for the result were the 
cooperation between Social Democrats and Farmers itself, as supporters of each party
34Unless otherwise indicated, specific party election policies on tax are taken directly from 
their official election manifestoes.
35Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-70, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, pp.97-
98, 86.
36Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-70, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, pp.93-
99.
37Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-1960', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, p.188.
38Tage Erlander & Sven Aspling (1956), ’Andrakammarvalen', SAP Verksamheten 1956,
p.110.
35
resented the other, and the relative decline in numbers of both industrial workers (the 
core Social Democratic support) and of farmers.
The Australian election of 1949 ushered in 23 years of unbroken Liberal- 
Country Party rule. In this and following elections communism was important as an 
issue 39. Other issues dividing the electorate during the 1950s included the use 
overseas of Australian troops, such as in Korea and Malaya, and industrial issues such 
as compulsory unionism40. In 1950 the Menzies government replaced smoothly rising 
marginal rates of income tax with a stepped scale, and in 1953 the difference between 
income tax rates for property income and exertion income was abolished41, as was land 
tax and entertainment tax. Meanwhile Menzies won the 1951, 1954 and 1955 
elections (although Labor received over 50% of the vote in 195442), aided by a major 
split in the Labor Party starting in 1954 over the issue of communism. Between 
1952-53 and 1955-56 total taxation revenue, which was levied mainly by the 
Commonwealth, was about 23.0% of GDP, of which almost half came from indirect 
taxes43. It appears that it was during this period that taxation in Sweden became 
heavier as a proportion of GDP than taxation in Australia, although figures for this 
period are not directly comparable. This was probably at least partly due to the 
dominance of the Left in Sweden but not in Australia.
In 1955, the last election before the commencement of the period under 
examination, Labor, led by Dr H.V.Evatt, promised increased social security payments, 
a more independent foreign policy, financial guarantees for primary industry, and 
support for union wage claims, while the Menzies government pointed to its record, 
alleged disunity and Communist sympathies within the Labor Party, and promised to 
retain high defence spending and to keep troops in Malaya to fight the Communist 
insurgency44. The new Anti-Communist Labor Party, which consisted mainly of Labor 
defectors and which later became the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), accused Evatt of
39See John Warhurst (1979), 'Catholics, Communists and the Australian Party System', 
Politics, v.14/2, pp.222-242.
40Murray Goot (1969), Policies and Partisans: Australian Electoral Opinion 1941 to 1968, 
Department of Government & Public Administration, University of Sydney, pp.76, 81.
41 R.I.Downing, H.W.Arndt, A.H.Boxer & R.L.Mathews (1964), Taxation in Australia: Agenda 
for Reform, Melbourne UP, Melbourne, p.23.
42Election figures for Australia are from Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in 
Australia Votes: the 1987 Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman 
Cheshire, Melbourne, p.273.
43R.I.Downing, H.W.Arndt, A.H.Boxer & R.L.Mathews (1964), Taxation in Australia: Agenda 
for Reform, Melbourne UP, Melbourne, p.7.
44Unless otherwise indicated, election policies are drawn from the official policy speeches 
delivered at the beginning of the campaign.
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links with Communists and supported the policy of keeping troops in Malaya45. The 
results were Labor 44.6%, Liberal-Country Coalition 47.6% (Liberals 39.7%, 
Country Party 7.9%), and Anti-Communist Labor Party 5.2%. As the Anti-Communist 
Labor Party successfully directed its preferences to the Coalition, the result was a 
comfortable victory for the government.
At the beginning of the period to be examined, then, the Social Democrats were 
ruling Sweden in coalition with the Farmers' Party, with the Liberals, Conservatives 
and Communists in opposition, while in Australia the Liberal and Country parties ruled 
in coalition with implicit support from the DLP. Two reasons for the greater success 
of the Social Democrats compared to Labor appear to have been the greater unity of the 
Social Democrats (Labor split three times between Federation and 1955) and the 
Social Democrats' coalition strategy with the Farmers' Party, which helped to keep 
them in power longer than would otherwise have been likely, particularly in the 
1930s.
Tax innovation, which normally meant introducing new taxes and raising 
existent taxes, in both countries took place mainly in wartime and during the 
Depression, and was more often carried out by governments of the Left than of the 
Right. By 1955 total taxation in Sweden was 26.5% of GDP, slightly higher than the 
Australian figure of 22.8% of GDP46. However tax as a percentage of GDP in both 
countries was relatively modest by international standards: of 19 OECD countries 
Sweden ranked 8th and Australia ranked 12th. This was largely due to the absence in 
both countries at this time of large-scale social security contributions47.
2.2 Economic trends 1954 to 1988
Between 1954 and 1988 economic trends in Sweden and Australia were rather 
similar, with the major exception of unemployment. Figures 2.1 to 2.5 show the 
annual changes in Swedish and Australian real GDP per capita, real wages, inflation, 
and unemployment between 1954 and 1988. Exact derivations of these aggregates are 
given in Appendix 1. The wage measures are in separate graphs because their scales are 
not commensurable: Swedish average wages are measured per hour, whereas Australian 
average wages are measured per week.
45'Political Chronicle', Australian Journal of Politics and History, v.1/2 (1955), p.246. 
46Full sources for Swedish and Australian taxation figures for the period 1955 to 1988 are 
given in Appendix 1.
47OECD, Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1988, OECD, Paris, p. 191.
Figure 2.1 reveals that real GDP per capita has approximately doubled since the 
mid-1950s, a massive change. Both countries have shown a fairly steady rise, but it is 
clear that Sweden has been slowly drawing ahead, and Swedes now appear to be richer 
on average than Australians. The steady growth during the 1960s can be clearly seen, 
with the exception of the Australian recession of 1961, and this contrasts with the 
problems of the 1970s and early 1980s. In recent years, however, steady growth has 
resumed.
Figure 2.1 Real per capita GDP, Sweden and Australia 1954-1988
O Real per capita GDP - Sweden •  Real per capita GDP - Australia
1 2000
1 0000 .
°  6 0 0 0 .
2 0 0 0 .
Sources
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1984, 1988 
Information supplied by the Swedish Ministry of Finance 
UN, Demographic Handbook 1961
Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter from Sweden, 11 January 1988
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 over the page show a similar trend steadily upwards for 
real wages during the 1960s and early 1970s, apart from Australia in 1960 and with 
an exceptionally large rise in Sweden in 1973, before this flattened out from the mid- 
1970s. In the early 1980s real wages fell in Sweden before resuming an upward path, 
while in Australia real wages fell in 1983 and again from 1985.
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Figure 2.2 Average hourly wages, Sweden 1955-1988
Sources
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks, 1984, 1988 
Swedish Ministry of Finance, Sweden's Economy, October 1988 
Statistics Sweden, Statistical Yearbook, 1985
Figure 2.3 Average weekly wages, Australia 1954-1987
350.
2 0 0 -
Sources
W.E. Norton & C.P. Aylmer, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1986-87 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1988
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In regard to inflation, Figure 2.4 shows a striking similarity between Sweden 
and Australia in that there is a clear discontinuity in both countries between the 
relatively low inflation that existed from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s and the 
distinctly higher inflation that has occurred since then. This may imply that the 
acceleration of inflation that occurred in the early 1970s was due to factors common to 
the two countries, such as the oil shocks.
Figure 2.4 Consumer price index, Sweden and Australia 1954-1988
OCPI - Sweden •  CPI - Australia
1 60 .
1 4 0 .
1 2 0 .
Sources
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks, 1982, 1984, 1988 
Sverige Nytt, 6 January 1989
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The unemployment pattern in Figure 2.5, however, is quite different for 
Sweden and Australia. Until the mid-1970s the unemployment rate fluctuated between 
1% and 3% in both countries, but while this continued to be the pattern in Sweden, 
unemployment climbed dramatically in Australia from about 1% in 1973 to a 
maximum of over 10% in 1983, before falling back slightly. This may imply country- 
specific influences on unemployment.
Figure 2.5 Unemployment, Sweden and Australia 1954-1988
•  Unemployment - AustraliaO Unemployment - Sweden
Sources
UN Statistical Yearbook, 1959, 1967, 1982
Vray Vamplew (1987), Australians: Historical Statistics
W.E. Norton & C.P. Aylmer, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1986-87 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Market Statistics Australia 1987 
Swedish Ministry of Finance, Sweden's Economy, October 1988
Finally, these developments can be summarized further as average economic 
changes both during terms of government and in the last 12 months prior to each 
election, which are the variables used later in my statistical analysis as controls. 
Averages of these over the entire period 1958-1988 are given in Table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2 shows again that growth in real per capita GDP and real wages has 
been faster in Sweden than in Australia, that inflation has been very similar, and that 
Australia's performance in regard to unemployment has been worse. GDP per capita has 
grown slightly faster in election years in Sweden than over the full terms of 
government, but more slowly in Australia: if there is a political business cycle, 
Swedish governments appear to be more adept at creating it.
Table 2.2 Average annual changes in economic variables, Sweden and Australia 
1958-1988
Sweden Australia
Govt term Election yr Govt term Election yr
Real per capita GDP (1980 $A) 183.28 210.08 1 46.26 119.16
Real wages 2.70% 2.46% 1.77% 1.78%
Prices 6.36% 6.05% 6.95% 6.85%
Unemployment (% workforce) -0.0 2% -0.08% 0.26% 0.28%
Sources
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 1982, 1984, 1988 
UN Statistical Yearbook 1959, 1967, 1982, UN Demographic Handbook 1961 
Statistics Sweden, Statistical Yearbook 1985 
Swedish Ministry of Finance, Sweden's Economy, October 1988 
Information supplied by the Swedish Ministry of Finance
Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter from Sweden, 11 January 1988 
Sverige Nytt, 6 January 1989
W.E. Norton & C.P. Aylmer, Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1986-87
Vray Vamplew (1987), Australians: Historical Statistics
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Market Statistics Australia 1987
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2.3 Party systems and electorates
From 1957, when the Farmers' Party left Sweden's coalition government, both 
Sweden and Australia have had effective two-bloc systems, with a single large labour 
party in each country competing for government with an alliance of anti-labour 
parties. Although there are also differences between the two party systems - Sweden's 
anti-labour parties are more divided than Australia's, which has facilitated Social 
Democratic dominance48, and only Sweden has an important party to the left of the 
main labour party - the existence of this dominant Left-Right cleavage in both 
countries makes the party systems similar by international standards. This similarity 
is further emphasized by the existence in both countries of agrarian parties, which are 
not common in Western democracies. While the Swedish Centre Party, as the Farmers' 
Party was renamed in 1957, is not as right-wing as the Australian National Party, 
which changed its name from Country Party during the 1970s, since the mid-1950s 
both agrarian parties have usually been part of the anti-labour alliance. Castles 
attributes the centrist character of the Swedish agrarians to the relative poverty of 
Swedish farmers, which in regard to redistribution has given them more in common 
with labour than with capital49. Furthermore, apart from the obvious equivalence 
between the Swedish Social Democrats and the Australian Labor Party, the Swedish 
Liberals and Conservatives are similar in character to the left and right wings 
respectively of the Liberal Party of Australia.
In terms of control of government, the period from the middle of the 1950s up 
to 1988 can be divided into two halves. Until 1972 both countries were ruled by 
hegemonic parties, but while Sweden was dominated by the Left, government in 
Australia was monopolized by the Right. In 1972 the Left finally won government in 
Australia, and since then governments have changed in parallel: there were Left 
governments in both countries until the mid-1970s, Right governments until the 
early 1980s, and since then Left governments again.
The average, minimum, and maximum vote shares cast between 1958 and 1988 
for the main labour parties (Social Democrats and Labor) and the main anti-labour 
alliances (Centre, Liberals and Conservatives in Sweden, and Liberals and Nationals in 
Australia) are set out in Table 2.3 below, along with the vote share for the total Left in 
Sweden (Social Democrats plus Communists). It can be seen that although the average
48Francis G. Castles (1978), The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, p. 116.
49Francis G. Castles (1978), The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, pp. 113-114.
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vote for the Social Democrats alone was slightly less than for Labor, the average vote 
for the Left as a whole was greater in Sweden than in Australia. Since the Communists 
generally support the Social Democrats in the legislature, having nowhere else to turn, 
this has allowed the Social Democrats to gain and keep government despite often lacking 
a Riksdag majority in their own right. In effect the Communists played a similar role 
in keeping the Social Democrats in power as the DLP did in keeping the Liberal- 
Country Party Coalition in power in Australia between 1955 and 1969 by directing its 
voters to give their second preferences to Liberal or Country Party candidates.
However the main contest in both countries has been between the main labour 
party and the main anti-labour alliance, as the alternative governments, and from now 
on unless otherwise indicated I use 'Left' as a shorthand term for the Social Democrats 
and Labor, and 'Right' for the bourgeois parties and the Liberal-National Coalition.
Table 2.3 Vote shares of Left and Right, Sweden and Australia 1958-88
Sweden % vote 
(N = 11)
Australia % vote 
(N s 1 3)
mean min max mean min max
Left government alternative 
Total Left
45.4
50.3
42.7
47.5
50.1
53.1
45.6 39.6 49.6
Right government alternative 46.8 41 .8 50.8 46.0 41 .5 53.1
Sources
Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), 
Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, BonnierFakta, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345 (Sweden 1958-82).
Sören Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och vat i Sverige, Bonniers, 
Stockholm, p.24 (Sweden 1985).
Statistiska Centralbyrän (Sweden 1988).
Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 Federal 
Election, ed. Ian McAllister and John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.273 
(Australia 1958-1987).
Australian Electoral Commission
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the vote shares received by the Left and Right 
government alternatives in Sweden and Australia from 1958 to 1988, while Figure 
2.8 shows the vote shares received by the Left as a whole in Sweden compared to the 
Right government alternative. The apparent anomaly for Australia in 1961, when 
Labor clearly outpolled the Coalition but still lost the election, was due to the strong 
flow of preferences to the Coalition from the DLP. The vote for the DLP is not shown on 
the graph because it was not part of either of the main two government alternatives.
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Figure 2.6 Social Democrat and bourgeois vote, Sweden 1958-1988
•  Social Democrats O Bourgeois bloc
Sources
Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), 
Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, BonnierFakta, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345 (1958-1982)
Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, 
Sweden, p.24 (1985)
Statistics Sweden (1988)
Figure 2.7 Labor and Liberal-National coalition vote, Australia 1958-1987
•  Labor O Liberal-National
Sources
Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, 
Melbourne, p.273 
Australian Election Commission
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Figure 2.8 Socialist and bourgeois vote, Sweden 1958-1988
■  Socialist bloc O Bourgeois bloc
Sources
Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), 
Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, BonnierFakta, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345 (1958-1982)
Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, 
Sweden, p.24 (1985)
Statistics Sweden (1988)
The most striking difference between the patterns of electoral support in 
Sweden and Australia is the greater volatility of the Australian electorate in regard to 
Left-Right voting: not only are the swings greater on average, but the apparent cycles 
are of shorter wavelength. This volatility can also be discerned from Table 2.2, which 
shows the greater range within which Left and Right shares of the vote have varied in 
Australia. One reason for the smaller vote changes between Left and Right in Sweden 
may be that there is more choice for voters within the Right than in Australia. There 
also appears to be a slight overall trend down over time in support for the main Left 
and Right parties in Sweden, whereas support for the main parties in Australia 
remains steady.
The similarity of the two countries’ party systems reflects the similarity of 
their electorates.
First, both electorates are linguistically and ethnically relatively homogeneous, 
with minorities such as Lapps, Aborigines and individual groups of immigrants (such
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as Finns in Sweden or Greeks in Australia) being few in number compared to groups 
such as blacks in the United States or the French in Canada.
Second, the two electorates enjoy a very similar living standard: private 
consumption per capita using current Purchasing Power Parities in 1987 was 
US$7273 in Sweden and US$7389 in Australia50.
Third, the employment patterns of the two countries are broadly similar, 
although Sweden has more of its workforce employed in manufacturing.
Table 2.4 Employment in Sweden and Australia, 1984
Employment sector Sweden
%
Australia
%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 4.7 6.2
Mining 0.4 1.4
Manufacturing 22.6 17.7
Electricity, gas, water 0.9 2.3
Construction 6.2 6.6
Transport, storage, communications 7.0 9.6
Finance, property, business 7.4 9.6
Other trade and services 51 .0 48.8
Source Europa Yearbook 1987, pp.375, 2570.
Furthermore, both countries have a very high degree of electoral participation, 
in Australia's case stimulated by fines for not voting51. Left-Right divisions in the 
party systems are clearly linked to Left-Right divisions in the electorate, measured in 
Sweden as attitudes to the role of government in the economy and in Australia by 
answers to a number of questions concerning the distribution of economic power. Class 
is the single most important socio-economic predictor of voting, although it is 
diminishing in importance due largely to increased Left voting among the expanding 
group of white-collar workers. The town-country split remains important, with rural 
areas continuing to support agrarian parties and Left voting stronger in urban areas, 
especially medium-sized towns and cities52. In recent years public employees have
50OECD (1989), Economic Surveys: Sweden 1988-89, OECD, Paris, Appendix.
51 Walter Korpi (1983), The Democratic Class Struggle, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
p.56.
52Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
pp. 141 ff, 183, 186, 200; Brian Graetz & Ian McAllister (1988), Dimensions of Australian 
Society, Macmillan, South Melbourne, pp. 245, 276-288; Ian McAllister & Alvaro Ascui
been shown to be slightly more likely to vote Left in both countries than are private 
employees. In both countries the traditional association between churchgoing and voting 
Right is declining, and the traditional conservatism of women is weakening, so that by 
the mid-1980s a majority of women in both countries were voting Left53. In general it 
appears that traditional connections between socio-economic characteristics and voting 
are weakening in both Sweden and Australia. In addition, mistrust of politicians has 
been increasing since the 1960s, so that by the mid-1980s mistrust and cynicism was 
high in both countries54.
Against a background of similarity, however, there are naturally also 
significant differences between the Swedish and Australian polities, and these may be 
important in that they may lead the Swedish and Australian electorates to react 
differently to the same tax stimuli.
First, the demographic structures of the two countries are different. Australia 
has much higher population growth due to higher fertility and large-scale 
immigration, and this has resulted in a younger population than Sweden's. This in turn 
means that Sweden has a higher proportion of aged people dependent upon the 
government for income support, which may imply less tax resistance in Sweden55.
Second, the electoral systems are different: Sweden has proportional 
representation while Australia has single-member constituencies using preferential 
voting. This has meant that it has been much easier for relatively small parties to gain 
representation in Sweden's Riksdag than in Australia's House of Representatives 
unless, as is the case with the National Party, such parties are regionally based. Thus 
in Australia since the mid-1970s both the Nationals and the Democrats have regularly 
won 5-10% of the vote, but only the Nationals have gained representation. In addition, 
Australian governments can choose when to have an election, within certain limits, 
whereas in Sweden elections are held on fixed dates, although governments may call 
extra elections in mid-term. However while this ability to manipulate the election
(1988), 'Voting patterns', in Australia Votes: the 1987 Federal Election, Longman Cheshire, 
Melbourne, p.227.
53Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
pp. 192-194, 203-208, 173; Brian Graetz & Ian McAllister (1988), Dimensions of Australian 
Society, Macmillan, South Melbourne, pp. 288, 283, 281.
54Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
pp.236-237; Clive Bean (1988), 'Politics and the public: mass attitudes towards the 
Australian political system', in Australian Attitudes: Social and Political Analyses from the 
National Social Science Survey, ed. Jonathan Kelley & Clive Bean, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
p.55.
55OECD (1989), 'OECD in figures 1989 edition', OECD Observer, No.158, Paris, pp.6-9.
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timing might be expected to give Australian governments an advantage compared to 
Swedish governments, in fact the government has changed more often in Australia.
Third, the greater proportion of the workforce employed in manufacturing in 
Sweden shown above in Table 2.1 implies a bigger industrial working class than in 
Australia, and thus a bigger core base of electoral support for the Left in Sweden.
Fourth, Sweden is a much more unionized country than Australia. While 
unionization was higher in Australia than in Sweden until the 1930s, by 1940 Sweden 
had passed Australia, and while Australia's union density has generally hovered 
between 50% and 55% ever since 1950, Sweden's continued to climb until the mid- 
1970s, since when it has oscillated within the range 80-90%56. This higher degree of 
unionization is matched by a higher degree of employer organization, with most 
employers represented by the peak body SAF, for which there is no Australian 
equivalent, as the Confederation of Australian Industry lacks both the coverage and the 
authority of SAF. Reasons for the very high unionization in Sweden, according to 
Pontusson, include the legitimacy conferred on the LO by the 1938 agreement with 
SAF, which set the ground rules for industrial relations; union control of 
unemployment insurance; and government encouragement of white-collar unionism57. 
To this might be added the very much lower rate of industrial disputation in Sweden: in 
1985, for example, there were 1845 disputes in Australia but only 160 in Sweden58. 
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Australians tend to distrust unions59. Union 
organization is different as well, with Swedish unions generally being industrially 
based while Australian unions are generally occupation based, and while since the 
1950s virtually all Australian unions have become members of the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions (ACTU), in Sweden the union movement remains split between the 
blue-collar LO, the white-collar TCO, and the academic SACO. While unionists as a 
whole in Australia tend to vote Labor60, in Sweden it is only LO members who are
56George Sayers Bain & Robert Price (1980), Profiles of Union Growth: A Statistical 
Portrait of Eight Countries, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p.170 (1895-1975); plus unpublished 
figures from the authors (1976-1985).
57Michael Pontusson (1988), Swedish Social Democracy and British Labour: Essays on the 
Nature and Conditions of Social Democratic Hegemony, Cornell Studies in International 
Affairs, US, p.26.
58 International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1961 p.547, 1969 (not 
paginated), 1977 p.850, 1986 pp.930-931; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Statistics 
Australia 1987, pp. 121, 138.
59Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, p.139.
60Brian Graetz & Ian McAllister (1988), Dimensions of Australian Society, Macmillan, South 
Melbourne, p. 291.
strongly Social Democratic61. However it is possible that this apparent difference is 
merely due to measurement: if white-collar and blue-collar unionists were 
distinguished in Australia the pattern could well be the same as for Sweden.
Fifth, the union movement in Sweden, in particular the LO, has generally played 
an active role in economic and social policymaking, which is not true of Australia's 
union movement apart from the early years of the century and from 1983, when it 
entered into an active partnership with the Hawke Labor government. In particular, 
the Swedish unions were prepared to moderate wage demands, minimize industrial 
conflict, and co-operate in economic policy in return for tax cuts, increased transfer 
payments, and a guarantee of full employment62. One especially important influence on 
Social Democratic economic and social policy was the economic model produced in the 
early 1950s by LO economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, which involved selective 
measures to stimulate full employment, a restrictive fiscal policy in order to restrict 
profits and thus enforce wage restraint, equal pay for equal work and the reduction of 
wage differentials regardless of profitability in order to facilitate continuing 
industrial rationalization and restructuring, and an active labour market policy to 
facilitate the movement of the resulting displaced workers to new jobs63.
Sixth, party identification has weakened in Sweden, with a consequent increase 
in issue voting64, but has remained high and stable in Australia65.
Seventh, Sweden has a reputation for consensual politics that Australia lacks. 
This is based partly on impressionistic evidence66, but firmer support comes from the 
fact that Australia has never had a Left-Right coalition of any sort at the national level, 
whereas in Sweden there have been not only coalitions between the Social Democrats 
and the Farmers, but also, during World War 2, between all parties represented in the 
Riksdag apart from the Communists. In addition, the Swedish policy process involves "a
61Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
p. 1 89.
62Francis G. Castles (1978), The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, pp.35, 123.
63Michael Pontusson (1988), Swedish Social Democracy and British Labour: Essays on the 
Nature and Conditions of Social Democratic Hegemony, Cornell Studies in International 
Affairs, US, p.26.
64Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
p.254.
65Brian Graetz & Ian McAllister (1988), Dimensions of Australian Society, Macmillan, South 
Melbourne, p.268.
66See, for example, Thomas J. Anton (1969), 'Policy-making and political culture in 
Sweden', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.4, pp.88-102.
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focus on achieving compromises, reaching agreements, attaining consensus" and "an 
emphasis on objectivity, expertise, science and rationalism"67, observations which 
are not often made about Australian policy-making.
Finally, there is the theory that Sweden is dominated by what Castles calls the 
'Social Democratic image of society', due to the representation of labour in the state 
apparatus and of Social Democratic ideas both in schools and in the media (which, 
unlike Australia, do not include commercial radio or TV but do include Social 
Democratic newspapers), which contrasts with the 'bourgeois image of society' 
prevalent in Britain and, possibly, Australia68. Some evidence for the idea that the 
long Social Democratic period of government has influenced Sweden in this way comes 
from Eva Block's finding that since 1945 mentions of freedom have decreased and 
mentions of equality have increased in editorials in five major Swedish newspapers, so 
that by 1975 they were about equal69. Another indication that Swedes are on average 
more left than Australians is their use of the terms 'socialist' and 'bourgeois' to 
describe the broad Left and Right party blocs. These are essentially socialist terms, and 
in Australia the word 'bourgeois' is hardly used at all while the word 'socialist' is used 
mainly as a term of abuse. To the extent that Sweden’s political culture is to the left of 
Australia's, one would expect Swedes to be less tax-averse than Australians, since high 
tax is an integral part of Social Democracy but anathema to liberalism.
2.4 Taxation trends
Any differences in electoral reactions to tax in Sweden and Australia may not be 
due to differences in the nature of the electorates in the two countries, but instead to 
differences in the tax stimuli to which they are subjected. In this final section I outline 
the main trends in levels of taxation and expenditure over the last thirty years using 
the measures that will later be used in the form of change variables in the statistical 
analyses of Chapters 6-10. Full sources are given in Appendix 1.
It is clear from Figures 2.9 to 2.12 over the page that real per capita taxation 
has been steadily increasing since the early 1960s, the main exceptions to this trend 
being sharp drops in Swedish central government per capita tax in 1972, 1977 and
67Olof Petersson (1986), The Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden: An Outline of the 
Final Report, Maktutredningen, Uppsala, p.35.
68Francis G. Castles (1978), The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, pp.96-97.
69Eva Block, 'Freedom and equality: indicators of political change in Sweden 1945-1975’, in 
Advances in Content Analysis, ed. Karl Erik Rosengren, Sage, US, p.246.
1978. Central government per capita taxation was very similar for the two countries, 
but general government taxation in Sweden has become much higher than in Australia, 
although it was at similar levels during the mid 1950s. Taxation growth was 
particularly steep in Sweden in the mid-1970s and since 1985. Much of the widening 
gap between the two countries is due to the importance in Sweden of social security 
contributions, which Australia doesn't have: without social security contributions 
Swedish general government real per capita total taxation in 1985 would have been 
$3882.60 (1980 Australian dollars) rather than $5178.48, compared to $2980.84 
in Australia.
As a share of GDP, however, central government tax has not grown in either 
country, and general government tax has grown substantially in Sweden but only 
slightly in Australia.
Direct tax as a proportion of total tax revenue dropped in Sweden from 59.6% 
in 1955 to 42.3% in 1985, due mainly to the increase in importance of social 
security contributions from 7.3% of tax revenue in 1955 to 25.0% in 1985. The 
share taken by indirect tax remained fairly steady, dropping only slightly from 33.1% 
of tax revenue in 1955 to 32.7% in 1985. However in Australia, lacking social 
security contributions, the pattern was different, with direct tax rising slightly from 
51.6% of tax revenue in 1955 to 54.7% in 1985. The share of indirect tax fell 
correspondingly from 48.4% to 45.3% of tax revenue, thus remaining considerably 
higher than in Sweden.
In regard to levels of direct taxation, Figures 2.13 to 2.16 show that central 
government direct tax is higher in Australia than in Sweden, but that the reverse is 
true for general government direct tax. This reflects the fact that in Sweden the 
revenue accruing from the operation of the lowest income tax rate goes to local 
government, with only the revenue from the higher rates going to the central 
government, whereas in Australia all income tax is levied by the central government. 
As with total taxation, real per capita direct tax tends to rise from the early 1960s, 
although unsteadily in the case of the Swedish central government's share due to 
periodic shifts in the tax burden away from direct tax towards indirect tax.
By contrast, general government direct tax as a percentage of GDP, which in 
Australia's case is identical to central government direct tax, rises only slightly over 
the thirty years, and the share of GDP taken by central government direct tax in 
Sweden actually drops over the period.
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Figure 2.9 Central government real per capita total taxation, Sweden and Australia 
1954-1988
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UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
IMF, International Financial Statistics 1984, 1988
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Figure 2.10 General government real per capita total taxation, Sweden and Australia 
1954-1988
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Figure 2.11 Central government total taxation as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
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Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
Figure 2.12 General government total taxation as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
OGen tax % GDP - Swed ©Gen tax % GDP - Aust
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
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Figure 2.13 Central government real per capita direct taxation, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
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UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
Figure 2.14 General government real per capita direct taxation, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
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Figure 2.15 Central government direct taxation as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
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Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
Figure 2.16 General government direct taxation as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
OSwed - Gen direct tax % GDP •  Aust - Gen direct tax % GDP
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
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Figures 2.17 and 2.18 show the growth of social security contributions in 
Sweden only, since apart from the very recent universal health insurance levy there 
were none in Australia. It can be seen that per capita contributions start to grow in 
1959, have a sudden spurt in the mid-1970s, a sharp drop in 1982, then remain 
steady until growth resumes from 1986. The pattern is similar for contributions as a 
percentage of GDP, except that as a share of GDP contributions declined slightly in the 
early half of both the 1970s and 1980s.
The last four graphs pertain to expenditure growth, since the main reason for 
taxing is to finance public expenditure and expenditure change will be used later as a 
control variable in the statistical analysis.
The trends for central government per capita expenditure (Figure 2.19) were 
similar for Sweden and Australia, with Sweden slowly drawing ahead until the mid- 
1980s, from which point the gap narrowed. The recent drop in both countries is due 
largely to measures to reduce budget deficits. A similar pattern is evident for general 
government per capita expenditure (Figure 2.20), except that Swedish expenditure 
increased considerably more rapidly than Australian expenditure. In both countries 
expenditure growth accelerated in the mid-1970s, but while in Australia it flattened 
out again towards the end of the decade before resuming growth in the early 1980s, in 
Sweden expenditure growth was more consistent.
As a percentage of GDP the similarity shown in Figure 2.21 between Swedish 
and Australian central government expenditure is even more striking, as the trends 
were virtually identical, although Swedish general government expenditure increased 
significantly more rapidly than Australian general government expenditure (Figure 
2.22). However it can be seen that since the early 1980s general government 
expenditure relative to GDP in Sweden and Australia has flattened out and fallen despite 
Left control of government in both countries.
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Figure 2.17 Real per capita social security contributions, Sweden 1955-1988
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Figure 2.18 Social security contributions as a percentage of GDP, Sweden 1955- 
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Figure 2.19 Central government real per capita expenditure, Sweden and Australia 
1954- 1988
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Figure 2.20 General government real per capita expenditure, Sweden and Australia 
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Figure 2.21 Central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
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Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
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Figure 2.22 General government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and 
Australia 1954-1988
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Finally, comparisons of overall trends in taxation and expenditure can be 
summarized in the form of the average annual changes in taxation and expenditure both 
over the whole term of government and over the 12 months immediately preceding each 
election. These are used later as independent variables in my statistical analysis, and 
averages over the whole period are shown in the concluding tables of the chapter.
In Table 2.5 it can be seen that in absolute terms changes over the whole term of 
government in taxation and expenditure were similar to election year changes - no sign 
of a political business cycle - but that while changes in central government taxation 
and expenditure were generally similar for Sweden and Australia, although the growth 
of direct taxation in Sweden was slower, changes in general government taxation and 
expenditure in Sweden were very much higher.
In relative terms, however, Table 2.6 shows that central government taxation 
and expenditure increased more quickly in Australia than in Sweden, contrary to 
reputation, and it can be seen that Swedish central government tax and expenditure 
growth was lower in election year than over the whole term of office. In addition, while 
general government total taxation and expenditure grew more quickly in Sweden, where 
expenditure grew by over 1% of GDP per annum, in election years the rates of growth 
relative to GDP in the two countries were almost identical.
The totality of these figures shows that the big difference between the levels and 
changes in levels of taxation in Sweden and Australia are due not to differences in 
central government taxation, but to Sweden alone having social security contributions 
and local government income taxation. The shortfall in Swedish central government 
taxation, due to so much income tax being collected by local government, has been made 
up over the years by increases in VAT, another tax that Australia lacks. That is, the 
structures of the tax systems are quite different, and one consequence of this may be 
that Swedes react more to changes in general government direct tax than to changes in 
central government direct tax, since it would appear unlikely that the average citizen 
could distinguish between an income tax change due to the national government's actions 
and one due to the actions of local government. In Australia, on the other hand, income 
tax is completely and unequivocally the domain of the central government.
Table 2.5 Average annual changes in real per capita taxation and expenditure 
(1980 $A), Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
Sweden Australia
Govt term Election yr Govt term Election yr
Central government
Total taxation 62.03 64.25 53.13 50.26
Direct taxation 18.18 25.76 39.64 39.74
Expenditure 67.58 65.72 68.22 69.10
General government
Total taxation 139.44 124.55 68.56 67.80
Direct taxation 57.18 54.92 39.64 39.74
Expenditure 159.94 150.35 88.39 90.81
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
Table 2.6 Average annual changes in taxation and expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
Sweden Australia
Govt term Election yr Govt term Election yr
Central government
Total taxation 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.30
Direct taxation 0.02 0.07 0.24 0.29
Expenditure 0.39 0.27 0.47 0.59
General government
Total taxation 0.81 0.51 0.39 0.47
Direct taxation 0.24 0.15 0.24 0.29
Expenditure 1.01 0.78 0.63 0.79
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
Australian Government Budget Statements, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
3ELECTIONS 1958-1972: OPPOSING HEGEMONIES
During the period from the mid-1950s until 1972 the governments of Sweden 
and Australia were monopolized by the Left in Sweden and by the Right in Australia. In 
the first two sections of this Chapter I examine each of the elections that took place 
during this time in Sweden and Australia in order to assemble evidence as to the extent 
to which tax affected their outcomes. In the final section the main features of this 
evidence for the two countries are summarized and compared.
3.1 Sweden 1958-1970
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The opening election of the period in Sweden was one of the most dramatic since 
World War 2, and a turning point for the Social Democrats' electoral fortunes.
The overriding issue between 1956 and 1958 was the Social Democrats' 
proposal to institute a universal earnings-related supplementary pension supplement, 
or national superannuation, funded by a compulsory levy on employers1. This had been 
promised at the 1956 elections, but the Farmers would not agree to support it in the 
form in which it was proposed, and a consultative referendum held in 1957 was 
inconclusive: although the Social Democrats' scheme received more votes than either 
the alternative put forward by the Farmers or the alternative put forward by the 
Liberals and Conservatives, it did not receive a overall majority of votes. As a 
consequence of disagreement over the issue the Farmers' Party left the government, 
and Tage Erlander formed a minority Social Democratic government when Farmers' 
leader Gunnar Hedlund refused to form a coalition with the Liberals and Conservatives. 
The Social Democrats were able to govern due to their control of the Upper House, 
which meant that if the two Houses disagreed on appropriation or expenditure Bills, the 
Social Democrats would win the resultant joint vote2. Nevertheless, from this point on
1 Unless otherwise indicated, general historical information is drawn from Bengt Owe 
Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en 
modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm.
2Donald M. Hancock (1972), Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change, Dryden Press, 
Illinois, pp.180, 219.
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the Centre Party, as the Farmers' Party was renamed in 1957, became, and remained, 
part of the bourgeois bloc.
Apart from implementation of the income tax cuts that had been legislated before 
the 1956 election, the major tax change between 1956 and 1958 was the abolition in 
1958 of estate tax. This had been an important point in the post-election coalition 
agreement between the Social Democrats and Farmers, although it was partly offset by 
the Farmers’ acceptance of an increase in inheritance tax3.
Despite losing their majority in the Lower House, the Social Democrats pressed 
ahead with their superannuation proposal and called an election on the issue when the 
Riksdag still refused to accept it (superannuation could not be passed by a joint vote 
because it did not qualify as an appropriation or expenditure measure)4.
During the period 1956 to 1958 real GDP per capita rose by $92.33 per 
annum and by $92.26 in election year, about half the average rise over the full period 
(all dollar amounts are real 1980 $A), and prices rose by 4.40% per annum and by 
4.43% in election year. Real hourly wages rose by 2.36% per annum and by 2.26% in 
election year, while unemployment rose by 0.30% of the workforce per annum and by 
0.59% in election year5.
The table below and succeeding tables of changes in taxation levels are based 
mainly on UN data supplemented where necessary by national statistics. Full sources 
and details of calculations are given in Appendix 1, including an explanation of apparent 
discrepancies between absolute and relative figures for central and general 
government. Figures are given, first, for the average annual change over the incumbent 
government's entire term of office, which enables comparisons to be made between tax 
changes for governments with different lengths of terms in office, and, second, for the 
change over the 12 months immediately preceding the election. Totals are given for 
both the central government alone and for all levels of government combined, or 
general government. Real change is used to control for the effects of inflation, in order 
to get a better measure of the actual change in purchasing power that is taking place. 
Change as a percentage of GDP is used to get a measure of both changes in taxation as a 
proportion of the total economy and insofar as this measure represents changes in the
3Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, pp.97- 
100. The government's tax record is set out in more detail in Appendix 2.
4Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige efter 
1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, pp.214-223.
5Sources of economic data are given in Appendix 1.
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average person's standard of living (change in average tax per capita as a proportion of 
average GDP per capita = change in total tax as a proportion of total GDP).
Table 3.1 shows that rises in taxation and expenditure between 1956 and 1958 
were generally relatively low compared to the overall averages between 1954 and 
1988 (which are set out in Chapter 2 section 2.4), except for central government 
expenditure, which increased as a percentage of GDP by more than the overall average. 
In addition, expenditure growth outstripped taxation growth, which led to problems 
with budget deficits.
Table 3.1 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1956-58
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
31.24 0.30
Direct taxation 12.14 0.07
Expenditure 43.64 0.60
General government: 
Total taxation 44.44 0.39
Direct taxation 17.97 0.07
Expenditure 67.79 0.87
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
35.66 0.39
Direct taxation 13.19 0.10
Expenditure 51.17 0.75
General government: 
Total taxation 43.72 0.37
Direct taxation 14.63 0.00
Expenditure 73.41 0.98
Sources6.
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
The 1958 election was a snap election called on the supplementary pension 
issue, and party propaganda focussed mainly on whether coverage would be universal 
and compulsory, and on who would control the huge social security funds that would
®All taxation level figures are derived from the same sources as the graphs in the previous 
chapter. These sources are given in detail in Appendix 1.
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ensue, rather than on whether there should be social security levies as such or how 
high they should be7. That is, the levies as such appear to have been widely accepted.
In their election manifesto the Social Democrats emphasized the benefits of 
universal and compulsory superannuation, and were supported by the Communists, 
while the three bourgeois parties all opposed the scheme, although they were unable to 
formulate a common alternative8. Tax as such was not prominent in election 
manifestos, although the Liberals promised to remove the increase in company tax in 
order to improve savings and warned voters against continued rises in excises if the 
Social Democratic government was re-elected, while the Conservatives promised to cut 
income and company tax and to abolish estate duty (which had already been legislated).
The 1958 election result was that the Social Democrats, Centre Party and 
Conservatives gained votes while the Communists and especially the Liberals lost votes.
Table 3.2 Election results, Sweden 1958
Party 1958 vote Change since 1956
Social Democrats 46.2% + 1.6%
Centre Party 12.7% + 3.3%
Liberals 18.2% -5.6%
Conservatives 19.5% + 2.4%
Communists 3.4% -1 .6%
Socialist bloc 49.6% 0.0%
Bourgeois bloc 50.4% + 0.1%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modem politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, p.345.
The election outcome appears to indicate a polarization of the electorate around 
the clear alternatives on the supplementary pensions question offered by the Social 
Democrats, on the one hand, and the Centre Party and Conservatives, on the other, with 
Liberal losses possibly being attributable to their disunity and vacillation on the 
issue9. Tax did not appear to play a significant role.
7Donald M. Hancock (1972), Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change, Dryden Press, 
Illinois, p.214ff.
8Specific party election policies on tax are taken directly from their election manifestoes, 
the tax policy contents and sources of which are given in Appendix 3.
9Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, p.193.
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The election of 1960 returned the Social Democrats, with Communist support, 
to a position of control of the Riksdag, and followed a period dominated by the continuing 
battle over supplementary pensions and by the Social Democratic proposal to introduce 
a general retail sales tax. Despite a deadlock in the Riksdag after the 1958 election, the 
Social Democrats' legislation to establish their supplementary pensions scheme was 
passed in May 1959 when a Liberal member abstained, and the compulsory levy on 
employers came into effect later that year10. In 1960 the entire Liberal Party changed 
sides, thus ensuring that the scheme could not be abolished.
The decision by the Social Democrats in 1959 to reintroduce a general retail 
sales tax was the outcome of a process that stretched back at least to 1948, only a year 
after the 1940 sales tax was abolished, when LO economist Gösta Rehn argued for a 
broad-based indirect tax as a means of both inhibiting inflation (by enabling the Budget 
to be kept in permanent surplus) and protecting against unemployment (by financing 
extensive labour market programs). Low-income earners, he argued, could be 
protected by compensation from the regressive effects of such a tax. Despite an initial 
unfavourable reaction from both sides of politics, official tax inquiry reports in 1949 
and 1957 were both in favour, and following the legislative resolution of the 
compulsory pensions issue in 1959 the Social Democratic government announced its 
intention to legislate for the introduction of a general retail sales tax of 4% in order 
both to reduce the large budget deficit caused by the continued expansion of expenditure 
and to finance cuts to income tax rates, which had had to be raised in 1959. By this 
time the LO, which had been concerned about the effect of such a tax on low income 
earners and on wage negotiations, saw it as a business tax which could finance the new 
active labour market policy, and had been persuaded that adequate compensation could 
be arranged for low income earners11.
All the opposition parties opposed the Social Democrats' proposal. The bourgeois 
parties objected to its present and future potential for increasing the size of the public 
sector as well as to its administrative costs and its effects on inflation, international 
competitiveness and the position of the low-paid. The Communists opposed it as 
reg ress ive12, but were persuaded to abstain in the joint vote and so allow the
10Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, p.43.
1 1 Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, 
pp.194, 126-152.
12Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, 
pp.153-156.
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legislation to pass when Prime Minister Erlander threatened to resign if defeated, as 
this would have resulted in the formation of a bourgeois government13.
Between 1958 and 1960 the economy improved, and real per capita GDP rose 
by $A181.82 per annum, close to the overall average, and by $175.78 in election 
year, which was rather below average. Real hourly wages rose by 2.02% per annum 
and 1.65% in election year, prices by a low 2.8% per annum and 3.36% in election 
year, and unemployment fell by 0.34% per annum and 0.68% during election year.
The period 1958-60 was characterized by quicker growth in taxation than in 
expenditure, in contrast to the previous term of office. Reasons for this include high 
economic growth, the new superannuation levies, and the new retail sales tax, which 
came into effect at the beginning of I96014.
Table 3.3 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1958-60
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
54.64 0.40
Direct taxation 6.42 - 0 . 19
Expenditure 30.10 0.05
General government: 
Total taxation 81 .39 0.57
Direct taxation 5.64 -0 .4 3
Expenditure 52.51 0.06
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
73.15 0.75
Direct taxation 14.12 -0 .0 3
Expenditure 7.15 - 0 . 3 7
General government: 
Total taxation 128.15 1.46
Direct taxation 19.00 -0 .15
Expenditure 35.52 -0 .2 4
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
13lrene Scobbie (1972), Sweden, Ernest Benn, London, p. 159.
14Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, p.176.
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The sales tax did not figure prominently in the Social Democrats' election 
p ropaganda15, but all the other parties promised to abolish it, including the 
Communists. The Conservatives promised to cut income tax rates, especially for people 
on average incomes, while the Communists promised to cut income tax for low-income 
earners while raising company tax and wealth tax. The Conservatives also promised to 
increase various income tax deductions and to fund their wide ranging tax cuts by 
cutting spending, but neither the Liberals nor the Centre Party promised specific tax 
cuts apart from abolishing the sales tax, and the Centre Party attacked the Conservative 
tax proposals as leading to higher tax for lower income earners.
According to the official election study the sales tax was one of the principal 
issues at the 1960 election, along with the Conservatives' 'restrictive social policy', 
which involved cuts in social welfare including abolition of the supplementary pension 
scheme and cuts to child allowances. Neither the sales tax nor the 'restrictive social 
policy’ were popular: the election survey showed that a plurality disapproved of the 
sales tax, and that two thirds favoured the continuation of the supplementary pension 
scheme and of current child support. The Conservatives' hard line on social policy also 
isolated them both from the Liberals, who now accepted the supplementary pensions 
scheme and who also opposed the cuts in child allowances, and from the Centre Party, 
which opposed the child allowance cuts16. Taxation was a prominent media issue, as 
was to be expected with the introduction of a controversial major new tax17.
The Social Democratic Party and its supporters were initially divided on the 
sales tax, due to its possible effects on the low-paid18, but the leadership ran a 
successful campaign to convince its supporters of its merits in reducing tax evasion 
and inflation, its potential for financing continued expansion of the public sector, and 
that the low-paid could be adequately compensated through such measures as indexing 
the basic pension, raising child allowances and unemployment insurance, and cutting 
income tax for low- and middle-income earners: during the campaign the proportion of 
Social Democrat voters who approved of the tax rose from 39% to 66%, while the 
proportion opposed dropped from 45% to 22%. As a result the total proportions of
15This is based on an election pamphlet, as the election manifesto was not available.
16Bo Särivik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, pp. 180-186.
1 7This is based on findings of a survey carried out by Kent Asp on three of the main morning 
newspapers: Svenska Dagbladet (Conservative), Göteborgs-Posten (Liberal) and Arbetet 
(Social Democrat) during the last 10 days of every election campaign since 1960. For more 
details see Chapter 9.
18Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.149.
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major party supporters (excluding Communists) who favoured the sales tax rose from 
28% to 42%, and the proportion opposed fell from 60% to 47%, even though the 
opposition of bourgeois supporters remained virtually unchanged19.
Särlvik's interpretation of this remarkable turnaround of opinion, based on his 
analysis of the survey data, is that Social Democrat voters' natural dislike of a new tax 
was counteracted by a number of factors. First, the Social Democrats presented the tax 
as being necessary to finance the welfare state, and this function was highlighted by the 
Conservative proposal to cut child benefits as an alternative way of reducing the budget 
deficit. The effect of this was that Social Democrat voters' support for the welfare state 
led many to reverse their opposition to the sales tax. Second, those with strong party 
allegiance tended to change their views on the tax so as to be consistent with this 
allegiance. Third, both these processes of opinion change were facilitated to the extent 
that Social Democrat supporters were exposed to their party's arguments on the issue 
during the campaign20.
Because Communist voters are not included in these calculations, the figures 
probably slightly overstate support for the sales tax and understate opposition to it, 
since the Communist Party itself opposed it. However a consequence of Communist 
opposition may have been that Social Democrats who opposed the sales tax switched to 
them rather than to a bourgeois party, thus lessening any bourgeois gains on the issue.
The election in 1960 resulted in gains for the Social Democratic government 
and for the Communists, but heavy losses for the Conservatives. 7% of those who had 
voted in both 1958 and 1960 changed parties, and of these changers 23% switched 
from socialist (Social Democrats plus Communists) to bourgeois and 15% switched 
from bourgeois to socialist21. That is, Social Democratic gains were due not to 
conversion but to changes in participation22.
1 9Figures calculated from Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: 
a study of issues in Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, Table 4 
(P-176).
20Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, pp.176-180.
21Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och Valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, p.168.
22Bo Särlvik (1966), 'Political stability and change in the Swedish electorate', Scandinavian 
Political Studies, v.1, p.212.
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Table 3.4 Election results, Sweden 1960
Party 1960 vote Change from 1958
Social Democrats 47.8% + 1.6%
Centre Party 13.6% + 0.9%
Liberals 17.5% -0.7%
Conservatives 16.5% -3.0%
Communists 4.5% + 1 .1%
Socialist bloc 52.3% + 2.7%
Bourgeois bloc 47.6% -2.8%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, p.345.
The election result, in particular the heavy defeat for the Conservatives, was 
generally interpreted as a vote of confidence in the welfare state, while the bourgeois 
parties blamed each others' attacks23.
Although the evidence available does not warrant the conclusion that the sales 
tax led to the Social Democrats losing votes, it is possible that it was 'carried' by its 
close connection with other Left-Right issues in an election where voters favoured the 
Social Democrats on these other issues, namely national superannuation, which 62% of 
voters supported, and child allowances, which 63% supported24. That is, most Swedes 
supported the welfare state and preferred to accept a new tax to finance it rather than 
to cut back on services - especially since income tax cuts were part of the deal.
After the election the bourgeois parties accepted the sales tax, and Elvander 
argues that this both laid the ground for the expansion of the welfare state and 
discouraged the bourgeois parties from proposing large tax cuts at future elections, and 
that this in turn led to a relative depoliticization of tax25.
23Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, pp.232-233.
24Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, p.186.
25Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.322.
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After their heavy defeat in 1960 the Conservatives changed leaders, accepted 
the supplementary pension scheme and the sales tax, and toned down their hard line 
social policy, but this did not prevent further vote losses in the 1964 election.
The main tax change between 1960 and 1964 was a further shift from direct to 
indirect tax in 1961, which was supported by the bourgeois parties26. The sales tax 
was raised from 4% to 6%, the regional deduction for income tax was raised and 
standardized to become the basic deduction27, and income tax rates were cut, especially 
for low income earners28. In addition, the supplementary pension scheme was 
extended29, but due to LO opposition the Social Democrats did not introduce the value- 
added tax that had been recommended by the general tax inquiry in 196430.
During this period the economy improved again, with real GDP per capita 
growing strongly at $271.81 per annum and by $359.48 during election year, well 
above the overall average. Prices rose by 3.30% per annum and by 3.20% in election 
year, while unemployment dropped by 0.11% of the workforce per annum and by 
0.24% in election year. Real wages grew by 4.25% per annum, which was well above 
average, but only by 2.97% in election year, which was only slightly above average.
Between 1960 and 1964 the growth of taxation, which was well above the 
overall average, outstripped the growth of expenditure, just as it did between 1958 
and 1960. Once again strong economic growth was no doubt one of the reasons for this, 
plus the operation over a full four years of the sales tax and of superannuation 
contributions, which at this early stage in the scheme far exceeded payouts. Similarly, 
during election year general government direct tax in particular rose strongly as a 
percentage of GDP, while the growth of expenditure was below average. However 
election year central government tax rises were comparatively small, and the level of 
central government tax actually dropped as a percentage of GDP, although expenditure 
grew more strongly.
26Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden,
pp.1 95-1 96.
27Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, p.42.
28Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden,
pp.1 95-1 96.
29lngemar Gians (1966), 'Sweden: the 1964 Riksdag election', Scandinavian Political Studies 
v. 1, p.228.
8 0 NiIs Elvander (1989), 'Frän Wigforss till Feldt: Svensk skattepolitik 1947-1988', 
unpublished paper, Uppsala University, p.5.
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Table 3.5 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1960-64
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
80.30 0.45
Direct taxation 25.40 0.03
Expenditure 61.69 0.30
General government: 
Total taxation 157.97 1.23
Direct taxation 62.49 0.33
Expenditure 109.67 0.54
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
59.56 -0 .2 4
Direct taxation 25.80 -0 .11
Expenditure 77.86 0.30
General government: 
Total taxation 149.41 0.47
Direct taxation 77.78 0.30
Expenditure 1 15.99 0.17
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
Although information for the 1964 election on the parties' electoral strategies 
in regard to tax is rather scanty, it appears that the Social Democrats did not 
emphasize tax in their propaganda31. On the bourgeois side the Centre Party took some 
credit for the recent tax changes, having come to an agreement with the Social 
Democrats, and referred approvingly to some of the recommendations of the 1964 tax 
inquiry report, in particular the proposed shift from the retail sales tax to a value- 
added tax, which would have the effect of reducing tax on business investment. They also 
proposed further cuts in marginal rates of income tax, rises in the basic deduction and 
in the deduction for working married women and single parents, and abolition of the 
energy tax. Adequate information on the tax policies of the Liberals and Conservatives 
is not available - the only election for which this is true - but it would appear that 
they did not stress tax as much as in 1960. The Communists proposed to increase tax on 
wealth and on profits in order to finance tax cuts for lower income earners.
31 Election pamphlets, since no manifesto was available.
Tax was not an important media issue. Instead the Social Democrats' extension of 
national superannuation after 1960 dominated the campaign, with the Conservatives 
again in conflict with the Liberals and Centre Party. Other issues included reform of 
the Constitution32, and the so-called 'queue society' caused by shortages of housing, 
education and social services, a theme exploited by the Liberals in particular33.
The 1964 election resulted in further losses for the bourgeois bloc and 
especially for the Conservatives, which were partly due the emergence of the new 
Christian Democratic Party (KDS), which however failed to enter the Riksdag.
Table 3.6 Election results, Sweden 1964
Party 1964 vote Change since 1960
Social Democrats 47.3% -0.5%
Centre Party 13.4% -0.2%
Liberals 17.1% -0.4%
Conservatives 13.7% -2.8%
Communists 5.2% + 0.7%
KDS 1.8% 1.8%
Socialist bloc 52.5% + 0.2%
Bourgeois bloc 44.2% -3.4%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, p.345.
1964 does not seem to have been a tax election except inasmuch as the 
supplementary pension scheme with its associated fees was an issue, which probably 
favoured the Social Democrats, as by 1964 80% of voters supported it34.
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At the 1968 election the Social Democrats received over 50% of the vote, which 
marked the high point of postwar Social Democratic dominance of Swedish politics. By 
this time socio-economic issues had receded in importance, to be replaced by new
32Donald M. Hancock (1972), Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change, Dryden Press, 
Illinois, p.105.
33ingemar Gians (1966), 'Sweden: the 1964 Riksdag election', Scandinavian Political Studies 
v. 1, pp.227-228.
34Bo Särlvik (1967), 'Party politics and electoral opinion formation: a study of issues in 
Swedish politics 1956-60', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.2, pp.186, 197.
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issues such as Constitutional reform, the environment, government subsidies to the 
Press, the Common Market, Vietnam, foreign aid, and rent control35. Other issues 
included state involvement in the economy, and the student revolt36.
The tax reform of 1965 continued the shift from direct to indirect tax by 
raising the sales tax from 6% to 9% and also the taxes on tobacco and petrol, while 
cutting marginal rates towards the lower end of the income tax scale, standardizing 
local income tax deductions, raising the lower limit for application of the wealth tax, 
and reducing certain excises and the sales tax on investment. This was generally 
accepted by the Liberals and Centre Party, despite their desire for indexation and 
further cuts to marginal rates, and was opposed only by the Conservatives37.
Also in 1965 the Centre Party accepted for the first time the Social Democratic 
argument that economic development led to reform demands which necessitated high 
tax. In 1966, when formal cooperation began between the Liberals and Centre Party 
(Mittensamverkan), both parties accepted that due to social needs, tax cuts were not 
possible at present38. This acceptance of high taxes by two of the three bourgeois 
parties was a sign of the Social Democrats' ascendancy on the issue.
Another influence on the tax debate at this time, especially on the Social 
Democrats, was the finding of the 1964 tax inquiry that income equalization had ceased 
after 1948, which placed distributional issues at the forefront of attention39.
In 1967 the retail sales tax was raised yet again, from 9% to 10%, and in 
1968 legislation was passed, first, to replace the sales tax with a value-added tax of 
10%, which would be superior to the retail sales tax in that it would exempt 
investment inputs from tax and make tax avoidance more difficult40, and, second, to 
transfer liability for social insurance levies from employee to employer41 . In 
addition, share profits were made taxable in 1966, and property profits in 196842.
35Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
efter 1900 - en modern poiitisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, pp.239-244.
36Stig Hadenius (1985), Swedish Politics During the 20th Century, Swedish Institute, 
Sweden, pp.126-127.
37Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden,
pp.200-222.
38Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.226. 
39Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.242. 
40Lars G. Sandberg (1964), 'A value-added tax for Sweden', National Tax Journal, v.17, 
pp.294-295.
41 Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, p.42.
42Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.297.
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Between 1964 and 1968 economic growth slowed, with real GDP per capita 
increasing by $174.34 per annum and by $209.29 in election year, close to the 
overall average, while inflation increased, with prices rising by 4.5% per annum, 
although only by 2.55% in election year. Unemployment rose by 0.21% of the 
workforce both per annum and during election year, but wage-earners did well, as real 
wages increased by 3.30% per annum and by 4.28% in election year, well above the 
overall average.
During this period general government taxation increased considerably faster 
than average both over the whole term and during election year, especially relative to 
GDP, while expenditure growth was below average over the whole term but above 
average in election year. Central government taxation and expenditure increased by 
around the overall average in absolute terms during the whole term, but faster than 
average in relative terms due to slower economic growth. During election year, 
however, central government taxation actually dropped in relative terms, just as it had 
before the 1964 election, while expenditure rises remained about average.
Table 3.7 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1964-68
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
62.31 0.36
Direct taxation 16.43 0.01
Expenditure 76.99 0.67
General government: 
Total taxation 176.74 1.63
Direct taxation 80.38 0.72
Expenditure 77.86 0.30
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
33.73 -0.1 8
Direct taxation -1 1 .43 -0 .43
Expenditure 62.39 0.32
General government: 
Total taxation 194.31 1.57
Direct taxation 53.38 0.19
Expenditure 199.72 1.79
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
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In the election campaign the Social Democrats did not make any specific tax 
promises, but instead pledged to retain "a tax policy which gives nation and commune 
the necessary resources", and attacked the bourgeois parties for wanting to transfer 
the tax burden to those least able to bear it.
Although maintaining that it was not possible to cut the taxation burden at 
present, the Centre Party opposed further tax increases, criticized the recent increase 
in indirect tax, and wanted a thorough tax reform to simplify and rationalize the 
system. Somewhat inconsistently, they also proposed specific tax cuts, including cuts 
in income tax for low income earners via the introduction of a standard deduction for 
local income tax, measures to eliminate the effect of inflation on tax scales, the 
abolition of several excises (including energy tax), tax equalization between communes 
(a perennial policy), and postponement of the introduction of the general employer 
levy. The Liberals promised to raise the tax-free threshold and to lower marginal rates 
of income tax as part of a continuing shift from direct to indirect tax, and to phase out 
joint taxation, but, like the Centre Party, specifically said that they were not 
promising less tax overall due to the social problems that needed to be solved43. The 
Conservatives also promised to cut marginal rates of income tax, apart from the lowest 
rate, and to raise the basic deduction and defer the introduction of the employer levy, 
but proposed to finance this by expenditure cuts as well as by raising the VAT. The 
Communists proposed to finance cuts to marginal rates of income tax at the lower end of 
the scale by raising taxes on wealth and profits, and to transfer all income tax 
collection to the national government, which would allow greater progressivity to be 
introduced at the bottom end of the scale (since local income tax was proportional). 
They also proposed to abolish the VAT and to make the sales tax progressive by 
introducing different rates for different classes of goods.
In 1968 the Social Democrats scored their biggest win since 1940, while the 
Centre Party vote rose to its highest total ever and the Liberals and Communists each 
lost over 2% of the vote.
43Election pamphlet, as manifesto was not available.
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Table 3.8 Election results, Sweden 1968.
Party 1968 vote Change since 1964
Social Democrats 50.1% + 2.8%
Centre Party 15.7% + 2.3%
Liberals 14.3% -2.8%
Conservatives 12.9% -0.8%
Communists 3.0% -2.2%
KDS 1.5% -0.3%
Socialist bloc 53.1% + 0.6%
Bourgeois bloc 42.9% -1 .3%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, p.345.
Among reasons put forward to explain the election outcome were the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was thought to have benefited the Social Democrats at 
the expense of the Communists, and conflict between the Conservatives and the middle 
parties over tax and foreign aid44. Tax, which had not been a media issue during the 
campaign, did not appear to play an important role in determining the election outcome, 
apart from a possible indirect effect due to its being a point of dispute between the 
bourgeois parties.
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The election of 1970 was a tax election, like the 1960 election, but this time 
both the issue and the election result were different: the controversy during the 
campaign was over the replacement of joint income taxation by individual income 
taxation, and the election outcome was a big step forward for the Centre Party and a 
severe setback for the Social Democratic government.
Between the 1968 and 1970 elections the Constitution was changed so as to 
establish a unicameral system of government with three-year terms, long-serving 
Social Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander retired and was replaced by the 
relatively young and radical Olof Palme, the environment remained an important issue, 
and there was a big wildcat strike by miners at Kiruna in the far north against the
44Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, pp.264-265.
7 9
government mining company LKAB in protest against both the dehumanization caused by 
rationalization, and the bureaucratization of their own union45.
In 1969 the value-added tax began operation46, and in March 1970 the Social 
Democratic government legislated for the introduction of individual taxation to replace 
joint taxation of spouses, both to encourage women into the labour force and to provide 
for greater equality between the sexes. This followed the report of the family tax 
inquiry in 1969 and a campaign initiated within the womens' movement and pursued 
most strongly by the Liberals. In addition, income tax cuts were introduced for low and 
middle income earners, financed by a rise in VAT from 10% to 15%, while income tax 
increased for people on higher incomes despite a reduction of the top marginal rate, due 
to the abolition of the communal tax deduction and the abolition or reduction of other 
deductions. Furthermore, tax was raised on wealth, apart from working capital in 
family businesses, and on inheritances.
Apart from the Conservatives, who were split on the issue, the bourgeois 
parties accepted this reform, but in January 1970 a so-called 'family campaign' was 
started outside the normal framework of parties and interest organizations by Brita 
Nordstrom. This was partly motivated by mistrust due to lack of detail from the 
government on exactly how individual taxation would work, and was precipitated by a 
comment by Finance Minister Gunnar Sträng, who stated that the purpose of individual 
taxation was to give women freedom of choice to work or not, and if they chose to stay at 
home and thereby receive a lower standard of living, then so be it. This was interpreted 
by Nordstrom as an attack on housewives and on the family in general, and a mass 
letter-writing campaign was followed in February by demonstrations outside the 
Chancery and the Finance Ministry. Although the campaign did have links with the 
Conservatives, the letter was ambiguous on the specific question of individual taxation 
and support for the campaign reached into all sections of society. In response the Social 
Democrats launched their own campaign in February, concentrating on the tax cuts for 
the lower paid, married and unmarried, the advantages for women who did want to 
work, and the protection afforded to women who could not find work. Behind the 
professed concern for the family, maintained the Social Democrats, lay only the 
interests of the highly paid47.
45Donald M. Hancock (1972), Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change, Dryden Press, 
Illinois, pp.163-167.
46lrene Scobbie (1972), Sweden, Ernest Benn, London, p.163.
4 ^Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, 
pp.252-31 1.
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in 1969, shortly before these events took place, a survey on tax compliance 
elicited information on general attitudes to tax, as well as finding that tax evasion was 
common, widely defended, and growing48.
At first glance, it appears that Swedes were quite hostile towards tax, with 
70.2% of respondents agreeing that marginal rates of tax were far too high, and 62.7% 
agreeing that the burden of taxes must be reduced at any cost, but when benefits were 
mentioned in the question, the answers suggested otherwise: 43.1% agreed that 
considering all social benefits taxes were not too high, and 53.5% agreed that the taxes 
that they personally had to pay were reasonable considering the benefits received. This 
implies that attitudes were both compartmentalized and held fairly lightly by a large 
proportion of respondents. Vogel concluded on the basis of these figures that Swedes 
were rather tolerant of the actual burden of taxation, but with only about half agreeing 
that the tax burden was not too high a more accurate evaluation would seem to be that 
Swedes were fairly evenly split in their attitudes towards tax, and that despite 
Sweden's reputation there was no general consensus in favour of high tax. Higher 
income earners and people who had suffered or expected to suffer a reduction in income 
were relatively more dissatisfied with tax. So too were members of blue-collar unions, 
which was somewhat surprising given that blue-collar unionists formed the core of 
Social Democratic support49. Vogel speculates that this may have been because such 
people tend to have low educational attainments, a characteristic which was also linked 
to high dissatisfaction.
At the same time most Swedes approved of progressivity in the tax system 
despite their attitude to marginal rates: only 16.5% agreed that income tax rates 
shouid be the same regardless of amount of income. On the other hand, only 33.5% 
considered that the tax system produced a fair distribution of the burden of taxes, 
although this may partly reflect the current controversy over individual taxation. 
However 56% considered that they received about the same benefit from government 
programs as the average taxpayer, compared to 36.3% who thought they received less 
and 5.2% who thought they received more.
In regard to particular taxes, it appears that the sales tax was not popular, as 
only 32.3% agreed that if the burden of taxes had to be increased an increase in sales
4 8 Reported in Joachim Vogel (1974), 'Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an 
interpretation of recent survey data’, National Tax Journal, v.27, pp.499-513, especially 
Table 1.
49Bo Särlvik (1973), 'Valet 1970', Allmänna Valen 1970, del 3, Statistiska Centralbyrän, 
Sweden, p.102.
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tax should be preferred. The excise on cars was especially unpopular, with 62.6% 
considering it to be too high, while opinions on the alcohol excise were divided: 41.9% 
thought the excise on alcohol was too high, compared with 33.9% who considered it 
about right and 21.9% who thought it too low. However 57.1% considered taxes for 
married people to be too high while only 3.2% thought them too low, which again may 
reflect the individual taxation controversy, and Swedes were evenly split on taxes for 
families with children: 46.0% considered them too high, 46.8% about right, and only 
4.1% too low. Taxes on property were considered too high by 25.7%, about right by 
53.1%, and too low by 17.1%, a division which possibly reflects the Left-Right 
cleavage in the electorate, while taxes on owner-occupied homes were considered too 
high by 39.2%, about right by 52.0%, and too low by only 1.8%.
Turning to what tax was used for, it seems that most Swedes saw their 
government as wasteful, with 56.0% agreeing that a large part of tax was used for 
meaningless purposes, and 51.5% considering that the government had executed a great 
number of unnecessary social reforms. The most popular programs were old age 
pensions and health, and the least popular were defence and social welfare (social 
assistance and personal welfare services).
The strong economic growth in this period is shown by the increase in real GDP 
per capita of $375.87 per annum and of $405.54 during the year prior to the 
election, both of which were well above the overall average. Inflation remained fairly 
steady, with prices rising by 4.20% per annum and by 5.90% in election year, while 
unemployment dropped by 0.30% per annum and by 0.39% in election year. Wage- 
earners did well, with real wages growing by 5.71% per annum and by 6.56% in 
election year, like 1968 well above average.
Between 1968 and 1970 growth of taxation and expenditure was generally high 
in absolute terms, but not so high relative to GDP due to strong economic growth - 
indeed central government expenditure dropped as a proportion of GDP, as did general 
government taxation during election year. However the growth of direct taxation was 
the highest in the period 1958-1970 for all categories apart from growth over the 
government's term in general government taxation as a proportion of GDP.
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Table 3.9 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1968-70
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
105.10 0.27
Direct taxation 88.21 0.68
Expenditure 66.70 -0 .07
General government: 
Total taxation 175.75 0.32
Direct taxation 119.44 0.59
Expenditure 189.52 0.71
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
1 16.38 0.32
Direct taxation 114.95 0.96
Expenditure 59.01 -0 .24
General government: 
Total taxation 156.72 -0.1 1
Direct taxation 128.44 0.60
Expenditure 181.22 0.43
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
The Social Democrats' 1970 election manifesto highlighted the recent tax 
reform as leading to greater equality, arguing that two thirds of taxpayers would pay 
less tax as a result and that for the first time women would be given full tax justice. It 
also pointed to reforms in company tax, attacked the Conservatives for attempting to 
shift the tax burden from high to low income earners, and attacked the middle parties 
for approving the government's tax cuts for low income earners while at the same 
time, and without financing, promising tax cuts for high income earners.
The Centre Party laid little stress on tax in 1970, merely promising to reform 
the tax system so as to lighten the burden on low income earners, while the Liberals 
promised to lighten the load for low income earners by increasing tax deductions, and
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also proposed to index the tax scale for inflation. The Conservatives promised to cut 
marginal rates of income tax, make the basic pension tax-free, and make increased 
allowance in the tax system for family costs, especially where the wife worked at home. 
The Communists reiterated their opposition to the VAT.
Prominent issues in the campaign included inflation, constitutional reform, the 
environment, the Common Market, labour-market policy, and the State as 
entrepreneur. Increasing centralization led to a debate on equality and democracy, in 
particular in regard to regional imbalance, city growth, and the distribution of 
industry. The opposition laid emphasis on economic problems, which the government 
attributed to international conditions. One perceived economic problem was lack of 
growth, which illustrates how long it takes for economic conditions to become properly 
known: the economy had been growing comparatively slowly in 1968, but by 1970 
growth was strong again. Considerable attention also focussed on bourgeois disunity, 
and on whether the Communists would clear the new 4% minimum barrier for 
representation in the Riksdag, as this could have determined whether the new 
government was Social Democratic or bourgeois50. In addition, the campaign was 
coloured by the miners' strike, and the Social Democrats were criticized from the left 
for having betrayed socialism51.
In regard to tax, the increasing size of the public sector was an issue, and the 
media gave wide coverage to the 'family campaign' against the alleged effects of the new 
tax system on the family52. Local income tax was also an issue due to the fact that its 
growth tended to offset cuts in national income tax53.
The 1970 election was the first held under the provisions of the revised 
Constitution, and resulted in the Social Democrats' share of the vote falling by nearly 
5%, although with Communist support they retained a majority of seats in the Riksdag. 
The Communists themselves gained votes, as did the Liberals and especially the Centre 
Party, while the long downward trend for the Conservatives continued. Of people who
50Harry Forsell (1972), 'The elections in Sweden in September 1970. Politics in a multi­
level election', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.7, pp.202-211.
51Stig Hadenius (1985), Swedish Politics During the 20th Century, Swedish Institute, 
Sweden, p.132.
52Harry Forsell (1972), 'The elections in Sweden in September 1970. Politics in a multi­
level election', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.7, pp.205-206.
53Eengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
after 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, p.242.
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voted in both 1968 and 1970, 16% changed party, and of these changers 30% switched 
from socialist to bourgeois while only 8% switched the other way54.
Table 3.10 Election results, Sweden 1970
Party 1970 vote Change since 1968
Social Democrats 45.3% -4.8%
Centre Party 19.9% + 4.2%
Liberals 16.2% + 1.9%
Conservatives 11.5% -1.4%
Communists 4.8% + 1.8%
Socialist bloc 50.1% -3.0%
Bourgeois bloc 47.6% + 4.7%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, p.345.
The 1970 Swedish election study revealed that the Social Democrats lost votes 
to both the Centre Party and the Communists, and that the Centre Party, which had been 
gradually broadening its base from farmers alone for over a decade, also won votes 
from the Liberals55. The Communist gain may be attributable at least in part to the 
disappearance as an issue of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and to a certain 
number of Social Democrats voting tactically to bolster support in the Riksdag by 
ensuring that the Communists surmounted the 4% barrier ('Comrade 4%'). Finally, 
new Prime Minister Olof Palme was clearly not as popular as Tage Erlander had 
been56.
Although tax was a media issue at the election, the distinction between the 
parties’ positions was blurred by the general acceptance of the Social Democrats' 
reforms, which meant that the main cleavage on tax was between the Conservatives and 
the rest. Nevertheless, it is possible that tax influenced the 1970 election result in 
two ways, although the evidence is not unequivocal.
54Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och Valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, p.168.
55Bo Särlvik (1973), 'Valet 1970', Allmänna Valen 1970, del 3, Statistiska Centralbyrän, 
Stockholm, p.67.
56Harry Forsell (1972), 'The elections in Sweden in September 1970. Politics in a multi­
level election', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.7, pp.202-211.
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First, the Social Democratic loss of votes is consistent with the substantial 
increases in direct tax that took place prior to the 1970 election: both absolute and 
relative direct taxation rose more quickly both over the whole term and in election 
year than at any other election between 1958 and 1970, with the exception of annual 
general government direct tax as a percentage of GDP. If Swedish voters are averse to 
large rises in direct tax, this is exactly the result that would be expected.
Second, it is possible that the family tax campaign contributed to vote losses by 
the Social Democrats, against whom the campaign was primarily directed.
However these theories are weakened to the extent that they are inconsistent 
with the loss of votes by the Conservative Party, which, as the principal opponent of 
the Social Democrats on tax, would have been expected to be the main destination of 
voters dissatisfied with the Social Democrats' tax policy. They must therefore be 
viewed as suggestive, rather than conclusive.
3.2 Australia 1958-1972
The politics of taxation in Right-dominated Australia between the mid-1950s 
and 1972 contrasted sharply with taxation politics in Left-dominated Sweden over the 
same period.
1 9 5 8
The Australian election of 1958 was won by the Liberal-Country Party 
Coalition, and resulted in a loss of votes by Labor compared to 1955 due mainly to a 
worsening of the split in the party when Queensland Labor Premier Vince Gair was 
expelled from the Labor Party and formed the Queensland Labor Party, which later 
combined with the Anti-Communist Labor Party to form the Democratic Labor Party 
(DLP). The split helped communism and defence to remain important issues, but the 
DLP was not very relevant to the tax debate despite its role in keeping the Coalition in 
power.
During this period the economy was weak: real per capita GDP increased by only 
$45.73 per annum, and fell by $19.35 in election year. Prices increased by 3.40% 
per annum, and by 1.57% in election year, while unemployment rose by 0.33% of the 
workforce per annum and by 0.46% in election year. Real wages increased by 1.06% 
per annum and by 1.74% in election year, close to the long-term average.
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Between 1955 and 1958 the main tax changes were increases in excises, an 
adjustment of company tax up and then down again, and increases in income tax 
concessions57. Income tax was clearly the most unpopular tax: when asked which tax 
should be reduced first, 45% of respondents nominated income tax compared with 29% 
who nominated sales tax58. Levels of taxation and expenditure stayed much the same, 
with growth being low or negative.
Table 3.11 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1955-58
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
-0.29 -0.20
Direct taxation -8.61 -0.29
Expenditure 3.53 -0.09
General government: 
Total taxation 8.40 -0.04
Direct taxation -8.61 -0.29
Expenditure 7.03 -0.05
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
-13.04 -0.19
Direct taxation -19.86 -0.37
Expenditure 31 .25 0.71
General government: 
Total taxation -2.66 .04
Direct taxation -19.86 -0.37
Expenditure 38.73 0.88
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
The joint Liberal-Country Party policy speech delivered by Prime Minister 
Menzies expressed the aims of keeping taxation as low as possible and of reducing it 
further, but referred to the need to combat inflation as a reason why no big tax cuts 
were promised. Another reason not mentioned was the large Budget deficit. However 
Menzies did promise tax concessions to resource investors, as a means of encouraging
57Information on taxation and politics is drawn from Budget speeches and the Political 
Chronicle of the Australian Journal of Politics & History, unless otherwise indicated. Detail 
on tax changes, plus the authors of the Political Chronicle, are given in Appendix 2. 
58Australian Public Opinion Poll, February 1957.
economic growth, and stated his preparedness to allow the States to resume certain 
taxing powers59.
The theme of Labor leader Dr Evatt's policy speech was the 'stagnant economy’, 
and he proposed increases in social services not only for their own sake but also as a 
means of stimulating the economy. This would be done by using borrowing instead of 
taxation to finance public works, which would free money for spending on social 
services. He attacked the government for 'ruinous taxation', and pledged to eliminate 
sales tax on basic commodities and to end payroll tax for wages paid by local 
authorities, with the longer term aim of abolishing payroll tax altogether.
Thus it is clear that on tax the Right was outbid by the Left, in contrast to the 
situation in Sweden during the late 1950s. Liberal tactics were to run on their record, 
cast doubt on the practicality of Labor policies, and, like the DLP, allege Communist 
sympathies within the ALP. During the campaign Menzies attacked Labor's social 
service proposals as leading to more tax and/or inflation, and deputy Labor leader 
Arthur Calwell conceded that increased tax might be necessary 'from those who have got 
it'. Nevertheless a survey of the electorate of Parkes found that Labor was considered 
the party most likely to reduce tax, especially by Labor voters, although in Rawson’s 
opinion the political cost of being accepted as a low-tax and high-pensions party was to 
be regarded as the party more likely to produce inflation60. Tax was not a major media 
issue during the campaign61, and the print media at least was clearly on the 
government's side: most newspapers devoted more news space to the government than to 
the opposition, and twelve out of fourteen capital city dailies supported the Coalition62.
The 1958 election saw a slump in the Labor vote, while the DLP vote nearly 
doubled. A drop in the Liberal vote was partly balanced by an increase in the Country 
Party vote, and DLP preferences ensured that the Coalition retained government.
59Specific party election policies on tax are taken directly from their policy speeches, the 
tax policy contents and sources of which are given in Appendix 3.
60D.W. Rawson (1961), Australia Votes: the 1958 Federal Election, Melbourne UP,
Melbourne, pp.77, 134, 100, 169-172.
61 Whether tax was an issue in Australian elections is judged on the basis of a survey of front 
page stories during the last 10 days of the campaign of five major metropolitan morning daily 
newspapers: the Sydney Morning Herald, the Melbourne Age, the Brisbane Courier-Mail, the 
Adelaide Advertiser, and the Perth West Australian. In addition, election-eve editorials for 
these newspapers were examined to determine which party or parties they supported. For 
more detail see Chapter 9.
62D.W. Rawson (1961), Australia Votes: the 1953 Federal Election, Melbourne UP,
Melbourne, pp.109, 102.
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Table 3.12 Election results, Australia 1958
Party 1958 vote Change from 1955
Liberals 37.2% -2.4%
Country Party 9.3% + 1.4%%
Liberal-Country Coalition 46.5% -1.1%
Labor 42.8% -2.8%
DLP 9.4% + 4.2%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
The chief reason put forward for the result was the continuing split in the Labor 
Party over attitudes to communism both in Australia and abroad. This meant that a 
significant number of former habitual Labor voters were converted in effect into 
habitual Coalition voters, as the DLP directed its preferences against Labor for the 
whole of its political life. Tax did not seem to be influential.
1961
The 1961 election was unexpectedly close: Labor gained over 5% of the vote 
compared with 1958 and missed government by just one seat. During this period issues 
related to the Labor split continued to be prominent. Closer to the election, the economy 
went into recession: real per capita GDP increased by $96.91 per annum but fell by 
$176.54 in election year. Prices rose by 2.70% per annum and by 2.75% in election 
year, but unemployment fell by 0.07% of the workforce both per annum and in 
election year, as the full effects of the recession on employment were not felt until the 
following year. Average real wages rose by 2.93% per annum and by 3.94% in election 
year, somewhat above average.
Between 1958 and 1961 the main tax changes were adjustments both up and 
down of income tax concessions, company tax and sales tax. Levels of taxation and 
expenditure generally grew more quickly than in 1958, but still more slowly than the 
long-term average. The high growth relative to GDP in election year was due to the 
drop in GDP that took place during those 12 months.
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Table 3.13 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1958-61
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Average annual changes in term
Central government: 
Total taxation 15.63 -0 .07
Direct taxation 17.08 0.13
Expenditure 25.72 0.18
General government: 
Total taxation 20.05 -0 .04
Direct taxation 17.08 0.13
Expenditure 31.21 0.22
Election year changes
Central government: 
Total taxation 18.98 1.01
Direct taxation 33.80 1.01
Expenditure 47.55 1.48
General government: 
Total taxation 22.97 1.18
Direct taxation 33.80 1.01
Expenditure 50.90 1.66
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
During the election campaign the Coalition government under Menzies was 
content to run on its record, and made few specific undertakings. On tax the only 
promise was to increase tax reimbursements to the States, which was in reality an 
expenditure promise. The Country Party leader, John McEwen, had nothing to say in 
his policy speech on tax.
Arthur Calwell's first policy speech as Labor leader took a similar line to 
Evatt's in 1958, arguing that increased social service expenditure was not only 
desirable for itself but also as a means for stimulating the flagging economy by 
expanding the Budget deficit. Thus no tax increase would be necessary to finance Labor's 
proposals. Indeed Calwell promised to reduce sales tax and abolish it on household 
items, remit payroll tax on wages paid by local authorities, and make employee 
transport costs deductible. That is, Labor once again outbid the Coalition on tax.
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Tax was not a major media issue at the 1961 election, although Press coverage 
was unusual in that the Sydney Morning Herald supported Labor, unlike most of the 
other newspapers. The result surprised most observers in that Labor gained more 
votes than the Coalition parties and was denied office only by DLP preferences.
Table 3.14 Election results, Australia 1961
Party 1961 vote Change since 1958
Liberals 33.6% -3 .6%
Country Party 8.5% -0 .8%
Liberal-Country Coalition 42.1% - 4.4%
Labor 47.9% + 5.1%
DLP/QLP 8.7% - 0.7%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
The most common explanation for the unexpected result was the recession, and 
it seems clear that without the split Labor would have won. However there is no 
evidence that tax affected the election outcome.
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In 1963 the Coalition regained the ground lost in 1961 and won by a 
comfortable margin. During this period the economy and defence remained prominent 
issues, and the right to vote was finally granted to all Aborigines.
Between 1961 and 1963 income tax was cut and concessions were increased, a 
20% investment allowance was introduced, sales tax was removed from most food items 
and sales tax concessions were increased, business tax concessions were raised, and 
estate duty exemption limits were increased. At the same time expenditure was 
increased on defence, pensions and housing.
The 1961 election was followed by more expansionary economic policies on the 
part of the narrowly re-elected government and by a marked improvement in the 
economy. Real per capita GDP increased by $247.97 per annum and by $246.06 in 
election year, well above the long-term average and a big increase over the previous 
electoral period. Prices remained steady over the period as a whole, and increased by 
only 0.28% in election year. Unemployment increased by 0.01% of the workforce per
annum, due mainly to a big jump in 1962 as a result of the recession, but fell by 
0.65% in election year. Real wages increased by 1.90% per annum and by 1.29% in 
election year, fairly close to the overall average.
Levels of tax and expenditure, however, grew slowly in absolute terms and 
without exception dropped relative to the rapidly growing GDP. Changes in real per 
capita taxation were somewhat lower than in the previous electoral period, but 
expenditure increases were slightly higher.
Table 3.15 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1961-63
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
-2.56 -0.91
Direct taxation -2.66 -0.55
Expenditure 34.33 -0.16
General government: 
Total taxation 5.32 -0.90
Direct taxation -2.66 -0.55
Expenditure 45.87 -0.12
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
16.51 -0.51
Direct taxation 8.96 -0.31
Expenditure 26.98 -0.29
General government: 
Total taxation 24.42 -0.50
Direct taxation 8.96 -0.31
Expenditure 39.57 -0.22
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
Both the Liberal and Country Party policy speeches contained little on tax apart 
from charging that Labor's expenditure proposals were unfinanced and would require 
extra tax. Menzies also pledged more money for child endowment, education, and health.
In Labor's policy speech Caiwell proposed to increase expenditure on social 
services, education, housing and defence, and to redistribute the taxation burden. In 
particular he pledged to reduce sales tax, abolish it on essential food items, and make
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employee transport costs deductible. That is, Labor went to the electorate with the same 
tax program as in 1958 and 1961, and in so doing outbid the Liberals once more.
Tax was not an important media issue, and all the five metropolitan morning 
newspapers surveyed supported the Coalition. The election result vindicated Menzies' 
decision to call an early election, as the Liberal share of the vote rose while the share 
won by the ALP and the DLP fell.
Table 3.16 Election results, Australia 1963
Party 1963 vote Change since 1961
Liberals 37.1% + 3.6%
Country Party 8.9% + 0.4%
Liberal-Country Coalition 46.0% + 3.9%
Labor 45.5% -2.4%
DLP 7.4% -1.3%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Possible explanations for this result include the economic recovery since 
1961, Labor disunity over American bases and over state aid for private schools, and 
the continuing effects of the Labor split. Tax does not seem to have been involved.
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At the 1966 election the the Coalition government won its biggest victory since 
coming to power in 1949. By this time the war in Vietnam had become an issue, 
especially when conscription was introduced in 1964 and Australian troops were sent 
to Vietnam in 1965, and Labor was divided on these matters as well as on American 
bases and on state aid for private schools.
Between 1963 and 1966 economic growth slowed somewhat, especially as the 
election approached: real per capita GDP increased by $172.32 per annum, slightly 
above average, but only by $70.63 in election year, which was well below the overall 
average. Prices increased by 3.10% per annum and by 2.94% in election year, while 
unemployment dropped by 0.14% of the workforce per annum but increased during 
election year by 0.43%. Real wages increased by 2.73% per annum, slightly above 
average, and by 1.57% in election year, slightly below average.
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During 1964 and 1965 several tax increases were announced, which were 
generally supported by Coalition partisans but opposed by Labor partisans63. These 
included abolition of the 5% income tax rebate in 1964, a 2.5% increase in income tax 
rates in 1965, increased company tax and sales tax, and increased excise on fuel, 
alcohol and tobacco. In 1966, however, concessions were increased for income tax, 
sales tax, payroll tax and gift duty.
During this period tax and expenditure grew more rapidly than previously. 
Over the term as a whole, levels of taxation grew more quickly than average, as did 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP, while real per capita expenditure grew more 
slowly. In election year real per capita taxation grew more slowly than average, while 
taxation growth as a percentage of GDP was close to average. Election year expenditure 
in general grew more quickly than the overall average.
Table 3.17 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1963-66
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
68.56 0.62
Direct taxation 56.89 0.64
Expenditure 62.71 0.54
General government: 
Total taxation 82.03 0.75
Direct taxation 56.89 0.64
Expenditure 73.77 0.62
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
37.05 0.38
Direct taxation 26.86 0.30
Expenditure 76.18 1 .04
General government: 
Total taxation 45.49 0.49
Direct taxation 26.86 0.30
Expenditure 81.82 1 .09
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
63Murray Goot (1969), Policies and Partisans: Australian Electoral Opinion 1941 to 1968, 
Department of. Government & Public Administration, University of Sydney, p.139.
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New Liberal Prime Minister Harold Holt's policy speech contained nothing 
whatsoever on tax, and concentrated on defending the commitment to Vietnam as vital to 
stopping the downward thrust of communism. On domestic issues Holt promised more 
money for education and social services. The Country Party referred to the 25% 
economic growth over the last five years, defended the Vietnam commitment, and, on 
tax, promised only tax incentives on wool.
Labor's policy speech did not continue the specific tax cut proposals of the three 
previous elections, but rather promised general reform of income tax to ensure that 
rates and deductions were more equitable, discrimination in favour of foreign capital 
was reduced, double taxation reviewed, and speculation in land and other assets 
eliminated. Calwell had earlier promised to return all petrol tax proceeds to the States, 
abolish conscription, and increase expenditure on anti-poverty measures, foreign aid, 
housing, education, conservation, and decentralization. These proposals were once again 
attacked by the Coalition and in the Press as being too costly. At one stage Treasurer 
McMahon predicted that income tax would have to go up by 30% to finance Labor's 
program, and Calwell had to concede that people must be prepared to pay extra taxes if 
they wanted more social services, education and development.
Tax did not appear to be an important issue for voters: Gallup polls taken in 
November 1966 found that the issues considered by respondents to be most important 
to them personally when they voted were health, education, pensions, prices, 
conscription, Vietnam, and housing, in that order, with little difference between Labor 
and Coalition supporters. Tax was not even listed among the alternatives, and only 1% 
nominated 'other issues' as being important64. Tax was not an issue in the media 
either, and all five newspapers surveyed supported the Coalition.
The result of the election was a sweeping victory for the Liberal and Country 
Parties at the expense of Labor.
64 Courier-Mail, 30 November 1966.
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Table 3.18 Election results, Australia 1966
Party 1966 vote Change since 1963
Liberals 40.2% + 3.1%
Country Party 9.7% + 0.8%
Liberal-Country Coalition 49.9% + 3.9%
Labor 40.0% -5 .5%
DLP 7.3% -0.1 %
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), ’Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Among explanations advanced for the result were a gain of 1.5% for the 
Coalition due to replacement of the electorate, support for the Vietnam war65, and the 
contrast between new Liberal Prime Minister Harold Holt and the ageing Arthur 
Calwell. There is no evidence that tax played any important role in the election, despite 
Labor's abandonment of specific tax cut promises.
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At the 1969 election Labor regained the ground it had lost in 1966 and almost 
won government.
During this period Vietnam and state aid for private schools continued to be 
prominent issues, Calwell was replaced as Labor leader by Gough Whitlam, who looked 
to the Scandinavian left for ideas66, and Harold Holt, who drowned in 1967, was 
succeeded as Prime Minister by John Gorton. Both the government and opposition 
suffered internal dissension, the Coalition over tariffs and over Gorton’s perceived 
centralism, and Labor over Whitlam’s moves to change party policy on matters such as 
Vietnam and aid to private schools.
65Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, pp.213, 206.
66Stuart Macintyre, (1984), The short history of Social Democracy in Australia', in Blast, 
Budge or Bypass: Towards a Social Democratic Australia, ed. Don Rawson, Academy of the 
Social Sciences in Australia, Canberra, p.138.
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Between 1966 and 1969 the economy grew even faster than in the previous 
electoral period: real per capita GDP increased by $295.93 per annum and by 
$343.29 during election year, well above average. Prices rose by 3.0% per annum and 
by 2.84% in election year, while unemployment fell by 0.08% of the workforce per 
annum and by 0.13% in election year. Real wages rose by 3.57% per annum and by 
3.89% in election year, well above average.
During this period income tax concessions were increased, the exemption limit 
for estate duty was lifted, and sales tax and company tax were raised. Expenditure was 
increased on defence, social services and education. Per capita taxation increased by 
more than the overall average, as in the previous electoral period, but per capita 
expenditure increased at less than the average, and more slowly than between 1963 and 
1966. Over the whole term, tax and expenditure increased by less than average as a 
share of the rapidly growing GDP, while in election year total tax and expenditure 
increased more slowly than average as a percentage of GDP, but direct tax increased 
more quickly.
Table 3.19 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1966-69
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
66.88 0.12
Direct taxation 51.31 0.22
Expenditure 49.06 -0 .09
General government: 
Total taxation 81 .29 0.27
Direct taxation 51.31 0.22
Expenditure 68.51 0.02
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
90.03 0.32
Direct taxation 71 .37 0.41
Expenditure 30.07 -0 .50
General government: 
Total taxation 103.49 0.34
Direct taxation 71 .37 0.41
Expenditure 56.02 -0.33
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
During this period the first national panel study of political attitudes was 
undertaken by Don Aitkin and his colleagues, with interviews in late 1967 and between 
October 1969 and February 1970 - that is, around the time of the 1969 election67.
While this survey did not provide as much information on tax as the tax 
compliance survey carried out in Sweden at much the same time, it did find support for 
taxation to be much higher than when a virtually identical question was last asked in 
1 949:
Table 3.20 Opinion on tax, Australia 1949, 1967, 1969
Preferred option: 1 949 1 967 1 969 Change 
1 949-69
% % % %
Spend more on social services 24 68 71 + 47
Reduce taxes 67 26 26 -4 1
Don't know 9 6 3 - 6
Balance favouring social services -4 3 + 42 + 45 + 88
Sources Morgan Gallup Polls 5.2.49 (1949); Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and 
Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, Canberra, pp.363, 375.
Aitkin also found that tax policy was not an important component of party 
images except in that respondents disapproved of the Liberals' failure to reduce taxes, 
and that only 6% of respondents in 1967 and 7% in 1969 considered tax to be an 
important problem for government68.
Attitudes to government as such were positive but not unqualified. In 1969 77% 
of respondents said that they were fairly satisfied with government and politics in 
Australia, while only 23% were not satisfied. Similarly, 66% of respondents 
considered that the people running government were pretty intelligent people who 
knew what they were doing, compared with only 28% who thought that there were too 
many who didn’t seem to know what they were doing. On the other hand, Australians 
were split on the extent to which politicians could be trusted: while 46% felt that 
people in government could be trusted to do the right thing, 47% felt that they were too 
often interested in looking after themselves. Similarly, in 1967 only 17% thought that
67Don Aitkin (1977), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, pp.355-356.
68Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, pp.60-65, 218-220.
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most MPs paid a good deal of attention to the people who elected them, while 40% said 
some attention, and 33% said not much at all, and in 1969 only 20% said that the 
people running the government in Canberra gave everyone a fair go, while 71% 
thought that they paid more attention to what the big interests wanted.69.
Apart from attacking Labor’s proposals as leading to increased inflation and/or 
taxation, in his policy speech Gorton referred to the recent increases in tax 
concessions, and promised to reduce personal income tax over a three year period to 
provide relief to lower and middle income earners. He also promised to increase 
expenditure on defence and water resources, while John McEwen for the Country Party 
promised to lift the exemption limit for estates passing between spouses.
Tax was not a big part of Whitlam’s first policy speech, which merely attacked 
the increase in income tax due to inflation and promised to review the income tax 
schedules in order to ensure progressivity in practice as well as in theory. This meant 
that for the first time in the period under examination the Coalition outbid Labor in 
promising tax cuts. Instead, Labor's policy had five main planks: a plan to end poverty, 
a comprehensive health insurance scheme, a plan to raise pensions until they reached 
25% of average weekly earnings and to abolish the means test over six years, 
provision of emergency grants to schools, and the withdrawal of all Australian forces 
from Vietnam. The Press was fairly favourable, and Whitlam challenged the Prime 
Minister to deny that automatic revenue rises would cover the cost.
According to a Morgan Gallup poll taken 3 months before the election, the main 
issues were Vietnam, education and pensions70. Taxation was nominated by only 2% of 
respondents, and was not an important media issue either. During the campaign Gorton 
continued to assert that defence and foreign policy were the main issues, and to press 
attacks on Labor’s pledge to end conscription, while McEwen charged that Labor was 
still under communist influence. Health was much discussed, and Whitlam's campaign 
was considered to have been superior to Gorton's71. However once again all five of the 
newspapers sun/eyed supported the Coalition in their election eve editorials.
69Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, pp.368, 379.
70Mercury, 24 July 1969.
71 Don Aitkin (1970), The 1969 Federal Election', Politics, v.5/1, pp.48-49.
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The result of the election was a considerable recovery for Labor since 1966, 
but the Coalition retained government due to DLP preferences.
Table 3.21 Election results, Australia 1969
Party 1969 vote Change since 1966
Liberals 34.8% -5.4%
Country Party 8.6% -1.1%
Liberal-Country Coalition 43.3% -6.6%
Labor 47.0% + 7.0%
DLP 6.0% -1.3%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
According to Aitkin, possible reasons for the shift in votes between 1966 and 
1969 include the declining popularity of the Vietnam war, the higher evaluation of 
Labor's policies on domestic issues, the decline in the proportion of voters who 
considered Labor to be too far to the left or influenced by communists, the greater 
popularity of the Labor leader, the lower popularity of the Liberal Prime Minister, 
perceived Liberal disunity, and increased perceptions of government incompetence72. 
However tax does not seem to have been influential despite the fact that for the first 
time in the period under examination the Coalition outbid Labor on tax cuts.
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In 1972 Labor finally won office after 23 years in opposition, and the 
conservative monopoly of national government in Australia came to a close.
Between 1969 and 1972 a new health system was introduced, Federal-State 
conflict continued over matters such as off-shore minerals, and there were large-scale 
demonstrations against both Australian involvement in Vietnam and a tour by a South
72Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, Chapters 13, 14.
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African rugby team. Conflict continued within both major parties, and in 1971 
William McMahon succeeded Gorton as Prime Minister when Gorton cast the decisive 
vote against himself in a deadlocked leadership ballot. However Whitlam remained 
dominant in Parliament despite the change of leaders73.
As the 1972 election approached, the economy deteriorated. Real per capita GDP 
increased by $156.87 per annum and by $120.91 during election year, close to the 
long-term average but more slowly than in the previous electoral period, but both 
inflation and unemployment rose: prices increased by 5.10% per annum and by 5.84% 
in election year, and unemployment increased by 0.31% of the workforce per annum 
and by 0.80% in election year. Similarly, the growth rate of real wages dropped from 
3.13% per annum to only 0.79% in election year.
During this period numerous tax changes were made. In the 1970 budget the 
Gorton government carried out the promised reform of income tax by reducing the 
income tax paid on low and middle incomes, but this was largely balanced by increases 
during 1970 and 1971 in company tax, sales tax, and customs and excise duties. In 
1971 the capacity to levy payroll tax was given to the States and the 2.5% levy on 
income tax was raised to 5%, although various income tax deductions were increased, 
but in 1972 the income tax levy was cut back again to 2.5%, an inquiry into the 
taxation system was announced, income tax rates were cut by an average of 10% while 
the tax-free threshold was raised, and income tax concessions were raised. In addition, 
exemption levels for estate and gift duty were doubled, a new excise was introduced on 
liquefied petroleum gas and shale oil, and various minor taxes were increased.
Levels of tax and expenditure grew more slowly than the overall average apart 
from general government total tax, which relative to GDP increased more quickly than 
average over the whole term but more slowly than average during election year, and 
direct taxation, which increased more quickly than average over the whole term but 
then actually decreased as a percentage of GDP during election year. Tax increases were 
lower and expenditure increases generally higher than in the previous electoral period.
73Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, 
Canberra, p.265.
Table 3.22 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1969-72
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
36.30 0.07
Direct taxation 44.25 0.32
Expenditure 48.10 0.25
General government: 
Total taxation 61.71 0.47
Direct taxation 44.25 0.32
Expenditure 70.68 0.47
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
-16 .00  -0 .55
Direct taxation 12.90 -0 .05
Expenditure 42.80 0.26
General government: 
Total taxation 33.71 0.05
Direct taxation 12.90 -0 .05
Expenditure 83.62 0.74
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
In his policy speech, Prime Minister McMahon referred to the government's 
record, tried to match many of Labor's promises, and warned of the dangers of electing 
an untried government. He referred in particular to the recent income tax cuts, and 
pledged to restructure the tax scale periodically so as to offset the effects of inflation.
The content of Whitlam's 1972 policy speech was similar to that of 1969, and 
in it he argued that tax rates would not need to be raised in order to finance Labor's 
proposals due to the huge and automatic increases that were already occurring. No 
specific pledges were made on tax, although reviews were promised into closing tax 
loopholes and adjusting income tax for the effects of inflation.
Tax was not an important issue in the media, much of which supported Labor74, 
nor did it appear to be an issue for the public. According to opinion polls the most
74Henry Mayer, Elaine Thompson & Lyn Beatty (1973), 'Partial partners? - the Melbourne 
Age and the Sydney Morning Herald’, in Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 Election, ed. Henry 
Mayer, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, pp.216-217.
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important issues were education, unemployment, health and pensions: tax was not even 
mentioned as an alternative75. On the other hand, ALP research showed that tax was one 
of the phobias that voters had about the Labor Party76, and only 20-30% of 
respondents to another survey were satisfied or very satisfied with the level of tax77.
The election result was the first Labor victory since 1949.
Table 3.23 Election results, Australia 1972
Party 1972 vote Change since 1969
Liberals 32.1% -2.7%
Country Party 9.4% + 0.8%
Liberal-Country Coalition 41.5% -1.8%
Labor 49.6% + 2.6%
DLP 5.3% -0.8%
Australia Party 2.4% + 1.5%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Various theories were put forward to explain the historic result, including the 
"glaring incapacity" of the Coalition government, rising unemployment, the role of the 
Womens Electoral Lobby in mobilizing women to vote Labor, a general feeling that, as 
the Labor slogan put it, "It's Time"78, and Labor's low-key soft-sell of Whitlam based 
firmly on poll findings79. A survey carried out by David Kemp, on the other hand, 
found leadership to be the most important factor80, and argued that the Coalition lost 
due to Liberal disunity, weak leadership and a bad campaign - McMahon’s promises, for
75Morgan-Gallup poll taken in September 1972 and quoted in Colin Hughes (1973), 'The 1972 
Australian Federal Election', Australian Journal of Politics and History, v.19, p.11; Morgan 
Gallup poll quoted in The Mercury, 30 October 1972; and Age Polls quoted in The Age, 15 
November and 1 December 1972.
76Vicky Braund (1973), Timely vibrations: Labor's marketing program', in Labor to Power: 
Australia's 1972 Election, ed. Henry Mayer, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, p.22.
77Probe Pty Ltd (1973), 'Futurologing the love-starved swingers', in Labor to Power: 
Australia's 1972 Election, ed. Henry Mayer, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, p.297.
78Russell Ward (1982), Australia Since the Coming of Man, Lansdowne Press, Sydney,
pp.221-222.
7 9 Neal Blewett (1973), 'Labor 1968-72: planning for victory', in Labor to Power: 
Australia's 1972 Election, ed. Henry Mayer, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, p.8.
80David Kemp (1973a), 'Swingers and stayers: the Australian swinging voter, 1961-72', in 
Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 Election, ed. Henry Mayer, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
p.287.
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example, were so expensive that it was hard to charge Whitlam with 'Where's the 
money coming from?' - combined with a considerably less socialist and therefore less 
threatening Labor Party81. Tax, however, did not appear to be influential.
3.3 Elections 1958-1972: Opposing hegemonies
In Sweden between the mid-1950s and 1970 the broadening of the tax base and 
the raising of rates of consumption taxes and social security levies combined with the 
effects of economic growth and inflation to enable the Social Democratic government to 
expand outlays on education, health and social security, which compensated for the 
increasingly regressive nature of the tax system. The main base-broadening measures 
were the introduction in 1959 of superannuation levies which, in combination with the 
already existent health and social insurance levies, rose steadily through the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the introduction in 1960 of a general sales tax of 4%. The sales tax 
rate was increased to 6% in 1964, 9% in 1965, and 10% in 1967, and in 1969 it 
was transformed into a VAT of 10%, rising to 15% in 1970. During the 1960s 
marginal rates of income tax were repeatedly cut and allowances increased as part of 
the steady shift from direct to indirect tax, but local income tax rates increased 
steadily from 14% in 1955 to 22% in 1970. The effect of this was a continuing 
redistribution of income tax revenue from the central government to local 
government82.
The net effect of these changes on tax levels was to raise real per capita taxation 
between 1956 and 1970 from $1315.56 to $3289.98. In relation to GDP tax rose 
from 26.88% to 40.76%. Rodrigues explains the expansion of Swedish taxation by 
reference to the strong economic growth, rising real incomes, the dominance of the 
labour movement, increased expenditure on education and health, and the need for 
increased savings, and argues that the Social Democrats minimized tax resistance by 
taking advantage of new revenue sources as they arose, replacing visible by invisible 
taxes, transferring more of the tax burden to employers, and easing compliance costs 
by use of self-assessment and taxation at source83.
Increases in taxation and expenditure tended to be larger in the electoral periods 
prior to the 1968 and 1970 elections than in earlier electoral periods. This pattern is
81 David Kemp (1973b), 'A leader and a philosophy', in Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 
Election, ed. Henry Mayer, Angus & Robertson, Sydney.
82Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, pp.40-47. 
83Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, Liber, Stockholm, pp.93-99.
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particularly marked in regard to direct taxation, all but one measures of which 
increased most rapidly in the electoral period preceding the 1970 election, the only 
election at which the Social Democrats lost a substantial number of votes, which may 
imply a voter backlash.
In Australia between the mid 1950s and 1972 individual taxes and concessions 
in Australia were adjusted up or down on many occasions, but compared to Sweden over 
the same period no major reforms of the taxation system were undertaken. The closest 
to a major tax reform occurred between 1969 and 1972, right at the end of the period, 
and consisted mainly of restructurings of the income tax scales in both 1970 and 
1972, the transfer of payroll tax to the States, and the introduction of a new excise. 
However income tax cuts were a feature of most election years in Australia as in 
Sweden, although compensatory rises in indirect tax were much less significant.
That is, the tax records of the Swedish Social Democratic and the Australian 
Liberal-Country Party governments were pretty much what one would expect of Left 
and Right governments respectively: the Social Democrats were active in broadening 
the tax base and significantly increasing the tax take, while the Liberal-Country Party 
government mainly restricted itself to relatively minor adjustments. Although between 
1955 and 1972 per capita taxation grew in real terms from $1069.54 to $1844.64 
(real 1980 $A), tax as a share of GDP increased only from 22.85% to 24.66%, far 
less than in Sweden. There is no evidence that changes in the levels of taxation and 
expenditure had any electoral impact in Australia: although they increased relatively 
quickly in those elections in which Labor improved its vote, namely 1961, 1969 and 
1972, and relatively slowly in 1963, when the Coalition vote rose, changes in the 
levels of taxation and expenditure were also relatively high in 1966, the year of the 
greatest Coalition success.
Throughout this period Social Democratic strategy in Sweden was to increase tax 
revenue in order to finance increased benefits for citizens, partly on the grounds that 
rising expectations of public services made it unreasonable to limit public 
expenditure84, so they did not generally promise tax cuts. The Conservatives, by 
contrast, used mainly economic arguments to justify an anti-tax position, in 
particular advocating cuts to marginal rates of income tax and to taxes on capital. 
However this anti-tax policy did not appear to help the Conservatives electorally, as 
their share of the vote declined at every election during this period apart from 1958. 
The Liberals and Centre Party generally opposed higher taxation for similar reasons,
84Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970, Raben & Sjögren, Sweden, p.107.
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but progressively moderated their positions as time went on, although without 
discernible effects on their shares of the vote. The Communists consistently favoured 
increased progressivity, an end to regressive indirect taxation, and higher taxes on 
capital and business.
The main tax-related party conflicts in Sweden took place in the late 1950s 
over national superannuation, although the levy which financed it did not itself appear 
to be controversial, and over the general sales tax of 1960. Both these new revenue 
sources were closely connected with specific and, in the case of the sales tax, already 
existent benefits. The Social Democrats won the subsequent elections on both occasions, 
which implies that the broadening of the tax base was not electorally damaging, 
following which national superannuation and the sales tax were accepted by the 
bourgeois parties. This resulted in a generally more cooperative approach to taxation 
issues during the 1960s, facilitated by the cuts to marginal rates of direct tax that 
accompanied the increases in indirect tax, so that by the late 1960s Social Democratic 
hegemony had extended to tax and the Conservatives' anti-tax policy had become 
isolated.
The pattern of electoral strategy in Australia in regard to tax contrasted sharply 
with that in Sweden: up to 1963 the Left outbid the Right in promising tax cuts, which 
never happened in Sweden. It was not until 1969 that what one might consider to be the 
normal pattern of Right outbidding Left emerged, with income tax cuts the focus. 
However there is no evidence that this change advantaged the Coalition, as in 1969 
Labor’s vote improved. There were no major tax controversies of the sort that occurred 
in Sweden.
As a media issue, tax was prominent in Sweden in 1960, when the retail sales 
tax was introduced. At first the sales tax proposal was unpopular even among Social 
Democrat voters, but the party leadership ran a remarkably successful campaign to 
convince party supporters of its merits, and in the end there is no evidence that tax 
influenced the election outcome, although it was changes in participation that 
principally led to the Social Democrats' success in 1960: conversions favoured the 
bourgeois parties rather than the socialists. One reason for the sales tax not hurting 
the Social Democrat vote may have been that its unpopularity was neutralized by the 
even greater unpopularity of the Conservative alternative of cutting child allowances.
The other election at which tax was a media issue was in 1970, when the shift 
from joint to individual income taxation was the subject of much discussion in the
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media. This was due largely to the 'family campaign' against the government's 
proposals, support for which reached into all sections of society, and it is possible that 
this campaign was partly responsible for the Social Democratic losses in 1970. 
However there is no evidence that tax influenced the elections of 1958, 1964 or 1968.
By contrast, tax was not an important media issue at any of the Australian 
elections during this period, possibly as a consequence of government inaction. In 
addition, surveys indicate that tax was not an important issue for voters either, and 
although the evidence here is not directly comparable, did not support the view that 
Australians were more tax averse than Swedes.
On the evidence available there appears to be no reason to think that tax 
significantly affected any of the Australian election results between 1958 and 1972. In 
particular, there is no reason to think that tax had anything to do with Labor's failure 
to win government during this period - indeed in 1958 Labor's reputation was one of a 
low-tax party - although its consistent proposals for higher social spending rendered 
it vulnerable to the question 'Where's the money coming from?' Instead it seems clear 
that the main reason for Labor's election losses was the split of the mid-fifties, as this 
led to a chunk of former habitual Labor voters to switch their support, in effect, to the 
Coalition, via directing their second preferences away from Labor. Indeed the combined 
Labor-DLP vote exceeded 50% at every election except 1966, as shown below.
Table 3.24 Combined Labor and DLP vote, Australia 1958-72
1 958 1 961 1 963 1 966 1 969 1 972
Labor + DLP vote (% total vote) 52.2 56.6 52.9 47.3 53.0 54.9
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988). 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Of course not all DLP voters would have voted Labor had there not been a split - 
and history would have been completely different anyway - but it was only after the 
DLP had declined to just over half its 1958 total that Labor finally gained office in 
1 972.
In summary, during the period 1958 to 1972 it would appear that tax was 
more important electorally in Sweden than in Australia, and that this was at least
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partly due to the much more substantial changes to the tax system that took place in 
Sweden, in particular in 1960 and in 1970.
4ELECTIONS 1973-1983: LEFT THEN RIGHT
After Australia's 1972 election, Left governments ruled both Sweden and 
Australia until the mid-1970s, and were followed by Right governments in both 
countries from then until the early 1980s. In the first two sections of this Chapter, 
the elections are examined individually for Sweden and then Australia in order to 
determine to what extent tax influenced their outcomes, before the evidence for the two 
countries is summarized and compared in the final section.
4.1 Sweden 1973-1982
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The 1973 election resulted in a tie in the Riksdag, an outcome not anticipated by 
the framers of the new Constitution when they stipulated an even number of seats. This 
followed a period during which cooperation grew between the three bourgeois parties, 
and when restrictive economic measures made necessary by balance of payments 
problems were accompanied by rising unemployment1.
Between 1970 and 1973 income tax was altered twice, being made more 
progressive in 1972 by cutting rates for lower income earners and raising them for 
higher income earners, and being cut again in 1973, largely to compensate for the 
effects of inflation. In addition, the VAT, excises, and the employer levy were raised, 
and the basic pension levy on individuals was transferred to employers2.
During this period economic growth slowed while inflation accelerated. Real per 
capita GDP increased by $171.08 per annum, about average, rising to $271.04 in 
election year, above average (real 1980 $A). Prices increased by 6.70% per annum
1 Unless otherwise indicated, general historical information is taken from Bengt Owe 
Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en 
modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm.
2Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, p.43; Enrique Rodrigues 
(1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, LiberLäromedel Lund, Stockholm, p.52.
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and by 6.56% in election year, while unemployment increased by 0.33% per annum 
but fell by 0.10% in election year. Real wages increased by 3.24% per annum, slower 
than in the previous electoral period but still above average, but only by 2.34% in 
election year, about average.
The growth of total taxation slowed markedly compared to between 1968 and 
1970 and was well below the long-term average. Levels of direct taxation fell in both 
relative and absolute terms, but expenditure growth remained much the same, and was 
generally close to average. That is, expenditure growth far outstripped taxation growth.
Table 4.1 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1970-1973
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
5.70 - 0 . 39
Direct taxation -60.31 -0.91
Expenditure 62.30 0.35
General government: 
Total taxation 95.63 0.31
Direct taxation -3 .99 -0 .4 5
Expenditure 154.82 1.08
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
- 1 7 .1 3  - 0 .9 2
Direct taxation -5 9 . 50 - 0 . 9 7
Expenditure 62.46 0.10
General government: 
Total taxation 4.80 -1.31
Direct taxation - 48 .69 -1 .21
Expenditure 121 .11 0.16
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
The Social Democrat manifesto did not mention tax at all3, and the government 
ran mainly on its record4.
The Liberals and Centre Party both promised to adjust the income tax scale for 
inflation, reduce and ultimately remove the VAT on essential food items, abolish the 
remaining joint taxation, and coordinate tax and grants so as to remove undesirable 
marginal effects of their interaction. In addition the Centre Party promised to lower 
tax for low income earners and to strengthen tax equalization between communes, while 
the Liberals promised to lower income tax for ordinary income earners, alter the tax 
rules so as to enable pensioners to keep more of their income, and fight tax evasion. For 
once the Conservatives made no specific tax cut promises in their manifesto, but still 
advocated lower tax in order to make it worthwhile to work and save. They also 
proposed to make the basic pension non-taxable, and promised to alter tax regulations 
so as to create freedom of choice between working and staying at home and between 
different forms of childcare (that is, introduce tax deductions for children and 
childcare). The Communists promised as usual to abolish the VAT on food, cut tax for 
ordinary wage-earners, raise tax on companies and capital, and introduce measures 
against tax cheating.
Unemployment was an important issue in the campaign, with the Centre Party 
promising 100,000 new jobs, as was tax, which was a prominent media issue5, and 
crim e6. In response the Social Democrats attacked the credibility of the bourgeois 
alternative, which did not have a common program, but on the whole ran a rather 
defensive campaign, a typical slogan being 'Do not vote away social security'7.
At the 1973 election the socialist and bourgeois blocs each received 175 seats 
in the Riksdag. The biggest gains were made by the Centre Party, and the biggest losses 
sustained by the Liberals, while the Conservatives and Communists gained slightly and 
the Social Democrats lost slightly.
3 Information on party election appeals on tax is taken from their election manifestos.
4Stephen Kelman (1973), 'Swedish socialists on the defensive', The New Leader, October 15, 
P-9.
5Based on Kent Asp's study of media issues 1960-1988.
6Stephen Kelman (1973), 'Swedish socialists on the defensive', The New Leader, October 15, 
P-9.
7Olof Petersson (1974), 'The 1973 general election in Sweden', Scandinavian Political 
Studies, v.9, p.219.
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Table 4.2 Election results, Sweden 1973
Party 1973 vote Change since 1970
Social Democrats 43.6% -1.7%
Centre Party 25.1% + 5.2%
Liberals 9.4% -6.8%
Conservatives 14.3% + 2.8%
Communists 5.3% + 0.5%
KDS 1.8% 0.0%
Socialist bloc 48.9% -1.2%
Bourgeois bloc 48.8% + 1.2%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345.
According to the 1973 election survey, of people who voted at both elections 
16% changed party between 1970 and 1973. 5% changed from socialist to bourgeois 
and 1.6% changed from bourgeois to socialist8, and the Centre Party continued its 
transformation since the 1950s from a farmers' party to a party with support in all 
social groups, especially blue-collar and white-collar workers9.
According to Bo Särlvik, one of the authors of the election study, the election 
outcome can be largely explained by the theory that economic circumstances weakened 
confidence in the capacity of the welfare state to maintain economic growth and full 
employment, as both voters' evaluations of the government's record on employment and 
their attitudes to the need for further social welfare reform became less positive 
between 1968 and 1973 (the relevant questions were not asked in 1970). In addition, 
voters moved to the right on questions of state control, and became more cynical 
towards parties and politicians10.
Tax was clearly a salient issue to voters, as the election survey found that when 
asked what they personally considered most important for the parties, the government,
8Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, p.168.
9Olof Petersson & Bo Särlvik (1975), 'Valet 1973', Allmänna Valen 1973, del 3, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, pp.66-67, 87.
10Bo Särlvik (1977), 'Recent electoral trends in Sweden', in Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent 
Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, pp.105, 108, 114.
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and the parliament to try to achieve or change at the national level during the next few 
years, the policy domains mentioned most often by respondents were employment and 
regional policies 38%, tax 22%, social welfare 16%, family welfare 14%, and 
pensions and old-age care 13%. A large number of the tax references were to VAT 
rather than to income tax, which is not surprising in view of the cuts to income tax 
that occurred between 1970 and 197311.
At the same time the Social Democrats' tax record was not popular despite the 
income tax cuts: 25% of respondents evaluated the Social Democrats’ record on tax as 
poor, with only 1% approving it. Even Social Democrat supporters were not 
impressed: 20% considered their record on tax to be poor, with only 2% considering it 
to be good12.
However while this clearly means that tax was a negative issue for the Social 
Democrats in 1973, whether it accounts for changes in votes since 1970, as distinct 
from being a permanent electoral disadvantage for the Social Democrats, depends upon 
whether either the salience of tax or the opinion balance on the Social Democrats' tax 
record changed between 1970 and 1973. Unfortunately this information is not 
available, but Särlvik argues that since the opinion balance was similar to that at the 
1968 election, when the Social Democrats won a majority, it cannot account for the 
change in voting support since then13. On the other hand, it could be argued that if tax 
became more salient compared to previous elections, these attitudes would have become 
activated and relevant to party choice even if their relative balance remained 
unchanged, whereas otherwise they would remain electorally dormant. However as 
figures for tax salience in 1968 are not available, no judgement can be made.
That is, there is no convincing evidence that tax played an important part in 
determining the 1973 election outcome.
11 Bo Särlvik (1977), 'Recent electoral trends in Sweden', in Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent 
Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, p.100.
12Bo Särlvik (1977), 'Recent electoral trends in Sweden', in Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent 
Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, p.102.
13Bo Särlvik (1977), 'Recent electoral trends in Sweden', in Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent 
Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, pp.98-99, 102.
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At the 1976 election the Social Democrats lost power for the first time in 40
years.
Between 1973 and 1976 the Riksdag tie made it difficult to govern Sweden 
effectively, as to pass legislation the government had to win the support of one or more 
bourgeois parties or resort to the drawing of lots, but Prime Minister Olof Palme was 
able to gain broad support for a number of measures, including an economic package, 
introduction of a fourth superannuation fund, worker co-determination, and tax and 
pension reform. Unemployment was kept low by large government subsidies to private 
industry, but a series of ’affairs' contributed to a growing sentiment of distrust of the 
government. These included the prosecution of Ingmar Bergman over tax matters; a 
mistake in the tax laws which meant that under certain circumstances one's total tax 
rate could exceed 100%, which received wide publicity when this happened to author 
Astrid Lindgren; and exploitative tax deductions claimed by leading Social Democrats14. 
Nuclear power became an issue when the Centre Party decided to call for its abolition 
for safety reasons, as did a plan devised by LO economist Rudolf Meidner to socialize 
industry over a period of years by appropriating the interest on 20% of company 
profits for union-controlled funds, later called wage-earner funds, in order to buy 
shares. This radical move towards socialism became especially controversial when it 
was adopted enthusiastically by the LO Congress in June 197615.
In 1974 marginal rates of income tax were lowered for middle incomes and 
raised for higher incomes, and certain deductions were widened in scope. This was 
financed by increases in the employer levy, which also absorbed the individual levy for 
health insurance16. In addition, property taxes on one-family houses were raised17.
14Olof Petersson (1978), 'The 1976 election: new trends in the Swedish electorate’, 
Scandinavian Political Studies, v. 1/2-3 (new series), pp. 110-111.
1 5Neil Elder (1977), 'The Swedish general election of 1976', Parliamentary Affairs, v.30/2, 
pp. 1 99-200.
1 6Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, p.45.
17OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, June 1975, OECD, Paris, p.55.
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These reforms facilitated wage negotiations, but were only passed by the Riksdag when 
the Liberals reluctantly supported them under threat of a new election (their opinion 
poll standing at the time was very bad)18. The VAT was lowered from 15% to 12% 
between April and September 1974, and abolished for residential constructions 
completed in 1974 and 197519, and in 1975 the Social Democrats, middle parties and 
LO agreed on a tax reform involving income tax cuts again financed by increases in 
social insurance levies and excises20. In addition, energy tax was reduced, and a special 
investment tax allowance was introduced to stimulate business21, but with the help of 
the lottery the bourgeois parties were able to reduce the employer levy22. The Social 
Democrats also proposed further cuts in income tax, again financed by higher employer 
social insurance levies, but legislation for this had not passed the Riksdag by the time 
the election took place in September23.
Between 1973 and 1976 the economy and real wage growth slowed, inflation 
rose, but unemployment dropped. Real per capita GDP increased by $189.01 per 
annum but only by $94.50 in election year, well below average. Prices rose 9.7% per 
annum and by 10.10% in election year, but unemployment dropped by 0.33% per 
annum and by 0.10% in election year. Real wages rose by 6.06% per annum, well 
above average, but only by 2.30% in election year, rather below average.
Taxation and expenditure growth accelerated considerably between 1973 and 
1976, and was well above the long-term average. In consequence, real post-tax income 
fell despite the growth in pre-tax income24.
18Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, p.45.
19OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, June 1975, OECD, Paris, p.53.
20Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, LiberLäromedel Lund, Stockholm, 
p.53.
21 OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1976, OECD, Paris, p.42.
22Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, p.285.
23Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svenska Skattehistorien, LiberLäromedel Lund, Stockholm, 
p.53.
24Douglas A. Hibbs Jr & Henrik Jess Madsen (1981), 'Public reactions to the growth of 
taxation and public expenditure’, World Politics, v.33, pp.416-417, 431-433.
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Table 4.3 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1973-1976
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Average annual changes in term
Central government: 
Total taxation 152.69 1.24
Direct taxation 128.71 1.26
Expenditure 138.57 1.11
General government: 
Total taxation 251 .12 1.90
Direct taxation 141 .47 1.16
Expenditure 300.59 2.48
Central government: 
Total taxation 151 .44
Election year changes
1.43
Direct taxation 84.49 0.83
Expenditure 86.65 0.72
General government: 
Total taxation 394.71 3.91
Direct taxation 128.64 1.20
Expenditure 275.20 2.57
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
The Social Democrat manifesto extolled the tax agreement with the unions as 
facilitating more peaceful wage negotiations, implying that it would be passed into law 
if they won the election, and asked rhetorically what the tax policy would be if the 
bourgeois parties won.
The tax policies of the middle parties were again fairly similar, with both 
promising to adjust the income tax scales for inflation and so cut tax for ordinary 
income earners plus, in the case of the Centre Party, for low income earners. In 
addition, the Centre Party promised to reform taxation on energy and raw materials so 
as to encourage their conservation, to shape capital taxation so as to facilitate the 
establishment of new firms and the transfer of family companies between generations,
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to improve tax equalization between communes, and to use tax reform itself as a means 
of combatting inflation, presumably via more wage-tax deals. The other Liberal tax 
promise was not to support any tax cuts which hit care for the weak in society. The 
Conservatives stated that the tax burden should not continue to increase, and that the 
rapid rise in employer taxation must be broken. They proposed that marginal rates of 
income tax should be reduced so that average wage-earners could keep at least half of 
their extra income, advocated tax deductions for childcare as a means of giving people 
freedom of choice between different forms of childcare, and argued that lower taxation 
was also desirable as a means of fighting inflation by facilitating wage negotiations. The 
Communists continued their policy of abolishing the VAT on food and raising tax on 
profits and capital, and once again proposed to replace the system of communal plus 
state income tax with a unified national system so as to permit greater progressivity at 
the lower end of the scale.
Opinion polls in early 1975 had favoured the Social Democrats25, but by early 
1976 the bourgeois parties held a comfortable lead, at one stage as much as 11%, 
although this gap closed somewhat as the election approached. Two major issues 
dominated the 1976 campaign. The first was the bourgeois attack on wage-earner 
funds, which was tied to a more general attack on the Social Democrats as the party of 
nationalization, bureaucracy and centralization. This dominated the first three weeks of 
the campaign, but on 25 August the second issue erupted onto the scene when Centre 
leader Thorbjörn Fälldin called for the ending of nuclear power by 1985, and appeared 
to make agreement to this a condition of his party's participation in any bourgeois 
government26. Unlike 1973, however, tax was not a major media issue.
The outcome of the election was that gains for the Conservatives and Liberals 
offset Centre party losses to result in a historic victory for the bourgeois parties, 
which then formed the first government without Social Democratic participation since 
the brief Farmers' Party interregnum in 1936.
25Bo Särivik (1977), 'Recent electoral trends in Sweden', in Scandinavia at the Polls: Recent 
Political Trends in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, ed. Karl H. Cerny, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, p. 119.
2®Neil Elder (1977), 'The Swedish general election of 1976', Parliamentary Affairs, v.30/2, 
pp.196-203.
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Table 4.4 Election results, Sweden 1976
Party 1976 vote Change since 1973
Social Democrats 42.7% -0.9%
Centre Party 24.1% -1.0%
Liberals 11.1% + 1.7%
Conservatives 15.6% + 1.3%
Communists 4.8% -0.5%
KDS 1.4% -0.4%
Socialist bloc 47.5% -1 .4%
Bourgeois bloc 50.8% + 2.0%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345.
According to the 1976 election study, changes in the composition of the 
electorate advantaged the bourgeois parties, while changes in participation were party 
neutral. Of people who voted at both elections, 19% changed parties between 1973 and 
1976, up from 16% in 1973. 4.9% switched from socialist to bourgeois, while only 
2.4% switched the other way. In party terms the main net voter flows were from the 
Social Democrats to the Centre Party and the Liberals, and from the Centre Party to the 
Liberals and Conservatives27.
In regard to explaining party change, Petersson reasoned that if an attitude is 
significantly more prevalent among voters who change parties than among stable 
voters, then that attitude may be related to party change. As changers from Social 
Democrat to Centre Party and Liberals were significantly more negative to state 
influence than voters who stayed with the Social Democrats, and changers from Social 
Democrat to Centre were significantly more negative to nuclear power than those who 
stayed, he concluded that the Social Democratic defeat was due to three factors: 
bureaucracy, the future ownership of private enterprise, and nuclear power. In 
addition, fully 53% of changers from Social Democrat to Centre fulfilled all four 
conditions for issue voting on nuclear power: they were opposed to it, knew that the 
Social Democrats supported it, knew that the Centre Party opposed it, and considered 
the issue important for their vote28.
270lof Petersson (1977), Vaiundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, pp.168, 164.
28Olof Petersson (1977), Vaiundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, pp. 111, 218-220.
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The 1976 election study contained several items which measured the opinion 
balance on various propositions about tax, that is, the percentages of voters agreeing 
less the percentages of voters disagreeing. Supporters of all parties were heavily in 
favour of cutting tax on low incomes, with an overall opinion balance of +84, and also 
favoured increasing equality in regard to incomes and working conditions, with an 
opinion balance of +70, although the balance in favour was less for bourgeois 
supporters and especially Conservatives than for socialist supporters. This Left-Right 
split was even more pronounced in regard to cutting employer levies, as although the 
overall balance was +12, socialist voters were on balance negative while bourgeois 
voters were positive. All parties' supporters apart from Conservative voters were 
against cutting taxes on high incomes, with an overall balance of -36. However voter 
cynicism towards parties and politicians continued to grow29.
Tax was a salient but not dominant election issue for voters: in answer to an 
open question on which issues voters considered to be important for their choice of 
party at the 1976 election, 9% of respondents mentioned tax, behind both energy and 
nuclear power 21% and Left/Right issues 13%, and level with family policy30. 
However the sensitivity of responses to question wording was highlighted by the fact 
that when asked about specific policy areas, 33% of respondents considered tax to be 
one of the most important issues for their party choice, ahead of employment 30%, 
prices 24%, and nuclear power 16%. A further 48% considered tax to be fairly 
important. A greater proportion of bourgeois voters than socialist voters were 
concerned with tax, and it was noticeable that those interviewed after the election were 
less likely to nominate tax than were those asked before the election, which Petersson 
saw as consistent with his view that 'everyday' issues such as tax were pushed into the 
background during the campaign. The voters most concerned with tax were stable 
Conservative supporters, fully 48% of whom considered it to be one of the most 
important issues for their party choice31.
Tax was again a positive issue for the bourgeois parties: the proportions of 
voters who thought that a bourgeois government would do well/badly on tax was 50- 
31%, compared with 46-49% for the Social Democrats' actual record, with bourgeois
29Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, pp.91, 258-259.
30Sören Holmberg, Jörgen Westerstähl & Karl Branzen (1977), Väljarna och kärnkraften, 
Liber, Sweden, as quoted in Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljarna i förändring, Liber, Stockholm, 
p.225.
31Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centraibyrän, Stockholm, pp.214-216.
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voters much more unequivocal on the issue. Similarly, 36% of respondents thought 
that tax would be lower under a bourgeois government (mainly bourgeois voters), 
18% thought it would be higher (mainly socialist voters), while 39% thought it would 
remain the same32.
Nevertheless, disapproval of the Social Democrats' handling of taxation dropped 
from 25% of respondents in 1973 to 18% in 1976, and fewer party changers than 
stable voters nominated tax as one of the most important issues for their party choice 
(24% compared to 29%). Thus Petersson concluded that tax as such could not explain 
the voting shift between the two elections despite the rapid tax increases and the 
salience of tax as an issue, except insofar as it may have had an indirect effect via the 
tax 'affairs' mentioned earlier33.
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Despite a split in the bourgeois government which resulted in the Liberals 
forming a minority government during the latter part of the term, the bourgeois 
parties narrowly won the 1979 election and re-formed a three-party coalition 
government.
Following the 1976 election the new bourgeois coalition government led by 
Centre leader Thorbjörn Fälldin extended paid holidays to 5 weeks, extended paid 
parental leave, and passed legislation against sex discrimination, but the Centre Party 
was forced to accept a new reactor start despite its anti-nuclear policy, and responded 
to threatened bankruptcies and mass unemployment with large-scale interventions, 
including nationalization of ship-building and steel34.
In October 1978 Fälldin resigned due to the refusal of the Liberals and 
Conservatives to agree to a referendum on nuclear power, and the three-party 
government was replaced by a minority Liberal government led by Ola Ullsten.
32Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, pp.208, 212.
33Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 1976, Statistiska 
Centralbyrän, Stockholm, pp.198, 215, 200.
3 4 Peter Walters (1983), 'Sweden’s public sector crisis, before and after the 1982 
elections', Government and Opposition, v.18/1, p.26.
However a referendum was scheduled for 1980 anyway when the Social Democrats 
reversed their previous opposition due to the Harrisburg nuclear accident.
Tax was controversial throughout the period. After the change of government in 
1976 the income tax cuts proposed by the previous government were extended further 
up the income scale, although higher tax rates applied to higher incomes, and were 
financed by increasing energy tax as well as the employer levy35. In addition, the 
investment allowance was extended, the VAT was increased, and in August 1977 the 
employer levy was cut36. In 1978 income tax rates were cut again, especially for 
middle income earners, this time without compensatory tax rises elsewhere37, while 
the petrol tax was raised and the general employers’ levy was abolished entirely38. In 
1979 tax indexation was introduced, having been decided upon in December 1977. 
There were also some additional reductions in marginal rates, although only half those 
originally proposed due to Centre Party opposition39. Furthermore, deductions were 
increased for pensioners' income and child maintenance40, the superannuation levy 
was raised, and legislation was passed to raise the occupational injury insurance levy 
on employers41. However another attempt by the Liberal government to further cut 
marginal rates of tax was defeated when the Social Democrats and Centre Party 
combined to oppose it42.
Between 1976 and 1979 the economy was flat, but improved slightly towards 
the end of the government's term. Real per capita GDP increased by only $70.76 per 
annum, but recovered to rise by $281.76 in election year, while inflation stayed high, 
with prices rising by 9.80% per annum and by 7.88% in election year. Unemployment 
rose by 0.18% of the workforce per annum but only by 0.03% in election year. Real 
wages rose by 1.09% per annum and by 1.46% in election year, well below average.
During their period in office the bourgeois parties delivered on their tax cut 
promises, as levels of central government taxation fell, but failed to cut expenditure to 
match. This led to serious problems with budget deficits.
35Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, p.48. 
36OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1978, OECD, Paris, pp.46-48. 
37Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, p.50.
38OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1979, OECD, Paris, pp.49-50. 
39Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, pp.50, 104. 
4qOECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1979, OECD, Paris, p.50.
41 OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1980, OECD, Paris, p.66. 
42Axei Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund, p.159.
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Table 4.5 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1976-79
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Average annual changes in term
Central government: 
Total taxation -1 1 1.07 -1 .39
Direct taxation -97.43 -1 .14
Expenditure 115.32 1.07
General government: 
Total taxation 11 1.65 0.85
Direct taxation 27.09 0.12
Expenditure 313.79 3.02
Election year changes
Central government: 
Total taxation -36.41 -1 .07
Direct taxation -7 .30 -0 .33
Expenditure 114.07 0.43
General government: 
Total taxation 61 .71 -0.87
Direct taxation 46.61 -0.20
Expenditure 305.08 1.62
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
A mail survey carried out in 1979 prior to the election asked what respondents 
needed personally in order to be better off in the broad sense, using parties' election 
promises as a base, and found that lower tax was considered very important by 37% 
and fairly important by 28%, a total of 65%, which implies that most Swedes really 
did want lower tax. In answer to the slightly different question of how society ought to 
be altered in order to make it better for everyone, 70% thought that cutting marginal 
rates of tax was important compared to only 1% who favoured raising them instead. 
36% thought cutting the employer levy was important, compared to 11% who favoured 
raising it. In addition, 90% considered action against tax cheating to be important, and 
50% considered income equalization to be important compared with only 6% who 
preferred to see less income equality. A desire for lower tax was especially frequent 
among Swedes who considered that they weren’t doing well in life. However only 35% 
wanted a binding referendum on taxation levels43.
43Gunnar Boalt & Sten Hultgren (1980), / Svenskarnas Ögon, LTs Förlag, Stockholm, pp.173, 
176, 177, 50, 84.
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A majority of supporters of every party except the Centre Party considered 
their own party's policy on marginal income tax rates to be the best, but majorities of 
only socialist and Conservative supporters considered their own party's policy on 
employer levies to be the best. On both these issues Conservatives were especially 
supportive of their own party. On economic equality and tax evasion majorities of only 
supporters of socialist parties considered their own parties' policies to be the best44.
Prospective vote changers appear to have been attracted by the Right on 
marginal tax and the employer levy, but by the Left on income equalization and tax 
evasion: of new supporters of each party, majorities of only Conservatives and Liberals 
supported their parties' policy on marginal tax, and majorities of only new 
Conservatives supported their party on employer levies. On income equalization 
majorities of only new Social Democrats and Communists supported their party's 
policy, while majorities of only Communists supported their new party on tax 
evasion45.
Expectations were clearly different for Social Democratic and bourgeois 
governments: 51% believed that a bourgeois government would be best to cut marginal 
rates of tax, and 73% believed it would be best to cut employer levies, but 51% 
considered that a Social Democratic government would be best to equalize incomes, and 
more people thought that a Social Democratic government would take steps against tax 
evasion than thought that a bourgeois government would46.
In its manifesto the Liberal minority government referred with pride to tax 
indexation and the cuts in marginal rates that had occurred since 1976, and promised 
further cuts to marginal rates of income tax with the aim of allowing people on 
ordinary incomes to keep at least half of their extra income, in order to restrain 
inflation, facilitate wage negotiations, encourage working, and discourage tax evasion. 
While conceding that it was not possible at the moment to reduce the total tax pressure, 
due to claims on the budget and to the budget deficit, the Liberals pledged to guard tax 
indexation, limit deductibility for losses, rationalize home taxation, reduce the 
combined marginal effects of tax and means-tested housing assistance, intensify the 
fight against economic crime, and establish a special law against leaving the country to 
avoid tax.
44Gunnar Boalt & Sten Hultgren (1980), / Svenskarnas Ögon, LTs Förlag, Stockholm, p.24. 
45Gunnar Boalt & Sten Hultgren (1980), / Svenskarnas Ögon, LTs Förlag, Stockholm, pp. 27- 
28.
46Gunnar Boalt & Sten Hultgren (1980), / Svenskarnas Ögon, LTs Förlag, Stockholm, pp.77- 
78.
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The Centre Party manifesto did not mention tax at all, but the Conservatives 
agreed with the Liberal aim of reducing marginal rates so that normal income earners 
were allowed to keep at least half of extra income, and stressed that tax must be 
lowered so as to make work and saving profitable, which would improve the will to 
work and thus productivity. To make this possible, lower tax rates would be financed 
by savings in central and local government rather than being balanced by additional 
taxation elsewhere. In addition, tax and allowances applying to families would be 
coordinated to prevent unreasonable marginal effects as income rises, and childcare 
costs would be made deductible in order to give people the freedom of choice to stay at 
home, and between different forms of childcare.
The opposition Social Democrats promised to create a more just distribution of 
income by, among other things, introducing a tax on production, which would make 
possible cuts in both national and local income tax, and pledged to fight tax evasion 
harder.
The Communists continued their past policy of promising to abolish VAT on food, 
increase taxation of capital and profits, and introducing a unified national income tax to 
replace the binary national-local system, but also agreed with the Social Democratic 
proposal to introduce a production tax. In addition, they proposed to transfer profits 
from large fortunes to a social fund.
Despite the incumbency of a Liberal minority government, the government 
alternatives offered to the Swedish electorate were, as usual, the Social Democrats and 
the bourgeois parties as a bloc47. In his opening campaign speech Social Democrat 
leader Olof Palme emphasized social welfare, employment and the economy, as did the 
Fälldin for the Centre Party and Ullsten for the Liberals to a slightly lesser extent, 
while Conservative leader Gösta Bohman stressed tax. The media emphasized 
employment and the economy, and nuclear power and energy, while tax was stressed 
only by the TV news and by the Conservative and Liberal party press48.
47Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans Wieslander (1984), Sverige 
efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, Stockholm, p.299.
48Kent Asp (1983), The struggle for the agenda: party agenda, media agenda and voter 
agenda in the 1979 Swedish election campaign', Communication Research, v.10/3, pp.337- 
338.
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The result of the 1979 election was extremely close, with postal votes tipping 
the balance for the bourgeois parties49. The biggest changes were within the bourgeois 
bloc, with the Conservatives gaining 4.7% while the Centre Party lost 6%.
Table 4.6 Election results, Sweden 1979
Party 1979 vote Change since 1976
Social Democrats 43.2% + 0.5%
Centre Party 18.1% -6 .0%
Liberals 10.6% -0 .5%
Conservatives 20.3% + 4.7%
Communists 5.6% + 0.8%
KDS 1.4% 0.0%
Socialist bloc 48.8% + 1.3%
Bourgeois bloc 49.0% - 1.8%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345.
According to the 1979 election survey, 18% of those who voted at both elections 
changed party since 1976, a slight drop compared with 1976. 3.4% switched from a 
bourgeois party to a socialist party, compared to only 1.9% from a socialist party to a 
bourgeois party, but the Social Democrats were disadvantaged by changes in both the 
composition of the electorate and in participation in voting. The main inter-bloc change 
was from the Centre Party to the Social Democrats, while within the bourgeois bloc the 
Centre Party lost votes to both the Liberals and the Conservatives, and the Liberals also 
lost votes to the Conservatives50.
Tax was an important media issue during the 1979 campaign, and the election 
survey found that 13% of respondents considered tax to be an important issue for their 
party choice, up from 9% from 1976, making it the third most important issue for 
party choice after energy and nuclear power 21% and employment 14%. For 
Conservative voters it was by far the most important issue51.
Tax was a particularly important aspect of the profiles of both the Social 
Democrats and the Conservatives, but evaluations depended upon whether the question
49Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, p.26.
50Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, Chapter 2.
51Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, pp.63-66.
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was open, leaving it up to respondents whether to mention tax, or whether it specified 
tax as one of the alternatives:
Table 4.7 Party profiles on tax, Sweden 1979
Party
Open question 
% pos % neg % diff
Specific question 
% pos % neg % diff
Social Democrats 3 8 - 5 26 23 + 3
Centre* . - - 1 1 8 + 3
Liberals 2 2 0 1 4 9 + 5
Conservatives 1 3 8 + 5 26 27 - 1
Communists 7 1 + 6 7 1 3 - 6
Source Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, 
pp.92-93, 104.
* The number of voters mentioning Centre Party tax policy in response to the open 
question was insignificant, that is, less than 3%.
The difference between the figures for the open and specific questions can be 
explained, first, by the fact that it is hardly surprising that more people took a 
position on each parties' tax policy when it was drawn to their attention than when it 
wasn't, and, second, by the theory that it was voters most concerned with tax who 
mentioned it without being prompted, and that these voters were either strongly 
against tax or strongly for tax progressivity. These voters would also presumably be 
more likely to switch parties on tax than other voters, although many would already 
vote Conservative or Communist. Voters for whom other issues were more important, 
however, were less favourable to both these extreme positions. Another reason why 
respondents to the closed question were less favourable to the Communists' policy may 
have been that in answers to the open question respondents tended to refer in particular 
to their policy of abolishing the VAT on food, while the specific question referred to 
their tax policy as a whole. Conservative and Communist supporters were most solid in 
support of their party's tax policy, and evaluations tended to be polarized by bloc: 
socialist but not bourgeois supporters tended to approve the Social Democratic tax 
policy, whereas the reverse was true for the Conservatives' tax policy52.
In regard to specific taxation issues, only 27% supported cutting tax on high 
incomes while 60% opposed it53, a similar margin to 1976, but a survey carried out
52Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, pp.92-104.
53Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, p.228.
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by Olof Petersson and Henry Valen found that a large majority favoured reducing taxes 
on low incomes and further equalizing incomes in general54. Only Conservative voters 
were on balance in favour of cutting tax on high incomes, although the opposition of 
Liberal voters to this proposal declined substantially between 1976 and 1979. In 
addition, 44% favoured limiting the deduction for mortgage interest rates as against 
36% who didn't55.
Another development at the 1979 election was that mistrust and cynicism 
towards politicians and parties increased again among supporters of all parties except 
Communists, this being only tenuously linked to whether their own party was in power 
and to dissatisfaction with their party's policies56.
In regard to which factors were important for party choice, Holmberg argues 
that if changers value their old party's policy in a certain area as less attractive than 
their new party’s policy to a significantly greater extent than do voters who stay with 
that old party, then this policy is a factor in party change. On this basis he concludes 
that for changers between the blocs, tax policy and Left-Right policies were important 
for changers from Social Democrat to Liberal, while Left-Right policies, nuclear 
energy policy, and policies towards different socio-economic classes were important 
for changers from Centre to Social Democrat. Within blocs, tax policy was important 
for changers from Centre and Liberal to Conservative, while Left-Right policies were 
important for Liberal to Conservative and for Social Democrat to Communist, policy 
towards classes for Centre to Liberal and for Liberal to Conservative, and nuclear 
policy for Centre to Conservative and Liberal, and from Social Democrat to 
Communist57.
These findings, plus the greater salience of tax as a public issue compared to 
197658 and its being a media issue when it wasn't in 1976, plus the gains made on tax 
by the Liberals from the Social Democrats and, within the bourgeois bloc, by the 
Conservatives with their definite low-tax profile, imply that an electorally significant
54Reported in Neil Elder, A.H. Thomas & D. Arter (1988), The Consensual Democracies? The 
Government and Politics of the Scandinavian States, revised edition, Martin Robertson, 
Oxford, p.191.
55Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, pp. 257, 262, 228.
56Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, pp.163-174.
57Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, pp.388-390.
58Sören Holmberg (1981), Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, p.65.
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proportion of voters tended to gravitate towards less tax and away from high tax and/or 
the Social Democrats' proposed new tax on production. Perhaps the high profile of 
political conflict over tax both made tax a media issue and made it clearer to bourgeois 
voters that the Conservatives were the party with the strongest line on lowering tax, 
while anti-tax Social Democrats opted for the Liberals instead. Alternatively (or as 
well), the explanation given by Särlvik for the 1973 election may apply: economic 
(and political) circumstances may have contributed to growing disillusionment with 
the power of government to deliver, and thus decreased readiness to pay the tax 
necessary to finance its activities.
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Following another period during which the bourgeois coalition government split 
again, the Social Democrats returned to power at the 1982 election.
After the 1979 election the three-party coalition government was re-formed 
with Centre leader Thorbjörn Fälldin again as Prime Minister, and in March 1980 the 
consultative referendum on nuclear energy resulted in a decision to phase out nuclear 
power stations.
However in May 1981 the Conservatives left the government due to their 
rejection of a tax reform agreement between the Liberals, Centre Party and Social 
Democrats, although they agreed to support a Centre-Liberal government, again led by 
Fälldin. Thus while the government pushed through its tax policies with the help of the 
Social Democrats, it passed its economic legislation with help from the Conservatives. 
Also during this period the Green Party was formed, the Social Democratic congress 
officially adopted the introduction of wage-earner funds as party policy, and 
controversy between Social Democrats and Conservatives over East-West relations was 
fanned by the discovery of a Soviet submarine aground inside Swedish territorial 
waters. In 1982 unemployment reached 3%, the budget deficit reached 82 billion 
kronor, and a decision to remove sick leave payments for the first few days of absence 
from work was met by determined opposition, including strike action.
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The first tax change made by the new government was to raise energy taxes in 
December 197959, while in 1980 a supplementary income tax rebate for medium 
income earners was introduced, VAT was increased in order to dampen demand, and 
excises were increased. In December 1980 marginal rates of income tax were cut for 
middle incomes in order to facilitate wage negotiations, the system for computing the 
index regulating tax brackets was altered, and the extra allowance for pensions was 
increased. In addition, a special tax deduction for business investment within certain 
periods was introduced, and the tax on dividends held for more than two years was 
reduced60.
In April 1981 the controversial tax agreement was reached between the 
Liberals, Centre Party and Social Democrats. This was passed by the Riksdag in June 
1982, and included cuts in marginal rates to 50% for most full-time working 
taxpayers, a review of tax indexation, and limitations on deductions for debt. It was to 
be fully financed by higher employer levies or by the introduction of a production tax, 
and was planned to come into effect in 1983. Later in 1981 VAT was cut by 2%, the 
Conservatives having blocked a cut of 3.5%, and the basic deduction for local income 
tax was reduced61, while in 1982 excises on energy, oil, petrol and alcohol were 
raised62.
Between 1979 and 1982 Sweden was hard hit by the oil crisis, and industries 
such as shipbuilding and steel declined in competitiveness on world markets63. Rea! 
per capita GDP increased by only $75.07 per annum and by $38.48 in election year, 
while prices increased by 11.4% per annum and by 9.45% in election year. Meanwhile 
unemployment rose by 0.28% of the workforce per annum and by 0.59% in election 
year, and real wages actually fell by 0.34% per annum and by 0.76% in election year.
During this period total taxation grew much more slowly than average, and 
levels of central government direct taxation fell, as they had in the previous electoral 
term. However expenditure again continued to grow much more strongly than average, 
which led to burgeoning budget deficits and foreign debt.
59OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1980, OECD, Paris, p.67.
60O£:CD Economic Surveys - Sweden, June 1981, OECD, Paris, pp.49-50.
61 OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, July 1982 , OECD, Paris, pp.55-56.
62OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, February 1984, OECD, Paris, p.52.
63Olof Ruin (1983), The 1982 Swedish election: the re-emergence of an old pattern in a new 
situation', Electoral Studies, v .2/2, p.166.
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Table 4.8 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1979-1982
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
7.92 -0 .0 8
Direct taxation -36 .82 -0 .45
Expenditure 124.28 1.10
General government: 
Total taxation 47.90 0.11
Direct taxation - 23 .94 - 0 . 43
Expenditure 242.72 2.11
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
21.44 0.14
Direct taxation -9 .13 -0 .1 2
Expenditure 160.97 1.58
General government: 
Total taxation 1.92 - 0 .18
Direct taxation 30.29 0.23
Expenditure 265.22 2.55
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
Between November 1981 and March 1982 a tax attitude survey found that 
expressed attitudes to tax levels varied significantly according to the question asked:
Table 4.9 Attitudes to tax ievel, Sweden 1981-82
Discontented Balance satisfied 
% %
The tax level is too high* 83 -8 3
Marginal rates 82 -7 0
Taxes should be reduced at all costs 54 - 1 1
Taxes are so high it is difficult to make ends meet 65 -31
In proportion to work effort my income after tax
is satisfactory 39 + 1 2
Given State benefits for citizens, taxes not too high 
Respondents own tax reasonable given benefits
39 + 1 7
received from the community 35 + 27
Source Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, p.23.
* The opinion balance here is not strictly comparable with the others, because for this 
question alone there was an intermediate alternative. The full figures are 'too high' 
83%, 'reasonably high' 15%, 'too low’ 0%.
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Hadenius concluded from this that "it is self-evident that people's attitude to tax 
pressure is divided among different cognitive levels. When the reasoning remains on a 
general level, the majority regards the tax burden as something negative. But when the 
problem is reduced to a more concrete level, people tend to take a more favourable 
view. And they are most positive when the argument acquires a more personal touch". 
Thus tax discontent appears to depend partly on the degree to which the fiscal 
connection between tax and expenditure is made, so that according to Hadenius those 
who want tax cuts should keep the debate as general and non-specific as possible, while 
those wanting to retain or increase tax levels should "bring people's interest to bear on 
the benefits (the reforms) which the community can offer by means of taxation"64.
Compared with the tax compliance study carried out in 1969, Hadenius found 
that dissatisfaction with marginal rates of income tax had increased, but that in other 
respects taxpayers were less dissatisfied in 1981-82 than in 1969:
Table 4.10 Changes in tax discontent, Sweden 1969 to 1981-82
1 969 
%
1 9 81 -82  Change 
% %
Marginal rates of tax 70 84 + 1 4
Tax must be reduced at all costs 63 53 - 1 0
Given social benefits, tax is too high 54 38 - 1 6
Own tax unreasonable, given benefits received 43 37 - 6
Sources Joachim Vogel (1974), 'Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an
interpretation of recent survey data', National Tax Journal, v.27, pp.501-502; Axel 
Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, p.23. The 1981-82 figures 
are not identical with those in Table 4.14 because non-taxpayers have been excluded in 
order to render the two sets of data more fully comparable.
Hadenius’ explanation for this was that the increased dissatisfaction with 
marginal rates was related to the steep increases in marginal rates put through in the 
early 1970s, which by 1981 even the Social Democrats were prepared to reduce, 
while the increased benefits since 1969 had offset in people's minds the increased 
overall level of taxation. In addition, at the time the survey was taken expenditure far 
exceeded taxation: people were getting more than they were paying for65.
64Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp.11-12. 
65Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp.23-24.
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Approaching the issue of tax discontent from another angle, Hadenius also asked 
whether a campaign against taxes should be started in Sweden, and found Swedes almost 
evenly divided: 47% were in favour while 49% were opposed. However if a tax 
referendum were to be held, 54% expressed the intention to vote for a major reduction 
in tax, while a further 18% said they would vote for a minor reduction, making a total 
of 72% who would vote for tax reductions. Only 2% would vote for an increase. If they 
knew for certain that tax cuts would lead to a deterioration of social services used by 
them personally, however, only 40% would still vote for tax reduction. Again 
perception of the fiscal connection seems crucial, and knowledge of this was fairly good 
when attention was drawn to it: 66% thought that tax reductions would lead to service 
reductions, compared with only 28% who thought that tax could be reduced without 
cutting services. However in general attitudes to taxation appeared to be kept 
cognitively separate from attitudes to expenditure66.
Taking yet another tack, Hadenius found that 37% of respondents said that if a 
new anti-tax party emerged, they would consider voting for it, while 57% wouldn't, 
although this result is difficult to interpret in view of the fact that there was already 
an avowedly anti-tax party which retained credibility on tax due to not having had the 
opportunity for over 70 years to lose it through having its policies put into effect, 
namely the Conservatives67.
Despite the importance of the fiscal connection in softening anti-tax attitudes, 
Swedes were far from fully satisfied with the purposes to which their taxes were put: 
52% considered that a fairly high proportion of taxes went to meaningless uses, with 
only 6% disagreeing, and 63% agreed that revenues were used wastefully, compared to 
only 32% who disagreed. Similarly, 73% of respondents agreed that social reforms had 
gone so far that, in the future, State benefits and support for citizens should be reduced 
rather than increased, compared with only 25% who disagreed. When asked whether 
expenditure in a number of areas should be increased or decreased, Swedes generally 
favoured increases, especially on measures to retain or create jobs, but on balance 
preferred to cut expenditure on administration, defence, housing allowances, social 
assistance, foreign aid, and culture68.
66Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp.124, 136-141.
67Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, p.136.
68Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp.139-141, 85.
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Furthermore, 53% considered that the economy would improve if taxes were 
cut, compared to only 3% who thought that tax rises would lead to economic 
improvement69.
In addition, a widespread commitment to income equalization coexisted with a 
commonly held view that the tax system was unfair: 70% agreed that the tax system 
should contribute to equalization of incomes, with just 13% disagreeing, but only 16% 
thought that the tax system was fair, compared with 48% who thought it unfair. 
Levellers were comparatively less discontented with tax, as one would expect, while 
those considering the tax system to be unfair were more discontented with tax in 
general70.
In a fairly direct test of the degree to which Swedes were motivated by their own 
economic self-interest, as opposed to concern for others, Hadenius found that 
unashamed economic rational actors outnumbered real or pretended altruists: 38% of 
respondents were prepared to say that they preferred taxes to go mainly to purposes 
which they themselves benefited from, while only 22% stated their opposition to this. 
Not surprisingly, this 'tax egoism', as Hadenius terms it, was clearly linked to tax 
discontent, especially with marginal taxes, and with finding it difficult to make ends 
meet after tax71.
When respondents were asked whether specific types of taxes were too high, 
Hadenius found income tax and VAT the most unpopular, and taxes on tobacco and alcohol 
the least unpopular:
Table 4.11 Discontent with specific taxes, Sweden 1981-82
Discontented
%
Balance satisfied 
%
Income tax 78 -7 7
VAT 78 -7 6
Energy taxes 71 -6 7
Company taxes 46 -3  1
Inheritance and property taxes 39 -2 2
Tobacco and alcohol taxes 31 + 3
Source Axel Hadenius, Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden 1986, p.136.
69Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, p. 141.
70Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp. 141, 48.
71 Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp. 141, 50.
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On the basis of this, Hadenius tentatively concluded that the most unpopular 
taxes are those with the greatest economic volume, rather than the most visible or 
those that affect the most number of people. This view is further supported by the fact 
that when respondents were asked which tax should foremost be reduced, 36% specified 
income tax (18% national income tax, 18% local income tax) while 30% specified the 
VAT. Only 4% specified other taxes72.
Factor analysis of the answers to the various questions revealed three 
underlying dimensions to responses: a general tax discontent dimension, which was 
strongly linked with dissatisfaction with income tax; a consumption tax dimension, 
which Hadenius interpreted as approval/disapproval of the price-increasing effects of 
consumption taxes such as VAT, taxes on alcohol and tobacco, and energy taxes; and a 
company and property tax dimension73.
When additive indices based on these were related to a wide range of measures of 
socio-economic characteristics, political attitudes, and political resources, the 
strongest association by far was found to be between Right (bourgeois) party sympathy 
and discontent with corporate and wealth taxes, with a somewhat lesser association 
between Right party sympathy and general tax discontent. Other factors linked with 
general tax discontent were youth, a low opinion of politicians and authorities, and the 
conviction that tax reduction would not impair public services. Discontent with 
consumption taxes was linked mainly with low education, while discontent with 
corporate and wealth taxes was linked with improving living standards, opposition to 
social reforms and benefits, and an interest in tax rules as well as Right party 
preference. Hadenius' conclusion was that aversion to taxes is better explained by 
political attitudes than by the socio-economic characteristics that a self-interest 
theory of attitudes to taxation would suggest74.
In its election manifesto, the Centre Party, in coalition with the Liberals as the 
incumbent government, argued that tax should be designed according to ability to pay 
and so as to encourage work incentive, and promised to carry out the agreed tax reform 
and to consider further reform. In addition it pledged to review marginal effects due to 
income limits for fees and grants, maintain the communal tax equalization system, and, 
in the longer term, test a tax system in which only consumption was taxed. Their
72Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp. 16-17, 136-137.
73Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp.19-20.
74Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, pp.57-60.
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partners the Liberals also pledged to complete the agreed tax reform, and proposed 
further cuts to marginal rates and tougher measures against tax evasion.
The Conservatives again had the most determinedly low-tax platform, attacking 
the Social Democrats' high tax policy and especially the idea of extra taxes on 
production. In their manifesto it was argued that the tax burden must be lowered in 
order to encourage work incentive, savings and enterprise, and that the marginal rate 
for the overwhelming majority of taxpayers should be 50%. They also stated that 
inflation should not raise taxes by stealth, implying support for indexation, and that 
there should be a right for tax deductibility for losses. In addition, they maintained that 
family taxation should take account of the extra costs of children and that childcare 
costs should be deductible in order to give the freedom to stay home or to choose among 
different forms of child care. Finally, a ceiling would be placed on local income tax. 
These tax cuts would be financed by government savings, and the consequence of this 
would be a diminished merry-go-round of the government taking money from 
taxpayers and then giving it back in other forms.
The Social Democrats' tax policy going into the 1982 campaign was for rises in 
both the VAT, reversing the recent cut, and in the employer levy in order to finance 
promised expenditure on sickness benefits, unemployment insurance, pension 
indexation and grants to communes.
The Communists once again recommended an end to VAT on food, and argued for 
the unjust 1981 tax agreement to be cancelled. They also advocated the introduction of a 
turnover tax on stocks and share trading, and tougher action against cheating on tax.
Prominent issues during the 1982 election campaign included the wage-earner 
funds, unemployment, social security, tax, and the budget deficit, and the newly formed 
Green Party received considerable media attention despite the environment not being an 
important issue. The bourgeois parties and business organizations claimed that the 
Social Democrat proposal to introduce wage-earner funds would lead inevitably to 
socialism, while the Social Democrats claimed that the bourgeois parties' record in 
government demonstrated that they were unfit for office and pointed to their disunity, 
the foreign debt, the increase in unemployment, and cutbacks to the welfare state. 
While the bourgeois parties advocated cuts in government expenditure in order to 
control the deficit, the Social Democrats argued for expansion and new investment, and
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promised to restore cuts in sickness benefits, childcare, pensions, and unemployment 
insurance, financed by rises in tax in order not to further increase the budget deficit. 
Within the bourgeois bloc the parties disagreed over the extent of expenditure cuts and 
over the 1981 tax agreement75.
At the 1982 election the vote polarized: both the Social Democrats and the 
Conservatives gained at the expense of the two middle parties, and the Social Democrats 
were returned to power.
Table 4.12 Election results, Sweden 1982
Party 1982 vote Change since 1979
Social Democrats 45.6% + 2.4%
Centre Party 15.5% -2.6%
Liberals 5.9% -4.7%
Moderates 23.6% + 3.3%
Communists 5.6% 0.0%
KDS 1.9% + 0.5%
Greens 1.6% + 1.6%
Socialist bloc 51.2% + 2.4%
Bourgeois bloc 45.0% -4.0%
Source Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander 
(1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, Bonnier, 
Stockholm, pp.344-345.
According to the 1982 election study, 20% of people who voted in both 1979 
and 1982 changed their party choice, continuing the steady upward trend in volatility. 
Although the Social Democrats were slightly disadvantaged by changes in the 
composition of the electorate, this was outbalanced by gains due to changes in 
participation, and 3.6% of those who voted in both 1979 and 1982 switched from the 
bourgeois bloc to the socialist bloc, compared with only 1.3% who switched the other 
way. The biggest net gains among party changers for the Social Democrats came from 
the Centre Party (1.4%) and the Liberals (1.0%), while within the bourgeois bloc the 
biggest vote flows were to the Conservatives from the Centre Party (1.4%) and from 
the Liberals (2.0%)76.
75Olof Ruin (1983), The 1982 Swedish election: the re-emergence of an old pattern in a new 
situation’, Electoral Studies, v.2/2, pp.168-169.
7®Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, pp.20-31.
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The election study found that evaluations of party policies on tax were similar to
1979:
Table 4.13 Party profiles on tax, Sweden 1982
Party % pos
Open question 
% neg % diff
Specific question 
% pos % neg % diff
Social Democrats 1 5 - 4 27 2 1 + 6
Centre 0 2 - 2 1 4 1 1 + 3
Liberals 1 2 - 1 1 4 1 1 + 3
Conservatives 7 5 + 2 25 26 - 1
Communists 8 0 + 8 5 1 2 - 7
Source Soren Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm,
pp.52, 193.
As in 1979, respondents who mentioned tax without prompting tended to favour 
the extreme parties, while evaluations in response to the specific questions favoured 
the parties in the middle, and especially the Social Democrats. There was a small shift 
between 1979 and 1982 towards the Social Democrats and away from the Liberals.
In response to questions on specific tax matters, voters approved of the 1981 
tax agreement by a margin of 39% to 22%, and of limiting tax deductions for home- 
owners by 46% to 36%. 48% of voters fulfilled the conditions for issue voting in that 
they both had a view on the tax agreement and knew where the parties stood77.
Compared to 1979, cynicism and mistrust of politicians and parties, which 
Hadenius had found to be linked to tax discontent, diminished slightly but remained 
high78.
Tax did not appear to be an important issue either for the media or for voters, 
being named as important for party choice by only 6% of respondents, compared with 
13% in 1979. Instead the most important issues were wage-earner funds 22%, 
employment 21%, economic policy 10%, and social policy and health 9%79.
77Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, pp. 166, 163, 190- 
191.
78Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, p.57.
79Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, p.225.
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In order to assess the electoral impact of issues, Holmberg utilized Petersson's 
approach of comparing views on which issues were important for the party choice of 
each party’s stable voters with the views of former voters who opted in 1982 for other 
parties. On the basis of this method, Holmberg concluded that the most important issues 
were the wage-earner funds and employment, followed by tax, the economy, sickness 
benefits and nuclear power. Tax in particular was important for voters who changed 
from Social Democrat, Centre Party and Liberals to Conservative, as well as for stable 
Conservative voters80.
Holmberg also used another method to estimate the potential significance of a 
given issue for a person's vote, reasoning that the more a party's 1979 voters were 
divided in 1982 on that party's policy on a given issue, the more likely it was that this 
policy was related to party change. Thus Holmberg examined where each party's 1979 
voters had gone in 1982, and for each of these groups measured the difference between 
the 1982 vote for each party of those who approved of a given policy and the 1982 vote 
for each party those who disapproved of that policy. These differences were then 
summed and used as an indicator of the potential vote-changing effect of that issue: the 
higher the score, the greater the potential effect81.
According to this method, the main issues on which disagreement with one's 
1979 party were potentially linked to change in party choice were the wage-earner 
funds, the 1981 tax agreement, the introduction of qualification days for sickness 
benefit, the size of the public sector, and nuclear power. Assuming that these links 
represent real issue voting (which overestimates the effect, as many other factors may 
also be involved), the Social Democrat net gain on employment was 1.2% and on 
qualification days 1.6%, while the voter streams to and from the Social Democrats on 
the wage-earner funds almost balanced. In regard to tax, the voter streams appear to 
have been mainly within the bourgeois bloc: 1.2% of the electorate moved from the 
Liberals and Centre Party to the Conservatives82.
It would appear from the election study evidence that issue voting on tax led to 
Conservative gains both from the Social Democrats, although this effect was rather 
small, and, to a considerably greater extent, from the middle parties, and that 
disapproval of the 1981 tax agreement between the Liberals, Centre Party and Social 
Democrats may have been a principal reason for this.
80Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, pp.228-230.
81Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, pp.200-201.
82Sören Holmberg (1984), Väljare i förändring, Liber Förlag, Stockholm, pp.202, 213-216.
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4.2 Austral ia  1974-1983
The first Left government in Australia for 23 years was forced to the polls 
twice in three years by a Right-controlled Senate, losing the second time in a landslide 
in 1975, following which the Right held office until 1983.
1 9 7 4
At its first election after gaining power in 1972, the Whitlam Labor 
government was returned despite a small swing against it.
Following the 1972 election the new Labor government abolished conscription, 
withdrew troops from Vietnam, reduced the voting age to 18, and increased social 
security pensions and benefits. At the same time, relations with the predominantly 
non-Labor State governments were poor, distrust between Labor and the security 
services was highlighted when Attorney-General Lionel Murphy personally took part 
in a dawn raid on the headquarters of Australia's counter-intelligence organization 
ASIO, a referendum to give the Federal government power over prices and incomes was 
lost, and a Constitutional Convention failed to agree on changes to the Constitution. In 
April 1974 the opposition-controlled Senate blocked Supply following claims that the 
government acted improperly in appointing DLP leader Senator Gair as ambassador to 
Ireland, and Whitlam called an election for both Houses of Parliament for 18 May83.
During its 18 months in office the Whitlam government abolished the lower 
rate of company tax, reduced income tax deductions for land tax and rates, made profits 
on property sold within one year of purchase taxable as income, reduced or abolished 
various tax concessions for business, and increased excises and duties on brandy, 
spirits, tobacco and fuel84. In 1974 the government announced that means-tested 
income tax deductions for interest paid on housing loans would be introduced, but these 
did not come into effect until 1975.
During this period the economy grew more strongly than between 1969 and 
1972, but inflation accelerated: real per capita GDP increased by $217.83 per annum 
and by $166.15 in election year, both well above average, but prices increased by 
11.20% per annum and by 11.89% in election year. However unemployment fell by
83Unless otherwise indicated, general historical and economic information is taken from the 
Political Chronicle of The Australian Journal of Politics and History.
841973-74 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
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0.43% of the workforce per annum and by 0.23% in election year, and real wages 
increased by 2.06% per annum and by 2.21% in election year, above the overall 
average.
Levels of taxation and expenditure grew significantly faster than between 1969 
and 1972, but while taxation growth was well above average, especially relative to 
GDP, expenditure growth remained close to the long-term average.
Table 4.14 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1972-74
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
84.64 0.52
Direct taxation 78.72 0.63
Expenditure 70.99 0.37
General government: 
Total taxation 110.54 0.73
Direct taxation 78.72 0.63
Expenditure 98.59 0.59
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
92.51 0.76
Direct taxation 86.53 0.82
Expenditure 76.49 0.57
General government: 
Total taxation 117.01 0.98
Direct taxation 86.53 0.82
Expenditure 103.77 0.82
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
In his 1974 policy speech Gough Whitlam appealed to the electorate for a 'fair 
go’, that is, a chance to fulfill the promises made in 1972, and on tax promised a 
restructuring of the taxation system, a review of the respective roles of the 
Commonwealth and the States in taxation, the establishment of a Board of Relief to hear
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applications for relief from liability for estate duty due to hardship, a reduction in 
estate duty on the matrimonial home where going to the surviving spouse, and an 
extension of tax deductions for people with dependent relatives living overseas85.
New Liberal leader Billy Snedden's policy speech focussed on inflation, tax cuts, 
and a general matching strategy rather than presentation of a stark alternative. 
Snedden attacked Labor's record on tax, presenting figures to support his claim that 
taxes were the highest in Australia's history and still rising, accused Labor of using 
inflation to drive people into higher income tax brackets, and outbid Labor on tax cuts 
by promising to reduce tax by $600 million. Doug Anthony for the Country Party 
argued that rising taxes had made voters worse off, that the tax on insurance companies 
had reduced bonuses, and that the tax deduction for superannuation was under threat.
Despite conservative concern over tax, it did not seem to be a very important 
issue to the public: an Age poll of 25 marginal electorates published shortly before the 
election found that 38% considered inflation to be the most important issue, 18% 
education, and 11% morality of government86. A Morgan Gallup poll published on 
election day itself found that when voters were asked to name the three most important 
problems, the top three policy areas mentioned were inflation, health and education87. 
Tax was not listed in either poll.
However tax was an media issue for the first time in the period under 
examination: 7% of front page stories in the five major quality capital city morning 
newspapers concerned tax. All these papers supported the Coalition88.
The election outcome was that Labor was returned with a reduced majority in 
the House of Representatives, but without a majority in the Senate even though all the 
DLP Senators lost their seats.
85Information on party appeals to the electorate 1974-1987 by the Labor, Liberal and 
Country parties is taken directly from the relevant policy speeches.
86 The Age, 8 May 1974.
87 The Bulletin, 18 May 1974.
88Based on a survey of front page stories during the last 10 days of each election campaign 
1958-1987 in The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Courier-Mail, The Advertiser, and 
The West Australian. For more details see Chapter 9.
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Table 4.15 Election results, Australia 1974
Party 1974 vote Change since 1972
Labor 49.3% -0.3%
Liberals 34.9% + 2.8%
Country Party 10.8% + 1.4%
Liberal-Country Coalition 45.6% + 4.1%
Australia Party 2.3% -0.1%
DLP 1.4% -3.8%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
According to an exit survey of six swinging Sydney electorates the main reason 
for voting Labor was that "they deserve a fair go", and Labor was considered to have 
better policies than the Liberals on issues such as health, education, and the urban 
environment, which were considered by respondents to be important at this election. 
Even though the Liberals stressed inflation as an issue favourable to them, Labor was 
still marginally regarded as being better able to control it89.
Nevertheless, a poll taken in August 1974, three months after the election, 
suggests that tax aversion increased markedly between 1969 and 1974:
Table 4.16 Opinions on tax and social services, Australia 1969 and 1974,
Favoured option: 1 969 
%
1 974
%
Change
%
Reduced taxes 26 56 + 30
Increased social services 71 36 -3 5
Can’t say 3 8 + 5
Balance favouring tax cuts -4 5 + 20 + 65
Source Don Aitkin (1982) Stability and Change in Australian Politics, ANU Press, 
Canberra, p.375; Morgan Gallup Poll Findings 135-136, August 1974.
Possible reasons for this enormous change include antagonism towards the 
relatively high growth of taxation between 1972 and 1974 (tax grew much more 
slowly between 1969 and 1972), especially as expenditure did not grow as rapidly;
89lan McNair (1977), 'Three years of Labor - Some reasons why Labor was elected and 
defeated', Australian Quarterly, September, pp.95,99.
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the expansion of social services that took place over those 5 years by both Coalition and 
Labor governments, which may have led many to conclude that social service increases 
were no longer so important; an increased emphasis by the Coalition in opposition on 
attacking Labor over tax; and the emergence of tax as a media issue for the first time 
since the 1950s, which may have awakened dormant anti-tax feelings.
It is possible that this turnaround of opinion on tax affected the 1972 and/or 
the 1974 election result, given that it is unlikely to have happened entirely in the 
three months between the 1974 election and the poll, and depending on to what extent 
the change took place before and after 1972, but as there is no corroborating evidence 
this must be considered a possibility only.
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After being dismissed from office by the Governor-General in November 1975 
following the blocking of Supply by the Senate, Labor went down to its biggest defeat 
since 1966.
By the end of 1974 inflation and unemployment were at their highest levels for 
decades, and the political debate increasingly focussed on the economy. Nevertheless a 
joint sitting of the House of Representatives and the Senate passed legislation that had 
been rejected by the Senate in the government's previous term of office, including 
legislation to establish a universal health insurance scheme. However conflict 
continued with the States, and the conduct of government itself became increasingly 
controversial, especially when it was revealed that the government had been attempting 
to secure massive 'short-term' loans from Arab oil money through somewhat 
unorthodox intermediaries. In June 1975 Jim Cairns was demoted from the Treasury 
post over a letter of authorization to one of these intermediaries, and sacked from the 
Ministry altogether in July for misleading Parliament over the issue. By this time 
polls showed the government well behind the opposition parties, and a by-election 
resulted in a swing against the government of almost 14%.
On 15 October, a day after the forced resignation of Minerals and Energy 
Minister Rex Connor for misleading Parliament about his loan raising activities, new 
Liberal leader Malcolm Fraser announced that the opposition-controlled Senate would 
delay the passage of Supply until an election was called. However this time Prime 
Minister Whitlam refused to call an election, on the rationale that governments were 
properly made and broken in the House of Representatives rather than the Senate. This
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stand-off continued for a month, accompanied by increased support for Labor in 
opinion polls90, but on 11 November Governor-General Sir John Kerr unexpectedly 
dismissed Whitlam, and appointed Fraser as Prime Minister on condition that he call an 
election as soon as possible. As a result the Senate passed Supply, and the election was 
set for 13 December.
In the short period between the elections of 1974 and 1975 the main tax 
changes were a restructuring of the personal income tax rate scale to make it more 
progressive, the temporary introduction of a 10% surcharge on property income, a 
reduction in education concessions but an increase in mortgage interest rate 
concessions, and the introduction of a tax rebate for low income families. In addition, 
more fringe benefits were made taxable, a new capital gains tax was announced but not 
followed through, a new tax on liquefied petroleum gas for road vehicles was 
introduced, excises on tobacco, beer and spirits were increased, and duties on imported 
vehicles were increased while sales tax on motor vehicles was reduced. Furthermore, 
the private company tax rate was increased and then reduced, mining concessions were 
reduced, estate duty conditions were eased, and an accelerated depreciation allowance 
was introduced. In the 1975 Budget, which was only passed by the Senate once Fraser 
had become Prime Minister, the personal income tax system was restructured into 7 
steps between 20% and 65% with an increased tax threshold, a minimum concessional 
rebate was introduced to compensate for higher marginal rates at lower income levels, 
other rebates were introduced to replace most deductions, and levies were introduced 
on crude oil and coal91.
Between May 1974 and December 1975 the economy slumped: real per capita 
GDP rose by only $12.38 per annum and by $66.15 in election year, prices rose by 
15.00% per annum and by 15.02% in election year, and unemployment rose by 
1.58% of the workforce per annum and by 2.10% in election year. However real wages 
rose by 1.06% per annum and by 1.68% in election year, only slightly below the 
overall average.
At the same time taxation and expenditure growth increased markedly compared 
to the previous electoral period, and were well over the overall average.
"Terence W. Beed (1977), 'Opinion polling and the elections', in Australia at the Polls: the 
National Elections of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, p.243.
91 1974-75 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra; 1975-76 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
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Table 4.17 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1974-75
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Average annual changes in term
Central government: 
Total taxation 108.32 1.35
Direct taxation 88.83 1.1 1
Expenditure 164.23 2.07
General government: 
Total taxation 132.02 1.65
Direct taxation 88.83 1.1 1
Expenditure 1 74.09 2.19
Election year changes
Central government: 
Total taxation 95.68 1.04
Direct taxation 68.49 0.74
Expenditure 200.15 2.39
General government: 
Total taxation 122.81 1.34
Direct taxation 68.49 0.74
Expenditure 200.70 2.35
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
Apart from a reference to the tax cuts in the 1975 budget, the Labor policy 
speech did not mention taxation.
In his policy speech, Liberal leader Malcolm Fraser accused Labor of having 
taken $2600 million more in tax in 1975 than in 1974, and pledged that the Liberals 
would reduce the overall tax burden and index tax scales over 3 years. This, he argued, 
would reduce inflation by encouraging wage restraint, as indexation was supported by 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). Other Liberal promises included a 
special childcare rebates for single-parent families and for families where one parent 
was an invalid, cuts in estate duty on transfers between spouses, introduction of a 40% 
investment allowance and an accelerated depreciation allowance, indexation of company 
tax, an increase in the retention allowance for small business, and allowing 
shareholders in private companies the option of being taxed as a partnership. National 
Country Party leader Doug Anthony's policy speech referred scathingly to Labor's 
crippling taxes and pledged to review estate duty, introduce tax concessions to 
encourage good land use and conservation, and to look to the tax needs of small business.
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The 1975 election campaign was a fiery affair, with Labor bitter over the 
Governor-General's action. Large rallies took place in support of Labor, with slogans 
such as 'Shame, Fraser, Shame' and 'Right the Wrong’, but following Whitlam's 
dismissal the polls once again showed declining Labor support in the electorate92 as the 
issue of the dismissal faded in significance and the issues of inflation and unemployment 
once again became salient93. Whitlam emphasized the Constitutional issue at first, then 
switched to the economy, maintaining that Labor was better placed than the Liberals to 
lead an economic recovery due to its wage indexation policy. He also argued that wage 
restraint could be procured in exchange for social reforms, and that by causing 
political instability the Coalition parties were in effect committing economic 
sabotage94.
After their initial emphasis on '3 Dark Years of Labor', the Liberals chose the 
theme 'Turn on the Lights' and proposed an investment-led recovery via boosting 
business profitability. Fraser refused to commit himself on specific areas of 
expenditure that might be cut, and attacked Whitlam as the man who tried to rule 
without Parliament95, while the Country Party emphasized the message that Labor had 
ignored people who lived outside the big cities96.
Tax was a less prominent media issue in 1975 than it had been in 1974, gaining 
only 3.1% of the front page stories of the 5 major morning dailies during the last 10 
days of the campaign, but once again these newspapers were united in their opposition 
to Labor. Indeed media bias was somewhat of an issue itself during the campaign, with 
Parliamentary Press Gallery members complaining about the treatment of their copy
92Terence W. Beed (1977), 'Opinion polling and the elections', in Australia at the Polls: the 
National Elections of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, p.247.
93Michelle Grattan (1977), 'The Liberal Party', in Australia at the Polls: the National Election 
of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington DC, p.137.
94D.W.Rawson (1977), 'The Labor campaign', in Australia at the Polls: the National Election 
of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research, 
Washington DC, pp.91-94.
95Michelle Grattan (1977), 'The Liberal Party’, in Australia at the Polls: the National Election 
of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington DC, pp.132-139.
96Margaret Bridson Cribb (1977), 'The Country Party', in Australia at the Polls: the National 
Election of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Washington DC, pp.152-153.
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once it was handed in. Journalists working for publisher Rupert Murdoch went as far 
as to go on strike in protest against the bias of news selection and treatment97.
A poll conducted a week before the election found that tax was not an issue for 
voters despite the very large increases that had taken place. Instead the most important 
issues were inflation 20%, economic management 16%, the dismissal 14%, 
dishonesty/inefficiency in government 12%, and pensions and social services 11%98.
The result of the election was a landslide win to the Liberals, while Labor lost 
heavily and the DLP and Australia Party receded into insignificance.
Table 4.18 Election results, Australia 1975
Party 1975 vote Change since 1974
Labor 42.8% -6 .5%
Liberals 41.8% + 6.9%
Country Party 11.3% + 0.5%
Liberal-Country Coalition 53.1% + 7.4%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
An exit poll of six Sydney electorates found that while Labor voters tended to 
emphasize the Constitutional issue of the dismissal, Liberal voters emphasized the state 
of the economy99. Similarly, a study conducted after the election by Melbourne 
University found that swingers to the Liberals tended to refer to Labor’s lack of 
control, the state of the economy, and the Loans Affair. The third of swingers who 
switched the other way disapproved of the dismissal, the Governor-General and/or 
Malcolm Fraser100. This implies that the election outcome was caused mainly by the 
economic problems and the Loans Affair.
In regard to tax, although a Morgan poll in November 1974 found that 55% of 
respondents wanted the government to spend much less and give big tax cuts, compared
97C.J. Lloyd (1977), The media and the elections', in Australia at the Polls: the National 
Election of 1975, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, Washington DC, pp.171-200.
98 The Age, 11 December 1975.
99Ian McNair (1977), Three years of Labor - Some reasons why Labor was elected and 
defeated', Australian Quarterly, September, p.98.
100Jean Holmes (1976), 'Swingers and stayers, 1975’, Politics, v.6/1, pp.47-50.
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to 26% who wanted to keep spending as it was and have small cuts and only 10% who 
preferred to spend more and forego tax cuts101, another Morgan poll taken in May 
1975 found that tax aversion had actually lessened since August 1974 despite the large 
tax rises that had taken place:
Table 4.19 Opinions on tax and social services, Australia 1974 and 1975
1 974 1 975 Change
% % %
Reduced taxes 56 50 - 6
Increased social services 36 41 + 5
Can’t say 8 9 + 1
Balance favouring tax cuts + 20 + 9 - 1 1
Source Morgan Gallup Polls, August 1974 and May 1975
This does not support the view that the change in the share of the vote won by 
Labor between 1974 and 1975 was due at least in part to its taxing and spending 
policies, so, given that tax was not a salient issue in the media or in the minds of the 
electorate either, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that taxation played any 
important part in determining the outcome of the 1975 election.
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Despite losing votes to the the Australian Democrats, a new centrist party led by 
disaffected Liberal Don Chipp, the Fraser Coalition government retained office at the 
1977 election due to the fact that Labor also lost votes.
Between 1975 and 1977 economic policy was based on fighting inflation first, 
and included opposition to wage rises based on the cost of living and an unsuccessful 
attempt to secure a voluntary price freeze in 1977, but inflation remained high while 
unemployment continued to rise102. As part of its strategy the government made wide- 
ranging expenditure cuts including a gradual dismantling of Medibank, the universal 
health insurance scheme introduced by Labor, and entered into a new tax-sharing 
arrangement with the States. In early 1976 another scandal afflicted the Labor Party 
when it was revealed that it had (unsuccessfully) solicited loans from Iraq to finance
101 Morgan Gallup Poll Finding 168, November 1974.
1 02Ainsley Jolley (1979), The economic program of the Liberal Party', in The Australian 
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, pp.266, 269.
149
its 1975 election debts103. Also during this period uranium mining became a 
prominent issue.
In 1976 it was announced that personal income tax indexation would apply from 
1 July, and that tax rebates for dependent children would be replaced by a system of 
family allowances. In addition, a 2.5% income levy was introduced to finance Medibank, 
while various business concessions were introduced or extended, including a 40% 
investment allowance, a superphosphate bounty (which had been abolished by 
Whitlam), trading stock adjustments for inflation, and tax incentives for mineral and 
petroleum exploration. Finally, exemption levels were increased for estate and gift 
duty, and changes were made to the income equalization scheme for primary 
producers104 .
In 1977 the government announced that personal income tax indexation in 
1977-78 would be discounted for the effects of devaluation, changes in health 
insurance arrangements, and indirect tax. In the budget a new personal income tax 
system was introduced which included a simplified rate scale (32%, 46% and 60%), a 
higher tax threshold, abolition of the general concessional rebate, and half indexation 
instead of the previously announced full indexation105. In addition, the company tax 
rate, crude oil levy and petroleum duty were raised while the coal export levy was 
reduced.
Between 1975 and 1977 the economy continued to deteriorate, and went into 
recession in election year. Real per capita GDP grew by only $87.29 per annum and 
fell by $21.20 in election year, while prices rose by 12.90% per annum and by 
12.23% in election year. Unemployment rose by 0.60% of the workforce per annum 
and by 0.80% in election year, while real wages rose by only 0.90% per annum and by 
1.43% in election year, well below average.
Real per capita taxation growth was very low, due largely to the low and then 
negative economic growth, but real per capita expenditure grew much more quickly 
than average, although it was lower than 1974-75, and this disparity between tax and 
expenditure growth led to continuing problems with budget deficits. As a proportion of
103 Patrick Weller (1979), The Labor Party and its 1977 campaign', in The Australian 
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, p.73.
104Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 20 May 1976, 17 
August 1976.
105 7977-78 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
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GDP taxation growth remained close to average over the term as a whole but somewhat 
above average in election year itself, while expenditure grew by over twice the long­
term average in both the whole term and in election year.
Table 4.20 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1975-77
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Average annual changes in term
Central government: 
Total taxation 40.86 0.26
Direct taxation 32.45 0.23
Expenditure 110.97 1.14
General government: 
Total taxation 51.24 0.33
Direct taxation 32.45 0.23
Expenditure 140.35 1.45
Central government: 
Total taxation 33.17
Election year changes
0.48
Direct taxation 38.19 0.52
Expenditure 93.86 1 .24
General government: 
Total taxation 37.98 0.55
Direct taxation 38.19 0.52
Expenditure 131 .28 1.72
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
In April 1976 a Morgan poll asked respondents to choose between increased tax 
or reduced social services, as distinct from the previously offered alternatives of 
reduced taxes and increased social services, presumably because of the large budget 
deficit at the time, and found that 47% preferred to increase tax while 42% preferred 
to reduce social services106. Similarly, a Liberal survey was reported as finding that a 
majority of respondents wanted tax cuts, but at the same time did not support further 
cuts in government expenditure107.
106Morgan Gallup poll results reported in the Bulletin, 29 May 1976, p.25.
107Quoted in Murray Goot & Terence W. Beed (1979), ’The polls, the public, and the 
reelection of the Fraser Government', in The Australian National Election of 1977, ed. Howard 
R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, p.188.
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In the Liberal policy speech, Prime Minister Fraser claimed that his 
government had reduced taxes, in particular that personal tax reforms had saved 
taxpayers $3.3 billion, and promised more income tax cuts from February 1978 plus 
the abolition of all estate and gift duty between spouses effective immediately and the 
abolition of all Commonwealth estate and gift duty during the next term of office. He 
also pointed to the extra tax incentives for business, and attacked Labor as the party of 
high tax, having more than doubled taxation during its period in office. Labor, said 
Fraser, would spend over $3 billion more, plus compensate the States for abolishing 
payroll tax, and increase taxes as a consequence.
The National Country Party also emphasized the government's tax reforms, 
claiming them to be the biggest in Australia's history, with the new standard rates 
making taxpayers better off and tax indexation making the system inflation-proof. 
Estate duty had already been eased and would be abolished entirely, starting with 
property transferred between spouses or between parent and child. Leader Doug 
Anthony also referred to the improved tax averaging arrangements for farmers and the 
40% investment allowance, and announced that the tax rebate for local government 
rates would be increased.
Labor's major taxation proposal in the 1977 policy speech was to ask the States 
to abolish payroll tax in order to lower labour costs and thus encourage employment, in 
exchange for compensation from the Commonwealth.
The tax policy of the Australian Democrats was unfortunately not available108.
During the election campaign the Liberals sought to present themselves as the 
party of stable government and responsible and successful economic management, and 
attacked Labor as divisive, extravagant, linked to extremist union leaders and as having 
a disastrous track record of economic ineptitude. 'Doing the Job' was the Liberal 
campaign slogan, and they promised tax cuts, a fall in inflation, new investment to 
promote growth and development, and more jobs109. Fraser campaigned hard to tempt 
voters with a 'fistful of dollars' (the expression refers to their most prominent TV 
advertisement) and to depict Labor as a high-tax party, and argued that one could
108Even Don Chipp does not have a copy.
109Jean Holmes (1979), 'The Liberal-National Country Party Coalition', in The Australian 
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, pp. 112, 114.
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accept the tax cuts and help the unemployed, as lower tax would mean lower wage 
rises, lower inflation, and consequently lower unemployment110.
In response Labor sought to de-emphasize the unpopular Whitlam and to make 
unemployment the main issue1 I 11, but voters didn't hold the government responsible 
for this: half blamed either unions or the unemployed themselves112, and Liberal 
research was reported to have shown that Whitlam was blamed for the high rate of 
unemployment, not Fraser113.
For the Australian Democrats, leader Don Chipp sought to attract voters 
disillusioned with both major parties by emphasizing honesty, tolerance and 
compassion, as well as a determined anti-uranium policy114.
As the campaign opened, Liberal research is reported to have indicated that the 
Liberals were starting behind Labor as the party of low taxation, which is rather 
surprising in view of Whitlam’s record on tax, although it may be due to the fact that 
the Liberals, being in government, were the ones actually doing the taxing in 1977. 
Liberal research also indicated that the budget tax cuts had proved "a public relations 
flop", but when Whitlam surprised everyone (including the Labor Party) by 
promising payroll tax cuts in order to increase employment, tax became a more 
prominent issue in the campaign115. However this was not to Labor's advantage: the 
media didn’t think the proposal would work, and criticized confusion within Labor 
ranks on matters such as whether to proceed with tax indexation116. A poll published
1 1 °C.J. Lloyd (1979), 'A lean campaign for the media’, in The Australian National Election of 
1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington DC, pp.264-265.
I 1 1 Patrick Weller (1979), 'The Labor Party and its 1977 campaign', in The Australian 
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, p.81.
112Murray Goot & Terence W. Beed (1979), 'The polls, the public, and the reelection of the 
Fraser Government', in The Australian National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, p.176.
113Jean Holmes (1979), 'The Liberal-National Country Party Coalition', in The Australian
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Washington DC, p. 113.
114Murray Goot (1979), 'Monitoring the public, marketing the parties', in The Australian 
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, p.227.
115Murray Goot (1979), 'Monitoring the public, marketing the parties’, in The Australian
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public
Poiicy Research, Washington DC, pp.199, 217, 200.
I I  6C.J. Lloyd (1979), 'A lean campaign for the media', in The Australian National Election of 
1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington DC, p.242.
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on election day showed that respondents preferred the Coalitions's proposed tax cuts to 
Labor’s by a margin of 47% to 34%117, and another poll showed that although 28% of 
a rather small sample of 180 swinging voters considered that if the Liberals won they 
would benefit from tax cuts, and 13% considered that they would benefit from a better 
economy, less than one in ten could name any particular likely benefit from a Labor 
win118.
Tax was more of a media issue than in 1975, comprising 6.9% of front page 
stories in the five main quality morning newspapers during the last 10 days of the 
campaign. All these newspapers supported the government in their editorials apart 
from The West Australian, which remained neutral.
Despite the evidence that the public preferred the Coalition's tax cut proposals, 
tax did not appear to be an important election issue to voters: only 2% considered 
income tax/payroll tax to be the most important issue in a poll conducted shortly after 
the policy speeches, and only 5% considered it to be the second most important issue. 
Instead, the issues most often nominated as most important were reduction of 
unemployment 39% and control of inflation 33%. In addition, voters preferred the 
Coalition’s policy on income tax/payroll tax by a margin of 30% to 21%119. 
Similarly, a poll published two days before the election found that 29% nominated 
unemployment as the most important issue, 16% inflation, 16% economic 
management, 13% honesty in government, and 10% strikes and union power. Tax was 
not even listed among the alternatives120. Polling for the Liberals was reported as 
indicating that although people named unemployment as the number one issue, what 
they really cared about was inflation121.
The result of the election was another smashing win for the Coalition. Although 
they lost 5% of the total vote, Labor lost over 3%, so that the gap between the two sides 
remained almost as wide as in 1975. The main beneficiaries were the Australian 
Democrats, who gained the support of nearly 10% of the electorate. Due to Australia’s 
single-member constituency electoral system and the relatively even spread of 
Democrat voters, however, they did not gain any seats in the House of Representatives,
11 7Morgan-Gallup Poll published in the Bulletin, 10 December 1977.
118Morgan-Gallup Finding 520A, 1977.
11 9McNair-Anderson Poll, 3 December 1977.
120Age Poll 21 (1977).
121 Murray Goot (1979), 'Monitoring the public, marketing the parties', in The Australian 
National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington DC, p. 113.
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unlike the geographically concentrated National Country Party, although they did in the 
Senate.
Table 4.21 Election results, Australia 1977
Party 1977 vote Change since 1975
Labor 39.6% -3.2%
Liberals 38.1% -3.7%
National Country Party 10.0% -1.2%
Liberal-NCP Coalition 48.1% -5.0%
Australian Democrats 9.4% + 9.4%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Goot and Beed argue plausibly that the main issue explanation of the election 
outcome was that the Coalition's win over Labor was due to economic management and in 
particular control of inflation, because inflation was salient as an issue, voters had a 
clear view of what should be done (inflation should fall), and the Coalition was 
considered to be more competent on the issue than Labor. Unemployment was also 
salient, but voters didn't hold the government responsible for this122.
Tax, however, was not salient to voters despite its prominence in the media, so 
it is unlikely that it had much of an influence on the election outcome. This 
interpretation is consistent with the results of an exit survey which found that no 
respondents at all mentioned tax as a reason why they voted as they did123, and with the 
results of a survey which found that the election outcome was not a vote for lower 
direct tax or for lower payroll tax but "against turbulence and change, for stability and 
order"124. To the extent that it might have had a small influence, however, given that 
even the 2% of voters who considered it the most important issue was more than in
122Murray Goot & Terence W. Beed (1979), 'The polls, the public, and the reelection of the 
Fraser Government', in The Australian National Election of 1977, ed. Howard R. Penniman, 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, pp.168-176. 
123Quoted in Murray Goot & Terence W. Beed (1979), The polls, the public, and the 
reelection of the Fraser Government', in The Australian National Election of 1977, ed. Howard 
R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, p.182. 
124David Kemp (1978), The secret ingredient in Fraser’s success', National Times 16-21 
January, p.21, quoted in Murray Goot & Terence W. Beed (1979), The polls, the public, and 
the reelection of the Fraser Government', in The Australian National Election of 1977, ed. 
Howard R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington 
DC, p.181.
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previous elections, it would appear to have advantaged the Coalition, as its policy on tax 
was considered better than Labor's.
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At the 1980 election the Fraser government was again returned to power 
despite a large swing to Labor.
Between 1977 and 1980 inflation and unemployment stayed high, more 
spending cuts were made, and a number of minor scandals affected the government. 
Other prominent issues included uranium, Aborigines, Vietnamese refugees, industrial 
relations, and the government's attempt to block Australian participation at the Moscow 
Olympics following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The Liberals' promised income tax cuts took effect on 1 February 1978, but 
were cancelled out when the August 1978 budget increased each income tax rate by 
1.5% for one year, which was very unpopular: 60% of respondents to a McNair- 
Anderson poll were dissatisfied with 1978 budget, a greater proportion than for any 
budget between 1975 and 1982 (excluding 1981, when the question was not 
asked)125. The budget also included increases in excises on alcohol and tobacco, a 
reduction of sales tax on cars, and an increase in the crude oil levy. In addition, more 
welfare payments were made taxable, tax deductions for home loan interest and rebates 
for overseas dependants were abolished, the compulsory health insurance levy was 
abolished along with compulsory health insurance itself126, and a departure tax was 
introduced on travellers leaving the country127.
In May 1979 it was announced that the 1.5% income tax surcharge would be 
extended but that full indexation would be reintroduced. However a poll taken in July 
found that 66% of respondents preferred to reduce government expenditure compared 
with only 26% who preferred to continue with the surcharge128. Other measures 
included the restriction of taxation deferments or reductions due to ’paper’ losses, an 
increase in the crude oil levy, and the imposition of a 2% duty on most goods 
previously imported duty free. The 1.5% income tax surcharge was finally removed in 
the 1979 budget, but tax indexation was not restored despite earlier statements. In
125McNair-Anderson Poll 01/9/82.
1260£CD Economic Surveys - Australia, June 1979, OECD, Paris, p.50.
1271978-79 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
1 25McNair-Anderson Poll, 2 July 1979.
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addition, a number of industry concessions were increased or extended, a limit was 
imposed on car depreciation, a tax concession for conservation was introduced, and the 
coal levy was cut129. In December the crude oil levy was increased again, and federal 
gift and estate duties were abolished.
In 1980 the crude oil levy was increased again, and the standard income tax rate 
was reduced to 32% and the income tax scale was indexed by 3.8% (half indexation). In 
addition, rebates for dependants were increased, self-employed superannuation 
contributions were made deductible, the deductibility of gifts was increased, and 
concessions were increased for primary industry130.
During this period one of the most controversial taxes was the crude oil levy, 
which had been steadily increasing since its introduction in the 1975 budget and which 
by 1979-80 brought in $2.2 billion, at the cost of higher petrol prices. Also 
controversial was a proposal to introduce a broad-based consumption tax in order to 
lessen reliance on income tax, average rates of which had risen and inspired growing 
tax evasion131. However this move was abandoned in early 1979 due to organized 
opposition from, among others, the Australian Retailers Association132. Two other 
unsuccessful moves to broaden the tax base were the extension of income tax to minors 
in 1978 - the so-called 'newsboys' tax' - and the taxation of imputed benefits from 
employer-subsidized housing. In addition, a truck blockade near Sydney in 1979 
resulted in the abolition of state road maintenance taxes133.
Another proposal current at this time was to shift from individual taxation to a 
form of joint taxation, but this was never implemented despite its popularity: 64% of 
respondents to a poll in 1979 approved of the idea of allowing families to split income 
equally between the husband and wife for income tax purposes, compared with only 
26% who disapproved134.
129 7979-80 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
1301980-81 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
131 Peter Groenewegen (1987), 'Tax reform in Australia and New Zealand', in Australian 
Taxation Policy, ed. P.D. Groenewegen, second edition, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.158. 
132Martin Rawlinson (1983), 'The Liberal Party’, in Australia at the Polls: the National 
Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.36-37. 
133Peter Groenewegen (1985), Everyone's Guide to Taxation in Australia, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p.64.
134Ian McNair (ed) (undated), Australian Public Opinion Polls (The Gallup Method) 1973- 
1987, Quadrant Research Services, Sydney, p.30.
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During this period the economy improved slightly, but deteriorated again in 
election year. Real per capita GDP increased by $150.87 per annum, about average, 
but only by $86.46 in election year, well below average. Inflation fell somewhat 
compared to 1975-77, but prices still rose by 9.00% per annum and by 9.94% in 
election year. Unemployment rose by 0.24% of the workforce per annum and by 
0.10% in election year, while real wages rose by only 0.48% per annum and by 
0.24% in election year.
The main fiscal development between 1977 and 1980 was that the government 
managed to rein in expenditure growth to a level well below the long-term trend, to the 
point where it was once again covered by taxation. The growth of real per capita 
taxation, and especially of real per capita direct taxation, was lower than average over 
the term as a whole but higher in election year itself. As a proportion of GDP taxation 
growth was below average apart from general government taxation growth in election 
year, which was relatively high.
Table 4.22 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1977-80
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
49.24 0.1 6
Direct taxation 11.20 -0 .17
Expenditure 36.77 -0 .02
General government: 
Total taxation 53.96 0.12
Direct taxation 11.20 -0 .17
Expenditure 52.76 0.06
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
86.96 0.79
Direct taxation 56.23 0.50
Expenditure 6.36 -0 .19
General government: 
Total taxation 93.59 0.82
Direct taxation 56.23 0.50
Expenditure 32.84 0.06
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
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Don Aitkin's third political survey in 1979 found that concern over tax had 
apparently increased in the decade since his last survey, although it was reported in 
conjunction with attitudes to the cost of living: 17% considered that tax and the cost of 
living was a problem that the government should do something about, compared to only 
7% in 1969. However the biggest change over the decade was the increase in the 
proportion of respondents mentioning the economy, which was up from 15% in 1969 
to 57% in 1979135.
Aitkin also found that the majority in favour of reduced taxes rather than 
increased social services had increased since it was last measured in 1975:
Table 4.23 Opinions on tax and social services, Australia 1975 and 1979
Favoured option: 1 975 
%
1 979 
%
Change
%
Reduced taxes 50 59 + 9
Increased social services 4 1 36 - 5
Can’t say 9 5 - 4
Balance favouring tax cuts + 9 + 23 + 1 4
Sources
Morgan Gallup Poll Finding 224, May 1975; Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change 
in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU Press, Canberra, p.385.
Given the option, however, most people preferred to keep things as they were: 
an Age Poll in 1979 found that while 20% preferred to reduce the levels of taxes, 
social services and welfare facilities, and 16% preferred to increase taxes to provide 
more social services and welfare facilities, a full 61% opted for the status quo136. 
Research carried out for the Liberal Party in 1979 was reported to have indicated that 
unemployment, inflation, and welfare assistance were all more important issues than 
income tax, but that by July 1980 pressure for income tax relief had increased137.
Disaffection with government and politics, too, was on the rise, as in Sweden:
135Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, ANU 
Press, Canberra, p.279.
"^Quoted in the Age , 6 May 1985.
137Martin Rawlinson (1983), 'The Liberal Party', in Australia at the Polls: the National 
Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.40-41.
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Table 4.24 Political cynicism, Australia 1969 and 1979
1 969
%
1 979 
%
Change
%
How do you feel about government and 
politics in Australia?
Very satisfied 7 4 - 3
Fairly satisfied 68 50 -1 8
Not satisfied 23 43 + 20
Do you feel that the people in government:
- can be trusted to do the right thing nearly always? 46 28 - 1 8
- are too often interested in looking after themselves? 47 67 + 20
Do you think that the people in government:
- give everyone a fair go? 20 1 6 - 4
- pay more attention to big interests? 71 78 + 7
Do you feel that the people running government: 
- are usually intelligent people who know what 
they are doing? 66 51 - 1 5
- too often don't seem to know what they are doing? 28 41 + 13
Source Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second edition, 
ANU Press, Canberra, pp.379, 390-391. Some questions are slightly abbreviated. The 
1969 figure for those 'fairly satisfied' with politics is written as 58% on p.379 (and 
also in the first edition), but as the percentages don't add up to 100% and as the round 
figure given on p.25 was 70%, I conclude that the real figure was 68%. Shortfalls 
from 100% in the table are due to 'don't know' answers not being shown.
Malcolm Fraser's Liberal policy speech concentrated on lauding the 
government's achievements on tax and on attacking Labor, rather than on making 
specific tax cut promises. Liberal aims in general were stated to be to keep tax at the 
lowest level possible compatible with responsible economic management and 
community needs, to distribute the tax burden as fairly as possible, with particular 
concern for low-income families, and to provide incentives for initiative and 
enterprise.
Fraser argued that taxes had been cut since the 1975 budget, most recently by 
$600 million on 1 July, and that the operation of tax indexation would mean a further 
tax cut of $500 million from 1 July 1981. He also referred to the increased dependent 
spouse and sole parent rebates, the reduction of the top marginal income tax rate from 
65% to 60%, the reduction of the number of tax brackets from 7 to 3, and the increase 
in the tax-free threshold since 1975. Commonwealth gift and death duties had been 
abolished entirely. Fraser also pointed to benefits for business, including the 
introduction of tax concessions for self-employed superannuation, the reintroduction 
of the investment allowance, the increase in the accelerated depreciation allowance, and
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the rise in the Private Company Retention Rate. Farmers and miners had benefited 
from the abolition of income limits on the primary producers’ tax averaging system 
and special tax concessions for resource development and oil exploration. In addition, 
concessions for energy conservation had been improved, and tax laws would be changed 
to make it easier for small businesses to build up their reserves. In defence of the 
controversial crude oil levy, Fraser stated that revenue from it had been used for tax 
cuts, defence, and reduction of the budget deficit. He also pledged that a hard line would 
be taken against tax avoidance.
In contrast to this record, Fraser argued that Labor had increased taxes by 
125% during its three years in office and would reintroduce high taxes if elected, as 
its promises added up to $2.5 billion, or an extra $8 per week in tax. Labor's 1975 
tax scale was compared unfavourably with the present one using current rather than 
constant dollars, disregarding the fact that inflation meant that a given income in 1975 
was worth much more than its nominal 1980 equivalent, and Labor was accused of 
intending to introduce a wealth tax, a capital gains tax, and estate duty.
For the National Party, the renamed Country Party, Doug Anthony stated his 
party's commitment to keeping the tax burden down by keeping spending down, 
promised new tax concessions for farmers, pointed to the abolition of death and gift 
duties, and defended import parity pricing for oil and thus implicitly the crude oil 
levy.
In response, new Labor leader Bill Hayden promised a general cut in income tax 
of $3 per week via increasing the tax-free threshold, and to overhaul the tax system in 
the long run. That is, in contrast to 1977 Labor at least matched the Coalition on 
promising income tax cuts, and Hayden went so far as to say that Labor was a 'low tax 
party'138. However a new tax was also on the agenda: a resource rent or excess profits 
tax would be imposed on major resource developments. In addition, the investment 
allowance would be abolished and retrospective legislation would be brought in to 
combat tax avoidance. These last three measures, it was claimed, would bring in an 
extra $1 billion per year.
The Australian Democrats' policy speech had little to say on tax, merely 
advocating, like Labor, the introduction of a resources tax.
138Francis G. Castles (1985), The Working Class and Welfare, Allen & Unwin, New Zealand 
p.96.
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During the campaign the Liberals stressed Australia's economic performance, 
the government's record, leadership, Labor's lack of capacity for economic 
management, and the consequences of Labor's expenditure commitments. Fraser 
enumerated five challenges: responsibility in economic affairs, a coordinated plan of 
national development, adequate assistance to those in need, the encouragement of 
excellence, and the safeguarding of national security139.
Labor's election strategy concentrated on the erosion of family living standards 
over the previous three years, emphasized unemployment and community problems, 
and projected a 'troika' of leaders: Hayden, ACTU leader Bob Hawke, and New South 
Wales Premier Neville Wran140. Accordingly, the slogan chosen was 'Raise the 
Standard’, and ALP advertising attacked the price of petrol as well as hammering the 
living standards theme, for example claiming that the average wage earner was $16 
worse off per week than in 1975. The six themes emphasized during the campaign 
itself were tax, housing, jobs, petrol, health, and family allowances, and Hayden made 
an appeal to bring Australians together, in contrast to Fraser's confrontationist style. 
Specific promises included freezing the price of locally produced oil for 12 months, 
re-establishing universal health insurance, and lifting pensions to 25% of average 
earnings141.
For the Australian Democrats Don Chipp appealed to be given the balance of 
power in the Senate in order to "keep the bastards honest"142.
Most observers agreed that Labor ran a good campaign, and the polls 
consistently showed Labor ahead of the Coalition. A Liberal phone poll midway through 
the last week of the campaign was reported to have showed Labor to be ahead 51% to 
23% on tax, which may reflect the appeal of Hayden's income tax cut promises. This 
prompted a change of strategy on the part of Fraser to a more aggressive attack on 
Labor as socialist, arguing that it was recycled Whitlam, controlled by the unions, and 
soft on defence. In the last week the Liberals tried to defuse resentment of the oil levy 
by announcing that any additional revenue from it (none was expected) would be 
returned in the form of tax cuts, and launched a big advertising campaign focussed on
139Martin Rawlinson (1983), The Liberal Party', in Australia at the Polls: the National 
Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.43, 47.
1 49'Political Chronicle', Australian Journal of Politics & History, v.27/1 (1981), p.371.
141 Patrick Weller (1983), 'Labor in 1980', in Australia at the Polls: the National Elections of 
1980 and-1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.71-75.
142Quoted in John Warhurst (1983), 'Minor parties and pressure groups’, in Australia at the 
Polls: the National Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p.109.
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inflation and on Labor's alleged intention of introducing a wealth tax, which Labor 
denied143.
In 1980, as in 1977, all but one of the five main quality morning newspapers 
supported the government, the exception this time being the Age. 9.1% of their front 
page stories during the last ten days of the campaign concerned tax, a greater 
proportion than in any previous election in the period since 1958.
Despite this, tax was still not a very important issue to voters, although its 
salience had grown since 1977, but in contrast to 1977 Labor was considered to have 
the best tax policy:
Table 4.25 Issue salience and best party on tax, Australia 1977 and 1980
Most important issue
1 977
Percent mentions 
1980 Change
Reduction of unemployment 39 37 - 2
Control of inflation 33 25 - 7
Control of industrial disputes 7 9 + 2
Education 7 8 + 1
Public health/Medibank 4 6 + 2
Oil pricing/energy na 6 na
Income tax (and payroll tax 1977) 2 5 + 3
Other issues/don't know 3 4 + 1
Best party on tax:
Coalition 30 26 - 4
Labor 2 1 38 + 1 7
Balance favouring Coalition + 9 - 1 2 -2  1
Sources
McNair-Anderson Polls 3 December 1977, 27-28 September/4-5 October 1980
Tax was also nominated as the second most important issue by 8%, up from 5% 
in 1977, and Labor was ahead of the Coalition on oil pricing/energy, relevant due to its 
connection with the crude oil levy, by the margin of 38-27% (there was no equivalent 
question in 1977).
Similarly, an Age Poll carried out on 11-12 October found that tax was 
considered the most important issue by only 6%, well behind unemployment 23%,
143Murray Goot (1983), The media and the campaign', in Australia at the Polls: the National 
Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.163, 210, 
165-170, 190-198.
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economic management 19%, pensions and social services 15%, and inflation 15%144. 
The picture remained the same even when respondents were allowed to nominate three 
issues: income tax reduction, which was mentioned by 17% of respondents, was well 
behind the reduction of unemployment 41%, the reduction of inflation 28%, toughness 
with unions with bad strike records 21% , and more assistance for the needy and aged 
20%. However the price of petrol was also mentioned by 17% of respondents145.
The outcome of the election was that Labor gained a swing of 5.4%, but this was 
not enough to win government although it did result in the Coalition losing its majority 
in the Senate.
Table 4.26 Election results, Australia 1980
Party 1980 vote Change since 1977
Labor 45.1% + 5.4%
Liberals 37.4% - 0.7%
National Country Party 8.9% - 1.2%
Liberal-NCP Coalition 46.3% -1 .8%
Australian Democrats 6.6% - 2.8%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Despite a widespread view that the Liberals' last minute scare campaign on 
wealth tax won them the election, a McNair-Anderson exit poll found that new Liberal 
voters did not mention tax as a reason for their vote, but rather economic management 
17%, the government's success in keeping inflation low 17%, and lack of trust in 
Labor 26%. Another McNair-Anderson poll taken after the election suggested that a 
wealth tax was not that unpopular anyway: when asked which new tax would be 
preferred if a new tax had to be introduced in order to reduce personal income tax, 
47% nominated wealth tax, 15% capital gains tax, and 14% VAT146.
Instead there is some evidence that in 1980 the issue of taxation may have led 
some voters to switch from Coalition to Labor, as tax was more salient than in 1977
144 The Age, 17 December 1980, p.13.
145Quoted in Morgan press release, 26 June 1987, p.2.
1 45Quoted in Murray Goot (1983), The media and the campaign', in Australia at the Polls: 
the National Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
pp.207, 210-211.
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and Labor was clearly ahead as the best party on tax, in sharp contrast to 1977. 
However any such effect was probably small, as tax was considered the most important 
issue by only a small proportion of the electorate. Possible reasons for Labor being 
ahead on tax include the government's withdrawal in 1978 of the 1977 'fistful of 
dollars' tax cuts, controversy over issues such as the attempt to extend sales tax, and 
the fact that in contrast to 1977 Labor matched the Coalition in promising income tax 
cuts. It would appear that the Coalition’s success in curbing the growth of taxation and 
expenditure and its implementation of specific measures such as the abolition of estate 
and gift duties were not uppermost in voters' minds.
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In 1983 the Fraser government was finally defeated by a resurgent Labor Party 
led by the charismatic Bob Hawke.
Government actions between 1980 and 1983 included the passage of Freedom of 
Information legislation, more expenditure cuts, the final end of Medibank, and a wages 
freeze from late 1982. The government was again touched by scandal, most seriously 
when a Royal Commission unexpectedly discovered that criminals associated with the 
Painters' and Dockers' Union were linked to white-collar tax evasion, and that some of 
these suspected tax evaders were in turn linked to the Liberal Party. Both major 
parties were divided by unsuccessful leadership challenges. In addition, the 
environment became a more important issue during this period, in particular a plan by 
the Tasmanian government to dam the Franklin, one of Tasmania's last wild rivers.
In 1981 the main tax changes were the ending of tax indexation, the 
introduction of rebates for health insurance, and an increase in departure tax147. 
However a combination of Labor and Democrats in the Senate defeated the government's 
proposal to extend sales tax to previously untaxed items including 'essential items' 
such as clothing and footwear148, and an opinion poll found that 89% of respondents 
were also against this broadening of the sales tax base149.
The 1982 budget contained significant changes to income tax, including an 
increase in the tax-free threshold, a reduction in the standard rate of tax from 32% to
1471981-82 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
1'48Patrick Weller (1983), 'The anatomy of a grievous miscalculation: 3 February, 1983', in 
Australia at the Polls: the National Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p.255.
149McNair Anderson Poll 03/12/81.
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30%, and a rise in the income level at which the 46% rate began to apply. In addition, 
rebates were introduced for pensioners, while concessions were introduced or 
increased for home loan interest and dividend income, dependants, gifts, depreciation, 
company losses, and benefits for employees of shares held by them in the company they 
work for. However there were tax rises too: sales tax rates were increased and some 
previously untaxed goods were made taxable, excise on beer and tobacco was increased, 
and a bank debits tax was introduced150.
The most contentious aspect of the 1982 budget involved measures to combat tax 
avoidance, which according to a pre-budget poll 46% of respondents thought that the 
government was doing a poor job in eliminating, compared to 39% who thought it was 
doing a fair job and only 10% who considered that it was doing a good job151. While 
increasing deduction at source of certain types of payments was relatively 
uncontroversial, measures to combat unpaid company tax associated with so-called 
'Bottom of the Harbour' tax avoidance schemes provoked opposition within the Liberal 
Party due to the inclusion of retrospective legislation, and only passed the Senate due to 
Labor support152. However retrospective legislation did not have the support of the 
public: a poll taken after the budget found that 65% of respondents disapproved of 
retrospective legislation, while only 25% approved153. The budget as a whole was also 
unpopular, with 44% disapproving of it compared with 31% who approved, while only 
30% approved of its general strategy of decreasing income taxes and increasing 
indirect taxes compared with 63% who disapproved154.
Between 1980 and 1983 the economy deteriorated compared with 1977-1980: 
real per capita GDP fell by $19.38 per annum, although it rose by $60.82 in election 
year. Inflation increased slightly, with prices rising by 10.40% per annum and by 
10.64% in election year, while unemployment climbed, rising by 0.74% of the 
workforce per annum and by a full 1.77% in election year. However real wage growth 
rose by 1.84% per annum, about average, accelerating to 2.62% in election year, well 
above average.
1501982-83 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
1 51 McNair-Anderson Poll 01/7/82.
152Patrick Weller (1983), 'The anatomy of a grievous miscalculation: 3 February, 1983', in 
Australia at the Polls: the National Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. Howard R. Penniman, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p.259.
153lan McNair (ed) (undated), Australian Public Opinion Polls (The Gallup Method) 1973- 
1987, Quadrant Research Services, Sydney, p.30.
154McNair-Anderson Poll 01/9/82.
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During the government's term as a whole both taxation and expenditure grew 
more quickly than average, especially as a proportion of GDP, having accelerated since 
1977-80. However in election year taxation growth slumped compared to the election 
year of 1980 and was below average. Direct taxation actually went down, but 
expenditure remained above average, which led to a large budget deficit.
Table 4.27 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1980-83
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
60.68 0.78
Direct taxation 45.62 0.58
Expenditure 84.78 1.07
General government: 
Total taxation 83.49 1.07
Direct taxation 45.62 0.58
Expenditure 122.33 1.54
Central government: 
Total taxation
Election year changes 
29.49 0.17
Direct taxation 8.04 -0 .03
Expenditure 129.83 1.37
General government: 
Total taxation 59.52 0.49
Direct taxation 8.04 -0 .03
Expenditure 166.91 1.76
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
It seems clear that tax as such was not popular in the early 1980s: a 1982 
Morgan poll found that 65% of respondents said that the general level of taxes was 
unreasonable, while only 28% said it was reasonable. Furthermore, 64% considered 
that the amount of income tax they paid was too high, compared with only 1% who 
thought it was too low, while 26% considered it to be about right. In addition, 61% of 
respondents thought that the income tax system was unfair for people like themselves, 
while only 28% thought it was fair155. However the idea of a flat rate of income tax
1 55Morgan-Gallup Poll Finding 969, 7 September 1982.
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was not seen as a solution: a poll in 1981 found 56% opposed, compared to 37% in 
favour156.
Income tax was especially unpopular relative to other taxes: in a poll conducted 
in December 1980 56% of respondents said they would prefer to pay some new form of 
taxation rather than pay more personal income tax, compared with 28% who held the 
opposite view. When pressed as to which of a number of taxes respondents would 
prefer, or least dislike, 47% named wealth tax, 17% VAT, and 15% capital gains 
tax157. In April 1982 respondents were asked which sort of tax should be increased, 
assuming that tax in general had to increase: 46% favoured a new super-tax on 
organisations such as banks, 19% nominated increased indirect taxes such as sales tax 
and duties, 11% a new capital gains tax, and only 8% increased personal income 
taxes158.
However in relation to sales tax in particular the picture is not quite so clear. 
In September 1982, given just three alternatives, 41% of respondents opted for lower 
income tax and higher sales tax, compared with only 14% who preferred higher income 
tax and lower sales tax and 33% who favoured the status quo159, but in August 1981 a 
similar question had elicited a different response: given the alternatives of increased 
direct taxes and increased indirect taxes, 47% preferred to increase direct tax, 
compared with 42% who preferred to increase indirect taxes. A narrow majority 
opposed increases in indirect taxes on beer, wine and tobacco (55% to 42%), while an 
overwhelming majority opposed increases in petrol tax (90% to 8%)160.
Findings regarding voters' attitudes to the idea of a capital gains tax were also 
inconsistent. When asked in July 1982 whether they approved the introduction of a 
new capital gains tax, which had been recently rejected as official party policy by the 
ALP National Conference, 38% of respondents approved but 52% were opposed, 
although 51% of Labor voters approved compared with 26% of Coalition voters161. 
Similarly, when Morgan asked a more specific question about capital gains tax, the only 
version supported by a majority of respondents was for investment farms and real
156lan McNair (ed) (undated), Australian Public Opinion Polls (The Gallup Method) 1973- 
1987, Quadrant Research Services, Sydney, p.30.
157McNair Anderson Poll 02/12/80.
158McNair Anderson Poll 02/4/82.
1 59Morgan-Gallup Poll Finding 969, 7 September 1982.
166McNair-Anderson Poll, August 1981.
161 McNair Anderson Poll 03/7/82.
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estate sold within 12 months'62. However another Morgan poll taken at about the same 
time found that 72% were in favour of a capital gains tax for sales made within 12 
months of purchase, and that 59% were in favour of a capital gains tax for sales over 
12 months163.
In 1982 a Morgan Gallup poll put a similar question to the familiar tax versus 
social services choice offered previously, but this time split the tax alternative into 
two and reworded all three options. The result was that 36% of respondents wanted to 
reduce income tax, 23% wanted to reduce sales tax, while 41% preferred to increase 
assistance to the needy and aged164. Since the choice had two tax options but only one 
expenditure option, however, the apparent support for tax cuts may be overstated: if 
health had been nominated as an additional expenditure alternative to replace the sales 
tax option it is not at all clear that the proportion favouring tax cuts to expenditure 
increases would have been the same as for the actual question asked. It is certainly not 
directly comparable to the tax versus social services question.
Despite Liberal problems with the economy and with the tax evasion scandal, 
Bill Hayden's leadership of the Labor Party came under increasing pressure following a 
bad by-election result in December 1982. Fearing that the Liberals would find it more 
difficult to win against a Labor Party led by the popular Bob Hawke, Fraser attempted 
to lock Hayden into the leadership on 3 February by calling an early election for 5 
March using the rejected sales tax Bills as a pretext, but this strategy backfired when 
Hayden resigned under pressure the very same day in favour of Hawke.
Fraser's policy speech contained only one promise to cut tax, namely to 
introduce a new rate of 5 cents below the standard rate of company tax for companies 
with taxable incomes below $100,000. This lack of tax cut promises was probably 
linked to the existence of a budget deficit estimate of $9.6 billion, which was not 
revealed until after the election. The Nationals declared that they were not offering tax 
cuts because tax cuts averaging $17 per week for the average family had already been 
made. They also mentioned the promise to cut company tax for small companies, and 
pledged tax concessions to help those affected by the current drought.
1 62Morgan Gallup Poll 953, 27 July 1982.
163Morgan Gailup Poll 447, 26 June-3 July 1982, quoted in Murray Goot (1983), 'The media 
and the campaign', in Australia at the Polls: the National Elections of 1980 and 1983, ed. 
Howard R. Penniman, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p.215.
1 64Morgan-Gailup Poll reported in the Bulletin, 12 January 1982, p.25.
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In the Labor policy speech Bob Hawke promised to reduce tax for low and middle 
income earners and to reform the tax system in order to increase the real value of the 
paypacket, restore equity, and redress the tax burden according to the principle of 
ability to pay. This would prevent the erosion of after-tax income by inflation, and 
thus facilitate the operation of the prices and incomes policy that had been negotiated 
with the ACTU. In particular, a new 6 step tax system would be introduced to restore 
tax progressivity, and there would be rises in the tax-free threshold, the pensioners’ 
threshold, the spouse rebate, the sole parent rebate, and zone allowances. Hawke also 
promised to end tax evasion and avoidance, allow 100% retention of profits by small 
business where these were used for genuine business operations, and pledged that there 
would be no capital gains tax. Instead, the existing laws on speculative gains would be 
applied.
The Australian Democrats pointed to their opposition to the sales tax increases 
and maintained that they had influenced the last budget to drop the sales tax on 
necessities, make gifts to conservation organizations deductible, and eliminate the 
double tax on dividends.
The general strategy of the Liberals was to campaign on sound and responsible 
management despite unemployment and inflation figures of over 10%. Fraser blamed 
the rest of the world for the recession, and attacked Labor divisiveness, economic 
irresponsibility, and union domination. Hawke, who received saturation media coverage 
following his unexpected accession to the Labor leadership, advocated a consensual 
approach and ran a presidential-style campaign with the slogan 'Bob Hawke: Bringing 
Australia Together'. During the campaign the prices and incomes accord was agreed 
with the ACTU, and Labor's economic policy included extensive capital works, pubiic 
housing, and industrial reconstruction as well as tax cuts165. Labor attacks on the 
government centred on broken promises, economic mismanagement, Fraser's 
confrontationist approach, and scandals in the Ministry166.
During the campaign, opinion polls consistently showed Labor ahead, and Fraser 
received wide criticism for claiming that, under Labor, people's savings would be safer 
under the bed than in banks167. Liberal research was reported to have showed the 
electorate to be unimpressed by the government's record, worried about the possibility
165Sue Elderton (1983), 'Political review', Australian Quarterly, v.55/2, pp.236-239.
166Graham Maddox (1988), 'The Hawke Labor Government', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p. 12.
167'Political Chronicle’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, v.29/3, p.506.
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of unemployment, and attracted by Hawke and his prices and incomes policy. In the last 
week of the campaign the Liberals concentrated their attack on union power and 
economic management, with slogans such as 'Don't bankrupt Australia with Labor*. 
Fraser also claimed that Labor could reintroduce estate duty, and that under Labor’s tax 
plan 2.5 million people would pay more rather than less tax. However this disregarded 
Hawke’s promise to lift the tax-free threshold, and later Liberal attacks concentrated 
on marginal income tax rates instead.
Four of the five major morning newspapers supported the government, the 
exception being the Age, which supported Labor. Tax stories constituted 7.6% of issue 
stories on the front page during the last ten days of the campaign.
However tax did not appear to be an important issue for voters: an opinion poll 
commissioned by the Australian found that only 3% considered tax to be the major 
issue of the campaign, well behind unemployment 46% and inflation 12%. However 
when voters were asked to score given issues out of 10 according to their importance, 
taxation scored 7.1, behind only unemployment 8.7 and inflation 8.1168.
A Morgan poll also found that tax reduction and petrol prices were well down the 
voters’ list of priorities:
Table 4.28 Important issues, Australia 1980 and 1983
Issue Percent mentioning as one of three most important issues
1 98 0 1 9 83 Change
Reduction of unemployment 4 1 55 + 14
Reduction of inflation 28 31 + 3
Toughness with unions 2 1 26 + 5
Reduction of interest rates 8 21 + 1 3
More assistance to needy, aged 20 20 0
Reduction of tax 1 7 1 8 + 1
Cost of health insurance 1 7 1 7 0
Assistance to families 1 2 1 3 + 1
Price of petrol 1 7 1 1 - 6
Control/freeze wages 1 3 1 1 - 2
Source Morgan Gallup Poll Press Release 26 June, 1987.
1 68Australian, 14 February 1983.
However in relation to personal needs, taxation was more important: in the poll 
cited above Morgan also asked what the Federal government could do that would most 
benefit respondents and their families, and found that 18% named the reduction of 
income tax, ahead of unemployment 12% and more help for the aged 10%. However it 
should be noted that a much greater proportion of the electorate is affected by income 
tax than by either unemployment or age.
The result of the election was a 4% swing to Labor, which was enough to give 
them victory. Most of this was at the expense of the Liberals, who lost 3%. The 
Australian Democrats also lost votes.
Table 4.29 Election results, Australia 1983
Party 1983 vote Change since 1980
Labor 49.5% + 4.3%
Liberals 34.4% -3.1 %
National Country Party 9.2% + 0.3%
Liberal-NCP Coalition 43.7% -2.6%
Australian Democrats 5.0% -1 .5%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
The obvious issue explanation for the swing to Labor was the state of the 
economy: with both inflation and unemployment rates exceeding 10% the Coalition's 
claims of superiority in economic management were not nearly as plausible as they had 
been, while Labor's prices and incomes accord with the unions arguably offered an 
attractive alternative. This theory is supported by the results of an ANOP survey, 
which found that Labor had a 43% lead over the Coalition as the party more likely to 
lower the level of unemployment, while the government was not significantly ahead on 
any of the questions asked169.
1 6^ Financial Review, 3 March 1983.
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The theory is also supported by the results of an exit poll of eight marginal 
seats, which asked which of a range of issues influenced respondents' votes most:
Table 4.30 Influential issues, Australia 1983
Issue Percent mentions
Most Second most
influential influential
Reduction of unemployment 31 25
Management of the economy 28 24
Stable government 21 1 1
Control of inflation 9 1 8
Control of industrial disputes 4 9
Education 3 6
Dam in South-west Tasmania 2 2
Income tax/indirect taxes 1 4
Not stated 1 1
Source McNair Anderson & Associates, Reasons for the Swing to Labor: the Federal 
Election March 5 1983, Australia, p.x.
An Australia-wide poll which asked similar questions over the two weekends 
following the election found a similar response170, and these results, plus those of the 
opinion polls cited earlier, do not support the view that tax was an especially salient 
issue at the 1983 election.
To the extent that it did have an influence, however, Labor may have benefited, 
as the above McNair Anderson poll found that Labor was considered to have a better 
policy on income tax/indirect taxes by 45% while the Liberals were only favoured by 
37%, and an ANOP poll published on election day showed that Labor had a 35% lead 
over the Coalition on the question of who would be more likely to make the average 
income earner pay less tax171. It is also possible that the tax scandals of 1982 helped 
Labor via eroding the credibility of the government.
However when asked an open question as to why they voted as they did, less than 
2% of the respondents interviewed in the exit survey mentioned tax, and not one of the 
52 swinging voters mentioned it, which confirms the general conclusion that there is 
no real evidence to support the view that tax influenced the outcome of the 1983 
election.
170McNair-Anderson Poll 02/3/83. 
171 Financial Review, 3 March 1983.
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4.3 Elections 1973-1983: Left then Right
Sweden and Australia were similar during the 1970s and early 1980s not only 
in the complexions of their governments, but also in that their economic problems 
increased substantially compared to the 1960s and led to problems with taxation: high 
inflation pushed ordinary taxpayers into higher tax brackets, necessitating frequent 
tax cuts, and slow or negative economic growth eroded the revenue base. This occurred 
at the same time as calls on expenditure increased due to these economic problems, 
leading to large budget deficits and thus to measures to cut expenditure and/or increase 
taxation revenue. All this was associated with an increase in tax salience and 
controversy.
The two terms of Left government in each country during the early 1970s were 
associated with accelerating growth in tax and expenditure, while the Right 
governments that succeeded them managed to rein in tax but were not nearly so 
successful at curbing expenditure, although in Australia expenditure was briefly 
controlled in the late 1970s. This retardation of tax growth was due partly to the tax 
cuts put through by these governments, including, temporarily, indexation, and partly 
to the effects of the economic problems they faced. As a result both Right governments 
experienced problems with budget deficits, and made late efforts to increase tax 
revenue.
Apart from income tax cuts, which occurred in every single electoral term 
except when Labor was forced to an early election in 1974, the main tax changes 
during this period were increases in the rates of indirect taxes in both countries: VAT, 
excises and energy tax in Sweden, and sales tax and excises in Australia. This was more 
marked in Sweden than in Australia, leading to a continuation of the shift from direct to 
indirect tax. In Sweden the employer levy rose steadily under the Social Democrats 
before being abolished by the bourgeois government in 1978. In Australia the Whitlam 
Labor government restricted business concessions, which were then extended again by 
Fraser, while the crude oil levy introduced in the 1975 budget was steadily increased 
under the Fraser government and helped counteract falls in tax revenue elsewhere. In 
addition, the Coalition converted tax rebates for children into a family allowance, 
reduced income tax progressivity, abolished Commonwealth estate and gift duty, and 
briefly introduced a levy for health insurance before abolishing it along with the 
universal health insurance scheme itself.
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In Sweden the most rapid taxation growth occurred prior to the election of 1976 
on all measures, while in Australia the most rapid taxation growth occurred prior to 
the election of 1975 apart from election year total taxation, in which the highest 
growth occurred prior to the election of 1974. Depending on the measure used, the 
lowest growth in taxation occurred prior to the 1973, 1979 or 1982 elections in 
Sweden, and in Australia prior to the 1980 election for most measures of changes over 
the whole term and prior to 1983 for most measures of election year changes.
In regard to electoral strategy, at the Swedish elections of 1973 and 1976 the 
Social Democrats ran on their record and did not promise tax cuts, whereas the 
bourgeois parties promised to cut and index income tax, with the Conservatives the 
most determinedly anti-tax followed by the Liberals. The Centre Party was more 
interested in the low-paid than were the other bourgeois parties, and was therefore 
somewhat closer to the Social Democrats. During their terms of office the bourgeois 
parties carried out several of their tax promises, including tax indexation, but in the 
face of problems with the budget deficit only the Conservatives continued to promise 
more tax cuts, which they proposed to finance by cutting expenditure. The opposition 
Social Democrats promised to raise tax in both 1979 and 1982, in 1979 proposing a 
new tax on production, and in 1982 proposing to raise extra revenue from the VAT and 
remaining employer levies. The Communists continued to advocate measures leading to 
greater tax progressivity, such as rises in capital taxes and cuts in VAT.
In Australia the Labor government ran on its record in 1974 and 1975, while 
the Coalition in opposition emphasized tax cuts to a significantly greater extent than in 
1972, and Fraser delivered on many of these promises once the Coalition regained 
government. In 1977 both sides promised tax cuts, the Coalition focussing on income 
tax and Labor on payroll tax, but in 1980 Labor matched the Coalition on income tax 
cuts and in 1983 it was Labor which promised income tax cuts while the Coalition ran 
on its record, a complete reversal of the respective roles taken in 1974 and 1975. 
This strategy of Labor's marked a return to that of the early 1960s, although then it 
was sales tax that was to be lowered, and stands in sharp contrast to the Social 
Democrats' promises in the same period of rises in taxation.
Related to this, survey evidence indicates that while in Sweden the Social 
Democrats were perceived by voters to be the high tax alternative, the same was not 
true of Labor in Australia despite the efforts of the Coalition to portray them as such. 
Even in 1977 Labor was ahead of the Coalition on tax until Whitlam unveiled his 
payroll tax cut promise. That is, the tax debate at the mass level, as distinct from the
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elite level, appeared to be structured on classic Left-Right lines only in Sweden, not in 
Australia.
In Sweden tax was a prominent issue both in the media and in voters' minds in 
1973 and 1979, and an issue for voters but not the media in 1976. In Australia tax 
was a media issue at all five elections, whereas it had not been at any of the elections 
between 1958 and 1972, but it was not an important issue for the electorate at any of 
the elections between 1974 and 1983 despite being somewhat more salient from 1977 
on. One reason for the sudden increased media salience of tax in 1974 may have been 
the newspapers' alignment with the Coalition, although this does not explain why tax 
remained prominent in the media once Labor lost office in 1975.
In regard to the actual electoral impact of tax, the elections covered can be 
divided into three categories: those for which there is reasonable evidence that tax did 
matter, those for which there is reasonable evidence that tax did not matter, and those 
for which the evidence is either insufficient or ambiguous.
The two elections at which there is reasonable evidence that tax contributed to 
the change in aggregate vote share compared to the previous election are the Swedish 
election of 1979 and the Australian election of 1980.
In Sweden in 1979 tax was a bigger issue both in the media and for the public 
than in 1976, and voters who switched from Social Democrat to Liberal and from the 
middle parties to the Conservatives were significantly more positive towards their new 
party's tax policy and less positive about their old party's tax policy than were voters 
who stayed with those old parties. This being so, it can be said that in 1979 tax cost the 
Social Democrats the election, although because the result was so close there would 
have been other issues too that could have swung the result the other way. Possible 
causes of this shift to the Right on tax include the Social Democrats' proposal to 
introduce a major new tax on production, and the hardening in the Conservatives’ anti­
tax position.
In Australia in 1980 tax was also a bigger issue in the media and for voters than 
at the previous election (although still not especially important), and voters 
considered Labor to be the best party on tax by quite a large margin whereas in 1977 
the Coalition had been ahead on the issue. Possible reasons for this include the 
numerous tax controversies that occurred between 1977 and 1980, such as the 
withdrawal in 1978 of the 1977 'fistful of dollars' income tax cuts, the attempts to
broaden the tax base, and the rises in petrol prices due to the rapidly rising crude oil 
levy, plus the fact that in 1980 Labor as well as the Coalition promised income tax 
cuts, in contrast to 1977. The shift to Labor on tax occurred despite the comparatively 
low growth in virtually all measures of taxation between 1977 and 1980. However 
there is no evidence that the last minute Coalition scare campaign on wealth tax had any 
effect on the election outcome.
In Sweden in 1973 the evidence is rather more ambiguous. Although tax and 
especially VAT was an important issue both in the media and for the public, tax had also 
been an issue in 1970, and although the Social Democrats' record on tax was 
unpopular, it was no more so than in 1968, when the party had won an absolute 
majority in the Riksdag (the question was not asked in 1970). It is thus not possible to 
evaluate whether tax explained any of the voting shift between 1970 and 1973.
In 1976, the election prior to which tax increased more rapidly than at any of 
the other three elections during this period, the evidence for tax having an impact was 
nevertheless generally negative, since tax had also been salient in 1973, fewer voters 
disapproved of the Social Democrats' handling of taxation than in 1973, and changers 
were less likely to nominate tax as a reason for their party choice than stable voters. 
However it is possible that tax affected the result indirectly via the tax 'affairs’, as 
these harmed the Social Democrats' credibility as a government.
In 1982 the evidence is also ambiguous: tax was not an important issue for the 
media or for voters, but changers to the Conservatives were significantly more 
favourable to the Conservative tax policy and less favourable to their old party's tax 
policy than voters who stayed with these old parties. Thus it is clear that the 
Conservatives gained on tax, which can therefore be said to have influenced the 
election, but in terms of inter-bloc voting shifts this effect may have been cancelled 
out by the decreased salience of tax compared to 1979, since this meant that some 
people who voted on tax in 1979 would have voted on some other issue in 1982, and 
some of these issues would have drawn them left rather than right. In addition, more 
Swedes approved than disapproved of the 1981 tax agreement, which was different 
from previous such agreements during the 1970s only in that this time the 
Conservatives were in a position to walk out of the government when their wishes were 
not acceded to, whereas in the early 1970s they were already in opposition.
In Australia in 1974 there is no direct evidence that tax made a difference, 
largely because there is little evidence available, but the enormous turnaround in
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attitudes to taxation and social services between 1969 and 1974, plus the fact that tax 
was a media issue for the first time in the period under examination, implies that it 
might possibly have benefited the Liberals nevertheless, especially as taxation grew 
more quickly than expenditure between 1972 and 1974 and the Coalition stressed tax 
cut promises much more heavily than they had in 1972.
However in 1975, 1977 and 1983 there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest 
that tax mattered, and there are plausible alternative explanations of the election 
results. In 1975, the election prior to which tax increased more rapidly than at any of 
the other four elections, tax was not salient at all to voters, less of a media issue than 
in 1974, and the proportion of people favouring tax reduction over social service 
increases fell compared to 1974. In 1977 tax was not salient either, and an exit poll 
found that in response to an open question on why they voted as they did, no-one 
mentioned tax. At the 1983 election, prior to which tax increases were lower than at 
the other four elections, tax was only very slightly more salient than in 1980, and 
again an exit poll found no-one who mentioned tax as a reason for their party choice.
In summary, at the two elections at which tax seemed to matter, which occurred 
very close together in 1979 in Sweden and in 1980 in Australia, tax as an issue 
appeared to advantage the Right in Sweden but the Left in Australia, but at the elections 
following the most rapid tax growth, which also occurred close together in 1976 in 
Sweden and in 1975 in Australia, tax did not appear to affect the result despite the loss 
of votes, and of office, by the incumbent Left governments.
5ELECTIONS 1984-1988: PALME, CARLSSON, HAWKE
After the Left regained power in Sweden in 1982 and in Australia in 1983, both 
countries were ruled by Left governments for the remainder of the decade. Taxation was 
an important political issue for much of this period.
5.1 Sweden 1985 and 1988
1 9 8 5
At the 1985 election the Social Democrats lost votes but retained office, with 
support in the Riksdag from the Communists. On the bourgeois side the big winners 
were the Liberals, who improved their 1982 vote by over 8%.
During the election period 1982-85 the economy was the focal point of debate1, 
starting with a 16% devaluation in 1982 immediately the Social Democrats under Olof 
Palme came to power. Further stiff economic measures introduced in 1984 were the 
subject of dispute between the government and the LO. The controversial wage-earner 
funds were finally introduced in a truncated form, while on foreign policy there were 
acrimonious exchanges between the Social Democrats and Conservatives over 
neutrality2. New Liberal leader Bengt Westerberg realigned the Liberals with defence 
of the market economy, and promised no more deals with the Social Democrats3.
In the tax field, the period 1982-85 was characterized by a flurry of 
government activity. Following its election in September 1982 the new Social 
Democratic government presented a crisis program for the Swedish economy which 
included higher tax on wealth, inheritance and gifts, and increases in VAT, excises, and 
the unemployment insurance levy. Other tax measures included a 20% levy on share 
dividends for 1983 to be paid into the National Pension Insurance Fund, a new tax on
1 Pia Brandelius (1985), 'Election year '85: The general political scene - retrospect and 
current tendencies’, Current Sweden 332, p.5.
2Claes-Göran Kjellander (1984), 'National political issues for the 1984-85 session of the 
Riksdag', Current Sweden 326.
3Thomas Hempel (1985), 'Election year '85: voters to the Riksdag: "As you were’", Current 
Sweden 341, p.6.
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apartment buildings built before 1975, a 40% tax deduction for union fees, and 
adjustment of the tax reform enacted in 1982 as a consequence of devaluation4.
In 1983 the second phase in the 1981 tax reform was passed by the Riksdag, 
including its financing by increases in energy tax. Measures to curb the budget deficit 
included introduction of a property tax of 1.4%, increased taxes on wine, liquor and 
tobacco, a temporary increase in the wealth tax by 1% for 1984, an increase of 40% 
in sales tax on cars, a new transaction tax of 1% of turnover, and increased capital 
gains taxation through lower standard deductions. In addition, a cut in corporate tax 
from 40% to 32% was accompanied by abolition of the tax allowance for research and 
development and restriction of depreciation deductions. Finally, new levies were 
introduced on wages and profits to finance five regional wage-earner funds5.
In 1984 taxes on petrol, electricity, alcohol and vacations were increased, and a 
new wealth tax on dwellings and business buildings came into effect in January 19856. 
In 1985 the third phase in the three-year program for reducing marginal tax rates to 
50% was implemented, measures were taken for the continued equalization of 
communal tax rates, and excise on cars and stamp duty on mortgages were increased7.
During this period the economy improved: real per capita GDP increased by 
$257.28 per annum and by $245.95 in election year, both above average, while 
inflation dropped slightly to 8.2% per annum and 7.55% in election year. 
Unemployment fell by 0.06% of the workforce per annum and by 0.33% in election 
year, but real wages only rose by 0.84% per annum, well below average, before 
recovering to rise by 2.40% in election year.
The combination of high economic growth and numerous tax rises helped the 
government to begin to draw in the budget deficit: over the term as a whole, rises in 
taxation slightly exceeded rises in expenditure, although in election year itself 
expenditure grew more quickly than tax. The annual growth over the government's 
term in real per capita tax and expenditure was more rapid than the long-term 
average, as was election year expenditure and central government tax, but election 
year direct taxation and general government taxation increased more slowly than 
average. As a percentage of GDP, central government tax and expenditure increased
4 OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, February 1984, OECD, Paris, pp.52-53.
5 OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, May 1985, OECD, Paris, pp.68-69.
5OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, May 1985, OECD, Paris, pp.70-71.
7 OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1987, OECD, Paris, p.63.
faster than average over the term as a whole, with the exception of direct tax, but 
general government taxation and expenditure fell slightly apart from election year 
expenditure, which still rose more slowly than average.
Table 5.1 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1982-85
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
131.78 0.76
Direct taxation 35.36 0.1 8
Expenditure 1 19.25 0.41
General government:
Total taxation 129.71 0.00
Direct taxation 45.40 -0 .10
Expenditure 128.50 -0 .33
Central government: 
Total taxation 1 18.88
Election year changes
0.62
Direct taxation 22.88 0.05
Expenditure 1 62.90 0.85
General government:
Total taxation 94.80 -0 .29
Direct taxation 26.94 -0 .26
Expenditure 192.50 0.38
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
In their 1985 election manifesto the Social Democrats promised to make the tax 
system simpler and more equitable, keep the total pressure of tax more or less 
unchanged, and pursue the objective of ensuring that at least 90% of all recipients of 
earned income paid 50% or less in marginal taxation, in accordance with the 1981 tax 
agreement. They also promised to reform the local tax equalization scheme.
The Centre Party expressed its opposition to further tax rises, due to the 
attendant risk of new price spirals, and advocated the reduction of marginal tax rates to 
the level agreed in 1981 plus the reintroduction of tax indexation. It also pledged to 
abolish the new taxes on property and forest worth, to reduce VAT on basic foodstuffs 
by redistributing the VAT burden, and to reform tax equalization arrangements with 
local government. The Liberal policy was similar, promising no tax rises and an
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indexed income tax system with a marginal tax ceiling of 70% and a marginal rate of 
50% for incomes up to 200,000 kronor. They also promised to abolish property tax, 
remove the remaining joint taxation provisions, and introduce environmental levies.
The most concerted attack on high taxes was made by the Conservatives, who 
blamed the size and rate of growth of the public sector for Sweden's economic 
problems, saying that high taxes and regulation reduced competitiveness and the 
incentives to save and work, and increased costs and prices. Therefore they argued that 
the public sector should be limited to the sphere where households and individual 
enterprises were unable to operate well, that the tax burden should be reduced to that 
of comparable countries, and that taxes should not be raised except under exceptional 
circumstances. Taxes on production would be the first to be lowered, in order to 
stimulate work, savings, and business activity. Income tax rates would be lowered to 
40% on average, with a 70% ceiling, and indexed. Childcare costs would be made tax 
deductible. A ceiling would be imposed on local income tax, for which child deductions 
would be allowed. Corporate tax would be lowered to the average rate of income tax, and 
the double taxation of dividends would be abolished. Taxation on shares would be 
harmonized, with profits for long-held shares freed from tax. Wealth tax would be cut, 
to encourage investment, and abolished for working capital in small and medium 
enterprises. Finally, inheritance and gift tax would be cut, and taxation replaced by 
fees and charges where possible unless there were strong social reasons not to do this.
The Communists stated that tax should be cut for ordinary people by increasing 
progressivity via raising taxes on capital, big fortunes, speculation and high incomes, 
and by abolishing the VAT on food.
The 1985 campaign was seen largely as a battle between the Social Democrats 
and the Conservatives, whose leader Ulf Adelsohn was the generally acknowledged 
bourgeois candidate for Prime Minister8. Adelsohn therefore received a extensive 
media coverage and was involved in controversy several times, for example when he 
expressed his willingness to swim in the water surrounding one of Sweden's nuclear 
power plants. However an opinion poll judged his TV debate with Palme to be a draw9. 
The wage-earner funds received wide publicity, with a large anti-fund demonstration 
taking place during the campaign, and tax was a prominent media issue10.
8 Indikator - Sifos politiska nyhetsbrev September 2, 1985, p.4.
9 Indikator - Sifos politiska nyhetsbrev September 2, 1985, p.6.
1 °According to Kent Asp's media survey of elections 1956-1985, unpublished information, 
Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University.
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According to Sainsbury11, the Social Democrats' strategy was to emphasize 
their economic success, as the budget deficit was down, production was up, and 
unemployment had been kept below 3%, while defending the welfare society against the 
Conservative 'system change' and reminding voters of bourgeois disunity, an appeal 
rendered more credible by Centre leader Fälldin's refusal to support a common 
bourgeois platform for the election12. The Conservative campaign, by contrast, was 
based around reducing the size of the public sector by measures such as tax cuts, 
spending cuts including reduction of sickness benefit levels, and privatization of 
services such as childcare, health, and housing. Meanwhile the Liberal slogan was 
'social responsibility without socialism', and towards the end of the campaign 
Westerberg criticized the Conservatives' tax proposals. The Centre Party was seen to 
be disadvantaged by the other parties becoming more environmentalist, and was also 
internally divided over an electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats (KDS).
The 1985 election outcome was that the Social Democratic government was 
returned, with Communist support in the Riksdag, while on the bourgeois side the 
Liberals surprised most observers by gaining 8.3% while the Conservatives and 
especially the Centre Party lost votes. In addition, the KDS entered the Riksdag due to 
its alliance with the Centre Party, although it was not accorded separate party status.
Table 5.2 Election results, Sweden 1985
Party 1985 vote Change since 1982
Social Democrats 44.7% -0.9%
Centre Party 8.8% -6.7%
KDS 2.3% + 0.4%
Liberals 14.2% + 8.3%
Conservatives 21.3% -2.3%
Communists 5.4% -0.2%
Greens 1.5% -0.1 %
Socialist bloc 50.1% -1.1%
Bourgeois bloc (incl KDS) 46.6% + 1.6%
S o u rc e  Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige,
Bonniers, Sweden, p.24.
1 1 Diane Sainsbury (1986), 'The 1985 Swedish election: The Conservative upsurge is 
checked', West European Politics, v.9/2, pp.293-297.
12Ulf Lindström (1986), 'The Swedish elections of 1985', Electoral Studies 4, p.77.
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According to the 1985 election study, 19% of voters who voted in both 1982 
and 1985 changed parties. 2.9% changed from socialist to bourgeois while 1.7% 
changed from bourgeois to socialist. The Social Democrats on balance lost votes only to 
the Liberals, who also gained votes at the expense of the Conservatives and Centre 
Party, and the election study found some support for the widespread view that this was 
at least partly due to the 'Westerberg effect', that is, to the calm, professional, 
reasonable image that Bengt Westerberg projected on TV, which contrasted with the 
more vindictive battle being waged by Palme and Adelsohn13.
However voter cynicism rose to its highest level since it was first measured in
1 968:
Table 5.3 Voter cynicism, Sweden 1982 and 1985
Question Percent agreeing
1982 1 985 Change
Parties are only interested in 
people’s votes but not in their views 61 66 + 5
Those in the Riksdag don’t take much 
notice of what ordinary people think 60 63 + 3
Source Sören Holmberg & Mikael 
Bonniers, Sweden, p.236.
Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige,
Judging by responses to an open question on each party's good or bad policies, it 
is clear that the Social Democrats' tax policy was rather unpopular in 1985, and that 
support for it had dropped markedly since 1982. This may well have been at least 
partly due to the numerous new taxes and tax increases put through since then. Support 
also fell for the tax policies of the Communists and Conservatives, but rose for the 
policies of the middle parties and in particular the Liberals.
13Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
pp.86-90, 163-166.
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Table 5.4 Party profiles on tax, Sweden 1985
Party pos
%
neg
%
balance
%
Change in balance 
since 1982
Social Democrats 22 42 -2 0 -1 6
Centre 9 6 + 3 + 5
Liberals 1 6 6 + 1 0 + 1 1
Conservatives 25 29 - 4 - 6
Communists 7 1 1 - 4 - 1 2
Source Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige,
Bonniers, Sweden, p.135.
All parties' supporters tended on balance to support their party's policy on tax, 
but Conservative voters were most unequivocal in this respect. In addition, most new 
converts to the Conservatives named tax as the issue either most negative for the party 
they left or most positive for their new party14.
According to the election survey, many more voters considered tax to be 
important for their party choice than in 1982, as was also the case for the 
environment and, to a lesser extent, social welfare. Wage-earner funds, on the other 
hand, declined markedly in importance as an issue. Tax was especially important for 
Liberals, Conservatives and Communists.
Table 5.5 Important issues for party choice, Sweden 1985
Issue 1 982 1 985 Change
Employment 29 25 - 4
Environment 7 22 + 15
Tax 8 20 + 1 2
Welfare/social policy/health 1 2 1 9 + 7
Family policy/childcare 8 1 7 + 9
Economy 1 4 1 4 0
Wage-earner funds 33 1 1 -2 2
Source Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, 
Bonniers, Sweden, pp.37, 39.
14Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
pp.135, 137.
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On the basis that 1982 Social Democrat voters who defected in 1985 named tax 
as an important issue to a significantly greater degree than did 1982 Social Democrat 
voters who stayed loyal, Holmberg and Gilljam concluded that tax caused Social 
Democrat losses not only to the Conservatives (although on balance the Social 
Democrats gained slightly from the Conservatives) but also to the Liberals and, on the 
issue of abolishing VAT on food, to the Communists. Tax was also associated with change 
both from the Centre Party to the Conservatives and vice versa15.
Holmberg and Gilljam also found that there appeared to be a general desire to 
retain and extend the progressivity of the tax system: voters were clearly against 
cutting tax on higher incomes and clearly in favour of lowering or abolishing the VAT 
on food. Responses to questions concerning the public sector and social assistance were 
evenly divided, but most Swedes opposed cutting specific programs or favoured 
spending more, although given the choice between raising or lowering the level of 
transfers and support for citizens, most Swedes favoured the latter. Compared to 
1979, the last time this question was asked, Swedes had become slightly less negative 
towards cutting tax on high incomes, and since 1982 they had become slightly less 
negative towards cutting the public sector, but on both of these issues this masked a 
polarization of views: Social Democrat and Communist supporters solidified their 
opposition, while bourgeois supporters became relatively more positive:
Table 5.6 Opinions on tax-related issues, Sweden 1982 and 1985
Issue good bad balance Change
% % % %
Lower tax for higher incomes 27 60 -3 3 + 3*
Cut the public sector 43 42 + 1 + 6
Cut social assistance 40 47 - 7
Cut defence expenditure 36 48 - 1 2
Cut foreign aid 1 0 73 - 63
Build more childcare centres 53 27 + 28
* Comparison for lower tax on higher incomes is between 1979 and 1985
for against balance
Lower or abolish VAT on food 75 1 2 + 63
Cut the public sector 35 36 - 1 + 8
Cut sickness benefits 1 5 71 -5 6
Introduce a childcare allowance 57 1 2 + 45
15Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden,
pp.116, 120, 122.
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Table 5.6 (cont)
agree disagree balance
Cut rather than increase transfers
and support for citizens 62 30 + 32
Source Source Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, 
Bonniers, Sweden, p.126-127, 260.
Again using the rationale that an issue is important for party change to the 
extent that the balance of opinion among a party’s stable voters is different from the 
balances of opinion among different groups of defectors, Holmberg and Gilljam 
concluded that at the 1985 election attitudes to tax-related issues cut both ways. On the 
one hand, the desire to cut the public sector was important for change from Social 
Democrat to Liberal, the desire to cut transfers and support for citizens was important 
for change from Social Democrat to Conservative, and the desire to cut social assistance 
was important for change from Social Democrat to both Liberal and Conservative, but, 
on the other hand, opposition to cutting tax on high incomes and to cutting transfers and 
support for citizens was important for change from Conservative to Social Democrat, 
and opposition to cutting the public sector was important for change from Centre to 
Social Democrat16.
It would therefore appear that the anti-tax flow of voters from the Social 
Democrats to the bourgeois parties was counterbalanced by the flow of voters attracted 
by the services and benefits that the Social Democrats pledged to protect and/or extend, 
which is consistent with the election study's general conclusion that a rightwards shift 
by the electorate, as measured by opinions on Left/Right issues including tax, led to 
Social Democrat losses, which however were largely balanced by gains on social 
welfare issues and on perceptions of bourgeois disunity17.
1 9 8 8
The Social Democrats retained office again at the 1988 election despite losing 
votes, but the most striking aspect of the election result was the success of the Greens
16Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
p. 1 30.
17Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, 
pp.315-31 7.
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in surmounting the 4% barrier to representation to become the first new party to 
enter the Riksdag since 1921.
Perhaps the most traumatic political event during this period was the 
assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme in February 1986 as he emerged from a 
Stockholm cinema. Palme was succeeded as Prime Minister by Ingvar Carlsson. 
Between 1985 and 1988 the economic situation improved, with unemployment falling 
to below 2%. At the same time environmental problems came to the fore, including the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, a poisonous algae bloom in the North Sea, and a seal 
epidemic. In addition, the government was hit by a series of scandals, the most serious 
of which involved the government's use of an unofficial investigator, Ebbe Carlsson, 
into Palme's murder, which had still not been solved by the time Swedes went to the 
polls in September 1988.
In the field of taxation, in 1986 the tax on charter tourism was increased and a 
once-for-all levy on insurance and pension funds was passed18. Income tax changes 
from January 1987 included an increase in the basic deduction for local tax, a new 
basic deduction for national tax, fewer steps in marginal tax rates, a top marginal rate 
of 75%, and the abolition of joint taxation of couples' income from capital. In addition, 
taxes on energy, endowment insurance interest, alcohol and tobacco were increased and 
endowment insurance was made assessable for wealth tax, but the maximum rate for 
inheritance and gift tax was lowered. Furthermore, vehicle taxes were increased, a 
broader turnover tax on securities was introduced, and tax allowances for advance 
interest payments were restricted19. In 1988 profit sharing was made subject to tax, 
wealth tax and property tax were altered, income tax was cut by increasing the income 
levels at which higher tax brackets applied, and taxes were increased on heavy 
vehicles, fuel, and coal20.
During this period economic growth slowed to slightly less than the overall 
average: real per capita GDP increased by $156.73 per annum and by $136.77 in 
election year. However inflation fell to 4.90% per annum and 5.54% in election year, 
and unemployment dropped by 0.40% of the workforce per annum and by 0.42% in 
election year. Real wages rose by 1.16% per annum and by 1.55% in election year, 
somewhat below average.
18OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, April 1987, OECD, Paris, pp.64-65. 
19OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, 1988-89 OECD, Paris, pp.97-99. 
20OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, 1988-89 OECD, Paris, pp.99-101.
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By 1988 the Social Democrats had a firm grip on the budget, with all measures 
of taxation growing considerably more rapidly than average while almost all measures 
of expenditure fell.
Table 5.7 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Sweden 1985-88
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government: 
Total taxation
Average annual changes in term 
161.73 0.90
Direct taxation 81.90 0.66
Expenditure -95 .4 9 -1 .3 4
General government:
Total taxation 261.51 1.63
Direct taxation 156.99 1.08
Expenditure 42.69 - 0 .8 7
Central government: 
Total taxation 150.04
Election year changes
0.28
Direct taxation 95.36 0.79
Expenditure -121 .65 -1 .5 0
General government:
Total taxation 139.80 0.62
Direct taxation 1 27.04 0.89
Expenditure - 11 1 . 17 -1 .80
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987
Statistics Sweden, Swedish Ministry of Finance
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
UN Demographic Yearbook 1961, Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter
In their 1988 manifesto the Social Democrats promised to make taxes fairer by 
reducing income tax in 1989 as the first step in a larger tax reform, which would also 
encourage work and saving, counteract tax avoidance, and achieve a fairer distribution 
of the tax burden between labour and capital. This would be financed through increased 
revenue from indirect tax, higher taxes on capital, and a tight expenditure policy. In 
addition, environmental levies would be introduced to discourage pollution.
The Centre Party emphasized the goal of reduced tax levels for individuals, and 
undertook to reduce tax on work by cutting marginal rates of income tax and 
introducing a higher basic deduction, which would be financed by raising taxes and 
levies on raw materials and energy. VAT on basic foodstuffs would also be reduced, and
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this would be made possible by raising VAT on other items. Finally, environmental 
levies on pollutants would be introduced, employer levies for small business would be 
reduced, and tax equalization between communes would be improved.
The Liberals pledged to lower the total tax burden, and emphasized the need to 
encourage work and saving ("It must profit one to work") by letting people keep the 
greater part of what they earn by cutting marginal rates of income tax so that most 
people would keep 60% of extra earnings, while everyone would keep at least 50%. 
Income tax rates would be indexed, and marginal tax rates would be cut by 4% in 1989 
for all full-time workers. This would be financed by lowering both the basic income 
tax deduction and the level of sickness benefit (from 90% of previous earnings to 
80%). In addition, tax would be abolished on working capital in small and medium 
businesses, social levies would be abolished on dividends, the employer levy in certain 
remote northern areas would be cut by 10%, the tax on alcohol would be increased, and 
environmental levies would be introduced.
The Conservatives promised to lower the total tax burden by 1% of GDP per 
year by means of cutting income tax, which would be financed by cutting expenditure 
rather than by raising other taxes. Tax cuts open new possibilities and stimulate 
economic growth, stated their manifesto, and one must be able to live on one’s income 
(that is, not be forced by high taxation to depend on government transfer payments). In 
1989 marginal rates of income tax would be cut by 4-5%, so that everyone would get a 
tax cut (an implicit contrast with Liberal policy). The eventual aim was a marginal 
rate for most people of 35% and a top rate of 50%. Income tax would also be indexed, 
and deductibility for childcare would be introduced. Furthermore, a cap would be placed 
on local tax, for which a basic deduction for all children would be introduced. Finally, 
the tax burden on small business would be reduced by making working capital tax-free 
and reducing inheritance tax (which would encourage family businesses), and the extra 
tax on profits to finance the wage-earner funds would be abolished along with the 
wage-earner funds themselves.
The Communists again advocated higher taxes on speculation, share trading, 
liquid resources within big companies, and the largest fortunes, plus the abolition of 
VAT on food. In the longer term a production tax was favoured, as this would create the 
possibility of lower income tax for ordinary wage-earners.
The Greens, who with opinion poll ratings of up to 10% during 1988 were a 
force to be reckoned with for the first time, emphasized progressivity and relief for
1 91
low income earners. In particular, they promised to introduce a tax threshold and 
abolish the VAT on food while increasing it on other goods, and aimed at reducing taxes 
on work while increasing them on energy, effluent, raw materials and speculation.
During the campaign the media focussed mainly on the Ebbe Carlsson affair and a 
number of lesser scandals; the environment, especially the seal deaths; and taxation21. 
The Greens received much attention, did well in a televised debate on environmental 
issues, but received a setback towards the end of the campaign when several leading 
members were shown to have evaded tax.
In regard to tax, the main debate was on the means of financing income tax cuts, 
with the Liberals in particular coming under heavy attack for proposing to lower the 
basic deduction, which would have the effect of raising tax for low income earners at 
the same time that high income earners were receiving tax cuts. Late in the campaign 
this led to a sharp and widely publicized exchange between Liberal leader Bengt 
Westerberg and new Centre Party leader Olof Johansson. The proposals by the Centre 
Party, Communists and Greens to reduce or abolish the VAT on food received less 
attention, despite opinion polls showing that 82% agreed with the idea of lowering VAT 
on food while raising it on other items22, and that 58% would prefer a cut in VAT on 
food to a cut in income tax rates, compared with only 32% who preferred the income 
tax cut 23. It was noticeable that the Social Democrats did not rule out reducing the VAT 
on food, which may have been due to the possibility of having to negotiate with the 
Centre Party and/or Greens in order to form a government if the socialists lacked a 
majority in the Riksdag after the election (the Liberals and Conservatives ruled out the 
possibility of governing with the Greens due to the magnitude of policy differences).
Despite opinion polls which suggested that the Greens might gain the balance of 
power in the Riksdag, the socialist parties once again gained a majority of seats, which 
meant a continuation of the Social Democratic government. However the Greens did 
surmount the 4% barrier and entered the Riksdag, the first new party to do so since 
the introduction of universal suffrage in 1921. The bourgeois parties suffered a heavy 
defeat, with the lowest combined vote for decades, although it should be noted that the 
KDS vote, which had been included in the bourgeois vote in 1985 due to the electoral
21 This is based on my survey of the coverage of the last 10 days of the campaign by the main 
evening TV news ('Rapport' and 'Aktuellt') plus front page stories in Dagens Nyheter, Svenska 
Dagbladet, Göteborgs-Posten and Arbetet.
22 Rapport, 1 September 1988.
23Aktuellt, 6 September 1988.
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alliance with the Centre Party, was no longer included due to the dissolution of that 
alliance.
Table 5.8 Election results, Sweden 1988
Party 1988 vote Change since 1985
Social Democrats 43.2% -1.5%
Centre Party 11.3% + 2.5%
Liberals 12.2% -2.0%
Conservatives 18.3% -3.0%
Communists 5.8% + 0.4%
Greens 5.5% + 4.0%
KDS 2.9% + 0.6%
Socialist bloc 49.1% -1.1%
Bourgeois bloc 41.8% -4.8%
Source Voting figures provided by Statistics Sweden.
According to a voter flow table prepared by the pollster Sifo, 3% of the total 
electorate changed bloc, 1.6% from socialist to bourgeois and 1.4% from bourgeois to 
socialist. The Greens gained about 1.5% from each bloc. The main voting shifts were to 
the left: the Social Democrats lost votes to the Communists; the Conservatives and 
Liberals lost to the Centre Party; and the Conservatives lost to the Liberals. In 
addition, large numbers of 1985 voters for both blocs failed to vote in 198824.
Although a definitive interpretation of the election results must await the 
publication of the full 1988 election study, which was not available at the time of 
writing, they are consistent with the high profile of the environment causing a 
movement to the Greens, with a flow of voters away from the Social Democrats due to 
the scandals being largely balanced by a flow the other way due to the economic 
recovery.
According to preliminary figures from the 1988 election survey, cynicism 
remained high but did not grow compared to 1985:
Z^Svenska Dagbladet, 21 September 1988. These figures must be viewed as approximate, as 
they are based not on a post-election sample survey but on a loglinear fitting of Sifo's party 
change table to the actual election, results.
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Table 5.9 Voter cynicism, Sweden 1985 and 1988
Question Percent agreeing
1 985 1 98 8 Change
Parties are only interested in 
people’s votes but not in their views 66 65 - 1
Those in the Riksdag don't take much 
notice of what ordinary people think 63 65 +2
Source Sören Holmberg (1988), Trends in Swedish voting behavior', unpublished, 
Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University, Figure 13.
As in 1985, about a fifth of voters considered tax to be important to their party
choice:
Table 5.10 Important issues for party choice, Sweden 1988
Issue 1 985 1 988 Change
% % %
Environment 22 46 + 24
Welfare policies 44 40 - 4
Taxes 20 1 9 - 1
Economy 1 4 8 - 6
Full employment 25 5 -2 0
Foreign policy/defence 6 5 - 1
Source Sören Holmberg (1990), Trends in Swedish voting behavior', unpublished, 
Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University, Table 2. This includes all 
issues mentioned by 5% or more of respondents, but is not fully comparable with the 
figures from the 1985 election study cited earlier because several of the welfare- 
related categories used then have been merged, which raises the apparent significance 
of welfare.
In regard to the electoral impact of tax at the 1988 election, given its salience, 
it is possible that the loss of Liberal votes to the left coupled with the gain from the 
right was caused by the perceived rightwards move in the Liberal tax policy, which one 
would expect to attract Conservative voters but repel the Liberals' left wing. However 
it is difficult to tell whether the VAT issue had an effect, as the three parties which 
wanted to reduce or abolish it, and which all gained votes compared with 1985, were 
also the three most environmentally radical parties.
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5.2 Australia 1984 and 1987
Following its return to power in 1983, the Left in Australia retained office at 
both the remaining elections of the 1980s, just as in Sweden, and undertook 
considerable tax reform.
1 9 8 4
Despite predictions of a landslide victory, the Hawke Labor government was 
returned at the election of 1984 with a reduced majority.
On its election in March 1983 the new Labor government immediately retracted 
some of its promises, including promises to cut tax rates, when it discovered that the 
projected budget deficit was $9.6 billion25, but a National Economic Summit convened 
in April 1983 was successful in its purpose of getting some measure of agreement 
between business, unions and other groups on the economy. In particular, agreement 
was reached on the need to fight inflation and unemployment simultaneously, and the 
need for an effective prices and incomes policy and for improvements in the equity and 
efficiency of the taxation system26. During this period the operation of the Accord 
between the ALP and the ACTU allowed a trade-off to take place between reduced wage 
claims and increases in the social wage, which included the reintroduction of universal 
health insurance under the new name of Medicare, income tax cuts, and improved social 
security. Meanwhile the economy improved, with both inflation and unemployment 
figures falling, and the government undertook considerable economic deregulation 
including allowing the currency exchange rate to float.
The government also successfully blocked the damming of the Franklin River in 
Tasmania, but became embroiled in controversy soon after its election over the 
association of lobbyist and former ALP Secretary David Combe with an alleged Soviet 
spy, and was internally divided over uranium mining and visits to Australian ports by 
nuclear-armed warships27. In 1984 another controversy erupted over allegations that 
High Court Judge and former Labor Attorney-General Lionel Murphy had attempted to
25Graham Maddox (1988), The Hawke Labor Government’, in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, pp.13- 
1 4.
26OECD Economic Surveys - Australia, June 1984, p.59.
27Unless otherwise indicated, general historical information for Australia including the 
government's tax record is from the Political Chronicle of The Australian Journal of Politics 
and History.
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pervert the course of justice. Other matters of contention included Asian immigration, 
Aboriginal land rights, and the winding up of a Royal Commission into organized crime.
The first tax changes to take place under the Hawke government were the 
implementation of the bank debits tax introduced by the Fraser government, a 
reduction in the crude oil levy28, a rise in the concessional tax threshold, and the 
abolition of deductibility for gold mining losses. In May the health insurance tax rebate 
was replaced by a compulsory health insurance levy on income when Medicare was 
established, rebates were abolished for home loan interest payments and dividend 
income, the threshold amount of rebatable expenditure was raised, the tax threshold 
for the unearned income of minors was reduced, and certain industry taxation 
concessions were removed.
Perhaps the most controversial decision, however, was to make lump sum 
superannuation payments taxable29. This prompted wide protest including industrial 
action by pilots and police30, and a poll taken following the change found that 66% of 
respondents opposed it, compared to only 25% who were in favour31. In response to 
this concern, modifications were made, including a reduction in tax rates32.
The 1983 budget increased and indexed excises on fuel, grape spirit and tobacco, 
imposed a new duty on imported petroleum products, changed the sales tax rate 
structure, strengthened the tax on profits made on the sale of property acquired for the 
purposes of resale, introduced legislation against 'bottom of the harbour’ taxation 
schemes (in which companies were stripped of assets but left with tax liabilities), and 
abolished a number of income tax concessions33. In September taxation at source was 
introduced for payments in industries where tax evasion was known to be significant.
In 1984 a resources rent tax was introduced, and excises were reduced on liquid 
petroleum gas, certain electrical components, and computer software. The budget 
included income tax cuts of $2.1 billion, with the biggest percentage cuts going to low
28OECD Economic Sun/eys - Australia, June 1984, OECD, Paris, p.59.
29Peter Groenewegen (1987), 'Tax reform in Australia and New Zealand’, in Austra lian  
Taxation Policy, ed. P.D. Groenewegen, second edition, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.162. 
30Peter Groenewegen (1985), Everyone's Guide to Taxation in Australia, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p.64.
31 Ian McNair (undated), Australian Public Opinion Polls (the Gallup Method) 1973-1987, 
Quadrant Research Services, Sydney, p.30.
S^OECD Economic Surveys • Australia, June 1984, OECD, Paris, p.61.
33 7983-84 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
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income earners: the standard rate was cut from 30% to 25%, and a 5 step scale 
replaced the former 3 step scale. The tax cut, which on average was worth $7.60 per 
week, was part of a trade-off for wage restraint, and the budget was generally 
favourably received34. Other changes to income tax included the introduction of rebates 
to ensure that social security recipients didn't pay tax, an increase in the pensioner 
rebate and zone rebate, the extension of the dependent spouse rebate to de facto spouses, 
and a higher income threshold for the Medicare levy. Business tax changes included the 
introduction of a special excise to encourage development of 'old' oil fields, increased 
depreciation concessions, and restrictions on transfers of losses between commonly- 
owned companies. Furthermore, the beer excise was altered to reflect alcohol content, 
a sales tax was introduced on wine and cider, there were some minor extensions to 
concessions for primary producers, and anti-tax avoidance measures were 
strengthened35.
During this period economic growth accelerated: real per capita GDP increased 
by $225.83 per annum, well above average, and by a massive $454.05 in election 
year. At the same time inflation fell to 6.8% per annum and 4.48% in election year. 
Unemployment rose by 0.71% of the workforce per annum but fell sharply by 1.60% 
in election year. Real wage growth at 1.53% per annum was about average, but 
accelerated to 2.68% in election year.
Over the government's term as a whole, expenditure growth was considerably 
above the long-term average and far outstripped the growth of taxation. Real per capita 
taxation growth was slightly above average while as a percentage of GDP it was well 
below average, and direct taxation growth however measured was well below average. 
However in election year the discrepancy between taxation and expenditure growth 
lessened as the government, aided by the economic recovery, started to reduce the 
budget deficit. All measures of real per capita taxation and expenditure grew more 
rapidly than average in election year, while growth in tax and expenditure was below 
average or even negative as a proportion of GDP.
34Brian Galligan (1984), 'Political review', Australian Quarterly, v.56/4, p.428. 
351984-85 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
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Table 5.11 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1983-84
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government:
Average annual changes in term
Total taxation 61.06 0.03
Direct taxation 14.28 -0 .3 0
Expenditure 155.90 1.06
General government:
Total taxation 80.01 0.09
Direct taxation 14.28 -0 .3 0
Expenditure 182.87 1.17
Central government:
Election year changes
Total taxation 118.82 0.01
Direct taxation 62.82 - 0 . 19
Expenditure 157.96 0.27
General government:
Total taxation 136.60 -0.1 1
Direct taxation 62.82 -0.1 9
Expenditure 1 89.75 0.24
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
According to Groenewegen, dissatisfaction with taxation grew in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s due to doubts as to its fairness, rapidly rising average tax burdens due 
to the effects of inflation, and the growth of tax avoidance in the late 1970s36. However 
a Morgan Poll taken in 1984 found that the majority who considered that taxes were 
unreasonable had shrunk somewhat since 1982:
36Peter Groenewegen (1987), Australian Taxation Policy, second edition, Longman Cheshire, 
Melbourne, pp.vii-viii.
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Table 5.12 Opinion on tax levels, Australia, August 1982 and September 1984
1 982 1 984 Change
% % %
Reasonable 28 35 + 7
Unreasonable 67 59 - 8
Undecided 5 6 + 1
Balance saying tax levels reasonable -3  9 -2 4 + 15
Source Morgan Gallup Poll 1292, 1 March 1985. The original record of the 1982 
survey, Finding 969 (7 September 1982) quotes the percentage of respondents 
considering tax unreasonable as 65% rather than 67%, but this discrepancy does not 
affect the overall trend.
According to the 1984-85 National Social Science Survey, which was carried 
out between August 1984 and July 1985, straddling the December 1984 election, 
60% supported cutting tax rates for everyone, and only 21% were opposed37. On the 
trade-off question with social services, support for tax cuts rose slightly since 1979:
Table 5.13 Opinions on tax and social services, Australia 1979 and 1984-85
1 979 
%
1984-85
%
Change
%
Reduced taxes 59 64 + 5
Increased social services 36 33 - 3
Can't say 5 3 - 2
Balance favouring tax cuts + 23 + 31 + 8
Sources Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second 
edition, ANU Press, Canberra, p.385; Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce 
Headey (1985), Australian National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social 
Sciences Data Archive, ANU, Canberra, p.17.
At the same time, however, 46% of respondents agreed that rich people should 
be taxed more, compared to 35% who disagreed, and 51% of respondents favoured a 
redistribution of wealth in favour of ordinary working people, to which only 28% 
were opposed38. Moreover, Australians were by no means enthusiastic about cutting 
specific government programs:
37Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian National Social 
Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, Canberra, p.21. 
38Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian National Social 
Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, Canberra, pp.21, 24.
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Table 5.14 Opinion on government spending, Australia 1984-85
Too much 
%
About right
%
Too little 
%
Balance
%
Improving the nation's education system 6 26 66 -6 0
Dealing with drug addiction 7 24 65 -5 8
Improving roads and highways 5 37 56 -51
Hospitals and medical care 7 37 56 -4 9
Scientific research and new technology 8 34 53 -4 5
Improving and protecting the environment 9 41 48 -3 9
The military, armaments and defence 1 7 25 55 -3 8
Pensions and other social services 1 5 38 45 -3 0
Providing assistance for the unemployed 1 9 37 42 -2 3
Improving conditions for Aborigines 33 31 34 - 1
Foreign aid 44 36 1 5 + 29
Source Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian  
National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, 
Canberra, pp.13-17. Data on attitudes missing from the Codebook was procured direct 
from the directors of the survey. 'Don't know' responses are not shown.
As in 1982, expressed attitudes to direct versus indirect tax varied according to 
the nature of the question asked:
Table 5.15 Direct vs indirect tax, Australia 1981/82 and 1983/84
McNair-Anderson Poll August July Change
1981 (%) 1983 (%) (% )
Increased indirect taxes 42 46 + 4
Increased direct taxes 47 45 - 2
Balance favouring increased indirect taxes - 5 + 1 + 6
Morgan Poll August September Change
1982 (%) 1984 (%) (% )
Lower income tax, higher sales tax 42 40 - 2
Higher income tax, lower sales tax 1 3 1 3 0
Same as now 32 38 + 6
Balance favouring lower income tax, higher sales tax +2 9 + 27 - 2
Sources McNair Anderson, quoted with findings of Poll 03/4/85; Morgan Gallup Poll 
1292, 1 March 1985.
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A majority opposed increased indirect tax on beer, wine and tobacco by the 
margin of 50% to 48% (compared with 55% to 42% in 1981), whereas respondents 
overwhelmingly opposed increasing petrol taxes by 91% to 8%, virtually identical to 
1 98139. This result is consistent with Hadenius' finding in 1981-82 that Swedes 
were much less satisfied with energy taxes than with taxes on alcohol and tobacco, and 
probably reflects the existence in both countries of substantial numbers of people who 
disapprove of smoking and/or drinking.
When asked in November 1984 what new tax they would prefer if there had to 
be a new tax, 38% of respondents nominated an indirect tax on goods and services, 26% 
a capital gains tax, 22% a wealth tax, and 8% estate duty40. Nevertheless, a poll taken 
3 weeks before the election found that the idea of new capital taxes was not popular. 
Estate tax was the most unpopular and wealth tax the least unpopular:
Table 5.16 Opinion on capital taxes, Australia 1984
Capital gains 
%
Gifts
%
Estates
%
Wealth
%
Approve 25 1 4 7 36
Disapprove 56 76 87 47
Undecided 1 9 1 0 6 1 7
Balance approving -3 1 -6 2 -8 0 - 1 1
Source Morgan Gallup Poll, Finding 1263, 1984.
Although 73% of respondents were satisfied with the way that democracy works 
in Australia, compared to only 24% who were not satisfied41, the level of cynicism 
about government and politicians was fairly high:
^M cN air Anderson, quoted with findings of Poll 03/4/85.
40Age Poll, Age, 10 November 1984.
41 Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian National Social 
Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, Canberra, pp.127.
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Table 5.17 Political cynicism, Australia 1984-85
Statement %
Those elected to Parliament lose 
touch with people pretty quickly:
Agree 7 6
Disagree 1 0
Balance agreeing +66
Government is pretty much run by:
A few big interests 5 3
For the benefit of all 4 0
Balance thinking run by big interests +1 3
In general, people in government:
Are only interested in looking out for themselves 5 4
Can be trusted to do the right thing 3 7
Balance thinking looking after themselves +1 7
Source Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian  
National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, 
Canberra, pp.27, 160.
Bob Hawke's 1984 policy speech promised tax reform but did not specify details 
except that it would conform to the following nine principles:
1. Tax must not increase as a proportion of GDP;
2. There must be further major cuts in personal income tax;
3. The reform must contribute to smashing tax evasion and avoidance;
4. The reform must result in a simpler system;
5. The resulting system must be fairer, that is, progressive and based on the 
principle of ability to pay;
6. The reform must not disadvantage recipients of welfare benefits, and 
should reduce or remove poverty traps;
7. Any changes to indirect taxes must be acceptable to those groups whose 
response will determine whether wage moderation can be maintained;
8. The resulting system must provide a good climate for investment, growth and 
employment;
9. The reforms must have widespread community support, including support at 
a Tax Summit to be held in 1985.
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Hawke also pointed to the tax cuts announced in the budget, and argued that 
future tax reform would ensure that the benefits of growth were equitably shared so 
that the hard work of ordinary Australians was not unfairly penalized. In addition, 
further legislation would be put forward, despite Coalition resistance, to combat tax 
avoidance. The one specific tax promise made was that a 150% tax deduction for 
research and development would be introduced.
New Liberal leader Andrew Peacock's policy speech attacked Labor's 
commitment to high spending and high taxes and maintained that taxes needed to be held 
down so that hard work, responsibility and success were rewarded. Labor, he claimed, 
was the highest taxing government in peacetime history, with average people being 
taxed at a marginal rate of 46%. He promised that under the Liberals there would be no 
overall increase in the tax burden and that over time tax would be reduced as a 
proportion of GDP by a combination of spending cuts and economic growth. Limits on 
spending would allow tax cuts, and reliance on income tax would be reduced by 
broadening the indirect tax base. Tax would be cut for families with children by 
allowing family income splitting up to a certain limit, and a tax rebate for childcare 
would be introduced. There would be no capital gains tax, and opting out of the Medicare 
levy would be allowed. In addition, the coal levy and taxes on superannuation lump sums 
and wine would be scrapped, the taxation of dividends would be reviewed and the 
investment allowance maintained and extended, and tax incentives would be introduced 
for research and development. Finally, there would be tax relief for small business in 
the form of reduced company tax, while for the primary sector the income equalization 
deposit scheme would be restored and the full tax rebate for the excise on diesel fuel 
maintained.
In the National Party policy speech, new leader Ian Sinclair claimed that big 
spending meant more tax and that the high level of taxation was holding people back. 
Like Peacock he promised to introduce income splitting for families to save the average 
one-income family $8 per week, introduce a tax rebate for childcare, and adjust the 
sole parent rebate. In addition, the tax on lump sum superannuation would be abolished, 
and there would be no taxes on capital such as a wealth tax or death duties (estate 
duty), which he claimed were on Labor’s agenda. Finally, tax averaging for primary
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producers would be maintained, and the tax rate on private company income would be 
reduced to help fund small business growth.
For their part the Australian Democrats pointed to their record of preventing 
the extension of sales tax to necessities, argued that they had prevented the tax on lump 
sum superannuation from being even harsher than it was, and pledged to block the 
reintroduction of estate duty and the introduction of a capital gains tax on homes.
Although the pretext for calling an election only 20 months after the previous 
election was to synchronize elections for the Senate with the House of Representatives, 
the real reason was to capitalize on the government's popularity, particularly that of 
Prime Minister Hawke. Labor pointed to its economic record of employment growth 
with low inflation, but was vague on contentious issues such as tax and land rights. 
However during the campaign itself Hawke pledged that during its next term of office 
his government would not increase tax, spending or the deficit as a proportion of GDP, 
the so-called ’trilogy', although apart from the tax component these commitments were 
later restricted to one year42.
The Liberal campaign focussed on small business and the family43, and sought to 
exploit fears over wealth and capital gains tax44. Liberal advertising also concentrated 
on the increased tax on lump sum superannuation and the assets test that had been 
imposed on old-age pensions45. Late in the campaign Peacock's approval rating rose 
sharply from 17% to 54% after he was perceived to have defeated Hawke in a major 
set-piece TV debate46.
Unusually, all but one of the five main morning daily newspapers supported 
Labor. Tax stories were not quite so prominent as a front page issue as they had been in
42Brian Galligan (1985), 'Political review: the 1984 Australian election', Austra lian  
Quarterly, v.57/1-2, pp.173-174.
43Brian Galligan (1985), 'Political review: the 1984 Australian election', Austra lian  
Quarterly, v.57/1-2, p.174.
44Peter Groenewegen (1985), Everyone's Guide to Taxation in Australia, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p.53.
45Michael Maley (1985), 'The Australian general election of 1984', Electoral Studies, 
v.4/1, p. 71.
46Australian, 30 November 1984, quoted in Brian Galligan (1985), 'Political review: the 
1984 Australian election’, Australian Quarterly, v.57/1-2, p.176.
204
the previous two elections, making up 5.8% of issue stories during the last ten days of 
the campaign.
When asked by a Morgan poll to name the three most important issues, the 
salience of tax was almost identical to 1983, although more respondents mentioned 
reducing the size of government. Income tax was prominent, but other tax issues were 
well down the list. It should be noted, however, that the change figures in this table are 
affected by the addition of new alternatives in 1984, which led respondents to spread 
their mentions more thinly:
Table 5.18 Three most important issues, Australia 1983 and 1984
Issue 1 983 1 984 Change
% % %
Unemployment 55 38 -1 7
Toughness with unions 26 25 - 1
Promotion of industry and business growth na 20 na
Reduction of personal income tax 1 8 1 7 - 1
Reduce the rate of inflation 31 1 7 -1 4
More for the needy and aged 20 1 7 - 3
Reduce the size and cost of government 9 1 5 + 6
Reduce interest rates 21 1 3 - 8
Cost of health insurance/Medicare 1 7 1 3 - 4
Price of petrol 1 1 1 1 0
Reduce tax on superannuation na 1 0 na
Reduce sales tax 9 7 - 2
Source Morgan press release, 26 June 1987. Listed are all iax issues plus all issues 
mentioned by at least 10% of respondents.
When asked what the government could do that would be of most benefit to them 
personally, however, over twice as many respondents mentioned income tax cuts than 
anything else, up substantially from 1983. As noted before, however, this result is at 
least partly due to the fact that taxation affects many more people than are affected by 
old age or most of the other alternatives offered.
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Table 5.19 What Federal Government could do of most benefit to respondents 
personally, Australia 1983 and 1984
Issue 1 983 1 984 Change
% % %
Lower/reduce income tax 1 8 26 + 8
Help the aged 1 0 1 1 + 1
Unemployment 1 2 6 - 6
Cost of living 7 5 - 2
Housing availability/interest rates 5 4 - 1
Education/schools 4 4 0
More social welfare 2 3 + 1
Hospitals/health care 4 3 - 1
Industry and business growth 2 2 0
Interest rates 6 2 - 4
Source Morgan press release, 26 June 1987.
An Age Poll taken a month before the election suggested that while economic 
issues dominated, welfare and taxes were also important, and that the parties were 
about even on tax:
Table 5.20 Most important issues & best party to tackle them, Australia 1984
Most important Best party (%)
issue (%) ALP Lib/NP ALP lead
Economic management 29 59 31 + 28
Unemployment 23 68 1 8 + 50
Taxes 1 0 43 45 - 2
Pensions/social services 1 0 58 27 + 31
Quality of leadership 7 46 35 + 1 1
The fight against crime 6 41 38 + 3
The assets test 5 24 62 -3 8
Inflation 5 66 25 + 31
The power of unions 2 28 54 - 2 6
Immigration 2 37 41 - 4
Source: Age, 5 November 1984.
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Despite opinion polls showing the Hawke government headed for a massive 
victory, Labor lost 2% of the vote and retained office with a reduced majority, while 
the Nationals gained 1.4% and the Liberal vote stayed the same.
Table 5.21 Election results, Australia 1984
Party 1984 vote Change since 1983
Labor 47.5% -2 .0%
Liberals 34.4% 0.0%
National Party 10.6% + 1.4%
Liberal-NCP Coalition 45.0% + 1.3%
Australian Democrats 5.4% + 0.3%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
Reasons put forward for Labor’s unexpected loss of votes included the length of 
the campaign, which allowed the Coalition to gain more media attention than it 
otherwise would have had; Peacock's success in the TV debate with Hawke; and the high 
informal vote caused by confusion about reforms to the Senate's voting system47.
However according to a McNair Anderson exit poll of 20 marginal electorates, 
taxation was the big new issue of 1984, behind economic management and the reduction 
of unemployment but well up compared to the results of a similar survey done in 
1983. While it should be noted that there were differences both in wording and in the 
alternatives offered in 1983 and 1984, the increase in the salience of tax appears too 
great to be merely an artefact of these differences:
47See Brian Galligan (1985), 'Political review: the 1984 Australian election', Australian 
Quarterly, v.57/1-2, p. 180; and Michael Maley (1985), 'The Australian general election of 
1984’, Electoral Studies, v.4/1, p. 70.
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Table 5.22 Most influential/important issues, Australia 1983 and 1984 (exit poll)
Issue Most influential/ Second most influential/
important issue (%) important issue (%)
1 983 1 984 Change 1983 1 984 Change
Management of the economy 28 25 - 3 24 1 5 - 9
Reduction of unemployment 31 1 6 -1 5 25 1 7 - 8
Taxation* 1 1 4 + 13 4 1 1 + 7
Control of inflation 9 9 0 1 8 1 2 - 6
Assets test/pensions na 8 na na 8 na
Medicare/health na 8 na na 1 1 na
Nuclear power/uranium na 8 na na 8 na
Education 3 6 + 3 6 9 + 3
Corruption/organised crime na 6 na na 6 na
Immigration na 1 na na 2 na
* Alternative expressed in 1983 as 'Income tax/sales tax' and in 1984 as Taxation 
including capital gains tax'.
Sources
McNair Anderson Associates, Reasons for the Swing to Labor: the Federal Election 
March 5 1983, Australia, p.x;
McNair Anderson Associates, Reasons for the Swing to the Coalition: Exit Poll 
in 20 Marginal Electorates, 2 December 1984, Australia, p.xiii.
Taxation and the assets test were considered especially important by Coalition 
voters, while unemployment and inflation were considered especially important by 
Labor voters. Management of the economy was considered the most important issue by 
both groups of voters. These results contrast sharply with those of the Morgan and Age 
issues polls quoted earlier, which suggested that the salience of taxation was high but 
relatively unchanged since 1983.
In addition, according to the exit poll the Labor lead on tax in 1983 had been 
converted into a deficit by 1984, although again the differences between the 
alternatives offered to respondents in the two polls need to be kept in mind:
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Table 5.23 Better party on given issues, Australia 1983 and 1984 (exit poll)
Issue
ALP
1983
Lib/NP
(%)
ALP
lead
ALP
1984
Lib/NP
(%)
ALP
lead
Change in 
ALP lead
Reduction of unemployment 52 33 + 1 9 51 27 + 24 + 5
Control of inflation 41 46 - 5 51 31 + 20 + 25
Economic management 42 48 - 6 47 37 + 1 0 + 1 6
Medicare/health na na na 45 40 + 5 na
Education 45 37 + 8 36 34 + 2 - 6
Nuclear power/uranium na na na 31 29 + 2 na
Immigration na na na 33 37 - 4 na
Corruption/org. crime na na na 30 38 - 8 na
Taxation* 45 37 + 8 37 48 -1 1 -1 9
Assets test/pension na na na 36 51 - 1 5 na
* Alternative expressed in 1983 as 
including capital gains tax'.
'Income tax/sales tax' and in 1984 as 'Taxation
Sources
McNair Anderson Associates, Reasons for the Swing to Labor: the Federal Election 
March 5 1983, Australia, p.xi;
McNair Anderson Associates, Reasons for the Swing to the Coalition: Exit Poll 
in 20 Marginal Electorates, 2 December 1984, Australia, p.xiv.
Moreover, taxation was the only issue on which Labor support fell markedly, 
which supports McNair-Anderson's conclusion that taxation was the most important 
issue explanation of Labor's loss of votes at the 1984 election, especially concern over 
possible taxes on capital gains and estates48.
Assuming that this is the case, given that the McNair-Anderson findings were 
the results of an exit poll carried out on election day rather than of surveys carried out 
some time prior to the election, other possible reasons for Labor's loss of support on 
tax include the controversy over the taxation of lump sum superannuation and the 
adoption by the Coalition of a heavy emphasis on tax cut promises, so that in 1984 they 
outbid Labor on tax whereas in 1983 the reverse had been the case. It would seem 
unlikely that the actual growth of taxation was a reason, since this was rather low, 
especially compared to expenditure growth.
48McNair Anderson Associates, 'Reasons for the swing to the Coalition: exit poll in 20 
marginal electorates, 2 December 1984', p.xv.
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At the 1987 election, which was dominated by the tax issue, the Hawke 
government was returned with an increased majority of seats despite losing votes.
Following its re-election in December 1984 Labor's popularity dropped steeply 
in early 1985, due at least partly to the controversy over a decision (later reversed) 
to cooperate with testing of the American MX missile. In May 1986 Treasurer Paul 
Keating's warned that, due to its balance of payments problems, Australia was in danger 
of becoming a 'banana republic', a remark which received wide publicity and added to a 
sense of economic crisis, especially when it was followed by a plunge in the value of the 
Australian dollar. Despite continuing expenditure cuts including in the health and social 
welfare areas, which provoked some disarray within the government, some modest 
initiatives in social security were taken. Political debate also focussed on the 
government's policy on Aboriginal land rights, mining, and conservation, and the 
controversy surrounding High Court judge Lionel Murphy ended only with his death 
from cancer in 198649. Meanwhile court victories against unions by the so-called 
'New Right' helped to give prominence to their small government agenda, and the 
Liberal Party took a turn to the Right when former Liberal Treasurer John Howard 
replaced Andrew Peacock as leader.
However the main political event during the electoral period was the Tax 
Summit in July 1985, where the focus of negotiation was on the government's 
proposals as set out in its Draft White Paper in June. This stated that there was a 
widespread view that the tax system operated unfairly, impaired economic incentives, 
and was too complex. One particular problem was the incidence of high marginal rates 
of income tax at moderate income levels due to a narrow tax base that had been further 
eroded by tax concessions. In addition, the existence of these concessions along with the 
non-existence of capital taxes allowed differing opportunities for reducing tax at high 
incomes, which impaired both the legitimacy of the system and economic efficiency. The 
Prime Minister promised that the proposed reforms would conform to the nine 
principles enumerated before the 1984 election, and the proposals in the Draft White 
Paper were set out as three options for broadening the tax base so as to reduce marginal 
rates of income tax:
49Due to the inadequacy of the Political Chronicles of the Australian Journal of Politics & 
History during this period, information is also drawn from the Political Reviews in Australian 
Quarterly.
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Option A proposed various measures to broaden the income tax base, including 
the introduction of taxes on capital gains and on fringe benefits, a national 
identification system to combat tax evasion, a review of tax shelters, the elimination or 
reduction of the concessional expenditure rebate, and a foreign tax credit system to tax 
overseas income.
Option B included Option A plus a wholesale sales tax of 10% on vehicles, wine, 
soft drinks and other goods currently subject to the 32.5% sales tax rate and a 5% 
consumption tax on virtually all other goods and services.
Option C, the government's preferred option, included Option A plus a 12.5% 
consumption tax, which would make very big income tax cuts possible. Low income 
earners would be compensated for the effects of introducing a consumption tax through 
the expenditure side of the budget50.
At the Tax Summit, however, the government was unable to get broad agreement 
to introduce Option C, in particular agreement by the unions to discount wage claims 
for the estimated 6.5% impact on the Consumer Price Index of the proposed 
consumption tax, so Option C was abandoned in favour of implementing most of the 
measures proposed in Option A.
Actual changes to taxation in 1985 included a number of adjustments to the 
crude oil levy and the closing of a tax loophole associated with lump-sum 
superannuation. The main changes in the 1985 budget, which preceded announcement of 
the major tax reform, were increases in the taxable proportion of lump-sum 
superannuation payments, deductions for self-employed superannuation, and rebates 
for social security recipients. In addition, the threshold for application of the Medicare 
levy was raised and the ceiling on the levy was abolished51.
The main features of the tax changes introduced as a result of the Tax Summit 
were cuts to marginal rates of income tax including the reduction of the top marginal 
rate from 60% to 49%, the introduction of a capital gains tax and a fringe benefits tax,
50Reform of the Australian Tax System - Draft White Paper June 1985, AGPS, Canberra,
pp. 1-1 0.
51 1985-86 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
the removal of deductibility for entertainment expenses, the introduction of taxation on 
foreign source income, and the limitation of concessions for education, medical 
expenses, superannuation, and losses incurred on rental properties. In addition, 
certain industry tax concessions were removed, full imputation was introduced for 
company tax, and the wholesale sales tax system was rationalized52.
In 1986 the government announced increased excises on petroleum products in 
order to help compensate for the decline in excise revenue from oil production, and 
reduced the fringe benefits tax on employer-provided vehicles. In the budget there 
were increases in the Medicare levy (from 1% to 1.5%), the wholesale sales tax, the 
bank account debits tax, the sales tax on wine and cider, and beneficiary rebates on 
income tax53. In December the income tax law was tightened further to combat tax 
evasion, and superannuation premium deductions were increased.
During this period the economy continued to grow strongly, with real per capita 
GDP increasing by $210.80 per annum and by $151.61 in election year, both above 
average. Inflation increased somewhat to 7.8% per annum and 8.68% in election year, 
but unemployment continued to drop, falling by 0.37% of the workforce per annum and 
by 0.10% in election year. However real wages fell by 0.15% per annum and by 
0.98% in election year. This was the only time that real wages fell in the period since 
1955, and was the subject of much comment and criticism, although the cuts were part 
of the government's strategy to lower employers' costs and thus permit greater 
employment and were at least in part compensated for by government actions such as 
tax cuts.
Between 1984 and 1987 the growth of taxation was considerably above average 
both in real per capita terms and as a percentage of GDP, while expenditure growth was 
low or even negative. In election year almost all measures of expenditure growth 
dropped, while direct tax growth was above average and total taxation growth was above 
average in absolute terms but below average relative to GDP. The consequence of this 
was a rapid drop in the budget deficit.
52-OECD Economic Surveys - Australia, March 1987, OECD, Paris, pp.75-77. 
331986-87 Budget Speech, AGPS, Canberra.
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Table 5.24 Changes in levels of taxation and expenditure, Australia 1984-87
Real 1980 $A per capita Percentage of GDP
Central government:
Average annual changes in term
Total taxation 101.30 0.50
Direct taxation 85.93 0.53
Expenditure 39.81 -0 .2 5
General government:
Total taxation 121.18 0.58
Direct taxation 85.93 0.53
Expenditure 80.96 0.03
Central government:
Election year changes
Total taxation 63.26 0.24
Direct taxation 62.31 0.37
Expenditure -2 1 .1 4 -0 .71
General government:
Total taxation 86.49 0.39
Direct taxation 62.31 0.37
Expenditure 4.62 - 0 . 56
Sources
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, 1972, 1981, 1987 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government Budget Statements 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, 1984, 1988
The focus on tax reform between 1984 and 1987 was accompanied by a marked 
upsurge of opinion surveys on the issue. Results of the more important of these are set 
out below, while a number of supplementary tables are set out in Appendix 5.
On taxes in general, a poll taken in February 1985 before the tax reform found 
that only 35% of respondents thought that the general level of taxes was reasonable, 
while 58% though it was unreasonable, which was almost identical to the pattern of 
responses six months earlier in September 198454. However responses in 1986-87 
to the National Social Science Survey question on whether respondents would prefer
54Morgan Poll Finding 1292, 1 March 1985.
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reduced taxes or increased social spending indicated an increased majority for reduced 
taxes since 1984-85, although opinion on cutting tax rates remained fairly constant:
Table 5.25 Opinion on tax levels, Australia 1984-85 to 1986-87 (NSSS)
1 984 - 85
%
1986 - 8 7  
%
Change
%
Reduce taxes 64 74 + 1 0
Spend more on social services 33 23 -1 0
Balance for reduced tax + 31 + 51 + 20
Cuts in tax rates for everybody:
Agree 60 61 + 1
Disagree 21 24 + 3
Balance favouring tax cuts + 39 + 37 - 2
Source Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian  
National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, 
Canberra, pp.17, 21; 1986-87 National Social Science Survey55
However when an Age Poll gave respondents the alternative of opting for 
maintaining current taxes and present levels of social services and welfare facilities, 
most opted to retain this status quo, with little change since 1979:
Table 5.26 Opinion on tax levels, Australia 1979-1985 (Age)
1 979 1 985 Change
% % %
Reduce tax and welfare 20 22 + 2
Increase tax and welfare 1 6 1 5 - 1
Maintain present tax and welfare 61 57 - 4
Balance preferring tax cuts + 4 + 7 + 3
Source Age Poll, Age, 6 May 1985
55lnformation from the 1986-87 National Social Science Survey, directed by Jonathan 
Kelley, was supplied by the Associate Director, Clive Bean.
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1986-87 NSSS questions that had not been asked in 1984-85 indicated that 
respondents were not only averse to tax but also wanted to cut spending:
Table 5.27 Opinion on tax levels and government spending, Australia 1986-87
Level of taxation Too high About right Too low
% % %
Your household's income tax 68 24 0.4
Tax paid by business and industry 40 30 23
Agree Disagree Balance agreeing
% % %
I would prefer a society 
with much lower tax 76 1 1 + 65
Cut government spending 72 1 1 + 61
Source 1986-87 National Social Science Survey
As in 1984-85, however, respondents were not nearly so eager to cut specific 
government programs apart from unemployment benefits and funds for the arts, 
although unfortunately the responses in 1986-87 are not fully comparable with those 
for 1984-85 due to different question wording:
Table 5.28 Opinion on government spending, Australia 1986-87
Spend less Spend same Spend more Balance
% % % %
Police and law enforcement 3 28 65 -6 2
Education 4 31 62 -5 8
Health 6 31 60 -5 6
Old age pensions 4 39 53 -4 9
The military and defence 1 7 35 44 - 2 7
Environment 1 6 49 30 - 1 4
Unemployment benefits 50 34 1 2 + 38
Culture and the arts 52 35 9 + 43
Source 1986-87 National Social Science Survey
Respondents were on balance fairly positive towards progressivity, but less so 
in 1986-87 than in 1984-85:
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Table 5.29 Opinion on progressivity, redistribution, Australia 1984-85, 1986-87
1984 - 85
%
19 86 - 8 7  
%
Change
%
Rich people should be taxed more: 
Agree 46 47 + 1
Disagree 35 40 + 5
Balance for taxing rich more + 1 1 + 7 - 4
Redistribute income and wealth 
towards ordinary people:
Agree 51 43 - 8
Disagree 28 36 + 8
Balance for redistribution + 23 + 7 - 1 6
Source Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian  
National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, 
Canberra, pp.24, 21; 1986-87 National Social Science Survey
Morgan Gallup polls published in 1985 found, as had the NSSS, that most capital 
taxes were unpopular, and that attitudes had hardened somewhat since 1984:
Table 5.30 Opinion on capital taxes, Australia 1984 and 1985
Tax on: 1984 1985 Change
% % %
Capital gains
Approve 25 20 - 5
Disapprove 56 73 + 1 7
Balance approving -3  1 -5 3 -2 2
Gifts
Approve 1 4 1 3 - 1
Disapprove 76 82 + 6
Balance approving -6 2 -6 9 - 7
Estates
Approve 7 8 + 1
Disapprove 87 89 + 2
Balance approving -8 0 -8  1 - 1
Wealth
Approve 36 36 0
Disapprove 47 55 + 8
Balance approving - 1 1 - 1 9 - 8
Sources Morgan Gallup Poll Findings 1263 (1984); Findings 1323, 1357 (1985).
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Although an ANOP poll commissioned by the government in March found that 
88% of respondents believed that tax reform was needed, it also found that voters 
feared that reform would mean more tax, since governments were believed to want to 
raise tax at every opportunity. The idea of taxing the 'necessities' of life was 
particularly unpopular, especially among Labor's core constituency56. However 
support for some other proposals was relatively high and/or increasing, and these 
were the ones finally adopted:
Table 5.31 Opinion on government's proposed tax package, Australia, June 1985 
(ANOP)
Are the following better than 
the present system?
Yes
%
No Balance positive 
% %
Option A 50 40 + 10
Option B 40 52 -2  1
Option C 23 70 -4 7
Proposals Approve Disapprove Balance
approving
Balance change 
since March
% % % %
Income tax cuts + consumption tax 26 66 -4 0 -1 1
Capital gains tax indexed for inflation 4 1 46 - 5 + 1 1
Fringe benefits tax 51 42 + 9
End entertainment deductibility 65 29 + 36
Identity cards 75 22 + 53
Source ANOP Polls, cited in Stephen Mills (1986), The New Machine Men, Penguin, 
Australia, pp.52, 59.
A poll taken in October 1985 following announcement of the tax reforms that 
the government actually intended to carry out showed that while some elements were 
popular, a majority of respondents still opposed the tax package despite the decision not 
to go ahead with a consumption tax, but by a lesser margin than had opposed the 
government's original preferred tax package:
56Cited in Stephen Mills (1986), The New Machine Men, Penguin, Australia, pp.50-54.
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Table 5.32 Opinion on government's intended tax package, Australia 1985
Approve
%
Disapprove
%
Don't know
%
Balance pro 
%
Tax package as a whole 4 1 51 8 -1 0
Income tax cuts 77 1 6 7 + 61
Tax on business lunches 53 43 4 + 1 0
Tax on other business entertainmenl 56 39 5 + 1 7
Tax on employer-provided cars 47 48 5 - 1
Tax on all fringe benefits 36 57 7 -2  1
Capital gains tax 30 63 7 -3 3
Sales tax increases 22 74 4 -5  2
Source McNair-Anderson Poll 02/10/85.
The 1986-87 NSSS survey also found that political cynicism was high and 
apparently increasing, although the results for the last two items are not directly 
comparable to those for 1984-85 due to the inclusion of a middle alternative in 
1 986- 87 :
Table 5.33 Political cynicism, Australia, 1984-85 and 1986-87
Statement 1984 - 85 1986 - 8 7 Change
% % %
Those elected to Parliament lose
touch with people pretty quickly:
Agree 76 79 + 3
Disagree 1 0 8 - 2
Balance agreeing + 66 + 71 + 5
Government is pretty much run by:
A few big interests 53 45 - 8
Half and half 38
For the benefit of all 40 1 6 - 2 4
Balance thinking run by big interests + 13 + 29 + 1 6
In general, people in government:
Are only interested in looking out for themselves 5 4 45 - 9
Half and half 36
Can be trusted to do the right thing 37 1 8 - 1 9
Balance thinking looking after themselves + 1 7 + 27 + 1 0
Source Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian  
National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, 
Canberra, pp.27, 160; 1986-87 National Social Science Survey
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In his 1987 policy speech, Prime Minister Bob Hawke downplayed tax, pledging 
only that tax would not increase as a percentage of GDP and that there would be no new 
taxes or discretionary increases in taxes. He also promised to crack down on tax 
avoidance and evasion, including by means of introducing a national identity card.
Liberal leader John Howard's policy speech, however, thrust tax to the 
forefront and promised very large cuts in income tax. The Liberal Party, he said, 
stands for lower taxation, the incentive effects of which are necessary to create 
economic prosperity: big government, high spending and big taxes, he claimed, are 
what got us into this mess. The Hawke government was the biggest-taxing government 
in Australia's peacetime history: in March 1983 a family on average earnings paid 
$65 per week in tax, but now it was $102, a rise in the average tax rate from 17.5% 
to 20.5%. Reduced and restructured taxes would be made possible by reducing 
government spending. Income tax would be cut by $26 per week, with the top marginal 
rate falling from 49% to 38% and one other rate to be set at 25%, and the dependent 
spouse rebate would be increased for childless families. Furthermore, the income tax 
free threshold would be lifted from $5,100 to $5,900, and there would be a bias 
towards families with children. The capital gains tax and fringe benefits tax would be 
abolished, deductibility would be reintroduced for bona-fide entertainment expenses, 
the taxation of lump sum superannuation would be modified, and negative gearing for 
owners of rental accommodation would be reintroduced. Finally, the corporate tax rate 
wouid be reduced from 49% to 42% and then to 38%, and the tax burden on farmers' 
fuel costs would be eased.
Ian Sinclair's speech for the National Party also stressed tax, saying that Labor 
was the biggest taxing government in peacetime history and that the Nationals would 
bring tax down. In particular, the capital gains tax and fringe benefits tax would go, 
entertainment expenses would once more be deductible, the lump sum superannuation 
tax would be reduced to 25%, and the corporate tax rate would be reduced to the 
maximum rate of personal income tax. The eventual aim was to reduce income tax rates 
to a single rate of 25%, and Sinclair suggested that a flat 23% rate might be introduced 
on increases in income from one year to the next. In addition, childcare for working 
parents would be made tax deductible. For industry and farmers there would be a full 
tax rebate for excise on petrol and diesel used off-road by primary producers, 
deductibility for Income Equalization Deposit Bonds would be reintroduced, the coal 
export levy would be abolished, and a deduction for the first $5000 of interest earned 
might be introduced.
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Janine Haines' policy speech referred to the Australian Democrats' role in 
preventing the imposition of a sales tax on necessities, and attacked the tax auction 
being conducted by the other parties. Senator Haines stated her party's support for the 
capital gains tax and argued that sales tax should be removed on the freight component 
of goods, that negative gearing on company takeovers should be abolished, and that a 
10% duty should be imposed on luxury imports and on money leaving the country.
The 1987 election was called on 27 May for 11 July following the favourable 
reception by the media and in the opinion polls to the government's May Economic 
Statement, which included more substantial cuts to public expenditure, and in the 
midst of considerable disarray within the Opposition. Dissatisfied with the 
performance of his colleagues in Canberra, long-serving National Party Queensland 
Premier Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen announced in January 1987 his intention to run for 
Prime Minister on a radical conservative program based around a flat 25% income tax. 
Opinion polls showed quite strong support for Sir Joh at first, and pressure on National 
Party Senators from Queensland resulted in the breakup of the formal coalition 
between the Nationals and Liberals, but the early election found Sir Joh insufficiently 
prepared and in the end he didn't even stand for a Federal seat57.
The long 1987 election campaign was unequivocally dominated by taxation, 
coming as it did after significant tax reforms and with the Liberals promising huge cuts 
in income tax, although they also sought to emphasize the issues of falling living 
standards and union power58.
Early developments included criticism by the government and the media of 
Howard's refusal to reveal his tax policy59. Shortly after this the government decided 
to scrap controversial sections of its Industrial Relations Bill in order to defuse union 
power as an issue, while speculation continued as to the size of Howard's tax cuts and 
the size and targets of consequent spending cuts, for example in regard to Medicare60. 
On 5 June Hawke accused the Liberals of having a hidden agenda on tax which included 
the introduction of a consumption tax, and Keating attacked Howard's credibility on tax
5^ ’Political review', Australian Quarterly, 1986-87.
58John Warhurst (1988), The ALP campaign', in Australia Votes: the 1987 Federal Election, 
ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.37.
59This account of the election campaign is based primarily on extensive coverage of the 
media during the campaign, in particular the major capital city daily newspapers, the main 
ABC news, and a limited amount of commercial radio and TV news.
60For example Times on Sunday, 7 June 1987, p.2.
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by pointing to the withdrawal in 1978 of the Liberals' 1977 tax cuts, which happened 
while Howard was Treasurer, and also to the massive deficit blowout in 1982-83 
following the last Howard budget61. Keating argued that Labor had already cut all the fat 
from government programs and that Howard's proposed but as yet unspecified spending 
cuts would be heartless. Meanwhile Hawke guaranteed that there would be no new or 
increased taxes or increases in the Medicare levy in the August budget62.
Possibly one of the most damaging attacks on the Liberal tax policy, however, 
was delivered by prominent economic commentator Max Walsh in an article entitled 
'Let’s hope Mr Howard is a liar'63. Walsh bitterly attacked Howard's promise of 
expenditure cuts to finance the tax cuts as 'preposterous', given the Liberal failure to 
significantly cut expenditure while in office before 1983, and argued that even if such 
cuts were successfully carried out a balance of payments crisis would result because 
the well-off, who were expected to be the main winners from Howard's redistribution, 
would spend their windfall gains on imports. In other words, the Liberals were 
abandoning economic rationality to try to bribe their way into office with tax cuts that 
would damage Australia's weak economy. As a senior and respected economic 
commentator, Walsh's views were widely reported, and it is arguable that his influence 
on fellow journalists, especially those in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, may have 
set the agenda for media coverage of Howard's tax package.
This tax package was finally unveiled on 10 June. While everyone would get a 
tax cut, it was clear that higher income earners would benefit considerably more than 
anyone else. To finance the estimated $7.3 billion in tax cuts plus a reduction in the 
budget deficit Howard proposed to cut expenditure by $7.8 billion, raise an extra $900 
million from more efficient tax collection and a further $900 million from the extra 
production caused by the incentive effects of the tax cuts, and sell $460 million of 
government assets. A large proportion of expenditure cuts were specified, including 
$800 million from Medicare and $970 million from social welfare, but not all: $2.53 
billion were left unspecified. The rationale for these enormous tax and spending cuts 
was that "Australians want smaller government, lower tax, greater incentive and more 
individual initiative", and that there should be a greater bias in the tax system in 
favour of families. Howard argued that his spending cuts would only return spending to 
the level of 1981, namely 38% of GDP (although in 1981 central government 
expenditure was really 26% of GDP and general government expenditure 33% of GDP).
61 ABC News, 7 June 1987.
62Australian, 5 June 1987, p.2.
63 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1987.
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Media reaction to the Liberal tax package was generally sceptical, presenting it 
as a political and economic gamble and raising doubts as to its feasibility (such big 
spending cuts had not been achieved in Australia before), its economic justification (in 
regard to the deficit, the balance of payments, tax evasion, and the claimed incentive 
effects of tax cuts) and its effects on Medicare and the disadvantaged (such as sole 
parents). Hawke labelled the package a recipe for disaster, asserting that the cost of the 
tax cuts was underestimated, which would result in a blowout of the deficit, higher 
interest rates, and a recession. He also referred to what he termed the 5 year cycle of 
'dudding' the Australian people: withdrawing the tax cuts after the 1977 election, 
blowing out the budget deficit in 1982, and now this tax package64 . Perhaps the most 
evocative quip came from Paul Keating, who warned that Those who sup from John 
Howard's tax cup will be poisoned by it'65.
On 13 June Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen launched his tax package, but because he 
had withdrawn as a candidate its main effect was probably to keep Opposition disunity 
alive as an issue. Meanwhile Hawke pledged not to introduce a gold tax, promised that 
tax would not rise as a proportion of GDP during the forthcoming term of office, and 
ruled out any more cuts to health, education or welfare. Other prominent issues during 
this period included health, where Liberal plans to partly dismantle Medicare were not 
widely supported; conservative allegations of media bias; union power, due a strike at a 
seatbelt factory; and the economy, on which several commentators claimed neither side 
was taking a responsible stand.
Then on 18 June Treasurer Keating hit the headlines with an accusation that the 
Liberals had made a $1.5 billion mathematical error in their tax package calculations, 
which Howard was forced to admit was true after a few days silence on the issue. This 
was a serious blow to the Liberals, reinforcing doubts as to the credibility of the their 
tax package, and resulted in heavy media criticism.
Bob Hawke's policy speech on 23 June stressed cooperation and working 
together and contrasted his united, stable and competent government with the disunited 
and incompetent opposition parties. His message was that we are experiencing hard 
times due to a dramatic fall in export income caused by a decline in our terms of trade, 
and that we therefore need to stick together and see it through. As noted earlier no tax 
cuts were offered, but he pledged no new taxes and no tax increases and reminded voters 
of the tax cuts due on 1 July. He also pledged that 'by 1990 no Australian child will be
64'PM\ ABC Radio, 10 June 1987. 
65’Sunday', 7 Network, 14 June 1987.
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living in poverty', and to this end announced details of a 'family package': a $400 
million program targeted not at swinging middle-income voters but at the poor. In 
addition, he announced a new $300 million job training plan, pledged to save the 
Daintree rainforest in Queensland from developers, and ruled out a wages freeze. In 
conclusion he expressed his 'vision' of a generous and open Australia, a fairer, more 
just Australia, an Australia where true equality of opportunity was the reality for all.
The media's response to Hawke's policy speech was fairly favourable, focussing 
largely on the child poverty pledge but with some concern about the economy and 
Labor's 'lack of vision'.
While there was little new in the Liberal policy speech on 25 June apart from a 
share ownership scheme for employees, Howard put his policies into perspective by 
focussing on the objective of prosperity via higher productivity due to increased work 
incentive brought about by lower marginal rates of tax. That is, the tax cuts were not 
an electoral bribe but an economic imperative, with incentive the concept that linked 
everything together. He also set out what he saw as the Liberals' fundamental 
principles: individual liberty with an emphasis on responsibilities as well as rights; 
family security and stability; smaller and less interventionist government; lower 
taxation; concern for the disadvantaged but an end to welfare fraud; less trade union 
power; and a strong emphasis on Australian nationalism. Specific policies included a 
referendum to outlaw compulsory unionism, and a scheme to force unemployed people 
to work for their unemployment benefits.
Media reaction to the Liberal policy speech was mixed, but not as critical as it 
had been of the tax package. While some commentators applauded the stress on incentive 
and curbing union power, others were sceptical of the attempt, as Ross Gittins put it, to 
turn bribes into economic strategy66, and continued to question the validity of the 
incentive argument, the lack of detail on spending cuts and their impact on the poor, 
and the 'workhouse' work-for-the-dole scheme67. Unusually, an editorial in the 
Canberra Times argued that what Australia needed was not lower tax, but higher tax68.
In the Australian Democrat policy speech on 27 June, leader Janine Haines 
proposed to fund increases of $4 billion in government expenditure (mainly on social 
welfare) by abolishing negative gearing for company takeovers, eliminating transfer
6 6 R oss Gittins, 'Goodtime John’s fairy tale', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 June 1987, p.1. 
67For example Editorial, Age, 26 June 1987, p.13.
68 Canberra Times, 26 June 1987, p.2.
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pricing, imposing a 10% duty on luxury imports, and taxing speculative outflows of 
currency. However these policies did not receive much attention in the media, which 
preferred to concentrate on the main Labor-Liberal struggle.
Advertising for both sides concentrated on the Liberals’ tax policy. The Liberals 
asserted that the tax cuts could be paid for by cutting 3 cents in each dollar of 
government expenditure for each of three years, but came under attack when their TV 
advertisements omitted the qualification 'in each of three years’, which rendered them 
misleading. Meanwhile Labor ran a series of TV advertisements featuring 'ordinary 
housewife' Wendy Wood, who continually asked Howard where the spending cuts would 
be made, and Keating alleged that, given areas of expenditure that the Liberals had 
already quarantined from cuts or in which cuts had already been specified, the 
remaining areas of government expenditure would need to be cut by 16% if the 
Liberals were to fund their tax cuts. He then went on to nominate areas, such as 
nursing home programs, where cuts would have to be made69.
On 1 July the last instalment of Labor’s tax cuts came into force, and although 
these only benefited high income earners the government was able to point out that 
everyone had already received tax cuts in December 1986, and that low income earners 
would be helped by the family package70. On 4 July Hawke raised the possibility of 
reintroducing negative gearing for rental properties, which had been abolished as part 
of the anti tax avoidance measures of the 1985 tax reforms, because of the shortage of 
rental accommodation, and accused Howard of planning to introduce a consumption tax 
in order to fund his income tax cuts71. Howard flatly denied this, and accused Labor of 
lying both in regard to consumption tax and on where spending cuts would fall72.
During the last week of the campaign Labor was fortunate in receiving several 
items of good economic news, including lower unemployment figures, optimistic 
investment forecasts, and a lower budget deficit outcome for 1986-87 than had been 
expected due to a surge in revenue, which was criticized by Howard. But perhaps the 
best news for Labor was another tax 'gaffe', this time by Senator Michael Baume, who 
stated contrary to Liberal policy that Liberal tax cuts would be phased in rather than 
arriving immediately73. This was immediately denied by Howard, but the episode 
contributed to the impression of Liberal incompetence.
69'AM', ABC Radio, 29 June 1987.
70For example Australian, 1 July 1987, p.3.
71 Australian, 4 July 1987, p.1.
72Daily Telegraph, 7 July 1987, p.1.
73Age, 7 July 1987, p.1.
224
On the eve of the election most newspapers either supported Labor or remained 
neutral: the Australian was the only major paper to support the Liberals. Tax was a 
more prominent media issue than in any of the previous elections examined, with tax 
stories comprising 17.9% of issue stories in the five major morning dailies.
Opinion polls consistently showed tax and the economy to be the two most 
important issues to voters74. When asked what the three most important issues were, 
tax was the third most frequently mentioned, slightly up from 1984. Reducing the size 
and cost of government was also up, but other tax issues were well down the list:
Table 5.34 Three most important issues, Australia 1984 and 1987
Issue 1 984 1 987 Change
% % %
Reduce unemployment 38 30 - 8
Reduce interest rates 1 3 25 + 1 2
Reduce personal income tax 1 7 20 + 3
Promote industry and business growth 20 1 9 - 1
Reduce the rate of inflation 1 7 1 9 + 2
Reduce the size and cost of government 1 5 1 9 + 4
More for the needy and aged 1 7 1 8 + 1
Cost of health insurance/Medicare 1 3 1 7 + 4
Be tough with unions with bad strike records 2 5 1 6 - 9
Family welfare 1 2 1 2 0
Reduce number of migrants 1 2 1 2 0
Reduce the price of petrol 1 1 8 - 3
Reduce tax on superannuation 1 0 7 - 3
Stop introduction of capital gains tax na 5 na
Stop introduction of fringe benefits tax na 5 na
Reduce sales tax 7 4 - 3
Source Morgan Press Release, 26 June 1987. Listed are all tax items plus all other 
items mentioned by at least 10% of respondents.
Morgan also asked what the Federal Government could do that would most benefit 
respondents and their families, and found that income tax was even more clearly the 
most mentioned item than it had been in 1984:
74For figures see Appendix 5.
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Table 5.35 What the Federal Government could do of most benefit to respondents 
personally, Australia 1984 and 1987
Issue 1984 1987 Change
% % %
Lower/reduce income tax 26 32 + 6
Help the aged 1 1 8 - 3
Housing availability/housing interest rates 4 6 + 2
Interest rates 2 6 + 4
Cost of living 5 5 0
Unemployment 6 4 - 2
Education/schools 4 4 0
More social welfare 3 3 0
Hospitals/health care 3 3 0
Industry and business growth 2 2 0
Source Morgan Press Release, 26 June 1987
Voters were attracted by the contents of the Liberal tax package, and certainly
not convinced by Labor's arguments that it was unfair, but were sceptical as to whether
the Liberals could or would implement it:
Table 5.36 Opinion on the Liberal tax package, Australia 1987
Question Yes No Balance positive
% % %
Age Poll
Is the Liberal tax package
- attractive? 50 46 4- 4
- sensible? 46 47 - 1
- workable? 40 49 - 9
- fair? 58 35 + 1 7
- responsible? 45 46 - 1
Will the Liberals be able to afford the tax cuts? 3 1 54 -2 3
News po ll
Would the tax package bring about
- lower taxes? 33 50 - 1 7
- lower government expenditure? 36 47 - 1 1
Source Age Poll, Age, 12 June 1987; Newspoll, Australian 24 June 1987, p.1375
^Expressed attitudes to details of the Liberals' proposals, however, were rather sensitive 
to the exact question asked - see Appendix 5.
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Thus the Coalition did not gain a decisive advantage over Labor in this area: 
Table 5.37 Best party on selected issues, Australia, June 26-28 1987
Issue Labor Lib/NP Labor lead
% % %
Industrial relations 49 30 + 1 9
Welfare and social issues 45 32 + 13
The economy 44 35 + 9
Taxation 39 37 + 2
Source Newspoll, Australian, 30 June 1987, p.2.
The outcome of the election was that Labor increased its majority of seats even 
though it received less first preference votes than the Liberal and National parties 
combined.
Table 5.38 Election results, Australia 1987
Party 1987 vote Change since 1984
Labor 45.8% -1.7%
Liberals 34.6% + 0.2%
National Party 11.5% + 0.9%
Liberal-NCP Coalition 46.1% + 1.1%
Australian Democrats 6.0% + 0.6%
Source Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 
Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
p.273; Australian Electoral Commission.
A number of theories were put forward from various quarters to explain the 
election result. Hawke and Keating maintained that voters had rejected the money and 
taken the quality product, while Labor's pollster Rod Cameron argued that the critical 
issue was where the money would come from to fund the Liberal tax cuts76. Howard, 
Sinclair and many in the media attributed the result to Opposition disunity, while other 
media commentators blamed John Howard's leadership. Maverick Liberal Steele Hall 
blamed the Liberals' move to the Right77, and former National leader Doug Anthony 
blamed media bias78. Labor's good campaign and the Liberals' bad campaign were also
76ABC-TV, 11 July 1987.
77Canberra Times, 15 July 1987, p.8. 
78Australian, 14 July 1987, p.5.
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seen to be relevant, in particular Labor's attractive leadership, skilled packaging of 
policies having managed to put a good face on the economic situation79, and the lateness 
and innumeracy of the Liberal tax package. Another explanation was that the 
conservationist vote favoured Labor80. Labor's campaign focus on marginal seats was 
credited with its success in increasing its majority in Parliament despite losing votes, 
as this enabled Labor to hold its position in marginal seats where it really mattered.
According to the 1987 Australian election study, about 20% of voters changed 
their vote between 1984 and 1987. Labor received 4% of the vote as conversions from 
other parties, having lost 10% of the 1984 electorate to other parties, while the 
Coalition received 7% in conversions, having lost only 4% of the 1984 electorate to 
other parties. Another 3% for each side came from new voters, who favoured Labor 
51% to 45%81.
Figures for the proportions of election survey respondents mentioning given 
issues as important are set out below both for all voters and for loyalists and defectors 
separately. The difference between the proportion of defectors and loyalists naming 
each issue is also given (defectors less loyalists).
Table 5.39 Extremely important issues, Australia 1987 (election study).
Total
%
Loyalist
%
Labor
Defector
%
Diff
%
Loyalist
%
Lib-Nat
Defector
%
Diff
%
Taxes 68 59 71 + 1 2 77 65 - 1 2
Inflation 66 63 64 + 1 69 66 - 3
Govt spending 63 50 70 + 20 74 66 - 8
Health care 62 68 58 -1 0 57 57 0
Interest rates 6 1 57 63 + 6 65 65 0
Living standards 59 62 59 - 3 56 65 + 1 1
Unemployment 56 62 47 - 1 5 51 55 + 4
The rural crisis 37 28 35 + 7 48 21 -2 7
The environment 31 35 34 - 1 27 26 - 1
Trade unions 30 1 7 28 + 1 1 45 26 - 1 9
Source Ian McAllister & Alvaro Ascui (1988), 'Voting patterns', in Australia Votes: 
the 1987 Federal Election, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.223.
79David Butler, Australian, 14 July 1987, p.13.
80Bob Carr, Australian, 14 July 1987, p.4.
81 As reported in Ian McAllister & Alvaro Ascui (1988), 'Voting patterns', in Australia  
Votes: the 1987 Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, 
Melbourne, pp.224-226.
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Significantly more Labor defectors than loyalists named taxes, government 
spending, and trade unions as extremely important issues, which implies that Labor 
may have lost votes on these issues. Conversely, significantly more Coalition defectors 
than loyalists named living standards, which suggests that this issue may have cost the 
Coalition votes. In addition, Hawke was clearly more attractive to voters than Howard.
The election study found that opinions concerning issues (including tax) 
explained only 3% of the variance in Labor defectors' votes, and none of the variance 
for Coalition defectors. This implies that although tax as an issue may have cost Labor 
votes in 1987, it didn’t lose many votes. Instead the main reasons for switching were 
leadership and the economy:
Table 5.40 Percent of voting variance explained by different factors, Australia 1987
Percent of variance 
explained by:
All
voters
%
Labor
defectors
%
Coalition
defectors
%
Social structure 1 1 1 3
Campaign 0 1 4
Issues 6 3 0
Economy 26 1 5 7
Party leaders 1 6 24 1 3
Party images 2 1 0
Source Ian McAllister & Alvaro Ascui (1988), 'Voting patterns', in Australia Votes: 
the 1987 Federal Election, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.241.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that although tax was the biggest 
issue during the campaign, with the Coalition offering huge tax cuts, its impact was 
successfully blunted by factors such as the Labor record in cutting tax (one tax cut 
came into operation during the campaign), media disapproval of Howard's tax package, 
Labor's scare campaign on where spending would be cut, and the Liberals' tax 'gaffes'.
Due to the 1985 tax reforms and the massive tax cuts offered by the Liberals, 
the 1987 election was a classic tax versus social welfare election superimposed on a 
weak economy, and it is arguable that the support for Labor’s economic policies in the 
media, from which voters get almost all their political information, limited the swing 
away from Labor both on the economy and on tax by convincing a sizeable proportion of 
voters that Labor was the safer alternative, and that the economy was far too weak to 
risk the Liberals' radical tax cut policies. This message was emphasized by Labor's
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efficient campaign under an attractive leader, coupled with the Liberals' mistake- 
ridden and relatively disunited campaign under a much less attractive leader.
Perhaps the most appropriate epitaph for Australia's 1987 election was penned 
by Labor's Bob Hogg: "Our own research showed that people wouldn't mind a tax cut but 
they really thought the country couldn’t afford it"82.
5.3 Elections 1984-1988: Palme, Carlsson, Hawke
The parallel economic and political courses taken by Sweden and Australia in the 
1970s continued during the 1980s: renewed Left governments in both countries 
presided over improving economies, with higher growth, lower inflation and lower 
unemployment than in the previous decade. However real wage growth was also low, and 
in Australia between 1984 and 1987 real wages fell.
The courses taken in regard to tax, too, were similar: both Left governments 
moved to broaden the tax base and restrict tax concessions in order to help reduce the 
large budget deficits they had inherited and to allow cuts in income tax, which occurred 
in all four electoral terms. In Sweden the main activity in the tax arena took place 
between 1982 and 1985, during which the tax reform agreed to in 1981 continued to 
be phased in, with income tax cuts being financed by new and increased indirect taxes 
and capital taxes. Major tax changes in Australia between 1983 and 1984 included new 
lump sum superannuation and resources rent taxes, the introduction of a health 
insurance levy, and considerable anti-avoidance legislation, but the major tax reform 
did not occur until 1985. Although the government was not successful in gaining 
acceptance of its proposal to give big income tax cuts in exchange for the introduction of 
a 12.5% broad-based consumption tax, it did broaden the tax base by introducing new 
taxes on capital gains, fringe benefits and foreign source income; removing 
deductibility for entertainment expenses; and removing or limiting a number of other 
concessions. It also introduced full imputation for company tax.
One important reason for the failure of the consumption tax in Australia in 
1985 was strong ACTU opposition, which contrasts with LO support for the 
introduction of Sweden's consumption tax in 1960. This difference in union attitudes 
appears to be at least partly due to the fact that in 1960 the Swedish unions were 
persuaded that the new tax would help finance labour market programs, whereas in 
1985 there was no such inducement.
82Bob Hogg (1987), '1987 poll: Labor had the luck', Labor Forum, v.9/4, p.27.
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As a result of these measures plus expenditure cuts, taxation growth by both 
governments’ second term in office exceeded the growth of expenditure, some measures 
of which were negative. Thus budget deficits steadily shrank. In Sweden the growth of 
taxation was higher between 1982 and 1985 than it had been between 1979 and 1982, 
and higher again between 1985 and 1988, while in Australia the higher taxation 
growth did not show up until the government's second term between 1984 and 1987. 
By the 12 months preceding the election in 1987, however, taxation growth was down 
again, although still greater than the very low or negative expenditure growth.
In contrast to previous periods, the electoral strategies of the Left in Sweden 
and Australia in regard to tax were fairly similar. In Sweden the Social Democrats 
made no specific tax cut promises in 1985 apart from pledging to continue to 
implement the 1981 reform, but in 1988 they departed from their usual practice to 
promise income tax cuts in 1989 as a prelude to yet another in the long line of 
tradeoffs between cuts in income tax and rises in indirect taxes and capital taxes, which 
was very similar to Labor's strategy in 1984. The one other major Social Democratic 
tax promise in 1988 was to introduce environmental levies, while in Australia in 
1987 Labor did not promise tax cuts but rather pledged that tax would not increase as a 
percentage of GDP and that there would be no new taxes or tax rises.
The Centre Party's policy at both Swedish elections was to reduce and index 
marginal rates of income tax and to reduce the VAT on food, while in 1988 it also 
promised to raise the basic deduction for income tax. These tax cuts were to be financed 
by raising taxes on resources and energy and, like the Social Democrats, they pledged to 
introduce environmental levies. The Liberals also pledged to cut and index marginal 
rates of income tax and to introduce environmental levies, but stiffened their anti-tax 
stand in 1988 by proposing to cut the total tax burden and to make working capital in 
small business tax-free. Cuts in marginal rates were to be financed by cutting sickness 
benefits and by lowering the basic deduction on income tax, the direct opposite of the 
Centre Party's policy and therefore a source of contention.
The Conservatives as usual took the strongest anti-tax stand, especially in 
1985, arguing that high tax was a prime source of Sweden’s economic problems. At 
both elections they promised to lower taxation as a proportion of GDP, cut and index 
marginal rates of tax, and cut inheritance tax. They also pledged to make childcare 
deductible, put a ceiling on local income tax, and abolish tax on the working capital of 
small and medium business. In 1985 they also promised to cut corporate tax, wealth 
tax, and gift tax, and to replace taxation with fees wherever possible.
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In Australia the Coalition took a similarly strong anti-tax line, pledging to 
reduce tax as a proportion of GDP via a combination of spending cuts and economic 
growth. Income tax in particular was to be cut, in part by making childcare deductible. 
In 1984 Peacock promised to allow families to split their income for tax purposes, 
abolish the tax on lump sum superannuation, reduce company tax for small business, 
and allow citizens to opt out of Medicare and thus escape paying the Medicare levy. In 
1987 John Howard pledged to cut marginal rates of tax, abolish the new taxes on 
capital gains and fringe benefits, modify the tax on lump sum superannuation, 
reintroduce deductibility for business entertainment expenses, and cut corporate tax.
The Communists in Sweden continued their policy of increasing tax 
progressivity by raising taxes on capital, speculation and high incomes while 
abolishing the VAT on food. The Greens, who only became important in 1988, followed a 
similarly progressive tax policy, while in addition proposing extra taxation on 
resources, energy and effluent. The Australian Democrats were not very prominent on 
tax, and their main appeal was to their record on blocking the extension of sales tax to 
'necessities'.
Tax was a major media issue at all the elections during this period. The 1985 
Swedish election and the 1987 Australian election were classic tax versus welfare 
elections, with the very large tax cuts offered by the Conservatives in Sweden and the 
Coalition in Australia being countered by Social Democrat and Labor scare campaigns on 
where the spending cuts would fall. In Australia mathematical mistakes in the Liberal 
tax policy were also instrumental in reducing its appeal. Income tax was the main tax 
issue, although the VAT on food was also important in Sweden and capital taxes were 
important in Australia.
The available evidence suggests that tax influenced the outcomes of both 
Australian elections and of the Swedish election of 1985, but it is not yet clear whether 
it affected the Swedish election of 1988.
At the 1985 Swedish election, tax was considered an important issue by 
substantially more people than in 1982 and the Social Democrats' tax policy was 
considerably less popular than it had been in 1982, which is not surprising in view of 
the numerous tax rises that had been implemented during this period. This, plus the 
fact that Social Democrat defectors named tax as an issue significantly more often than 
did Social Democrat loyalists, supports the conclusion of the authors of the 1985 
election study that the Social Democrats lost votes to the Conservatives and Liberals on
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the issue, although at the same time similar evidence suggests that this loss was largely 
counterbalanced by vote gains by the Social Democrats due to opposition to the 
consequences of the spending cuts proposed by the Conservatives. It also appears that 
the Social Democrats lost votes to the Communists on the issue of removing the VAT on 
food.
In 1988 tax was almost as salient as in 1985, and although information is 
sketchy as yet, it is at least arguable that the increased emphasis on tax cuts by the 
Liberals led to their winning votes from the Conservatives but losing votes to the Social 
Democrats and Centre Party. However a more definite conclusion must await 
publication of the 1988 election study.
In Australia in 1984 most polls found tax to be about the third most salient 
issue, but were divided on whether it rose in salience between 1983 and 1984 and on 
which party was considered the best on tax. Assuming that the exit poll was more 
accurate than previous polls, however, it would appear that in 1984 tax salience rose 
compared to 1983, and that Labor fell behind the Liberals as the best party on tax 
whereas it had been ahead in 1983. This implies that Labor lost votes on tax in 1984. 
Possible reasons for this include the lump sum superannuation tax controversy, the 
renewed Coalition emphasis on promising big tax cuts, and the Coalition's scare 
campaign on capital taxes.
In 1987 most polls showed tax to be the number one issue, and that voters were 
attracted by the Liberals' massive tax cut promises but sceptical as to whether they 
could be carried out. Nevertheless, significantly more Labor defectors than loyalists 
named the issue as important, which suggests that Labor did indeed lose at least some 
votes on the issue.
5.4 Elections 1958-1988: Summary
In regard to the electoral impact of tax, the elections in Sweden and Australia 
over the whole period from 1958 to 1988 can be divided into three categories: those 
for which reasonable evidence exists that tax affected the outcome, those for which 
reasonable evidence exists that tax did not affect the outcome, and those for which the 
evidence does not permit a judgement to be made:
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Table 5.41 The electoral impact of tax, Sweden and Australia 1958 to 1988
Sweden Australia
Elections influenced by tax 1 970 1 980
1 979 1 984
1 985 1 987
Elections not influenced by tax 1 958 1 958
1 968 1961
1963 
1966 
1 969 
1 972 
1 975 
1 977 
1 983
Elections where evidence is inconclusive 1 960 1 9 74
1964 
1 973 
1976 
1 982 
1 988
With the exception of the 1970 Swedish election, all the elections which appear 
to have been influenced by tax occurred within the last third of the period since 1958. 
This may be partly an artefact of the much more abundant evidence available for recent 
elections - better evidence may well have revealed that the 1960 Swedish election and 
the 1974 Australian election were affected by tax - but the pattern is also consistent 
with the common view that electorates have tended to turn against tax and expenditure 
since the mid-1970s, thus making actual and promised tax cuts more salient. Possible 
reasons for this include the influence of inflation in moving wage earners into higher 
tax brackets and of recession in putting pressure on governments to introduce new 
taxes and raise tax rates in order to compensate for falling revenue. The increasing 
frequency of tax elections also coincides with a steady rise in voter cynicism.
In addition, three other major factors can be adduced to help explain why some 
elections were influenced by tax but not others.
First, four of the six tax elections followed periods during which the 
government significantly altered the tax system. In Sweden in 1970 joint taxation was 
replaced by individual taxation, a move which arguably touched deep-rooted feelings
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and values concerning families and how human relationships should be structured, 
while the election of 1985 followed the implementation of numerous new taxes and tax 
rises as the new government tried to reduce the budget deficit. In Australia the 1980 
election followed considerably controversy over the crude oil levy and over 
unsuccessful attempts to broaden the indirect tax base, and the 1987 election followed 
the implementation of a significant broadening of the tax base, including the 
introduction of new taxes on capital gains and fringe benefits. This criterion would also 
suggest that the 1960 election in Sweden should be a tax election, but unfortunately the 
empirical evidence is not sufficient to warrant such a conclusion.
Second, at all the tax elections apart from 1970 the pattern of the parties' tax 
cut promises was significantly different to that of the previous election. In Sweden in 
1979 the Social Democrats proposed for the first time to introduce a tax on production 
while the Conservatives hardened their anti-tax stand, and in 1985 the Conservatives 
again significantly increased the size and scope of their tax cut promises. In Australia 
in 1980 Labor matched the Coalition in promising income tax cuts, in contrast to 
1977, while in 1984 the Coalition but not Labor promised specific income tax cuts, 
the reverse of 1983. In 1987 the Coalition significantly increased the size and scope of 
their tax cut promises, just as the Conservatives had done in Sweden in 1985.
It should be noted, however, that while in Sweden the Left is clearly perceived 
to be the high-tax alternative, in Australia there is no such clear distinction in voters' 
minds, which means that the nature of party competition on tax is fundamentally 
different in the two countries.
Finally, tax was an important media issue at all the tax elections, although it 
was an issue at some non-tax elections too. This may imply that the influence of tax is 
via the media in some way, or it may simply mean that journalists are indeed in touch 
with popular opinion.
This historical examination offers little evidence, however, to support the view 
that electoral outcomes are related in any way to what actually happens to tax levels. 
This is possibly due to the fact that for the most part people are simply not aware of 
what is happening to tax levels, so are not in a position to react to their movements in 
any systematic way. Instead, people seem to react to what is obvious and well-known: 
big tax changes and especially the introduction of major new taxes, promises to cut 
income tax, and tax controversy in general.
6TAX LEVELS AND ELECTION RESULTS
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I report the results of statistical tests of three theories 
concerning the relationship between taxation and election results: that voters punish 
governments or Left parties for tax rises (the tax aversion theory); that voters 
reward governments or Left parties for tax rises due to their connection with 
expenditure rises (the tax attraction theory); and that a tax attraction effect operates 
in Sweden while a tax aversion effect operates in Australia (the national differences 
theory). These theories will be tested using several alternative measures of tax: 
absolute versus relative tax, total tax versus direct tax, and central government 
versus general government tax.
Perhaps the most commonly held view about taxation and election results is that 
tax rises result in losses of votes for the government, other things being equal, while 
tax cuts win votes, since the government is seen as responsible for the level of 
taxation. This opinion is widespread among the practical participants in politics, such 
as politicians, journalists, and the electorate. Voters, according to this tax aversion 
theory, tend to vote according to their personal economic self-interest, and therefore 
vote for tax cuts and against tax rises.
But while this obviously would be true for very large tax rises or cuts - a 
government which raised all marginal income tax rates to 100% or more, for example, 
would clearly be punished at the polls - is it true of tax rises and cuts of the 
magnitudes that have occurred in Sweden and Australia over the past thirty years? It 
can be argued, for example, that there is an information gap problem: voters are 
simply not really aware of what is happening to taxation levels because they do not pay 
sufficient attention to their pay-packets, which often change due to other factors such 
as wage adjustments. In addition, wages are being continually eroded by inflation, and 
many taxes are hidden in the prices of goods. Because voters don’t really know what is 
going on, they can't consistently vote in favour of tax cuts and against tax rises. Instead, 
tax affects election results in other ways, for example as an election issue: the 
causation is ideal rather than material. Another possibility is that while personal 
economic self-interest is one human motive, other motives may be equally or more 
important. Empirical support for this view comes from recent studies by Kinder &
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Kiewit 1 and Lewis-Beck 2, which appear to indicate that people are more inclined to 
vote according to their conception of the common economic good than according to their 
own financial circumstances.
Yet a third possibility is that voters prefer improvements in government 
services to tax cuts, or even at the expense of tax rises, so that tax rises have the 
indirect effect of helping the government rather than of hurting it due to the strong 
positive electoral effects of the expenditure rises made possible by the tax rises. In 
other words, while voters might still be averse to tax as such, their stronger 
preference for what tax makes possible may show up statistically as implicit approval, 
which may be due either to a genuine preference for public goods and services or, 
following the fiscal illusion theorists, because taxes are not as obvious to the average 
citizen as government benefits. This I call the tax attraction theory.
Another possibility is that national differences between Sweden and Australia 
may mean that Swedish voters react positively to improvements to government 
transfers and services and thus to tax rises, but that Australian voters prefer tax cuts 
to improvements in government transfers and services. This theory is consistent with 
Sweden having much higher taxation and expenditure than Australia, if one believes 
that this is electorally determined. Castles, for example, argues that Swedes have what 
he calls a 'social democratic image of society', in which public services and transfers 
are considered not only to be legitimate but to be important3, while it can be argued 
that Australians have what might be termed a liberal image of society, in which the 
State is considered to be a menace to personal freedom, and low taxation is valued more 
highly than extensive public services. While this distinction is of degree rather than of 
kind - many Swedes are liberals and many Australians are social democrats - it is 
postulated to be sufficient to produce different effects at the aggregate electoral level. 
Alternatively, such an effect could be due to differences in the tax systems of the two 
countries, as indirect taxation and social security contributions, which are thought by 
many to be less onerous to citizens than direct taxes, play a much larger role in Sweden 
than in Australia. In either case, Swedes are thought to reward incumbent governments
1 Donald R. Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewit (1979), 'Economic discontent and political behavior: 
the role of personal grievances and collective economic judgements in Congressional voting', 
American Journal of Political Science, v.23/3, pp.495-527.
^Michael Lewis-Beck (1988), Economies and Elections - The Major Western Democracies, 
University of Michigan Press, U.S.
3Francis G. Castles (1978), The Social Democratic Image of Society, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
London; and Francis G. Castles (1985), The Working Class and Welfare - Welfare in Australia 
and New Zealand, Allen & Unwin, New Zealand.
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when tax rises, while Australians punish them. This I call the national differences 
theory.
The results of testing these three theories in respect of the votes won by the 
incumbent government are set out in section 6.2.
However it is also possible that voter reactions to changes in levels of taxation 
are not directed so much towards the incumbent government as such, whatever its 
political stripe, as towards the Left/Right division of the vote. In Sweden, for instance, 
where the Social Democrats are clearly identified as the party of high taxation, a voter 
dissatisfied with tax rises put through by a bourgeois government may be unlikely to 
switch their vote to the Social Democrats. In other words, a partisan effect could be in 
operation rather than an incumbency effect, consistent with tax being a position issue 
rather than a valence issue. Such a 'partisan hypothesis' is similar to Rattinger's 
'clientele hypothesis' according to which Left parties benefit from increasing 
unemployment regardless of whether they were in power, since the Left is generally 
seen as more likely to reduce unemployment, while Right parties benefit from 
inflation, because the the Right is generally perceived as more likely to restrain rising 
prices. In regard to tax this implies that tax rises lead tax-averse voters to swing to 
the Right regardless of which government is in power, while voters attracted by tax 
(via expenditure) would swing to the Left. In addition, these tax aversion and tax 
attraction effects might apply differently in Sweden and Australia: Swedes might 
reward the Left while Australians might punish it.
In section 6.3, therefore, I replicate the statistical tests carried out in section 
6.2 focussing on the Left/Right vote instead of the government vote.
In each of these sections a number of variants of each theory will be examined.
First, changes in tax are tested both as changes in absolute tax - tax as buying 
power taken from voters, measured as real per capita taxation - and as changes in 
relative tax - the share of voters' resources going to the state, measured as tax as a 
proportion of GDP.
Second, changes in both total tax and direct tax are considered, in order to test 
the widely held view that voters are more sensitive to direct tax than to tax in general.
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Third, changes in both central government and general government taxation are 
considered, in case voters do not distinguish changes in that part of taxation for which 
the central government is directly responsible from changes in taxation in general.
Sources of these variables are listed in Appendix 1 along with a description of 
their transformations from raw data to the exact measures used in the statistical tests 
plus their means and standard deviations.
The statistical method used for all these tests is ordinary least squares 
regression analysis. While one can't expect to fully capture reality in a set of 
regression equations, the aim is to run enough tests from enough different angles to 
catch a feel of the drift of things, via the accumulation of findings for or against the 
specific theories.
The dependent variable used is the change since the previous election in the 
percentage of the total vote won by the main government alternatives of the Left and 
Right. In Sweden these parties are either the Social Democrats, who were in office at 
nine of the eleven elections surveyed, or the combined bourgeois parties. The Social 
Democrat vote alone is used despite the fact that for much of the period they needed 
Communist support in the Riksdag in order to retain office because the Social 
Democrats alone formed the government, and have allowed the Communists little 
influence on policy: when the Communists refuse to support legislation the Social 
Democrats try, often successfully, to gain support from one or more of the bourgeois 
parties. The combined bourgeois vote (including the KDS in 1985) is used despite 
coalition splits during both their terms of office because the bourgeois bloc as a whole 
was clearly the alternative government at every election, as was demonstrated by the 
re-formation of a three-party government following the 1979 election. In Australia 
the situation is simpler, as governments were formed exclusively either by the 
Liberal-National Coalition (formerly Liberal-Country Coalition) or by Labor4.
Change in the government vote is used, rather than the level of the government 
vote, for two reasons. First, because it represents the net balance of voter streams
4Swedish election figures are from Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin & Hans 
Wieslander (1984), Sverige efter 1900 - en modern politisk historia, 10th edition, 
BonnierFakta, Stockholm, pp.344-345 (elections 1956-1982); Sören Holmberg & Mikael 
Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Stockholm, p.24 (1985 election); and 
Statistics Sweden (1988 election). Australian figures are from Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 
'Election Results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 Federal Election, ed. Ian McAllister & John 
Warhurst, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, p.273, and from the Australian Electoral 
Commission.
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moving to or from the government at each election, which is the focus of interest 
because this is what determines, through the lens of the electoral system, whether the 
party or parties of government retain power. Second, because according to the election 
survey literature most of the total vote for a party appears to be determined by habit, 
or party identification, so that the model would be misspecified if the total vote was 
used as the dependent variable without including party identification as an independent 
variable, which I cannot do because adequate measures of this are not available for all 
of the elections covered. While party identification may also have an impact on vote 
change, due to the turnover of the electorate5, this impact would not generally be likely 
to be as great relative to other factors.
Because the coefficients of models estimated by OLS regression are biased unless 
all relevant independent variables are included in the specification6, I seek to include 
in my equations as many such variables as possible. To include all such variables is, of 
course, impossible, since many are not amenable to measurement, so in practice I seek 
to minimize parameter bias by setting my tax variables in the context of an economic 
model of voting to which expenditure variables are added. Such models hypothesize that 
people react to the state of the economy as it really is, and I attach a short review of a 
number of these models as Appendix 4.
The particular economic model into which I insert different tax variables 
consists of three independent variables, namely inflation, unemployment, and income, 
as these are the main variables used in the economic voting literature. For my income 
measure I have chosen to use real wages, as this is a measure that applies to most 
people (although not to all), is not highly correlated with unemployment (as certain 
other measures are), and is the income measure which is most often the subject of 
public discussion in the media.
Because in general people who change their vote on economic grounds would be 
expected to do so due to changes in economic circumstances, these and the tax and 
expenditure variables are operationalized as changes rather than as levels.
In addition, because most of the economic voting literature suggests that it is 
economic conditions over the year or so immediately preceding the election that matter, 
all independent variables are operationalized as changes over the 12 months preceding
5See, for instance, David Butler & Donald Stokes (1974), Political Change in Britain: The 
Evolution of Electoral Choice, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London, Part 3.
6Eric A. Hanushek, John E. Jackson & John F. Kain (1974), 'Model specification, use of 
aggregate data, and the ecological correlation fallacy’, Political Method v.1, p.96.
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each election. Average annual changes over each governments' entire term of office 
were also examined, but model fits were so low that this line of investigation was 
abandoned. This null result is consistent with the view that voters have a short-term 
perspective in regard to economic conditions.
Sources, transformations, means, and standard deviations for these economic 
variables are given in Appendix 1. Their precise definitions are as follows:
First, inflation is defined as the percentage change over the 12 months prior to 
the election in the Consumer Price Index. This is calculated as the mean of the 
percentage change over the year in which the election takes place and the percentage 
change over the previous year, weighted by the number of months in the 12 months 
immediately preceding the election that fall within each of these two calendar years.
Second, unemployment change is defined as the change over the 12 months 
preceding each election in the percentage of the workforce who are unemployed. This is 
also calculated as a weighted average of the changes in election year and the previous 
year.
Third, the rate of change of real wages is defined as the percentage change over 
the 12 months preceding each election in real wages, again a weighted average of the 
changes in election year and the previous year.
The final independent variable included is expenditure change, in order to try to 
distinguish between tax effects and expenditure effects. This is because changes in 
government expenditure may themselves have an independent electoral impact, and 
because one would expect that any hypothesized negative effect of tax rises may be to 
some degree offset by positive effects from any concurrent expenditure rises that the 
tax rises might have made possible (and conversely for cuts in tax and expenditure). 
Thus to omit expenditure as a variable would increase the risk of expenditure effects 
appearing disguised as tax effects. However it does not eliminate this possibility 
entirely, as the necessity of choosing between different measures of tax and 
expenditure means that an aspect of expenditure effect not caught by the exact 
expenditure measure used in the particular regression may be caught to some degree by 
the taxation measure. Measures of expenditure change, sources for which are given in 
Appendix 1, are derived in exactly the same way as tax changes in order to make them 
equivalent. Like the tax variables, the exact definitions of expenditure variables vary 
according to model specification, but both tax and expenditure changes are over the 12
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months prior to each election, and are weighted averages of the changes in election year 
and in the previous year.
In order to compare and contrast results for Sweden and Australia, regressions 
are run separately for each country, which means that there are just 11 cases for 
Sweden and 13 for Australia. These very small N render results vulnerable to the 
values of individual outliers, but the statistical tests are undertaken nevertheless for a 
number of reasons.
First, the cases under examination are to be considered as a population rather 
than as a sample, so that conclusions are drawn at least in the first instance for just 
those elections and not for elections in general. This means that there is no problem of 
inference from sample to population, and the probability values are therefore to be 
understood not as sample statistics but as measures of strength of association using 
conventions of sample to population inference as a yardstick.
Second, the R2 is adjusted for the small number of cases and the number of 
variables in order to give a more conservative estimate, using the usual formula:
A d j.R 2 = R2 - (p(1-R2)/(N -p -1 ))
where p is the number of variables in the equation7. This ensures that the R2 is not 
affected by changes in the number of variables in the equation, as Adj. R2 rises only if 
the t-value of a new variable exceeds 1.
Third, the robustness of the results is tested using the jacknife technique, 
which consists of deleting each case in turn and re-running the regression to check 
whether its omission seriously affects the estimates.
Finally, the small number of cases means that elections can also be looked at 
individually, as in the previous three chapters, and final conclusions will depend upon 
evidence from both historical and statistical examination.
It should also be pointed out that the use of regression analysis on aggregate data 
with a very small number of cases is fairly common in this field, although of course 
this does not demonstrate that it is justified8.
7Marija J. Norusis (1985), SPSSX Advanced Statistics Guide, SPSS Inc., U.S., p.18.
8See, for example, Edward R. Tufte (1978), Political Control of the Economy, Princeton UP, 
Princeton.
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6.2 Tax levels and the government vote
In this section I test the tax aversion, tax attraction, and national differences 
theories concerning the impact of changes in the level of taxation on changes in the 
governments ote.
The precise hypotheses based on the three theories to be tested are as follows:
1. Tax aversion: There is a significant negative association between
government vote change and changes over the year prior to 
each election in levels of taxation, variously measured;
2. Tax attraction: There is a significant positive association between
government vote change and changes over the year prior to 
each election in levels of taxation, variously measured, due 
to the effect of concurrent expenditure changes;
3. National differences: There is a significant positive association in Sweden between
government vote change and changes over the year prior to 
each election in levels of taxation, but a significant negative 
association in Australia between government vote change and 
changes over the year prior to each election in levels of 
taxation.
As indicated earlier, several measures of changes in taxation levels are used, 
along with equivalent measures of changes in expenditure levels. Changes in absolute 
(real per capita) tax are considered first, then changes in relative tax (tax as a 
percentage of GDP). Within these sections changes in both total and direct tax are 
considered, and these are further subdivided into changes in central government and 
general government tax. Regression results are set out separately for Sweden and 
Australia.
One way of conceptualizing the reality of taxation is as buying power 
transferred from individuals (and other entities) to the state, or what I call absolute  
tax. After all, the principal purpose of tax is to take buying power from taxpayers in 
order to use it in other ways. This section examines whether taxpayers as voters react 
to changes in taxation as buying power.
Tax variables are operationalized as the changes over the 12 months prior to 
each election in levels of real per capita total taxation, expressed in 1980 Australian 
dollars, and expenditure is operationalized correspondingly, so that the unstandardized
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b regression coefficients indicate the change in the government vote as a percentage of 
the total vote which is associated with a $1 change in tax or expenditure. Thus the 
apparently low unstandardized b coefficients are a function of the unit of measurement: 
for Swedish central government tax in Table 6.1, for example, an increase of $1 per 
capita over the year prior to each election is associated with a vote gain for the 
incumbent government of .009% of the total vote. Another way of expressing this would 
be to say that a tax increase of $100 per capita is associated with an increase of 0.9% 
of the total vote.
The results of the regressions (Table 6.1) do not provide support for any of the 
three theories, for Sweden or for Australia. In addition, the explained variance is 
rather small, apart from a modest .4 for Sweden general government. The only 
statistically significant relationship in the table is the negative association in Sweden 
between inflation and government vote change.
The Durbin-Watson statistics are inconclusive, as they are for all the 
regression results detailed in this thesis. For Sweden positive autocorrelation would be 
definitely indicated if d < 0.316 and negative autocorrelation if d > 3.684, while for 
Australia positive autocorrelation would be indicated if d < 0.445 and negative 
autocorrelation if d > 3.555. None of the Durbin-Watson values approach these critical 
rejection zones, but, on the other hand, due to the small N there are no possible values 
for d which entirely exclude the possibility of autocorrelation9.
The next regressions test the view of Wilensky and others that it is not so much 
changes in total taxation that matters as changes over the 12 months prior to each 
election in real per capita direct taxation. However the results, shown in Table 6.2, 
indicate that the models tested are clearly misspecified. Not only do the coefficients for 
tax lack statistical significance, but the explained variance for Sweden is even lower 
than in the previous model (Australia's is about the same), and the coefficients for 
inflation in Sweden are no longer significant.
9Critical values for d at the 5% level of significance are taken from J. Johnston (1985), 
Econometric Methods, McGraw-Hill, Singapore, p.556; and a discussion of how these should 
be used can be found in A. Koutsoyiannis (1977), Theory of Econometrics, 2nd edition, 
Macmillan, London, pp.212-216. For discussions of the effect of autocorrelation on regression 
coefficients, see Douglas A. Hibbs Jr. (1974), 'Problems of statistical estimation and causal 
inference in time-series regression models', Sociological Methodology 1973-74, pp.252-308; 
and Charles W. Ostrom Jr. (1978), Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques, Sage 
University Papers on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, U.S.
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Table 6.1 Absolute  changes in real per capita total tax levels and changes in the 
government vote: regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for party or parties of government % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N = 11) (N = 1 3)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) (2 )
Central government:
Per capita total tax .009 - .018
( .015) ( .033)
Per capita expenditure .005 .018
( .012) ( .020)
General government:
Per capita total tax .011 - .0 1 7
( .006) ( .032 )
Per capita expenditure .003 .017
( .007) ( .020 )
CPI(% ) - . 8 3 * - . 9 3 * *  * - .34 - . 35
( -39) ( -32) ( .36 ) ( .37 )
Unemployment rate .96 1 .02 -1 .07 - .8 9
(2 .19) ( 1.74) (1 .61) (1 .49 )
Wages (%) - .46 - .68 -1 .48 -1 .46
( .48 ) ( .41) ( -83) ( .82 )
Intercept 4.41 4.67 2.91 2.92
Adj. R2 .04 .40 .16 .14
Significance level .46 .19 .32 .33
D.W. 2.63 2.84 2.18 2.14
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.2 Absolute changes in real per capita direct tax levels and changes in the 
government vote: regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for party or parties of government % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N = 11) ( N = 1 3)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (3 ) (4 ) (3 ) (4 )
Central government: 
Per capita direct tax - .004 - .030
(.021) ( .048)
Per capita expenditure .001 .013
(.014) (.019)
General government: 
Per capita direct tax -.001 - .038
(.015) (.050)
Per capita expenditure .004 .01 0
(.009) (.020)
CPI(%) - .67 - .82 - .27 - .27
(.45) ( .44) ( .43) (-47)
Unemployment rate .43 .14 -1.13 -1 .04
(2.14) (2.14) (1.59) (1 .64)
Wages (%) - .30 - .45 -1 .35 -1 .29
(-58) ( .56) ( .89) ( .92)
Intercept 3.97 4.54 2.83 2.62
Adj. R2 - .02 .02 .1 7 .1 4
Significance level .51 .48 .31 .33
D.W. 2.66 2.59 2.10 2.08
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed 
** p<.05, two-tailed 
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Given the failure of changes in absolute tax to contribute anything towards 
explaining changes in the government vote, the next theory to be examined postulates 
that it is rather changes in relative taxation that influence the government vote, that 
is, changes in tax as a proportion of the average total resources available to each 
person. Because the data is not available to directly relate taxation to wages, I have 
chosen to use as my relative measure per capita tax as a percentage of per capita GDP - 
that is, multiplying through, the familiar tax as a percentage of GDP. Expenditure 
change is also expressed as changes in percentage of GDP.
The regression results using changes in relative tax, shown in Table 6.3, are 
rather similar to those using changes in absolute tax: the explained variances are low, 
apart from .41 for Sweden general government, and the only statistically significant 
result is the negative relationship in Sweden between inflation and changes in the 
government vote.
Finally, the idea that changes in direct tax may have an impact on government 
support, even if changes in total tax don't, is tested by substituting changes in direct 
tax as a percentage of GDP for changes in total tax as a percentage of GDP, but once 
again the results, which are set out in Table 6.4, do not provide any support for either 
of the hypotheses, for Sweden or Australia.
In summary, the statistical tests up to this point do not provide any evidence 
that changes in taxation are related in any way to changes in the government vote.
247
Table 6.3 Relative changes in total tax levels and changes in the government vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in the vote for party or parties of government % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
( N = 11) ( N = 13)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (5 ) (6 ) (5 ) (6 )
Central government:
Total tax % GDP .94 -1 .1 4
(•97) (2 .33)
Expenditure % GDP .53 1.69
(1 .28) (1 .62)
General government:
Total tax % GDP .64 -1 .03
( .47) (2.48)
Expenditure % GDP .34 1 .71
( .80) (1.72)
C PI (%) - . 8 2 * - . 8 0 * *  * - . 3 4 - .36
( .32) ( .30) ( .29) ( .29)
Unemployment rate .40 .21 -1.31 -1 .26
(2 .42) (2.27) (1 -42) (1.47)
Wages (%) - .38 - .44 -1 .5 3 -1 .56
( .41) ( .37) ( .84 ) ( .86)
Intercept 4.72 4.43 2.78 2.77
Adj. R2 .18 .41 .18 .17
Significance level .36 .18 .30 .31
D.W. 2.79 3.09 2.1 1 2.08
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.4 Relative changes in direct tax levels and changes in the government vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in the vote for party or parties of government % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
( N = 11) (N -1 3 )
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (7 ) (8 ) (7 ) (8 )
Central government: 
Direct tax % GDP .10 -1 .22
(1.54) (2.45)
Expenditure % GDP .77 1.56
(1.48) (1.57)
General government: 
Direct tax % GDP .05 -1.17
(1.07) (2.45)
Expenditure % GDP .91 1.63
(.81) (1.69)
CPI(%) - .78 - .91 * * * - .35 - .36
( .40) ( .35) (-28) ( .28)
Unemployment rate - .25 -1 .20 -1 .25 -1 .37
(2.53) (2.40) (1-39) (1.48)
Wages (%) - .38 -.51 -1 .53 -1 .55
( .49) ( .44) ( .84) (-86)
Intercept 4.51 5.01 2.91 2.68
Adj. R2 .03 .18 .18 .17
Significance level .48 .35 .30 .30
D.W. 2.65 2.43 2.08 2.04
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
2 4 9
6.3 Tax levels and the Left/Right vote
The absence of any statistically significant relationship between changes in tax 
levels and changes in the government vote may indicate that voters do not react in a 
simple, unthinking manner to tax changes regardless of which party or parties are in 
government, but rather take into account party policies on tax. Just as Rattinger 
argues that unemployment favours the Left, so tax rises may favour the Right, as tax is 
clearly a Left/Right issue and the Left is generally seen as the high tax side of politics. 
On the other hand, if voters are more interested in expanded government transfers and 
services than in tax cuts, tax rises might favour the Left instead, pulled along by a 
strong positive connection between expenditure rises and changes in the Left vote.
In this section, therefore, the three theories tested previously in relation to 
changes in the government vote are tested in relation to changes in the vote for the main 
Left/Right government alternatives:
1. Tax aversion: For changes in tax levels there is a negative association with
Left vote change and a positive association with Right vote 
change;
2. Tax attraction: For changes in tax levels there is a positive association with
Left vote change and a negative association with Right vote 
change, due to the effect of concurrent expenditure changes;
3. National differences: For changes in tax levels there is in Sweden a positive
association with Left vote change and a negative association 
with Right vote change; but in Australia there is a negative 
association with Left vote change and a positive association 
with Right vole change.
Thus the eight regression equations used in the previous section are repeated, 
except that this time the dependent variables are changes in the percentage of the total 
vote won by the Left and Right respectively, rather than changes in the government 
vote. Results for models with change in the Left vote as dependent variable (Left 
models) and for those with change in the Right vote as dependent variable (Right 
models) are set out in paired tables on successive pages.
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Table 6.5 Absolute changes in real per capita total tax levels and changes in the Left 
vote: regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Left government alternative % total vote
Change over 12 months 
prior to election in:
SWEDEN 1958-1988 
( N = 1 1)
Equation
(9 ) (10)
AUSTRALIA 1958-1987 
( N = 1 3)
Equation
(9 )  (10)
Central government:
Per capita total tax .005 .008
( .010) ( .040)
Per capita expenditure .009 - . 0 6 6 * *
( .008) ( .024)
General government:
Per capita total tax .005 .017
( .003) ( .044)
Per capita expenditure .009* - . 056*
( .004) ( .028)
CPI(%) - . 6 4 * - . 8 2 * * * .36 .29
(•25) ( .17) ( .43) ( .51)
Unemployment rate 2.16 1.83 .48 .37
(1.43) ( .92) (1-94) (2.06)
Wages (%) - . 8 9 * * - 1 . 1 4 * * * 2.61 ** 2.27*
(-31) (-22) (1.00) (1.15)
Intercept 5.21 5.77 -2.98 -2.05
Adj. R2 .56 .82 .31 .06
Significance level .096 .01 .18 .42
D.W. 3.01 3.03 1.60 1.43
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<-1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.6 Absolute changes in real per capita total tax and changes in the Right vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Right government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N =11) ( N = 1 3)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (9 )  (10) (9 )  (10)
Central government:
Per capita total tax 
Per capita expenditure
General government: 
Per capita total tax
Per capita expenditure
- .002
(.013)
.006
(.011)
- .004
(.007)
.000
.007
.027
(.043)
.049* 
( .026)
.033
(.047)
.033
(.030)
CPI (%) .63 .74* - .53 . - .52
(.34) ( .36) ( .47) (.54)
Unemployment rate - .07 .25 .63 1.00
(1.89) (1 .93) (2.11) (2.18)
Wages (%) 1 .48**  * 1 .60** -2 .43 * -2.01
(.41) ( .46) (1 .09) (1.21)
Intercept -8.52 -8.76 3.12 1.77
Adj. R2 .57 .55 .1 1 - .14
Significance level .09 .1 0 .36 .64
D.W. 1.49 1.72 1 .59 1 .55
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
Table 6.7 Absolute changes in real per capita direct tax levels and changes in the Left 
vote: regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Left government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N = 11) (N = 1 3)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: ( 1 1 ) ( 1 2 ) ( 1 1 ) ( 1 2 )
Central government: 
Per capita direct tax .003 - . 026
( . 014) ( . 058)
Per capita expenditure .009 - . 0 6 7 * *  *
( . 009) ( . 023)
General government: 
Per capita direct tax .005 - . 036
( . 008) ( . 070)
Per capita expenditure .010* - . 0 5 8 *
( . 004) ( . 028)
CPI(% ) - . 6 2 * - . 8 2 * * .60 .68
( -29) ( . 22) ( . 51) ( . 65)
Unemployment rate 1.97 1.46 - . 44 -1 .03
( 1 . 38) (1 . 09) 1.89 2.27
Wages (%) - . 89* - 1 . 1 0 * * 2 . 8 6 * * 2 . 64*
( . 37) ( . 29) (1 . 06) (1-27)
Intercept 5.32 5.89 -3.31 - 2 . 28
Adj. R2 .54 .73 .33 .07
Significance level .10 .03 .17 .40
D.W. 3.38 3.31 1.76 1.47
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<. 1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.8 Absolute changes in real per capita direct tax and changes in the Right vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Right government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N = 11) ( N = 1 3)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: ( 1 1 ) ( 1 2 ) (11 ) ( 1 2 )
Central government:
Real per capita direct tax - .015 .052
( -017) ( .062)
Real per capita expenditure .001 .057*
( .011) ( .025)
General government:
Real per capita direct tax - . 0 2 4 * * .057
( .009) ( .074)
Real per capita expenditure - .003 .045
( .005) ( .030)
CPI(% ) .80* . 9 8 * * - .6 9 - .70
( .35) ( .25) ( .55) ( .68)
Unemployment rate - .23 .19 .92 1.35
(1 .67) (1 .20) ( 2.04) (2.39)
Wages (%) 1 .70** 1 . 9 2 * * * - 2 . 6 7 * - 2 .37
( .45) ( .32) ( 1.14) (1 -34)
Intercept -9 .49 -9 .60 3.31 2.37
Adj. R2 .62 .81 .15 - .13
Significance level .07 .01 .32 .62
D.W. 1 .31 1.74 1.78 1.71
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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The first tests concern changes in real per capita total tax, and it can be seen 
immediately that the results reported in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 are more positive than 
previous results.
In particular they provide considerable support for the national differences 
hypothesis, at least as far as expenditure changes are concerned: for changes in the Left 
vote there are significant negative associations with Australian central and general 
government expenditure, and a marginally significant positive relationship with 
Swedish general government expenditure, and for changes in the Right vote there is a 
marginally significant positive association with Australian central government 
expenditure. However none of the tax variables were statistically significant.
It is also noticeable that the model fits are generally considerably better than 
for models with government vote-change as dependent variable. Fits for Swedish 
models are also better than for Australian models, which are rather low, and Left 
models have consistently better fits than Right models. In addition, in Sweden changes 
in the Left vote are significantly negatively associated with inflation, which was also 
significantly positively associated with Right vote change in the general government 
model. Both these results are consistent with Rattinger's clientele hypothesis.
However the most consistently significant associations are for the rate of real 
wage change: negative for the Left in Sweden and the Right in Australia, and positive for 
the Right in Sweden and the Left in Australia10. One possible explanation for this odd 
result is that it is a spurious correlation due to an association between real wage rises 
and industrial disputes, which might be expected to be unpopular, but controlling for 
the percentage change in working days lost per employee over the 12 months preceding 
each election did not change the result, and nor did controlling for the change over the 
12 months preceding each election in the number of industrial disputes or in working 
days lost per dispute (a measure of strike intensity)11. Alternatively, the result may 
be due to some sort of dominant party effect: as real wages rise, voters are emboldened
1 °Similarly perverse results were reported by John Hibbing in 1987 in his article 'On the 
issues surrounding economic voting: looking to the British case for answers', Comparative 
Political Studies v.21/1, pp.3-33. Hibbing found that his income measure, change in per capita 
real disposable income, was significantly and negatively related to the government vote in 
Britain (for details see Appendix 4).
1 1 Data for 1954-1982 is from International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
1961 p.547, 1969 (not paginated), 1977 p.850, 1986 pp.930-931. Data for 1982-1987 is 
from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Statistics Australia, 1987, pp. 121, 138. Data 
was not available for Sweden 1988. Figures for working days lost per employee 1964-1987 
were derived from these sources by Bruce Chapman of the Division of Politics and Economics, 
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
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to try out-parties (bourgeois in Sweden, Labor in Australia), but return to the safe 
dominant parties (Social Democrats in Sweden, Liberal-National Coalition in 
Australia) if wages are more constrained.
For models substituting real per capita direct tax for total tax (Tables 6.7 and 
6.8) the results are similar for expenditure and the economic control variables, but 
there is one important difference: for the Swedish general government model there is a 
significant negative association between Right vote change and changes in real per 
capita direct tax. Like the expenditure findings, however, this result is consistent with 
the national differences theory.
The next tests concern changes in relative tax, that is, changes over the 12 
months preceding each election in levels of total tax as a percentage of GDP:
The results set out in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 are almost identical with those for 
changes in real per capita total tax: changing the measure of tax from absolute to 
relative makes virtually no difference. That is, the national differences theory receives 
support from the positive association in Sweden between changes in the Left vote and 
changes in general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the negative 
association in Australia between changes in the Left vote and changes in both central and 
general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In addition, the associations 
for inflation and wages are almost the same as in the absolute tax models. However the 
Australian Right models have no statistically significant variables and measures of R2 
that are, due to the operation of the formula which adjusts R2 for small N, so low as to 
be negative, which effectively means no fit at all.
The last two tests substitute changes in relative direct tax for changes in 
relative total tax.
The results set out in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 are very similar to those for 
changes in relative total tax. They are also similar to those for changes in absolute 
direct tax, except that the negative association with changes in the Right vote in the 
Swedish general government model does not reach statistical significance.
In summary, the results for both absolute and relative tax models support the 
national differences hypothesis.
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Table 6.9 Relative changes in total tax levels and changes in the Left vote: regression 
estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Left government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
( N = 11) ( N = 13)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: ( 1 3 ) ( 1 4 ) ( 1 3 ) ( 1 4 )
Central government: 
Total tax % GDP .42 2.23
( . 65) ( 2 . 81)
Expenditure % GDP .96 - 5 . 6 5 * *
( . 85) (1 . 95)
General government: 
Total tax % GDP .12 2.52
( . 22) (3 . 45)
Expenditure % GDP 1 . 10* * - 4 . 9 7 *
( -38) (2 . 39)
CPI(%) - . 61 * * - . 7 4 * * * .02 .00
( . 21) ( . 14) (■35) ( . 41)
Unemployment rate 1.48 .28 2.93 2.48
(1 . 61) (1. 08) (1 . 71) ( 2 . 04)
Wages (%) - . 81  * * - . 9 8 * * * 2 . 4 2 * * 2.19
( . 28) ( . 18) (1 . 02) ( 1 . 20)
Intercept 5.35 5.84 - 2 . 49 -1 .77
Adj. R2 .60 .86 .33 .09
Significance level .08 .007 .17 .39
D.W. 2.87 2.63 1.88 1.75
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.10 Relative changes in total tax levels and changes in the Right vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Right government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N = 1 1) (N-13)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (13) (14) (13) (14)
Central government: 
Total tax % GDP .26 - .84
(.87) (3.40)
Expenditure % GDP 1.03 3.95
(1.14) (2.36)
General government: 
Total tax % GDP - .14 .05
(.53) (4.02)
Expenditure % GDP .1 6 2.56
( .92) (2.79)
CPI(%) .58* .67 - .05 - .08
(.28) ( .34) ( .42) ( .47)
Unemployment rate - .63 .15 -2.14 -1 .46
(2.15) (2.60) (2.07) (2.38)
Wages (%) 1 .50** * 1 .50** -2.03 -1.74
(-37) ( .43) (1.23) (1 -40)
Intercept -8.30 -8.56 2.62 2.1 0
Adj. R2 .60 .53 - .08 - .35
Significance level .08 .1 1 .57 .85
D.W. 1.70 1.70 2.29 2.21
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.11 Relative changes in direct tax levels and changes in the Left vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Left government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
( N = 1 1) ( N = 13)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (15) (16) (15) (16 )
Central government: 
Direct tax % GDP .18 2.27
( .98) (2.96)
Expenditure % GDP 1.11 - 5 .3 8 * *
(•94) (1.89)
General government: 
Direct tax % GDP .10 1.98
(.44) (3.47)
Expenditure % GDP 1 .20** -4 .73 *
( .33) (2.39)
CPI(%) - .61 * - . 7 6 * * * .04 .05
( .25) ( .14) ( .34) ( .40)
Unemployment rate 1.18 .04 2.79 2.66
(1.61) ( .99) (1.67) (2.10)
Wages (%) - . 8 2 * * - 1 . 0 0 * * * 2 .43** 2.24
( .31) ( .18) (1.02) (1.22)
Intercept 5.38 5.99 -2.78 -1 .83
Adj. R2 .57 .85 .32 .06
Significance level .09 .008 .17 .41
D.W. 3.08 2.67 1.70 1 .71
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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Table 6.12 Relative change in direct tax levels and changes in the Right vote: 
regression estimates
Dependent variable: Change in vote for Right government alternative % total vote
SWEDEN 1958-1988 AUSTRALIA 1958-1987
(N-11) ( N = 13)
Change over 12 months Equation Equation
prior to election in: (15) (16) (15) (16)
Central government: 
Direct tax % GDP -.68 -1.80
(1.23) (3.52)
Expenditure % GDP .85 3.91
(1.18) (2.25)
General government: 
Direct tax % GDP -1.45 -1.50
(.83) (3.95)
Expenditure % GDP .13 2.64
(.62) (2.72)
CPI(%) .68* .78** - .00 .02
(.32) ( .27) ( .40) ( .45)
Unemployment rate - .78 .14 -2.1 9 -1 .62
(2.03) (1.85) (1.99) (2.39)
Wages (%) 1 .59** * 1 .62** * -1.95 -1 .59
(-39) (-34) (1.21) (1.38)
Intercept -9.04 -9.31 2.43 1.61
Adj. R2 .62 .70 - .05 - .32
Significance level .07 .04 .53 .82
D.W. 1.28 1.52 2.14 2.1 2
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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6.4 Tax levels and election results
It is clear that of the three hypotheses tested, the statistical evidence supports 
the national differences hypothesis, although these results need to be interpreted with 
caution because the small number of cases in the analyses make them vulnerable to 
disproportionate influences from single elections. However multicollinearity was not a 
serious problem, as the highest zero-order correlation among the independent 
variables was .7 (unemployment and general government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP in Australia). Similarly, the Durbin-Watson statistics, although inconclusive, 
were never close enough to the critical rejection zone to justify a serious charge of 
autocorrelation.
A number of other important points also emerge from the analysis.
First, models with variables pertaining to the 12 months immediately 
preceding each election performed much better than models (not shown) with variables 
pertaining to each government's entire term of office, which is consistent with the 
view that voters have short memories.
Second, models with Left or Right vote change as dependent variable fitted the 
data considerably better than models with government vote change as dependent 
variable. This implies that voters may be somewhat more policy-oriented and aware of 
party differences than some theorists of economic voting would suggest.
Third, for Sweden models which included changes in general government tax and 
expenditure performed consistently better than those which included changes in central 
government tax and expenditure, whereas for Australia the reverse was true: central 
government models performed better. This may be because in Sweden's unitary system 
the central government is perceived as more powerful relative to other levels of 
government, which are local rather than provincial, than is Australia's central 
government, and so tends to be held more responsible by voters for whatever happens 
to tax and expenditure as a whole, despite the fact that Sweden but not Australia has a 
local income tax. In Australia, on the other hand, the States may have a higher profile, 
making it easier for voters to distinguish what the central government does from what 
other levels of government do.
Fourth, substituting relative  tax and expenditure for absolute  tax and 
expenditure, and direct tax for total tax, generally made little difference either to R2
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or to the statistical significance of variables, except that there was no relative tax 
counterpart to the statistically significant negative relationship between changes in the 
Swedish Right vote and changes in general government real per capita direct tax.
Fifth, Swedish models consistently fitted the data better than Australian models, 
and Left models better than Right models. This may reflect Sweden's more homogeneous 
and possibly more sophisticated electorate, and the fact that the Left government 
alternative in each country was a single party while the Right government alternative 
was comprised of three parties in Sweden and two in Australia. That is, a dissatisfied 
Right voter could generally vote for a different party while still voting Right, whereas 
a dissatisfied Left voter had to leave the Left to vote for a different party (remembering 
that the Left government alternative excludes the Communists). This may mean that 
electorally relevant factors influence the Left vote in a more clear-cut way.
Sixth, although in Sweden inflation seemed to hurt the Left and benefit the 
Right, consistent with Rattinger's clientele hypothesis, inflation was also negatively 
associated in Sweden with changes in the government vote, consistent with an 
incumbency or responsibility hypothesis, and it is difficult to distinguish which of 
these theories provides a better explanation because the Social Democrats were in 
government at all but two of the 11 Swedish elections. In Australia there was no clear 
pattern.
Changes in unemployment, on the other hand, were not statistically significant 
in any of the equations, contrary to expectations.
Even more puzzling, however, is that the rate of real wage change was 
positively associated with voters moving Right in Sweden and moving Left in Australia. 
Controlling for various measures of industrial disputes, on the grounds that rises in 
real wages might be associated with disputation, made no significant different to the 
wage coefficients. While it is beyond the scope of this investigation to fully explore this 
result, it is possible, as mentioned earlier, that it is due to some sort of dominant 
party effect: bigger increases in real wages induce a sense of security among voters, 
which leads them to consider giving the out-parties a go - the bourgeois parties in 
Sweden and Labor in Australia - whereas slow rates of wage increase, or wage cuts, 
prompt a sort of siege mentality and a return to the safe embrace of the dominant 
parties in each system, namely the Social Democrats in Sweden and the Liberal- 
National Coalition in Australia.
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The most important result, however, is that the national differences theory 
appears to find some support from the statistical results. On the basis of goodness of fit 
I have selected two preferred models for each country, namely the Left/Right models 
shown earlier for changes in absolute total and direct tax. For Sweden the models use 
general government tax and for Australia central government tax. Correlation matrices 
for these models are set out in Appendix 1.
In order to test these preferred models for stability I utilize the so-called 
jacknife technique, which consists of deleting each case in turn and re-running the 
regression for the remaining N-1 cases until each case has been deleted once. For each 
Swedish model this procedure yields 11 jacknife regressions each with 10 cases, and 
for Australia it yields 13 jacknife equations each with 12 cases. The original models 
with 11 and 13 cases respectively are referred to as the full models.
Table 6.13 summarizes the regression coefficients for the preferred models’ 
tax and expenditure variables only (remembering that the three economic control 
variables were included in all equations) and sets out the number of jacknife 
regressions in which each variable was statistically significant at the .1 level, plus the 
range of adjusted R2 for the jacknife regressions, in order to reveal how much of a 
difference the exclusion of individual cases makes to regression results. If all jacknife 
results for a given model yield coefficients that are statistically significant, for 
example, and the adjusted R2 remains fairly stable, then the results for the full model 
can be considered fairly robust, but if coefficients vary in significance and R2s 
fluctuate widely, this would weaken confidence in the results of the full model.
The first point arising from these results is that for all of the preferred models 
the signs of variables that were statistically significant in the full model did not change 
for any of the jacknife equations, despite fluctuation in R2 and in significance levels.
Second, despite the multiplicity of different operationalizations and 
specifications, only one taxation variable in one equation appears to be both 
statistically significant and robust, namely changes in general government real per 
capita direct taxation, which was negatively related to Right vote change in Sweden and 
statistically significant in 10 of the 11 jacknife equations. In the remaining equation 
change in expenditure was significant instead. This suggests that direct tax may be 
more electorally relevant than tax as a whole, although this conclusion would be 
stronger had other direct tax variables been significant.
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Table 6.13 Left/Right preferred models: regression coefficients for changes in 
absolute tax and expenditure, and jacknife results
Change over 12 months prior 
to election in real per capita
SWEDEN 1958-1988 
general government 
( N = 11)
Dep var: change in 
Left vote Right vote
AUSTRALIA 1958-1987 
central government 
( N = 1 3)
Dep var: change in 
Left vote Right vote
Total tax model
Tax .005 -.004 .008 .027
(.003) (.007) ( .040) (.043)
No. jacknife eqns significant in 1/1 1 1/1 1 0/13 1/13
Expenditure .009* .000 - . 0 6 6 * *  * .049*
(.004) (.007) ( .024) (.026)
No. jacknife eqns significant in 6/1 1 1/1 1 11/13 3/13
Adj. R2 .82 .55 .31 .1 1
Jacknife R2 range .59-.97 .30-.82 0
 
cn 1 CD - .05- .7
Direct tax model
Tax .005 - .0 24 * * - .026 .052
(.008) ( .009) (.058) (.062)
No. jacknife eqns significant in 0/1 1 1 0/1 1 0/1 3 0/1 3
Expenditure .010* - .003 - . 0 6 7 * * .057*
( .004) ( .005) (.023) (.025)
No. jacknife eqns significant in 2/1 1 1/1 1 11/13 9/13
Adj. R2 .73 .76 .33 .15
Jacknife R2 range .46-.89 .68-.94 .13-.61 - .03- .6
Sources United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics, IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbooks, national statistics, official voting figures
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed
** p<.05, two-tailed
*** p<.01, two-tailed
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For expenditure, on the other hand, there seems to be a consistently significant 
negative relationship with changes in the Left vote in Australia, being statistically 
significant at the .1 level or better in 12 out of the 13 jacknife models and very close 
to statistical significance in the remaining one. This is mirrored by a somewhat less 
definite positive relationship between expenditure changes and changes in the Right 
vote in Australia: although the proportion of jacknife equations in which expenditure 
change was statistically significant was rather less than for the Left model, 
expenditure change did hover very close to a significance level of .1 except when the 
1975 election was left out. Other significant outliers were 1969, which boosted the 
positive relationship between Left vote change and changes in both expenditure (that is, 
statistical significance falls when 1969 is left out), and 1974, which depressed the 
relationships between Right vote change and changes in both taxation and expenditure. 
Nevertheless, it does appear that Liberal-National governments which presided over 
rising expenditure in the year prior to the election tended to do well, while Labor 
governments in the same situation tended to do badly.
In Sweden the relationships between Left/Right vote change and expenditure 
change are rather weaker: a positive association with changes in the Left vote, with 
coefficients that hovered close to significance when not actually significant, and a 
negative association with changes in the Right vote, which was generally not 
significant. Significant outliers were 1964, which appeared to depress an otherwise 
strong positive relationship between Left vote change and changes in both total tax and 
expenditure (that is, statistical significance rises when 1964 is left out), and 1988, 
which depressed a strong negative relationship between Right vote-change and changes 
in total expenditure. In general, however, it does appear that Left governments which 
preside over rising expenditure over the 12 months prior to an election tended to do 
well, while Right governments in the same position tended to do badly, the reverse of 
the situation in Australia.
While these results do exhibit considerable instability, with certain elections 
having disproportionate effects on regression coefficients, the consistency of the signs 
for tax and expenditure variables is total: for each model they remain the same for all 
jacknife equations, as well as for the different versions of specifications. In addition, 
the pattern is consistent: expenditure rises benefit the Left in Sweden and the Right in 
Australia, just as predicted by the national differences theory in respect of 
expenditure, and the one significant result for tax backs this up.
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It is possible that this phenomenon may be a period effect due to the Left being 
in power in Sweden, and the Right in Australia, during the expansionist 1960s, as 
regressions for changes in the government vote in Sweden and Australia in the periods 
1958-72 and 1973-88 yield a positive sign for expenditure in the earlier period and 
a negative one in the later period, although whether these coefficients were 
statistically significant depended upon which tax measures were included (tax itself 
was never significant).
In conclusion, while the results of the statistical tests described in this chapter 
provide only limited support for the view that changes in tax levels had anything to do 
with election outcomes in Sweden and Australia between 1958 and 1988, the results do 
constitute important evidence for the theory that national differences are influential in 
determining the responses of the Swedish and Australian electorates to changes in 
expenditure levels, as they do imply that higher spending was rewarded by Swedes but 
punished by Australians.
7TAX RECORD AND ELECTION RESULTS
7.1 Introduction
The lack of a consistent statistical relationship between tax levels and election 
results does not necessarily imply that tax does not have any electoral impact, but 
instead may indicate that it is not so much tax levels that are the object of voters’ 
attention as tax events. One class of such events is changes to tax legislation, such as 
cuts to rates of income tax or the introduction of new taxes. Such legislative changes 
are news, and are the focus of media coverage to a far greater extent than even taxation 
as a percentage of GDP, which is the most often quoted measure of overall levels of 
taxation. Thus insofar as voters are led by the media in regard to tax, governments' 
legislative records on taxation might be expected to have a greater electoral impact 
than changes to levels. Another reason why voters might focus on legislative changes 
rather than on changes to tax levels is that governments are responsible for legislative 
changes to taxation to a greater degree than they are responsible for changes to tax 
levels, since tax levels are to a considerable degree also influenced by exogenous 
factors such as economic growth.
The object of this chapter is to extend the regression analysis carried out in the 
previous chapter in order to examine whether a government's legislative record on tax 
does have any impact on election results. As far as I am aware, the only previous 
researcher to use statistics to test whether changes to tax legislation influence the vote 
is Theodore Eismeier, who published a study in 1979 of 320 gubernatorial elections in 
American States between 1948 and 19741.
The initial object of Eismeier's investigation was to examine whether the 
introduction of new taxes, rises to sales tax or to income tax, or the proposal of tax 
measures that are subsequently rejected by the State legislature, harmed governors at 
the next election. Using as his dependent variable the percentage change in the two- 
party vote for the Democratic candidate, and controlling for national gubernatorial
1 Theodore J. Eismeier ( 1979), 'Budgets and ballots: the political consequences of fiscal 
choice', in Public Policy & Public Choice, ed. Douglas W. Rae & Theodore J. Eismeier, Sage, 
London, pp.121- 145.
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voting trends, Eismeier used as independent variables dummy variables for each of the 
above tax events, which took the value 1 if the they took place under a Democratic 
governor, -1 if they took place under a Republican governor (remember the dependent 
variable is the Democrat vote), and 0 if they didn't take place at all. Despite the fact 
that no non-tax factors were taken into account, apart from national voting trends, 
Eismeier found that all of the tax variables were negatively associated with the changes 
in vote share for the incumbent gubernatorial parties, consistent with what I have 
called the tax aversion theory.
Eismeier then used the same methodology to test the view that such tax changes 
or proposals for which the previous administration can be blamed - that is, those 
occurring in the first year of a gubernatorial term - have less severe electoral 
consequences than taxes changes put through in subsequent years of the term, and found 
that of first-year tax measures only new taxes were associated negatively and 
significantly with incumbent vote change, whereas later-year tax measures all 
appeared to have a significant negative impact.
Eismeier's next move was to examine whether the magnitude of tax rises 
affected election results, by using changes, and rates of change, in actual rates of 
income tax and sales tax as independent variables. To do this he isolated cases where 
either (but not both) sales tax or income tax was raised, but no other significant tax 
changes took place, and where such rises could not be blamed on the previous 
administration (that is, excluding cases where tax rose in the first year following a 
change of government). Again he found that each of these variables was negatively 
associated with changes in the incumbent vote, implying that the larger the tax 
increase, the larger the loss of votes.
Finally, Eismeier compared the fates of taxing governments with non-taxing 
governments, and found that 45.1% of governments which enacted or proposed a tax 
increase were defeated in the next election, compared to 27.5% of governments which 
didn't: taxing governments were approximately twice as likely to be defeated as non­
taxing governments.
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Eismeier’s results provide considerable evidence that voters, or at least 
American voters, are indeed averse to tax. The question is, does this apply to Sweden 
and Australia, given the evidence in the previous chapter that Swedes’ dislike of 
taxation may be offset by their attraction to expenditure? In the next section I set out 
and discuss what the tax record in Sweden and Australia was during the last 30 years, 
before moving on to confront this question.
7.2 The tax record
Each year dozens of changes are made to taxation legislation, ranging from 
major changes such as the introduction of new taxes to minor adjustments such as 
amendments to close tax loopholes. Table 7.1 below sets out the more important of these 
judging by their appearance in the sources used, on the rationale that if a tax change is 
not covered by these sources, it is unlikely to be electorally important. See Appendix 2 
for a full list by year of these changes.
Noticeable features of this table include the greater use of tax concessions by 
Australian governments (although it is possible that this is an artefact of my data 
sources, which may not catch this very well for Sweden); the more frequent changes to 
rates of business taxes (mainly corporate tax) by Australian governments; and the 
greater emphasis of Swedish governments on increasing progressivity and capital 
taxation, which may be largely a function of the dominance of Left governments in 
Sweden.
Table 7.2 sets out the tax records of Left and Right governments separately.
The main point of interest in this table is the clear Left/Right difference in 
respect of progressivity, social security taxation, and capital taxation. In addition, the 
number of income tax cuts far exceeded the number of income tax rises, whereas the 
reverse was true of indirect tax, especially for Left governments. Overall, a clear 
difference can be seen between Left and Right: for the Left, tax rises outnumbered tax 
cuts, whereas for the Right the reverse was true, although only narrowly.
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Table 7.1 Government tax record, Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
Tax variable Sweden Australia
(N = 11) ( N = 1 3)
Inc tax rates up 3 4
Inc tax rates down 9 8
Inc tax concessions up 6 1 2
Inc tax concessions down 1 7
N types inc tax rises 4 1 1
N types inc tax cuts 1 5 20
Increase progressivity 4 2
Decrease progressivity 0 2
Social security tax up 4 3
Social security tax down 2 2
Goods/services tax up 7 7
Goods/services tax down 2 3
Excise up 7 1 1
Excise down 2 2
Capital tax up 6 1
Capital tax down 3 7
Business tax rate up 5 1 2
Business tax rate down 3 5
Bus. tax concessions up 6 9
Bus. tax concession down 2 5
N types non-inc tax rises 31 39
N types non-inc tax cuts 1 8 28
Total N types tax rises 35 50
Total N types tax cuts 33 48
Sources: Nils Elvander, Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970
Enrique Rodrigues, Den Svenska Skattehistorien 
Axel Hadenius, Spelet om Skatten 
OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden 
Australian Government Budget Statements
Political Chronicle in The Australian Journal of Politics & History 
OECD Economic Surveys - Australia
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Table 7.2 Tax record by Left/Right governments, Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
Tax variable Left Governments Right Governments
( N = 1 3) ( N = 1 1)
Inc tax rates up 4 3
Inc tax rates down 1 0 7
Inc tax concessions up 7 1 1
Inc tax concessions down 5 3
N types inc tax rises 9 6
N types inc tax cuts 1 7 1 8
Increase progressivity 5 1
Decrease progressivity 1 1
Social security tax up 5 2
Social security tax down 3 1
Goods/services tax up 7 7
Goods/services tax down 1 4
Excise up 9 9
Excise down 3 1
Capital tax up 7 0
Capital tax down 3 7
Business tax rate up 8 9
Business tax rate down 5 3
Bus. tax concessions up 6 9
Bus. tax concession down 5 2
N types non-inc tax rises 41 29
N types non-inc tax cuts 21 25
Total N types tax rises 50 35
Total N types tax cuts 38 43
Sources: Nils Elvander, Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970
Enrique Rodrigues, Den Svenska Skattehistorien 
Axel Hadenius, Spelet om Skatten 
OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden 
Australian Government Budget Statements
Political Chronicle in The Australian Journal of Politics & History 
OECD Economic Surveys - Australia
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7.3 Regressions
In general, one would expect a well-informed voter who is primarily concerned 
with tax cuts to vote for a Right-wing party, other things being equal. Thus such voters 
would not be expected to be swinging voters, but would be locked in as part of the 
Right's core electoral support.
However there are also other types of tax voters, for example those vitally 
interested in tax justice rather than in tax cuts, who may be concerned with changing 
the distribution of taxation in order to get the rich to pay more while allowing the poor 
to pay less. In addition, there may be other voters who want (or implicitly accept) tax 
rises rather than tax cuts, in order to finance desired expenditure. Both these sorts of 
voters would generally be expected to vote Left, and to be part of the Left's core 
support.
But what of swinging voters? Given that tax is a Left/Right issue, it could be 
expected to influence changes in party vote only insofar as more people become 
interested, thus activating their latent tax predisposition, than lose interest. In 
addition, this change must also affect the balance in the electorate between Right tax 
voters (those who vote for tax cuts) and Left tax voters (those who vote for 
progressivity, or for more tax).
If it is the case that most tax voters are tax cut voters, then the Right should 
benefit from any increase in the salience of tax to the electorate as a whole due to 
increased taxation (tax aversion theory), whereas if most tax voters are concerned 
with tax justice, or with expenditure, a rise in tax salience due to tax rises might be 
expected to benefit the Left (tax attraction theory). These effects may operate 
differently in Sweden and Australia, so that tax rises benefit the Left in Sweden but the 
Right in Australia (national differences theory).
In order to test whether legislative records on tax are related to election 
results, variables indicating major tax changes were inserted into the regression 
equations employed in the last chapter to replace those indicating changes in tax levels. 
Due to the small number of cases in each dataset, only those tax record variables which 
might be thought to be most electorally important can be tried, so I have concentrated 
on major election year income tax cuts, major rises in indirect tax (over the whole 
term), and the introduction of major new taxes (also over the whole term), on the 
rationale that if no significant relationships are apparent for these, then it is unlikely
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that any relationship exists for legislative tax changes as a whole. These variables are 
similar to those used by Eismeier, although not identical, and are scored 1 if the tax 
event took place, and 0 if it didn’t.
The precise variables are as follows:
First, whether there was a major cut in income tax during the 12 months 
preceding the election. This variable could not be used for the whole term because 
almost every government cut income tax rates at some time during their term of office. 
Reforms involving higher rates for higher income earners, as well as lower rates for 
other taxpayers, are included because most taxpayers' rates of tax are cut in such 
reforms in the short term, although in the long term they might pay more as inflation 
pushes them into the newly created higher tax brackets.
Second, whether there was a major rise in indirect tax during the government's 
term of office. This variable mainly catches increases in the Swedish VAT and its 
predecessor, increases in sales tax in Australia, and increases in major excises (such 
as energy taxes) in both countries.
Third, whether a major new tax was introduced during the government's term.
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 set out the occurrence of each of these types of tax changes in 
Sweden and Australia respectively, according to the year of the subsequent election.
In Sweden the main rises in indirect tax concerned the general sales tax, which 
was introduced in 1960, and its successor the VAT, which were raised 6 times during 
the period (excluding 1979-82, when it was lowered again after having been raised). 
The other main indirect taxes included were energy taxes and other major excises. New 
taxes during the first half of the period included the supplementary pension levy, the 
general sales tax, and the VAT (which was included even though it merely replaced the 
general sales tax because its modus operandi was different, and because it was the focus 
of much discussion). During the 1970s no important new taxes were introduced, and it 
was not until the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982 that new taxes again 
came on the scene. It is noticeable that income tax was not cut during election year until 
1970, but that election year cuts occurred thenceforth at every election except 1988.
In Australia, sales tax and excises comprised the main indirect taxes, with 
increases in sales tax during the term 1958-1961 not being counted because sales tax
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Table 7.3 Major legislative changes to taxation, Sweden 1958-1988
Election year Change to tax legislation*
(government)
1958
1960
(Left)
(Left) Supplementary pension fees introduced 
General sales tax (oms) introduced
1964 (Left) General sales tax (oms) raised
1968 (Left) General sales tax (oms) raised, major excises raised
1970 (Left) Income tax rates cut
VAT raised, major excises raised
VAT introduced (to replace general sales tax)
1973 (Left) Income tax rates cut
VAT raised, major excises raised
1976 (Left) Income tax rates cut
1979 (Right) Income tax rates cut and indexed 
VAT raised
1982 (Right) Income tax rates cut, rebate introduced, basic deduction raised 
Major excises & energy taxes raised
1985 (Left) Income tax rates cut
VAT raised, major excises raised
Turnover tax on securities & wealth tax on buildings introduced
1988 (Left) Energy taxes raised
Once-only levy on insurance and pension funds
* Income tax cuts refer to election year, other tax cuts to the whole term of office
Sources: Nils Elvander, Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970
Enrique Rodrigues, Den Svenska Skattehistorien 
Axel Hadenius, Spelet om Skatten 
OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden
was cut again before the election. In contrast to Sweden, there were no major new taxes 
until the term 1975-1977, when the important crude oil levy was introduced. Despite 
its low revenue potential, departure tax is included due to the controversy it aroused,
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Table 7.4 Major legislative changes to taxation, Australia 1958-1987
Election year Change to tax legislation*
(government)
1958 (Right) Income tax concessions increased 
Major excises increased
1961 (Right) Income tax concessions increased
1963 (Right) Income tax rates cut and threshold increased
1966 (Right) Sales tax and major excises increased
1969 (Right) Sales tax increased
1972 (Right) Income tax cut, concessions increased 
Sales tax and major excises increased
1974 (Left) -
1975 (Left) Income tax rates cut
1977 (Right) Major excises increased
Levies imposed on coal and crude oil
1980 (Right) Income tax rates cut and half-indexed, dependant concessions up 
Crude oil levy increased, and duties broadened 
Departure tax introduced
1983 (Right) Income tax rates cut
Sales tax increased and broadened
1984 (Left) Income tax rates cut
Sales tax increased and broadened, major excises raised 
Medicare levy and resources rental tax introduced
1987 (Left) Income tax rates cut
Sales tax and major excises raised
Capital gains tax introduced
* Income tax cuts refer to election year, other tax cuts to the whole term of office
Sources Australian Government Budget Statements
Political Chronicle in The Australian Journal of Politics & History 
OECD Economic Surveys - Australia
but it wasn't until the Hawke government came to power in 1983 that more significant 
new taxes were introduced. Election year income tax cuts were the rule at the beginning 
and end of the period, but more sporadic in the middle.
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The regression models tested are those used in the last chapter, which included 
inflation, changes in the unemployment rate, the rate of real wage change, and 
expenditure change as well as tax variables. The expenditure change variable chosen is 
change in general government real per capita expenditure for Sweden, and change in 
central government real per capita expenditure for Australia, as these gave the most 
consistent and plausible results, and the tax level variables are replaced by dummy 
variables (scored 1-0) for major cuts in income tax (election year only), major 
increases in indirect tax, and new taxes. The dependent variables are changes in the 
percentage of the vote won by Left and Right party alternatives. Change in the 
government vote was also tried as dependent variable, but results are not shown 
because they lacked significance.
The specific hypothesis to be tested is the national differences theory, according 
to which voters in Sweden turn Left when tax rises, while voters in Australia turn 
Right. This is because the results in the last chapter implicitly supported this theory 
rather than the straight tax aversion or tax attraction theories. Thus the specific 
predictions of the regression coefficient signs are as follows:
Major election year Major indirect Major
income tax cuts tax rises new tax
Sweden Left _ + +
Right + - -
Australia Left + - .
Right - + +
Because this hypothesis specifies the sign of the coefficients, the appropriate 
test for statistical significance is the one-tailed rather than the two-tailed. In order to 
keep consistency with previous results, however, I have elected to continue to show 
two-tailed figures, but if the sign of the coefficient is as predicted, the one-tailed 
figure can be obtained by halving the two-tailed figure shown. That is, a two-tailed 
level of significance of .1 is equivalent to a one-tailed level of significance of .05, if 
the sign is as predicted.
Table 7.5 sets out the regression results.
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Table 7.5 Major changes to tax legislation and changes in Left/Right vote: regression 
estimates
Variables
SWEDEN 
(N =
Left vote
1958-1988 AUSTRALIA
= 11) ( N =
Dependent variable: change in: 
Right vote Left vote
1958-1987
13)
Right vote
Major income tax cut -1 .8 9 6 .17* 5 .10* -.61
(election year) (2 .27) (2 .18) ( 2 .03) (1 .95)
Major indirect tax rise -.41
( 1.00)
- 2 . 9 6 *
( .96)
3.58
(2 .22)
-1 .78 
(2 .13)
Major new tax
Control variables: 
Change over 12 months 
prior to election in:
- . 5 8
( 1.37)
.24
(1 .32)
.29
( 2.74)
- 7 . 4 7 * *
( 2.63)
Real per capita expenditure .010 - .006 - . 0 7 0 * ' ' . 0 5 0 * *
(1980 $A) ( .005) ( .005) ( .018) ( -017)
CPI (%) - .4 6
( .43)
- .31
( .41)
.54
( .30)
.10
( .29)
Unemployment rate .55 
(1 -70)
1.75
(1 .64)
.24
( 1.37)
- 3 . 0 5 *
(1 .32)
Wages (%) - . 8 7 *
( .30)
1 .1 9 * *
( .29 )
3 . 6 5 * * ’
( . 87 )
* - 3 . 4 8 * * *
( .83 )
Intercept 4.70 -2 .09 - 11 .5 4 6.80
Adj. R2 .70 .85 .61 .61
Significance level .126 .05 .085 .086
D.W. 3.01 1.95 1.25 1.63
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors 
* p<.1, two-tailed 
** p<.05, two-tailed 
*** p<.01, two tailed
Sources
Tax variables: Nils Elvander, Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-1970; Enrique Rodrigues, 
Den Svenska Skattehistorien; Axel Hadenius, Spelet om Skatten; OECD Economic 
Surveys - Sweden; Australian Government Budget Statements; Political 
Chronicle in The Australian Journal of Politics & History; OECD Economic 
Surveys - Australia.
Control variables: United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics; IMF 
International Financial Statistics Yearbooks; national statistics; official 
voting figures.
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It is immediately evident that for major election year income tax cuts all signs 
are as predicted, although only statistically significant for the Swedish Right and the 
Australian Left. The signs remain the same for these two even when jacknifed, although 
significant in only 5/11 and 9/13 of the jacknife equations respectively. 
Nevertheless, in the broad the results for income tax are consistent with the tax 
culture theory.
For major indirect tax rises, on the other hand, the signs are perverse except 
for the one statistically significant result, namely that for the Swedish Right. 
Moreover, the sign for the Swedish Right remains negative in all jacknife equations, 
although it is statistically significant in only 4 of the 11 jacknife equations. Although 
this result is considerably weaker than the income tax result, it is nevertheless 
generally in accord with the national differences theory.
For new taxes, however, the signs are not only perverse for both Sweden and 
Australia, but statistically significantly perverse for the Australian Right. This sign 
stays negative for all jacknife equations, and is statistically significant in the opposite 
direction to that predicted for 10/13 jacknife equations. These results, then, 
constitute evidence against the national differences theory.
The signs for expenditure are all congruent with the national differences 
theory, as in the tax level regressions, and the results for the Australian Left and Right 
are statistically significant, and remain so for 13/13 and 12/13 jacknife equations 
respectively. The signs for expenditure for Sweden are all negative, although 
significant in only two of the jacknife equations.
For the other control variables the results are mixed. There is no apparent 
relationship between Left/Right vote change and inflation, whereas there had been for 
Sweden in the tax level regression results. As the correlation matrix indicates fairly 
strong negative zero-order correlations between inflation and changes in the 
government vote, the possibility that inflation has an incumbency effect rather than a 
partisan effect was tested by multiplying the inflation figures by -1 for elections when 
the party or parties in question were not the incumbent government, but the resulting 
regression results did not show up the negative association that one might expect. For 
unemployment, on the other hand, for the first time there is a significant relationship, 
at least for the Australian Right. Moreover, the sign for this is negative, which accords 
with Rattinger's clientele hypothesis. Finally, once again the relationships for 
percentage change in real wages are significant, being negative for the in-parties
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(Swedish Left and Australian Right) and positive for the out-parties (Swedish Right 
and Australian Left).
The explained variance for Sweden is quite high, and similar to that of the tax 
level regressions, while for Australia it is considerably higher than in previous 
regressions: replacing changes in tax levels with changes in tax legislation 
significantly improves the fit. Only the equation for the Swedish Left is not significant 
as a whole at the .1 level, although it is close, and another problem with the Swedish 
Left result is that its Durbin-Watson statistic implies possible autocorrelation, 
although it is not conclusive.
7.4 Tax record and election results
In this chapter, variables indicating major tax changes, namely major election 
year income tax cuts, major indirect tax rises, and the introduction of major new 
taxes, were substituted into the regression models developed in the previous chapter to 
test whether these were associated in any consistent way with changes in the 
proportion of the total vote won by the Left/Right government alternatives, as the tax 
level variables had failed in this regard. The results above show that some of these new 
tax record variables do seem to be significantly related to change in Left/Right vote to 
some extent, and that in general these relationships are consistent with the national 
differences theory, with the important exception of new taxes and changes in the 
Australian Right vote.
Given the small number of cases in the analyses, and measurement problems, 
this result is about as strong as one could reasonably expect, although it is by no means 
conclusive. That is, despite a certain level of inconsistency it constitutes additional 
evidence for the national differences theory.
8TAX STRATEGY AND ELECTION RESULTS
8.1 Introduction
The implicit premise behind election campaigns is that what parties (or their 
leaders) have to say has an effect on election outcomes, for if this were not so then it 
would be pointless for parties to campaign at all. But while it would be implausible to 
deny that campaigns do matter, it is not at all clear that what is said has any consistent 
effect over a number of elections. What I wish to do in this chapter is to test whether 
what is said about tax in particular is associated consistently with election results. 
Apart from being of interest in itself, this examination also provides another way of 
testing the national differences theory, and pioneers a new approach to the analysis of 
party strategy.
The analysis falls into four parts. First, party policy on tax as expressed in 
election manifestos and policy speeches is analysed descriptively, in order to discern 
patterns both of the emphasis placed by parties on tax, in particular on tax cuts, and of 
the nature of specific tax pledges. Second, regression analysis is used on this data to 
test whether the degree of emphasis on tax cuts is related to election outcomes. Third, 
the same procedure is used to test whether specific tax cut promises are related to 
election outcomes. Findings are summarized and conclusions drawn in the final section 
of the chapter.
Although party competition has long been a principal object of study for 
political scientists, those investigators who have looked at party manifestos in 
particular, such as Budge, Robertson & Hearl1, have tended to use the amount of space 
devoted to given policy areas as their unit of analysis rather than the actual semantic 
content of specific propositions, and even these studies have not included tax as a 
specific area. Thus my investigation is, as far as I am aware, on new ground.
11an Budge, David Robertson & Derek Hearl (ed.) (1987), Ideology, Strategy and Party 
Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-war Election Programmes in 19 Democracies, Cambridge 
UP, Cambridge.
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8.2 Election tax appeals
Rather than attempt to describe parties' election policies on tax in full, which 
would be difficult if not impossible due to the inaccessibility of adequate sources, I have 
chosen to try to capture only those aspects of their tax policies that parties themselves 
have emphasized, and as indicators of this I have used mentions of tax in Swedish 
election manifestos and Australian policy speeches. These mentions are set out in full in 
Appendix 3.
Swedish election manifestos are statements of each party's official election 
platform as approved by its collective leadership, generally a central party executive. 
They vary in length but are mostly short, often consisting of just a brief statement of 
party philosophy and a few tersely expressed specific promises. They are thus far from 
a complete statement of tax policy, but are nevertheless taken to indicate whether tax 
is emphasized, and, if so, what the emphasized policy is. Somewhat surprisingly 
manifestos proved extremely difficult to locate, since parties don’t seem to keep them 
for long, and in a few instances election pamphlets containing statements of general 
policy were used as sources instead (for details see Appendix 3). In two cases - the 
Liberals and Conservatives in 1964 - it proved impossible to find an adequate source 
at all, and for this reason the 1964 election had to be omitted from the analysis, 
reducing the number of Swedish cases to 10.
Australian policy speeches, by contrast, are much longer documents prepared 
and given by the Parliamentary party leader, rather than by the official party 
leadership group. They are delivered to an enormous blaze of media publicity, and seem 
to play a much more prominent role in Australian campaigns than do Swedish 
manifestos in Swedish campaigns. Indeed the nearest Swedish equivalent of the policy 
speech may not be manifestos but 'valupptakt' or campaign opening speeches, various 
versions of which are given at different rallies around the country to officially launch 
the campaign in each area. Unfortunately, however, valupptakt are even more difficult 
to find than manifestos, and hence were not used. Being longer, Australian policy 
speeches contain more detail on tax than do most Swedish manifestos, but both are taken 
as indicating the main emphases in regard to tax, even if these are more clearly defined 
for Australia than for Sweden.
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Mentions of tax were categorized as they fell, so to speak, rather than being 
allotted among predetermined categories, in order to capture as fully as possible their 
range and flavour. However, additional classifications were also utilized at a second 
stage, so as to enable theory to be tested more effectively.
Tables 8.1 to 8.3 set out the tax appeals made by parties in Sweden and 
Australia between 1958 and 1988. Table 8.1 deals with the tax appeals of the main 
Left-Right government alternatives, and tax appeals made by parties of the Right are 
scored 1 even if more than one party made them. This makes the description of Right 
tax appeals comparable to that of the single-party Left tax appeals, but even so the 
greater number of manifestos and policy speeches on the conservative side of politics 
give more opportunities to mention tax than exist on the Left. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 set out 
the tax appeals of individual Right parties plus the Communists (in Sweden) and the 
Australian Democrats.
Looking at the Left-Right alternatives in Table 8.1, it is noticeable how few tax 
cut promises were made by the Social Democrats compared not only to the Right in both 
countries, but also to their Labor counterparts in Australia. The chief exception to this 
pattern is that the Social Democrats promised cuts to income tax rates on three 
occasions, similar to the Australian parties but still far less than the Swedish 
bourgeois parties. In all categories the bourgeois parties promised more than the Social 
Democrats, indicating a very definite Left-Right division on tax.
In Australia, however, this Left-Right division is not as marked, although 
overall the Liberal-National Coalition promised tax cuts more often than Labor. This 
difference is most marked for promises to cut the total level of taxation, estate or 
inheritance taxes, taxes on business, and other types of taxes, but in terms of income 
tax cuts the two sides of politics are fairly even. Moreover, Labor promised to cut taxes 
on goods and services on three occasions (in the early part of the period) while the 
Coalition did not make such promises at any time. Another Labor promise not matched 
by the conservatives was the rather defensive pledge not to increase taxation, probably 
because the conservatives generally wanted to go further and cut taxation overall. Other 
distinctively Labor moves were to promise to increase progressivity, attack tax 
avoidance, and review taxation. The Coalition, on the other hand, was more likely to 
mention past tax cuts, possibly because it was in office for more of the time and hence 
had more chances to cut tax, and was also more likely to attack its opponent's tax 
policy.
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One interesting difference between Sweden and Australia is that in Sweden it was 
not the Left but the Right, specifically the Centre Party, which emphasized increasing 
progressivity in the tax system and which favoured cutting indirect taxation (although 
the Communists also emphasize these appeals), while in Australia it was the Left which 
stresses progressivity and lower indirect taxation. This may be due to Sweden's income 
tax system being so progressive already at the upper end of the scale that further 
progressivity could only be achieved by cutting rates at the lower end, which would 
involve massive revenue losses that the Social Democrats were unwilling to accept 
without compensatory tax rises in the only area where large amounts of revenue were 
potentially available, namely indirect taxation.
In regard to the tax appeals of individual Swedish parties, set out in Table 8.2, 
it can be seen that in Sweden the Conservatives placed the most stress on tax cuts, as 
might be expected from the party on the extreme Right of Swedish politics, and were 
especially distinct from the other bourgeois parties in their emphasis on cutting the 
total level of taxation, increasing income tax concessions, cutting taxes on capital and 
inheritance, and espousing the need for spending cuts. The distinctively Liberal tax 
appeal was to attack tax avoidance, while, like the Conservatives, they placed more 
emphasis on cutting income tax rates and using economic arguments to justify their 
policy than did the Centre Party. Apart from stressing the need to reform local tax, 
which accords well with their rural base, the Centre Party also favoured increasing 
progressivity and cutting taxes on goods and services, mainly the VAT, more than did 
the other bourgeois parties. For their part the Communists (VPK), like the bourgeois 
parties, strongly favoured cutting income tax rates, but for the low-paid rather than 
for everyone, and combined with new or higher taxes on the rich and a greater degree of 
progressivity in the tax system. They also stressed combatting tax avoidance, and 
persistently opposed taxes on goods and services as regressive.
In Australia the two Right parties had fairly similar records of tax appeals, 
which is not surprising given their close alliance, and the main distinctions between 
them were a greater stress on tax cuts for primary producers on the part of the 
Nationals, as the farmers' party, and greater detail on taxation on the part of the 
Liberals. The Democrats did not place much emphasis on tax, even allowing for the fact 
that only four policy speeches are considered.
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Table 8.1 Left-Right tax appeal frequencies, Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
SWEDEN AUSTRALIA
Social Bourgeois Labor Liberals &
Tax appeal Democrats parties Party Nationals
(N = 1 1) ( N = 1 0) # ( N = 1 3) (N = 1 3)
Cut in total tax level 0 5 0 4
Cut income tax levels 0 2 0 0
Income tax indexation 0 6 0 1
Cut in income tax rate 3 9 3 4
Increase income tax concessions 0 1 0 4 5
Cut social security tax 0 3 0 0
Cut taxes on goods & services 0 5 3 0
Cut taxes on capital 0 1 0 2
Cut taxes on estates/inheritance 0 3 1 4
Cut taxes on business 0 5 2 7
Other tax cuts 0 5 3 6
N income tax cut appeals* 1 3 27 7 1 0
N other tax cut appeals2 0 22 9 1 9
Total N tax cut appeals3 3 54 1 6 33
Past tax cuts mentioned 0 1 2 5
Tax rise or new tax 3 4 1 1
No increase in tax 2 3 5 0
Increase in progressivity 1 5 4 1
Attack tax avoidance 2 4 4 1
Tax review 2 2 6 4
Spending cuts 0 5 0 2
Attack opposition policy 3 5 2 8
Local tax reform 2 6 1 1
Economic reasons 2 1 0 1 4
Anti-inflation reasons 0 5 0 1
Recoded categories:
Cut/index income tax rates4 3 9 3 5
Miscellaneous tax cut5 0 4 1 6
Economic arguments6 2 1 0 1 5
# Excludes 1964 due to lack of information for Liberals and Conservatives
1 Number of types of income tax cut appeals
2 Number of types of other tax cut appeals, excluding cuts in total tax
3 Total number of tax cut appeals, including cuts in total tax
4 Index income tax or cut income tax rates
5 Social security tax cut or capital tax cut or estate/inheritance tax cut
6 Economic reasons or anti-inflation reasons
Sources Election manifestos and policy speeches
Table 8.2 Other party tax appeal frequencies, Sweden 1958-1988
Tax appeal Centre Liberal Conservative VPK
(N = 11) (N = 1 0)# ( N = 1 0 ) # (N = 1 1)
Cut in total tax level 1 1 5 0
Cut in income tax level 0 0 2 0
Income tax indexation 3 4 2 0
Cut in income tax rate 4 8 8 7
Increase income tax concessions 3 2 1 0 0
Cut social security tax 0 2 1 0
Cut taxes on goods & services 4 2 2 9
Cut taxes on capital 0 0 1 0
Cut taxes on estates/inheritance 0 0 3 0
Cut taxes on business 2 3 4 0
Other tax cuts 5 3 3 0
N income tax cut appeals1 1 0 1 4 22 7
N other tax cut appeals2 1 1 1 0 1 4 9
Total N tax cut appeals3 21 25 41 1 6
Past tax cuts mentioned 0 1 0 0
Tax rise or new tax 2 2 1 1 0
No increase in tax 2 1 2 0
Increase in progressivity 5 0 0 7
Attack tax avoidance 0 4 0 4
Tax review 2 0 0 0
Spending cuts 1 1 4 3
Attack opposition policy 3 0 2 2
Local tax reform 7 0 2 3
Economic reasons 4 8 9 0
Anti-inflation reasons 3 2 3 0
Recoded categories:
Cut/index income tax rates4 6 8 8 7
Miscellaneous tax cut5 0 2 3 0
Economic arguments6 6 9 9 0
# Excludes 1964 due to lack of information
1 Number of types of income tax cut appeals
2 Number of types of other tax cut appeals, excluding cuts in total tax
3 Total number of tax cut appeals, including cuts in total tax
4 Index income tax or cut income tax rates
5 Social security tax cut or capital tax cut or estate/inheritance tax cut
6 Economic reasons or anti-inflation reasons
Sources Election manifestos and policy speeches
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Table 8.3 Other party tax appeal frequencies, Australia 1958-1987
Tax appeal Liberals Nationals Democrats
(N = 1 3) (N = 1 3) ( N = 4)
Cut in total tax level 4 1 0
Cut income tax level 0 0 0
Income tax indexation 1 0 0
Cut in income tax rate 4 1 0
Increase income tax concessions 4 4 0
Cut social security tax 0 0 0
Cut taxes on goods & services 0 0 1
Cut taxes on capital 2 2 0
Cut taxes on estates/inheritances 2 3 0
Cut taxes on business 7 6 0
Other tax cuts 1 5 0
N income tax cut appeals1 9 5 0
N other tax cut appeals2 1 2 1 6 1
Total N tax cut appeals3 25 22 1
Past tax cuts mentioned 3 4 3
Tax rise or new tax 1 0 2
No increase in tax 0 0 0
Increase in progressivity 1 0 0
Attack tax avoidance 1 0 0
Tax review 3 1 0
Spending cuts 2 0 0
Attack opposition policy 8 5 1
Local tax reform 1 1 0
Economic reasons 4 0 0
Anti-inflation reasons 1 1 0
Recoded categories:
Cut/index income tax rates4 5 1 0
Miscellaneous tax cut5 4 5 0
Economic arguments6 5 1 0
1 Number of types of income tax cut appeals
2 Number of types of other tax cut appeals, excluding cuts in total tax
3 Total number of tax cut appeals, including cuts in total tax
4 Index income tax or cut income tax rates
5 Social security tax cut or capital tax cut or estate/inheritance tax cut
6 Economic reasons or anti-inflation reasons
Sources Election manifestos and policy speeches
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8.3 Regressions
In examining what effect tax appeals might have on election results, it would 
seem probable that what matters is not the absolute position of each party on tax but 
rather its relative position. For example, one would expect a promise to increase 
income tax concessions for children to have a different electoral impact against an 
opposition which says nothing on tax than against an opposition which promises not 
only to increase deductions for children but also to cut all marginal rates of income tax. 
For this reason I express the difference between the Left and Right positions on tax as a 
Left-Right index based on who leads in terms of tax promises. If the Right promises, 
say, to cut income tax rates but the Left doesn't, score 1. If the Left promises to cut but 
the Right doesn't, score -1. If neither or both promise to cut income tax rates, score 0. 
The resultant 3-value variables can then be used as independent variables in 
regression analysis. For composite variables, such as the number of types of income 
tax cut promises made at each election, the index is the result of subtracting the 
number of Left promises from the number of Right promises, so that it is positive 
when the Right is ahead, negative if the Left is ahead, and has more than 3 values.
The first criterion for selecting which of the tax cut appeal types to express as 
Left-Right indices and use as independent variables is sufficient variation in both 
countries to make regression analysis worthwhile. If, for example, the Right always 
promises to increase income tax concessions whereas the Left never does, as was the 
case in Sweden between 1958 and 1988, then regression is not going to be of much use.
Because so few variables can be used in each regression equation, due to the 
small number of cases, the second criterion for choice as an independent variable is 
that there is some prior reason to think that the tax appeal type might be especially 
electorally potent. Here income tax in particular springs to mind.
On the basis of these two criteria, 6 tax appeal types were chosen, transformed 
into Left-Right indices, and tested. These were as follows, with the elections indicated 
at which either side was ahead:
1. Promises to cut the total level of tax, on which in Sweden the Right was
ahead in 1960 and 1979-1988, and in Australia the Right was ahead in
1974, 1975, 1984 and 1987;
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2. Promises to cut or index income tax rates, on which in Sweden the Right 
was ahead in 1960-1968 and 1973-1982, and in Australia the Right was 
ahead in 1975, 1977 and 1987, and the Left in 1983;
3. Promises to increase progressivity, on which in Sweden the Right was ahead in 
1968, 1973, 1976 and 1982, and in Australia the Left was ahead in 1963,
1983 and 1984;
4. The number of income tax cut appeals made, on which in Sweden the Right 
was ahead at all elections, and in Australia the Right was ahead in 1975- 
1980, 1984 and 1987, and the Left in 1961, 1963, 1974 and 1983;
5. The number of other tax cut appeals made, on which in Sweden the Right 
was ahead in all elections apart from 1970, 1976 and 1979, at which the 
parties were equal, and in Australia the Right was ahead in 1977-1980,
1984 and 1987, and the Left in 1958-1963 and 1974; and
6. The total number of tax cut appeals made, on which in Sweden the Right was 
always ahead, and in Australia the Right was ahead in 1977-1980, 1984 
and 1987 and the Left in 1958-1963, 1974 and 1983.
No other variables were transformed into Left-Right indices or tested. It can be 
seen that in Sweden the Right either promised more tax cuts than the Left or promised 
the same, whereas in Australia the story is more mixed: the Right generally promised 
more in 1977-1980, 1984 and 1987, but the Left was generally ahead in 1958- 
1963, 1974 and 1983. Another distinction between Sweden and Australia was that in 
Sweden it was the Right (plus the Communists) which promised to improve 
progressivity, whereas in Australia it was the Left. This is consistent with the ALP in 
Australia taking a redistributionist line while the Social Democrats in Sweden 
concentrated on expanding tax revenue by broadening the tax base.
The general theory to be tested is a recast version of the national differences 
theory tested in previous chapters, namely that in Sweden tax cut promises by the 
Right lead voters to shift Left, whereas in Australia they lead voters to shift Right. 
Thus the specific hypotheses are as follows:
1. In Sweden the Left-Right index is associated positively with changes in the 
Leftvote and negatively with changes in the Right vote.
2 9 0
2. In Australia the Left-Right index is associated negatively with changes in 
the Left vote and positively with changes in the Right vote.
In summary form the predictions for the signs of the coefficients for the Left- 
Right indices are as follows:
Sweden Australia
ALeft vote +
ARight vote - +
The first model to be tested is that the overall degree of emphasis on tax cuts 
affects election results in the manner predicted, and in order to do this I use as tax 
variables indices for the number of income tax cut promises, and the number of other 
tax cut promises. These give a rough idea of the stress placed by parties on cutting tax, 
although it must be pointed out that these indices are not weighted in any way, so that a 
promise to increase concessions for primary producers weighs equally with a promise 
to cut all marginal rates.
The results of testing this tax emphasis model are set out in Table 8.4, and it 
can be seen that they do not support the national differences hypothesis: the only 
statistically significant tax variable has a sign opposite to that predicted, and the other 
coefficients are nowhere near statistical significance. In addition, the R2s are rather 
low, with the exception of the Swedish Left. The tax emphasis model was also tested 
using the total number of tax cut promises as the tax variable, but no coefficients were 
significant. I therefore conclude that this result either demonstrates the crudeness of 
the indices, or implies that the overall emphasis on tax cuts is not related to changes in 
Left-Right voting.
The other main model tested used specific tax cut proposals as independent 
variables, on the grounds that it is the semantic content of tax appeals that matters, 
rather than the number. Thus two specific tax cut indices were chosen as independent 
variables, namely promises to cut the overall level of taxation, and promises to cut or 
index income tax rates. The first is a clear statement of orientation towards tax, and the 
second is perhaps the most familiar tax cut proposal, so it would seem unlikely that if 
these variables had no effect, other tax cut variables would.
The results of testing the specific tax cut model are set out in Table 8.5, and 
give some support to the national differences theory: all the tax variables which reach 
or approach statistical significance have the correct sign. For the Swedish Right both
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tax coefficients have the right signs and are statistically significant, and while the 
signs are wrong for the Swedish Left, the coefficients are nowhere near statistical 
significance. For Australia both signs are correct for the Left, and approach statistical 
significance for promises to cut or index income tax rates. And while the sign is wrong 
for Australian Right promises to cut or index income tax rates, the coefficient is far 
from statistical significance, and the coefficient for promising to cut the total level of 
tax does have the right sign and also approaches statistical significance. However the R2 
for the Australian Right is rather low, and that for the Australian Left not much higher. 
If the progressivity increase coefficient is added to each equation, however, none of the 
tax variables are significant, and all the R2s drop, implying a misspecification.
When the models are jacknifed, the tax variables for the Swedish Left have 
mixed signs but are never significant, and those for the Swedish Right are always 
negative (as predicted), and although they reach statistical significance in only 4/10 
and 3/10 instances, hover close to significance in all cases. For the Left in Australia 
the coefficient for cutting or indexing income tax rates is always negative (as 
predicted), and hovers at or near significance in all cases except when 1977 is left 
out, while the other tax coefficient has mixed signs and is never significant. 
Conversely, the coefficient for cutting total levels of tax is positive in all cases for the 
Australian Right (as predicted), and approaches or reaches statistical significance 
except when 1977 (again) is omitted, while the coefficient for cutting or indexing 
income tax rates is mostly negative but never significant.
One peculiarity in the table is that the coefficient for expenditure change for the 
Swedish Right both changes sign compared to previous tables and is statistically 
significant, although the signs remain correct for the other government alternatives 
(and are significant in the case of the Australian Left). In addition, the coefficients for 
wages are not as statistically significant, although it remains so for the Australian 
Left, and unemployment becomes significantly and negatively related to changes in the 
Swedish Right vote, which accords well with Rattinger's hypothesis that unemployment 
favours the Left. For inflation, however, the result is mixed, being correct and 
significant for the Swedish Left but incorrect and significant for the Australian Left.
In conclusion, however, the evidence from Table 8.5 does on balance support the 
national differences hypothesis, as every tax variable which is either significant or 
close to significance has the correct sign.
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Table 8.4 Tax emphasis and changes in Left-Right vote: regression estimates
SWEDEN 1958-1988# AUSTRALIA 1958-1987 
( N = 1 0) ( N = 1 3)
Dependent variable: change in:
Variables Left vote Right vote Left vote Right vote
Left-Right index* 1:
N income tax cuts2 .56
( .67 )
N other tax cuts3 .03
( .25 )
Control variables: 
Change over 12 months 
prior to election in:
Real per capita expenditure .010
(1980 $A) ( .005 )
CPI (%) - . 8 3 * *
( .23 )
Unemployment rate 1.16
(1 .09 )
Wages (%) - . 9 4 * *
( .31 )
Intercept 4.58
Adj. R2 .79
Significance level .07
D.W. 2.60
.48 -1 .59 .65
(1 .48) (1 .07) ( 1 .04 )
.30 1.57 - 1 . 8 2 *
( .56) ( .86 ) ( .84 )
.004 - . 0 8 1  ** . 0 7 7 *
( .012) ( .022 ) ( . 02 2)
.60 .48 - . 2 7
( .51) ( .29 ) ( .28 )
- . 1 0 - . 33 - .6 0
(2 .43) ( 1 .28) (1 .2 5)
1 .61 * 2 . 9 6 * * - 3 . 5 5 * *
( -68) (1 .06 ) ( 1 .04 )
-10.61 - 4 . 24 5.39
.38 .49 .47
.32 .11 .12
1.59 2.71 2.08
#Excludes 1964, due to tax appeal information being unavailable for Liberals and 
Conservatives
1 Tax indices are positive if Right promises more than Left, negative if Left 
promises more than Right, and 0 if there is no difference between them.
2 Number of types of income tax cut promises (see Tables 8.1 to 8.3)
3 Number of types of other tax cut promises (see Tables 8.1 to 8.3)
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates
Figures in brackets are standard errors
* p<.1, two-tailed 
** p<.05, two-tailed 
*** p<.01, two tailed
Sources
Tax indices: Manifestos, pamphlets and policy speeches.
Control variables: United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics; IMF 
International Financial Statistics Yearbooks; national statistics; official voting figures.
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Table 8.5 Specific tax cut appeals and changes in Left-Right vote: regression 
estimates
Variables
SWEDEN 1958-1988# AUSTRALIA
(N = 1 0) ( N =
Dependent variable: change in: 
Left vote Right vote Left vote
1958-1987
13)
Right vote
Left-Right index1: 
Cut total level of tax - .77 -6 .1 2 * * -1 .22 6.45
(1.85) (1.84) (2.98) (3.44)
Cut/index income tax rates -.4  3 -4 .76* -3.51 -1.00
(1.68) (1-67) (1.93) (2.23)
Control variables:
Change over 12 months 
prior to election in:
Real per capita expenditure .013 .025* - . 0 5 8 * * .031
(1980 $A) (.009) (.009) ( .022) (.025)
CPI (%) -1 .00* - .29 .61 * - .65
(.36) ( .36) ( .31) ( .36)
Unemployment rate .34 -6 .16* - .56 1.73
(2.21) (2.20) (1 .45) (1-68)
Wages (%) -1.38 - .99 1 .96* -1.81
(.78) ( .78) ( .89) (1 -02)
Intercept 8.14 5.36 -2.50 3.34
Adj. R2 .76 .86 .53 .31
Significance level .09 .04 .09 .23
D.W. 2.83 2.42 2.53 1.52
#Excludes 1964, due to tax appeal information being unavailable for Liberals and 
Conservatives
1 Tax indices take value 1 if Right promises more than Left, -1 if Left promises more 
than Right, and 0 if there is no difference between them.
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors 
* p<.1, two-tailed 
** p<.05, two-tailed 
*** p<.01, two tailed
Sources
Tax indices: Manifestos, pamphlets and policy speeches.
Control variables: United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics; IMF 
International Financial Statistics Yearbooks; national statistics; official voting figures.
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8.4 Tax strategy and election results
The examination in this chapter of the main emphases of parties' election 
strategies in regard to tax, as indicated by tax appeals made in manifestos and policy 
speeches, shows that in general the Right stresses tax cut promises more than the Left, 
as one would expect. This Left-Right division is clearest in Sweden, where the Social 
Democrats rarely if ever outbid the bourgeois parties on tax cuts, while in Australia 
Labor sometimes did outbid their Liberal-National opponents, especially in regard to 
income tax. Another difference between Sweden and Australia was that in Sweden it was 
the Right which stressed increasing progressivity and lowering taxes on goods and 
services, specifically the Centre Party, while in Australia it was the Left.
When the two main models of how tax strategy might affect election outcomes 
were tested, it was clear that the results of the tax emphasis model did not support the 
national differences theory. Indeed the only statistically significant tax variable had the 
wrong sign. This indicates either that the tax indices used were too crude to allow 
meaningful results, since tax cut promises were simply added together without regard 
to their semantic content, or that the simple number of tax cut appeals does not have 
any real impact on election outcomes.
The results of testing the specific tax cut model, on the other hand, do give some 
support to the national differences theory: all the tax variables which reached or 
approached statistical significance had the predicted signs. Given the nature of the data, 
in particular the small number of cases, this result is about as positive as one could 
reasonably expect.
My general conclusion is that in Sweden an emphasis by the Right on promising 
tax cuts is associated with losing votes to the Left, while in Australia it is associated 
with winning votes from the Left. This accords well with the results in the previous 
two chapters, which also supported the national differences theory.
9TAX SALIENCE AND ELECTION RESULTS
9.1 Introduction
If tax is to affect a large enough number of citizens' votes to affect the election 
outcome, then it must be a prominent object of their attention, for if they didn't notice 
it, they could not vote on tax as an issue. Therefore one might expect that the more 
attention voters pay to tax, the larger its effect on the election result is likely to be. 
Since most people receive most of the contemporary political information through the 
mass media, it follows that if tax is a major issue in the media during the election 
campaign, more people will pay attention to tax and thus more people will vote on tax.
In this chapter I wish to test this agenda-setting theory, which has been 
advanced on many occasions in regard to political issues, one prominent Swedish 
example being Kent Asp's analysis of the role of the media in the process of opinion 
formation and change in the late 1970s in regard to nuclear power1. In particular, I 
wish to test the theory that if tax is a media issue, voters turn Left in Sweden and Right 
in Australia - the national differences theory - and in so doing also test the implied 
theory of Budge and Farlie that because tax is a bourgeois issue, its being a media issue 
will favour the Right in both countries2.
9.2 Tax as a media issue
In order to determine at which elections tax was a media issue, the number of 
articles referring to tax on the front pages of a representative selection of newspapers 
during the last ten days of each election campaign were surveyed, on the rationale that 
tax was unlikely to be a major media issue if it did not appear on the front page of such 
newspapers during the final stages of the election campaign. While this may not be true 
of all elections, as other sections of the media not surveyed might emphasize tax even if 
the surveyed newspapers didn’t, my survey of a greater variety of media during the
1 Kent Asp (1986), Mäktiga Massmedier - Studier in Politisk Opinionsbildning, 
Akademilitteratur, Stockholm.
2lan Budge & Dennis J. Farlie (1983), Explaining and Predicting Elections - Issue Effects and 
Party Strategy in Twenty-Three Democracies, George Allen & Unwin, London.
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1988 Swedish election campaign, including TV coverage, showed a marked similarity 
in the issues stressed: all four major morning newspapers plus both TV channels gave 
most coverage to the same four issues in the same order. This implies that the media 
tend to run together, which tendency is also evident in Australia.
For Sweden my source is the Media Investigation undertaken by Kent Asp and his 
colleagues as part of the wider election surveys carried out under the auspices of 
Gothenburg University. This covers all the Swedish elections from 1956 on apart from 
1958, which, being an unscheduled election, caught the team at Gothenburg 
unprepared. The Media Investigation covers three main morning newspapers chosen for 
their political representativeness: Svenska Dagbladet (conservative), Göteborgs- 
Posten (liberal) and Arbetet (social democratic). Asp's criteria for deciding whether a 
given article should be classified as a tax article are either that discussion of tax 
occupies at least half the article, or that it both occupies at least a third of the article 
and is emphasized in the headline and introduction. The front page emphasis on tax as a 
percentage of total issue mentions was in all cases similar to that of the paper as a 
whole.
As Australian newspapers do not have as clear or as consistent political 
affiliations as Swedish newspapers, and as Australia lacks anything approaching a 
major social democratic newspaper, I selected newspapers for an equivalent survey on 
the basis of geographical rather than political representativeness, since the Australian 
newspaper market is much more regionally based than Sweden's. Hence I selected for 
attention the main morning newspapers of each of the populous State capital cities: the 
Sydney Morning Herald, the Melbourne Age, the Brisbane Courier-Mail, the Adelaide 
Advertiser, and the Perth West Australian. Small circulations precluded choosing any 
Tasmanian or national newspapers (such as The Australian), and afternoon tabloids 
were omitted due to the low news content of their front pages and their absence from 
the Swedish survey. Criteria for selecting an article as a tax article were the same as 
for Sweden.
As the amount of front page political coverage increased in both countries over 
the period under examination, the Swedish indices for tax as a media issue were
2 97
expressed initially as percentages of the total number of issue mentions. Because time 
did not permit the full replication for Australia of the very extensive Swedish analysis, 
tax as a media issue in Australia was expressed initially as a percentage of the total 
number of issue articles (rather than issue mentions). As these two indices are not 
strictly comparable, and as exact percentages are unlikely to accurately reflect the 
coverage of tax by the media as a whole, these indices were collapsed into a simple two- 
value variable which indicates either that tax was a media issue (1) or that it wasn't 
(0). More precisely, if tax was not mentioned at all or only mentioned once, tax 
salience was scored 0, since a single mention of tax hardly establishes that tax was an 
important media issue, while if it was mentioned two or more times, tax salience was 
scored 1. In fact on no occasion was tax mentioned just twice: either it was mentioned 3 
or more times, or once or not at all. This suggests that setting the boundary at one 
mention may indeed be realistic in reflecting whether tax was an issue.
Table 9.1 tabulates elections by whether tax was a media issue, and also lists 
which newspapers mentioned it and how often.
The first thing to emerge from this table is the very clear difference between 
the patterns of tax salience in Sweden and Australia. While tax appears to have been an 
important media issue in Sweden from time to time throughout the period, in Australia 
tax was never an issue between 1958 and 1972, when the Liberal-National Coalition 
was in power, but alw ays  an issue from 1974 to 1987, when Left and Right 
governments alternated. Tax was stressed most in 1987, the last election in the period 
under examination.
One thing to note in regard to Sweden is that tax was never an issue in all three 
newspapers simultaneously. In Australia, newspapers early in the period did not tend 
to have clearly defined issue articles on their front pages, but rather reports of 
election meetings and, if at all possible, of violence at such meetings. This changed 
about 1966, when a more policy-oriented style took over. The Sydney Morning Herald 
tended to run the most election stories on page one, followed by the Age, Courier-Mail,
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Table 9.1 Tax as a media issue, Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
Election year Tax an issue? Newspapers mentioning tax (N of mentions)
SWEDEN
1 958 na na
1 960 yes Svenska Dagbladet (2), Arbetet (1)
1964 - -
1 968 - Arbetet (1)
1 970 yes Arbetet (3)
1 973 yes Svenska Dagbladet (2), Göteborgs-Posten (2)
1 976 - Arbetet (1)
1 979 yes Svenska Dagbladet (4), Göteborgs-Posten (1)
1 982 - -
1 985 yes Svenska Dagbladet (5), Göteborgs-Posten (1)
1 988 yes Svenska Dagbladet (3), Göteborgs-Posten (1), 
Arbetet (4)
AUSTRALIA
1 958 - Courier-M ail (1)
1 961 - Courier-M ail (1)
1 963 - -
1 966 - Age (1)
1 969 - -
1 972 - Age (1)
1974 yes SMH (3), Age (4), Courier-Mail (1), 
Advertiser (2)
1 975 yes SMH (2), Age (3)
1 977 yes SMH (1), Age (3), Courier-Mail (1), 
Advertiser (1)
1 980 yes SMH (5), Age (2), Advertiser (2), 
West Australian (2)
1 983 yes SMH (3), Age (4), Courier-Mail (4)
1 984 yes Age (4), Courier-Mail (1)
1987 yes SMH (2), Age (3), Courier-Mail (3), 
Advertiser (7), West Australian (2)
Sources: Sweden: Kent Asp, Mediaundersökningen 1956-1988; Australia: Sydney 
Morning Herald (SMH), Age, Courier-Mail, Advertiser, West Australian 1958-1987.
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Advertiser and West Australian. Indeed the West Australian in 1963 did not report the 
election at all on its front page.
Editorial opinion in Australia heavily favoured the Liberal-National Coalition, 
with all five papers recommending a vote for the Coalition at all elections between 
1958 and 1975 apart from 1961, when the Sydney Morning Herald supported Labor, 
and 1972, when opinion was divided. In 1977 and 1980 four out of the five supported 
the Coalition, and it was only at the last two elections, in 1984 and 1987, that there 
was a clear bias in favour of Labor. This predominant slant to the Right may be related 
to the sharp division of the period 1958-1987 into a first half when tax wasn't an 
issue and a second half when it was, as it would hardly have been in the interests of 
proprietors and/or editors who favoured the long-lived Liberal-National government 
of the 1950s and 1960s to emphasize tax as an issue, because this would tend to bring 
into question the existent tax system for which the government was clearly 
responsible. Once Whitlam came to power in 1972, however, this situation would have 
been reversed, and the continuing emphasis on tax by the Fraser government, and then 
the advent of another Labor government, may have helped tax to remain an issue.
9.3 Regression results and conclusions
Table 9.2 sets out the results of substituting the dummy variable denoting 
whether tax was a media issue for the tax variables employed in the models used in 
previous chapters, and it can be seen immediately that the results do not support the 
national differences model: none of the coefficients for the salience variables are 
statistically significant and the adjusted R2s are comparatively low, especially for 
Australia.
If this result is not simply an artefact of an inadequate indicator of whether tax 
really is a media issue, it may mean that it is not salience as such that matters, but the 
actual content of the media coverage of taxation as an issue. Such an explanation would 
be consistent with the results of the previous chapter, where changes in the Left/Right 
vote were related to specific tax cut promises but not to the degree of overall emphasis 
on tax cuts. The way to find out would be to replicate Asp's research in Sweden, which
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Table 9.2 Tax as a media issue and changes in Left-Right vote: regression 
estimates
Variables
SWEDEN 1958-1988# AUSTRALIA
( N = 1 0) (N =
Dependent variable: change in: 
Left vote Right vote Left vote
1958-1987
13)
Right vote
Tax a media issue -.5 6 .77 5.30 -4.99
Control variables: 
Change over 12 months 
prior to election in:
(1.12) (1.40) (5.40) (6.13)
Real per capita expenditure .009 .007 - . 0 7 4 * * .061 *
(1980 $A) ( .006) ( .007) ( .023) ( .026)
CPI (%) - . 7 3 * * .65* - .14 .20
( .24) (■30) (-65) (-74)
Unemployment rate .73 -1.81 1.57 -1 .63
(2.05) (2.56) (1.88) (2.13)
Wages (%) -1 .03 ** 1 .32** 2 .96* * -2 .56 *
( .30) ( .37) (-97) (1.10)
Intercept 5.77 -9.99 -2.39 2.20
Adj. R2 .67 .73 .39 .15
Significance level .08 .06 .13 .33
D.W. 3.19 2.36 1.99 2.20
^Excludes 1958, due to information being unavailable
Coefficients are unstandardized regression estimates 
Figures in brackets are standard errors 
* p<.1, two-tailed 
** p<.05, two-tailed 
*** p<.01, two tailed
Sources
Tax as media issue: Kent Asp, Mediaundersökningen 1956-1988, unpublished, 
1989; Sydney Morning Herald, Age, Courier-Mail, Advertiser, West 
Australian 1 958-1 987
Control variables: United Nations Yearbooks of National Accounts Statistics; IMF 
International Financial Statistics Yearbooks; national statistics; official 
voting figures.
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involved the classification of many political issues and actors plus their properties and 
relations as expressed in many different media sources over a period of years, but 
unfortunately this is beyond the scope of the present investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I bring the results of the preceding historical and statistical 
analyses to bear on the question of whether, on the balance of the evidence, any of the 
major hypotheses isolated in Chapter 1 can be accepted.
10.1 Tax level hypothesis
Tax aversion is positively related to the overall level of direct and/or 
total taxation, and is directed either at the incumbent government or at 
the Left/Right policy difference on tax.
Insofar as tax was higher in Sweden than in Australia, and higher later in the 
period than earlier, this hypothesis has two corollaries: first, that tax aversion was 
higher in Sweden than in Australia; and, second, that tax aversion increased over time. 
However it should be noted that, as shown in Chapter 2, both direct and total tax levels 
were higher in Sweden only for general government, but not for central government, 
and that the trend upwards over time was true for real per capita tax levels, apart 
from Swedish central government real per capita direct taxation, but not for tax levels 
as a share of GDP, apart from general government total taxation.
That is, the propositions to be examined are that Sweden's higher general 
government direct and total taxation was associated with a higher degree of tax 
aversion, and that the general growth over time of real per capita direct and total 
taxation, and of general government total taxation as a proportion of GDP, was 
associated with a growth in tax aversion over time.
Despite numerous questions asked in opinion surveys over the years, 
comparison of tax aversion in Sweden and Australia is inhibited by the fact that 
identical questions have never been asked in both countries, even allowing for the 
language difference. Nevertheless, if responses to a number of similar questions are 
compared, it does appear that Swedes are more tax averse than Australians:
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Table 10.1 Opinion on taxes, Sweden compared to Australia
Question Agree Disagree Balance
% % %
SWEDEN
1 969:
Marginal rates are far too high 70 1 9 + 51
Taxes must be reduced at all costs 63 34 + 29
1 979:
Lower tax is very important for me personally 65 6 + 59
Cutting marginal rates of tax would
make society better for everyone 70 6 + 64
1981- 82 :
The tax level is too high 83 0 + 83
Marginal rates are far too high 82 1 2 + 70
Taxes must be reduced at ail costs 54 43 + 1 1
Income tax is too high 78 1 + 77
VAT is too high 78 2 + 76
Energy taxes are too high 71 4 + 67
AUSTRALIA
1 982:
The general level of tax is unreasonable 65 28 + 37
My income tax is too high 64 1 + 63
1 984:
The general level of tax is unreasonable 59 35 + 24
1 985:
The general level of tax is unreasonable 58 35 + 23
1984- 85 :
Cut tax rates for everybody 60 21 + 39
1986 -8 7 :
My household's income tax is too high 68 24 + 44
Cut tax rates for everybody 61 24 + 37
Some questions have been slightly reformulated in order to facilitate presentation.
Sources
S w e d e n : Joachim Vogel (1974), Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an 
interpretation of recent survey data’, National Tax Journal, v.27, pp.501-502 
(1969); Gunnar Boalt & Sten Hultgren (1980), / Svenskarnas Ögon, LTs Förlag, 
Stockholm, pp.173, 176 (1979); Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? 
Sweden, pp.135-136 (1981-82).
Aust ral ia: Morgan Gallup Poll Finding 969, 7 September 1982 (1982); Morgan 
Gallup Poll Finding 1292, 1 March 1985 (1982); Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing 
& Bruce Headey (1985), Australian National Social Science Survey 1984-85 
Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, Australian National University, Canberra, 
p.21 (1984-85); 1986-87 National Social Science Survey (1986-87).
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On the other hand, the two countries had an equal number of elections which 
according to the historical analysis seemed to be influenced by tax, although it is 
possible that one or more of the Swedish elections for which evidence is not conclusive 
were also tax elections:
Table 10.2 The electoral impact of tax, Sweden and Australia 1958 to 1988
Sweden Australia
Elections influenced by tax 1 970 1 980
(tax elections) 1 979 1 984
1985 1 987
Elections not influenced by tax 1 958 1 958
1 968 1 961
1 963 
1 966 
1 969 
1 972 
1 975 
1 977 
1 983
Elections where evidence is inconclusive 1 96 0 1 974
1 964 
1 973 
1 976 
1982 
1 988
Source Table 5.41, which summarized the results of the historical analysis
My conclusion is that the available evidence is consistent with the view that 
Swedes are more tax averse than Australians due to Sweden's higher general 
government taxation.
The view that tax aversion increased over time also receives some support from 
the evidence, at least for Australia, although it should be noted that this could be caused 
by any of a host of factors which changed unidirectionally over time. In particular, an 
increase in tax aversion over time is also predicted by the alienation hypothesis, which 
posits that tax aversion is positively related to the degree of alienation from 
government in the electorate (hypothesis 18), since in both countries political 
cynicism appeared to increase over the period.
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The Australian evidence is as follows.
First, answers to the tax versus social services question became more negative 
as time went on, although it is possible that one reason for this was that the meaning of 
'social services' changed over time from old-age pensions, which are generally 
popular, to unemployment benefits and sole-parent pensions, which are not. However 
answers to the only other tax questions that have been asked more than once imply 
steady or declining tax aversion:
Table 10.3 Opinion on taxes, Australia over time
1 967 1 969 1974 1975 1979 1984-85 1986-87
% % % % % % %
Reduce taxes 
Increase social
26 26 56 50 59 64 74
services 68 71 36 41 36 33 23
Balance for tax cuts -4 2 -4 5 + 20 + 1 9 + 23 + 31 + 51
1982 1984 1 985 1986- 87
% % % %
The general level of tax is unreasonable 65 59 58
Cut tax rates for everybody 60 61
Sources Don Aitkin (1982), Stability and Change in Australian Politics, second 
edition, ANU Press, Canberra, pp.363, 375, 385 (1967, 1969, 1979); Morgan 
Gallup Polls, August 1974 and May 1975; Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce 
Headey (1985), Australian National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social 
Sciences Data Archive, Australian National University, Canberra, pp.17, 21 (1984- 
85); 1986-87 National Social Science Survey.
Second, tax has steadily increased in salience over time, which implies 
increasing tax aversion insofar as it is true that tax salience means concern about the 
level of taxation and a desire for tax cuts. During the period 1958-1972 tax was never 
a media issue, and such evidence as is available does not suggest that it was ever an 
issue in the minds of the electorate either, but in 1974 it became a media issue for the 
first time and in 1977 it became a minor election issue for the public. From then on, 
tax salience steadily increased both in the media and for the public, and reached its 
maximum at the election of 1987.
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Third, all the Australian elections that seemed to be influenced by tax were in 
the 1380s.
However in Sweden the evidence does not support the theory that tax aversion 
increased over time.
First, attitudes to tax in 1981-82 were not noticeably more negative than in
1969:
Table 10.4 Opinion on taxes, Sweden over time
1 969 
%
1 9 81 -82 Change 
% %
Marginal rates of tax are far too high 70 84 + 1 4
Tax must be reduced at all costs 63 53 - 1 0
Given social benefits, tax is too high 54 38 - 1 6
Own tax unreasonable, given benefits received 43 37 - 6
Sources Joachim Vogel (1974), 'Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an 
interpretation of recent survey data', National Tax Journal, v.27, pp.501 -502 
(1969); Axel Hadenius (1986), Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, p.23 (1981- 
82). The 1981-82 figures are not identical with those in Table 10.1 because non­
taxpayers have been excluded in order to render the two sets of data more fully 
comparable.
Hadenius' explanation for this pattern of attitude change was that the increased 
dissatisfaction with marginal rates was related to the steep increases in marginal rates 
put through by the Social Democrats in the early 1970s, which by 1981 even they 
were prepared to reduce, while the provision of increased benefits since 1969 had 
offset in people's minds the increased overall level of taxation. In addition, at the time 
the 1981-82 survey was taken, expenditure far exceeded taxation: people were getting 
more than they were paying for.
Second, the salience of tax in the media, which is relevant to the extent that it 
indicates tax aversion, fluctuated rather than increased, as tax was a media issue in 
1960, 1970, 1973, 1979, 1985 and 1988. Tax was also an issue for the public from 
1973 on, and especially in 1979, 1985 and 1988, but unfortunately it is not clear 
whether this was part of an upwards trend because data is lacking for the elections 
prior to 1973.
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Finally, although the identified tax elections fell mainly in the later part of the 
period, tax also appeared to have an effect in 1970, and it is possible that it was 
influential in 1960 as well.
Thus it appears that tax aversion increased over time in Australia but not in 
Sweden. This implies that the Australian result is due to factors peculiar to Australia 
rather than to the increase in real per capita taxation and in general government total 
taxation as a percentage of GDP that took place in both countries. Similarly, the 
evidence does not support the idea that tax aversion was linked to political cynicism, as 
this too increased in both countries
In summary, the tax level hypothesis is supported by evidence that tax aversion 
is higher in Sweden than in Australia, which implies that the overall level of general 
government direct and/or total taxation may affect voters' attitudes, but the hypothesis 
is partly contradicted by evidence that tax aversion has increased over time only in 
Australia, which implies that the increase in real per capita taxation and in general 
government total taxation as a percentage of GDP that took place in both countries was 
not electorally significant.
In other words, the tax level hypothesis is fully supported only insofar as it 
refers to general government direct taxation as a proportion of GDP. To the extent that 
this is a real effect, it implies that direct taxation is more electorally significant than 
indirect taxation.
10.2 Tax change hypothesis
Tax aversion is positively related to the magnitude of changes to the
overall level of direct and/or total taxation, and is directed either at the
incumbent government or at the Left/Right policy difference on tax.
This hypothesis receives some support from the historical evidence, but the 
results of the statistical analysis were inconclusive.
The biggest annual rises in tax over whole terms of office were prior to the 
elections of 1976 and 1988 in Sweden and the elections of 1975 and 1987 in 
Australia, and at all four of these elections the incumbent Left government lost votes. 
Similarly, the biggest rises in tax over the 12 months preceding elections were in 
1970, 1976 and 1988 in Sweden and in 1961, 1974, 1975 and 1984 in Australia, 
and again the incumbent governments, which apart from Australia in 1961 were Left
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governments, lost votes at all of these elections. This implies that large tax rises lose 
votes, although it should be pointed out that of the 24 elections considered, incumbent 
governments lost votes at 19. In addition, three of the six elections mentioned above 
were tax elections, namely 1970 in Sweden and 1984 and 1987 in Australia.
The statistical analysis of aggregate data reported in Chapter 6 provided no 
support for the theory that incumbent governments were rewarded for tax cuts and/or 
punished for tax rises, but, in regard to Left-Right voting, found that changes in 
Swedish general government real per capita direct taxation were negatively related to 
changes in the Right vote. This implies that when direct taxation rises in Sweden, 
voters turn away from the bourgeois parties, but as none of the other tax variables in 
the several alternative specifications tested were significant, this is not a very 
convincing result, especially given the very small N involved in the regression 
analysis.
Instead it was expenditure change that was significantly related to Left-Right 
voting. In Sweden, rises in expenditure were associated with rises in the Left vote, 
implying that voters rewarded the Social Democrats when the provision of benefits and 
services was increased, while in Australia expenditure increases were associated with 
rises in the Right vote and falls in the Left vote, implying that the Right was rewarded 
when expenditure increased while the Left was punished. This is consistent with an 
incumbent effect, since the Left was in power more often in Sweden and the Right was 
in power more often in Australia, but, as mentioned above, the regression 
specifications using the change in vote for incumbent governments as dependent 
variable did not produce any statistically significant results.
In summary, the evidence supports the tax change hypothesis only in that the 
largest tax rises were associated with vote losses at subsequent elections for incumbent 
governments, all but one of which were Left governments.
10.3 New tax hypothesis
Tax aversion increases when new taxes are introduced, and decreases
when old taxes are abolished, and is directed either at the incumbent
government or at the Left/Right policy difference on tax.
There is some evidence to support the view that introducing new taxes was 
electorally significant. Of the six tax elections, half were preceded by the introduction 
of major or controversial new taxes: Sweden in 1985, after a number of new taxes had
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been introduced in order to help narrow the budget deficit; Australia in 1984, at which 
the new tax on lump sum superannuation appears to have been influential; and 
Australia in 1987 following the introduction of new taxes on capital gains and fringe 
benefits. At each of these elections the Left, which was in government on all three 
occasions, lost votes. Of the remaining 18 elections, only a third were preceded by the 
introduction of major new taxes.
However the statistical tests of Chapter 7 did not support the proposition that 
incumbent governments were punished for introducing new taxes. In regard to Left- 
Right voting, the only statistically significant result indicated that the introduction of 
major new taxes in Australia was associated with falls in the vote for the Right, which 
is rather puzzling.
Nevertheless, the historical evidence that the introduction of major new taxes 
was associated with vote losses for incumbent Left governments at subsequent elections 
does give some support to the new tax hypothesis.
10.4 Tax rate hypothesis
Tax aversion increases if tax rates are raised, and decreases if tax rates
are cut, and is directed either at the incumbent government or at the
Left/Right policy difference on tax.
The historical evidence is inconclusive on this issue, but the regression results 
of Chapter 7 indicate that when income tax rates were cut in the 12 months prior to an 
election in Sweden the share of the vote won by the Right rose, whereas in Australia it 
was the Left vote share that increased. In addition, rises in rates of indirect tax in 
Sweden, usually VAT rises, were significantly associated with vote losses by the Right. 
This may imply that the expenditure associated with extra tax leads voters to turn Left 
in Sweden (remembering that if income tax is not cut it inevitably rises due to the 
effects of inflation) but that Australian voters focus on the tax rises and turn Right. 
However although this neat explanation is consistent with the regression results for 
changes in expenditure levels, it is somewhat inconsistent with the result reported 
above that introduction of a major new tax leads to Right vote losses in Australia, 
rather than gains.
On balance, however, this evidence does give some support to the tax rate 
hypothesis as it relates to Left-Right voting.
10.5 Party strategy hypothesis
Promises to cut tax win votes and promises to raise tax lose votes.
This hypothesis receives support from both historical and statistical evidence.
First, all but one of the elections influenced by tax show signs of having been 
influenced by changes in the pattern of party promises in regard to tax. In Sweden in 
1979 the Social Democrats' new proposal to introduce a tax on production arguably 
cost them the election, and did not reappear in 1982, while at the same time the 
Conservatives hardened their anti-tax stand and gained votes. In 1985 the Conservative 
position hardened still further, but vote gains on tax were offset by vote losses due to 
fears about where the consequent spending cuts would fall. In Australia in 1980 Labor 
matched the Coalition on income tax cuts, in contrast to 1977, and gained votes, while 
in 1984 the Coalition outbid Labor in promising specific income tax cuts, in contrast 
to 1983, and gained votes. In 1987 the Coalition promised even bigger tax cuts than in 
1984, and won votes on tax.
Second, the only statistically significant results of regressions using tax cut 
promises as independent variables (Chapter 8) indicate that when the Right in Sweden 
outbid the Left in promising to cut the total level of taxation and/or to cut or index 
income tax rates, it lost votes. Coefficients which approach but do not quite reach 
statistical significance for Australia suggest that when the Right outbid the Left in 
promising to cut the total level of tax, its vote rose, whereas when it outbid the Left on 
promising to cut and/or index income tax rates, the Left vote fell. These results are 
similar to those for changes in expenditure levels and for tax rate changes in that they 
imply that in Sweden the appeal of bourgeois tax cut promises is outweighed by that of 
Social Democratic expenditure promises, which the bourgeois parties can’t match due 
to their tax cut promises, whereas in Australia the focus remains on tax, so that both 
the Coalition and Labor gain when they outbid the other on tax cuts.
One important difference between the two countries was that the Left-Right 
distinction on tax was much sharper in Sweden, where the bourgeois parties always 
either matched or outbid the Social Democrats in promising tax cuts, than in Australia, 
where Labor often outbid the Coalition.
In summary, the historical and statistical evidence supports the party strategy 
hypothesis for both Sweden and Australia, although in Sweden the historical evidence 
for 1979, which suggests that the Right gained to the extent that it outbid the Left on
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tax, is somewhat inconsistent with the statistical evidence, which suggests the reverse. 
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that while over the period as a whole the bourgeois 
parties lost by outbidding the Social Democrats on tax cuts, individual elections such as 
that of 1979 went against the trend, perhaps due to the specific nature of the Social 
Democrats' production tax proposal at that election.
10.6 Media power hypothesis
If tax is an election issue, the Right will gain votes and the Left will lose
votes.
Although the statistical tests of Chapter 9 gave no support whatsoever to this 
theory as formulated above, it is noticeable that all the tax elections were elections at 
which tax was an issue in the media, which implies either that the tax effect was via 
the media - people reacting to the representation of tax as an issue in the media - or 
simply that the media was doing its job in noticing that tax was important to voters.
However the media may also have had an important role in setting different 
ground rules in the two countries for party competition on tax, as the Swedish media 
allowed more scope for the expression of social democratic ideas than the Australian 
media, due to the existence in Sweden alone of important newspapers which are aligned 
with the labour movement, in particular Arbetet and Aftonbladet. That is, in Sweden 
some newspapers supported a pro-tax position by stressing the need for adequate 
revenue to fund social reform, but the Australian media were, in general, uniformly 
anti-tax. This lack of media support for pro-tax policies arguably made it more 
difficult for Labor to successfully promote a pro-tax line than it was for the Social 
Democrats, which would help to account for the more blurred Left-Right distinction on 
tax in Australia: there was more pressure on Labor to compete on tax cuts than on the 
Social Democrats.
In addition, the contrast between the relatively balanced partisan complexion of 
the Swedish media and the conservative nature of the Australian media may help to 
explain why tax aversion increased in Australia but not in Sweden, as there is some 
evidence that in Australia alone the media played an important role in helping to 
stimulate tax aversion in the 1970s and 1980s.
At the six Australian elections between 1958 and 1972, during which the 
Coalition government made few important changes to the tax system, tax was never an
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issue in the five major quality morning newspapers, which almost always supported 
the Coalition at election time. At the first election after Labor came to power, however, 
tax suddenly appeared as an issue on the front pages, consistent with conservative 
concerns about Labor increasing taxes to fund programs such as Medibank, although 
between 1972 and 1974 actual tax levels did not in fact increase markedly. At the same 
time the Coalition, now in opposition, started to take a much stronger anti-tax line, and 
an opinion poll taken shortly after the 1974 election indicated that the strong public 
preference in 1969 for social services over tax cuts had been transformed into equally 
strong support for tax cuts over social services. Nevertheless, tax was still not at all 
salient as an issue for the electorate at large in 1974 or 1975, which implies that the 
new anti-tax attitude was not strongly held. Tax did not become an issue for the voting 
public until 1977, and it was not until 1984 that it became an important issue.
The significance of this lag between media salience and public salience is that it 
is consistent with the theory that it was media concern with tax that over a period of 
years caused the public concern with tax, although it is also possible that the impact of 
the very large tax rises that took place in Labor's second term (1974-75) took time to 
sink in. In Sweden, on the other hand, tax was a media issue at every other election on 
average, which is consistent with Sweden's relatively unchanging levels of tax 
aversion.
Furthermore, the media also helped to perpetuate the idea that the high taxing 
and spending of the Whitlam government was in large part responsible for its electoral 
defeat in 1975. In fact the economic disaster of 1974-75 coupled with the Loans Affair 
explains the election result quite adequately, and there is no evidence at all that tax 
played any part: indeed tax aversion appeared to decline slightly between 1974 and 
1975. Instead the tax theory appears to be an example of the winners rewriting 
history: having included tax cuts as a prominent part of their election platform, the 
Coalition naturally claimed that their win demonstrated that voters had supported this 
stand. The very size of the Coalition’s win gave credibility to this claim, which was 
accepted by the media and, after the 1977 election, by Labor as well despite the lack of 
evidence to support it.
In conclusion, the evidence does not support the media power hypothesis as 
formulated, but does support the proposition that media salience heightens tax 
aversion, which can also be termed a media power hypothesis.
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10.7 National differences hypothesis
The electoral impact of tax is different in Sweden and Australia due to
differences between the two countries.
The usual form of this theory is that Swedes are less tax averse than Australians 
due to their different cultures or national ethos, which in turn are attributed to factors 
such as Sweden's larger industrial working class, higher unionization, and long Social 
Democratic hegemony. Lower tax aversion in Sweden is also predicted by the 
demographic hypothesis, which posits that tax aversion is inversely related to the 
proportion of the electorate dependent on the government for their incomes, since there 
is a greater proportion of retired people in Sweden than in Australia (hypothesis 12); 
the selectivity hypothesis, which posits that tax aversion is positively related to the 
degree to which government spending is selective in character, since government 
spending in Australia is more selective than in Sweden (hypothesis 13); and the home- 
ownership hypothesis, which posits that tax aversion is positively related to the level 
of home ownership, since home ownership is more widespread in Australia than in 
Sweden (hypothesis 14).
The results of the statistical analysis support the national differences theory: 
when expenditure rose, the Left vote rose in Sweden but fell in Australia; when income 
tax rates were cut in election year the Right vote rose in Sweden but fell in Australia; 
and when the Right outbid the Left on tax cut promises the Right vote rose in Australia 
but fell in Sweden. All these results imply that real or promised tax rises lead Swedish 
voters to turn Left, due possibly to the associated real or promised expenditure, but 
Australian voters to turn Right.
On the other hand, the opinion survey results set out in Table 10.1 give more 
support to the opposite view that Swedes are more tax averse than Australians, which 
contradicts the national differences hypothesis as formulated above.
One reason why higher Swedish tax aversion seems to coexist with rewarding 
the Left for tax rises may be that in electoral terms this higher tax aversion is 
counteracted by the apparently stronger support for progressivity and income 
redistribution that exists in Sweden:
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Table 10.5 Opinion on tax progressivity, Sweden compared to Australia
Question Agree Disagree Balance
% % %
SWEDEN
1976:
Cut tax on low incomes 88 5 + 83
Cut tax on high incomes 25 61 -3 6
1979:
Cut tax on high incomes 27 60 -3 3
1 981 -82:
Tax system should contribute to income equalization 70 1 3 + 57
1985:
Cut taxes for higher incomes 27 60 -3 3
AUSTRALIA
1984-85 :
Tax rich more 46 35 + 1 1
Redistribute income and wealth 
to ordinary working people 51 28 + 23
1986- 87 :
Tax rich more 47 40 + 7
Redistribute income and wealth 
to ordinary working people 43 36 + 7
People with high incomes are taxed too much 36 47 - 1 1
High income earners should pay a larger 
part of earnings in tax than low income earners 62 34 + 28
It is the responsibility of government 
to reduce income differences between:
- those with high and low incomes 41 39 + 2
- rich and poor 51 44 + 7
Sources
Sweden: Olof Petersson (1977), Valundersökningar Rapport 2: Väljarna och valet 
1976, Statistiska Centralbyrän, Stockholm, p.89 (1976); Sören Holmberg (1981), 
Svenska Väljare, LiberFörlag, Stockholm, p.228 (1979); Axel Hadenius (1986), 
Crisis of the Welfare State? Sweden, p.141 (1981-82); Sören Holmberg & Mikael 
Gilljam (1987), Väljare och val i Sverige, Bonniers, Sweden, p.126 (1985); 
Australia: Jonathan Kelley, Robert G. Cushing & Bruce Headey (1985), Australian 
National Social Science Survey 1984-85 Codebook, Social Sciences Data Archive, ANU, 
Canberra, pp.21, 24 (1984-85); 1986-87 National Social Science Survey (1986- 
87) .
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That is, in electoral terms, any drain of voters to the Right on tax cuts in 
Sweden may be offset by a more significant flow of voters to the Left on issues of 
progressivity and equality than tends to be the case in Australia, as the Social 
Democrats are perceived to be stronger on progressivity and redistribution than the 
bourgeois parties despite their record in increasing indirect taxes. This voter flow 
would be in addition to any flows of voters concerned with expenditure rather than tax.
This greater polarization of the Swedish electorate on tax is reflected in the 
greater polarization of attitudes towards the parties: in Sweden the Left is consistently 
perceived as the high tax alternative whereas in Australia perceptions of the parties in 
this respect varied over time, with the Left often being considered more likely to 
reduce tax. A consequence of this may be that in Sweden tax cut voters tend to be 
anchored firmly in the bourgeois camp rather than being swinging voters, whereas in 
Australia tax cut voters may be very likely to be swinging voters, which would mean 
that the Social Democrats have less to lose from following a high tax line than Labor 
has. This again would help to explain how greater tax aversion in Sweden may coexist 
with the Left being rewarded at elections for tax rises.
Finally, the difference in the political complexion of the media in the two 
countries may have been significant in conditioning the electoral impact of tax, as 
argued in the previous section, by making it easier for the Left to follow a pro-tax line 
in Sweden than in Australia.
In summary, the evidence contradicts the national differences hypothesis as 
formulated in terms of tax aversion, but supports a slightly different version, namely 
that the Left is rewarded for tax rises in Sweden but punished in Australia due to 
Swedish voters' greater concern with expenditure and with tax progressivity and 
redistribution, combined with the sharper Left-Right policy difference on tax.
10.8 Other hypotheses
Several of the other hypotheses identified at the end of Chapter 1 have been 
considered along with the major hypotheses, but a number remain.
The economic hypothesis, that tax changes affect election results via their effect 
on real disposable incomes (hypothesis 8), has not been considered in detail due to the
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lack of adequate data, but as incomes as such have not been conclusively demonstrated to 
affect election results (see Appendix 5), this hypothesis can be considered speculative 
only at this stage.
Similarly, it is not clear whether Sweden or Australia has the most complex or 
the most buoyant tax system, so no conclusions can be drawn concerning the complexity 
hypothesis, namely that tax aversion is inversely related to the complexity of the tax 
system (hypothesis 9), or the buoyancy hypothesis, namely that tax aversion is 
inversely related to the buoyancy of the tax system (hypothesis 10), and time did not 
permit an adequate evaluation of the budget hypothesis, namely that tax aversion 
increases to the extent that the budget is in surplus and decreases to the extent that the 
budget is in deficit (hypothesis 11).
In regard to the symbol hypothesis, which posits that tax aversion is positively 
related to the degree of abstraction of the symbols used in current discourse which 
refer to taxing, spending and the public sector (hypothesis 15), the opinion surveys 
cited in Chapters 3-5 consistently found that apparent tax aversion was higher when 
questions referring to tax in the abstract were asked than when these questions 
included references to what taxation revenue was used for or when spending in 
particular areas was focussed on. This is consistent with the findings of surveys in a 
number of countries (see Chapter 1) that attitudes to tax are rather 
compartmentalized in voters' minds, and that reactions depend upon the terms in which 
the issue is couched: the more abstract the terms, the greater the apparent tax 
aversion.
The fairness hypothesis, which postulated that tax aversion is inversely related 
to the degree to which the tax system is perceived to be fair (hypothesis 16), was 
difficult to evaluate, since little data was available on the issue. The same applied to the 
role of government hypothesis, namely that tax aversion is inversely related to voters' 
perceptions of the proper scope of government (hypothesis 17), and the waste 
hypothesis, which posits that tax aversion is positively related to the degree to which 
government is perceived to be wasteful and inefficient (hypothesis 19).
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10.9 The electoral impact of tax in Sweden and Australia 1958-1988
The results of my historical and statistical investigations give some support to 
all the major hypotheses tested: Sweden's higher tax levels were associated with higher 
tax aversion than in Australia, in particular Sweden's higher levels of general 
government direct tax as a proportion of GDP; the largest tax rises were associated 
with (mainly Left) incumbent governments losing votes at the next election; and the 
introduction of major new taxes was also associated with Left incumbent governments 
losing votes at the next election.
Furthermore, national differences seemed to be important: election year income 
tax cuts were in general associated with vote gains by the Right in Sweden but the Left 
in Australia, and major rises in indirect tax were associated with vote gains by the Left 
in Sweden but the Right in Australia. In addition, when the Right outbid the Left on 
promising to cut the total level of tax and/or to cut or index income tax rates, the Left 
tended to gain in Sweden but the Right gained in Australia, although in Sweden in 1979 
the Social Democrats' proposal to introduce a production tax was associated with vote 
losses.
In conjunction with the statistical finding that expenditure rises appeared to 
benefit the Left in Sweden but the Right in Australia, and that Swedes were more 
supportive of progressivity and income equalization than Australians, these findings 
imply that swinging voters in Sweden were more inclined than Australian voters to 
focus on the benefits of increased taxation, namely expenditure and income 
equalization, and that in electoral terms this tended to offset the generally greater tax 
aversion in the Swedish electorate. One possible reason for this difference is that the 
Left-Right distinction on tax was much sharper in Sweden than in Australia both in 
reality and in the minds of the electorate. This is possibly linked to the conservative 
control of the media in Australia, to the extent that this inhibited the general 
dissemination of pro-tax arguments and forced Labor to compete more vigorously on 
tax cuts than was necessary for the Social Democrats in Sweden, where social 
democratic ideas do find expression in the media. The Australian media may also have 
contributed to the rise in tax aversion in Australia, although other factors, such as the 
general change in the economic orthodoxy following the oil shock of 1973, may well 
have been involved too.
Thus it appears that although actual tax changes did help to explain election 
results, these effects were strongly conditioned by essentially political factors, in
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particular the difference in the nature of party competition on tax in the two countries 
and the conservative near monopoly of control of the media in Australia but not in 
Sweden. Unless this changes, it seems clear that tax will remain, in general, a positive 
issue for the Social Democrats in Sweden, due to the benefits associated with tax, but a 
negative issue for Labor in Australia, because attention tends to be focussed on tax 
alone, rather than tax in conjunction with its associated benefits.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Tax, expenditure and economic control variables
The basic data on which the tax level variables are based are figures for direct 
tax, indirect tax, and social security contributions, for both central government and 
general government. Central government total tax is calculated by adding central 
government direct and indirect tax, while general government total tax is calculated by 
adding general government direct tax, indirect tax, and social security contributions. 
Where figures were for financial years, these were converted to calendar years by 
averaging the financial years beginning and ending in a given calendar year.
Sources and transformations of these tax and expenditure variables, plus 
economic control variables, are set out below.
A1.1 Direct and indirect tax: sources
Swedish figures for central government direct and indirect tax are taken from 
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.343 (direct tax 1954/55- 
1961/62, indirect tax 1955-62, with the 1954/55 figures being the average of 
1953/54 and 1955/56, as the actual figures were not available); UN Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1972, v.2, p.489 (direct tax 1960-1970, indirect tax 
1961-1970); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1981, v.1/2, pp.1624- 
1629 (1971-1980); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1987, pp.1252- 
1254 (1981-1984); Statistics Sweden, National Accounts 1970, 1975-87, Annual 
Report 1988, Table H:12 (1985-1987); and figures from the Swedish National 
Institute of Economic Research provided by Lennart Markgren of the Swedish Ministry 
of Finance (direct tax 1987-1988, indirect tax 1988). Discrepancies between series' 
occurred in 1960 for direct tax (new series SEK6100m compared to old series 
SEK6357.5m); 1961 for indirect tax (new series SEK7800m compared to old series 
SEK7842m); 1971 (new series for direct tax SEK17553m and indirect tax 
SEK21064m compared to old series SEK17500m and SEK19200m respectively); and 
1980 (new series direct tax SEK38007m and indirect tax SEK69587m compared to 
SEK36778m and SEK69644m respectively). These series' were linked by multiplying 
each old series by the ratio at the overlap year of the new series figure to the old series 
figure.
3 22
Australian figures for central government direct tax are taken from UN  
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p. 12 (1953/54, 1955/56-1964/65, 
with direct tax figures being the sum of 'direct taxes on corporations' and 'direct taxes 
on households and private non-profit institutions'); UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics 1972, v.1, pp.29-30 (1965/66-1971/72); UN Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 1981, pp.40-46 (1972/73-1980/81); UN Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 1987, pp.28-30; Australian Government, Budget Statements 
1987/88, p.400 (direct tax 1981/82-1987/88); Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Taxation Revenue in Australia 1986/87, Cat. No. 5506.0, Table 3 (indirect tax 
1981/82-1985/86); and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Taxation Revenue in 
Australia 1987/88, Cat. No. 5506.0, Table 3 (indirect tax 1986/87-1987/88). 
Because a figure for 1954/55 was not available, the average of the figures for 
1953/54 and 1955/56 was used. There was a break between the series to 1980 and 
the series from 1980 (with new series figures at 1980 for direct tax and indirect tax 
being $22399m and $10221m, compared to old series figures at 1980 of $22342m 
and $10291m respectively), so the two series’ were linked by multiplying the old 
series by the ratio at 1980 of the new series figure to the old series figure.
Swedish figures for general government direct tax are taken from UN Yearbook 
of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.342 (1955-1960); UN Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 1972 v.2, p.487 (1960-1970); UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics 1981, pp.1624-1630 (1970-1980); Statistics Sweden, National Accounts 
1970, 1975-1987, pp.54-55 (1980-1987); and information supplied by Helge 
Thelander of Statistics Sweden (1988).
Australian general government direct tax was identical with central government 
direct tax.
Swedish figures for general government indirect tax are from UN Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.342 (1955-1960); UN Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 1972 v.2, p.487 (1960-1970); UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics 1981, pp.1624-1630 (1970-1980); Statistics Sweden, National Accounts 
1970, 1975-87, pp.54-55 (1980-1987); and information supplied by Helge 
Thelander of Statistics Sweden (1988). Series' were linked by multiplying the old 
series by the ratio at the overlap year of the new series figure to the old series figure.
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Australian figures for general government indirect tax are from UN Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.11 (1953/54-1960/61, with 1954/55 being 
an average of 1953/54 and 1955/56, as the actual figure was not available); UN 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972, v.1, p.27 (1960/61-1970/71); UN
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1981, pp.40-45 (1970/71-1980/81); UN
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1987, pp.28-30 (1980/81-1982/83); and
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Taxation Revenue Australia 1987/88, Cat. No.
5506.0. Table 4, p.8 (1982/83-1987/88).
A1.2 Social security contributions: sources
Figures for social security contributions, which exist in Sweden but not 
Australia, are from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.342 (1955- 
1960); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972 v.2, p.487 (1960-1970); 
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1981 v.1/2, pp.1624-1629 (1970- 
1980); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1987, pp. 1252-1254 (1980- 
1985); and Statistics Sweden, National Accounts 1970, 1975-87, pp.54-55 (1980- 
1987). The 1988 figure was estimated by adding half the difference between the 1985 
and 1987 figures to the 1987 figure, and series' were linked at overlap years by 
multiplying the old series by the ratio at the overlap year of the new series figure to 
the old series figure.
A1.3 Expenditure: sources
Swedish central government expenditure figures (current disbursements) are 
from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.343 (1954/55-1964/65, 
remaining figures being calendar year, with 1954/55 being the average of 1953/54 
and 1955/56, as the actual figure was not available); UN Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 1972 v.2, p.489 (1964-1970); UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics 1981, pp.1624-1630 (1970-1980, being current disbursements less net 
savings); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1987, pp.1252-1255 (1980- 
1985, current disbursements less net savings); and information from the Swedish 
National Institute of Economic Research supplied by Lennart Markgren of the Swedish 
Ministry of Finance (1985-1988). These figures exclude expenditure on social 
security benefits.
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Australian figures for central government expenditure are from UN Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.12 (1953/54-1963/64, with the 1954/55 
figure being an average of 1953/54 and 1955/56, as the actual figure was not 
available); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972, p.29 (1963/64- 
1970/71); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1981, pp.41-46 (1970/71- 
1980/81, figures being current disbursements less net savings); UN Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1987, pp.28-30 (1980/81-1982/83, being current 
disbursements less net savings); and Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1988-89 
Government Financial Estimates, Cat. No. 5501.0, Table 15, p.24 (1982/83- 
1987/88). Series were linked where necessary by multiplying each old series at the 
overlap year by the ratio of the new series figure to the old series figure.
Swedish figures for general government expenditure (current disbursements) 
are from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.343 (1955-1960); UN 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972 v.2, p.487 (1960-1970); UN
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1977, p. 1128 (1970-1975); Statistics 
Sweden, National Accounts 1970, 1975-87, pp.54-55 (1975-1987); and the 1988 
figure was estimated by extrapolating the trend for the current term of office (by 
adding half the difference between the 1985 and 1987 figures to the 1987 figure). 
Series' were linked by multiplying the old series by the ratio at the overlap year of the 
new series figure to the old series figure.
Australian figures for general government expenditure (current 
disbursements) are from UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1965, p.11 
(1953/54-1960/61, with 1954/55 being an average of 1953/54 and 1955/56, as 
the actual figure was not available); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics
1972, v.1, p.27 (1960/61-1970/71); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics
1981, pp.40-45 (1970/71-1980/81); UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics
1987, pp.28-30 (1980/81-1982/83); and Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1988- 
89 Government Financial Estimates, Australia, Cat. No. 5501.0, Table 12, p.21 
(1 982/83-1 987/88) .
A1.4 Economic control variables: sources
Swedish CPI figures are from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook
1982, p.108 (1954); IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984,
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pp.552-553 (1955-1980, which included a series break 1979-1980); IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p.665 (1980-1987); and Sverige 
Nytt, 6 January 1989 (1980 CPI calculated from percentage price rise figure). 
Australian CPI from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1982, p.108 
(1954); IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984, pp.148-149 
(1955-1980, which included a series break 1978-1979); and IMF, International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p.207 (1980-1987).
Swedish unemployment figures are from UN Statistical Yearbook 1959, p.62 
(1955-1958, which included a series break 1955-1956); UN Statistical Yearbook 
1967, p.110 (1958-1965); UN Statistical Yearbook 1976, p.91 (1966-1974); UN 
Statistical Yearbook 1982, p.96 (1975-1982); Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Labour Market Statistics Australia1987, p.133 (1982-1987); and Swedish Ministry 
of Finance, Sweden's Economy, October 1988, p.4 (1988). Series' were linked at 
1975 and 1982 by multiplying each old series by the ratio at the overlap year of the 
new series figure to the old series figure. Australian figures from Vray Vamplew (ed), 
Australians: Historical Statistics, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, Sydney 1987, 
p.152 (Butlin estimates for 1954-1965); and W.E. Norton & C.P. Aylmer, Australian 
Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1986-87: I Tables, Reserve Bank of Australia 
Occasional Paper No. 8A, February 1988, Table 4.16, p.115 (1965-1987). These 
series' were linked at 1965 by multiplying the old series by the ratio at 1965 of the 
new series figure to the old series figure.
Swedish wage index figures are from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1984, pp.552-553 (1955-1980); IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1988, p.665 (1980-1986); Swedish Ministry of Finance, Sweden's 
Economy, October 1988 (1987-1988). Both the IMF indices used 1980=100. The 
1987 and 1988 data was converted from percentage increases by multiplying the 
1986 index by the 1987 percentage change and adding the result to the 1986 index to 
derive the 1987 index, and repeating the process for 1988. Australian figures are 
from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, pp.206-207 (1962- 
1987). These wage indices (1980=100) were converted into current prices by 
multiplying by 1980 wages and dividing by 100. The Swedish 1980 wage is from 
Statistics Sweden, Statistical Yearbook 1985, Stockholm 1986, p.205, and the 
Australian 1980 wage is from W.E. Norton & C.P. Aylmer, Australian Economic
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Statistics 1949-50 to 1986-87: I Tables, Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional Paper 
No. 8A, February 1988, Table 4.18, p.117. The Australian average wages for 1955- 
61 were then added, from W.E. Norton & C.P. Aylmer, Australian Economic Statistics 
1949-50 to 1986-87: I Tables, Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional Paper No. 8A, 
February 1988, Table 4.18, p.117. Calendar year data was derived from financial 
year data by averaging the figure for the financial years beginning and ending in the 
calendar year.
Swedish figures for real GDP measured in constant 1980 currency are from 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984, pp.548-549 (1955-1980); 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p.667 (1980-1987); and 
Lennart Markgren of the Swedish Ministry of Finance (1988). Australian figures are 
from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983, p.110 (1954), IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984, pp.150-151 (1955-1980); and 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p.209 (1980-1987).
A1.5 Transformations
Real 1980 figures were obtained by dividing nominal figures by the GDP 
deflator (1980=100) and multiplying by 100. Swedish GDP deflator figures are from 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984, pp.548-549 (1955-1980); 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p.667 (1980-1987); and 
information on inflation supplied by Lennart Markgren of the Swedish Ministry of 
Finance (1988). Australian figures are from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook 1984, pp.150-151 (1955-1980); and calculations based on figures for
current GDP and constant GDP in IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
1988, p.209 (1980-1987). Because the current GDP index did not match the 
constant GDP index in IMF 1988 (figures were not identical for 1980), current GDP 
figures for 1980-1987 were deflated by the ratio of the 1980 constant GDP to the 
1980 current GDP (in order to get the 1980 figures to match), then new GDP 
deflators were derived for 1981-1987 by taking the current GDP as a percentage of 
the constant GDP.
Swedish 1980 kronor figures were converted in 1980 Australian dollars by 
multiplying by the 1980 Purchasing Power Parity, namely 0.15. This was obtained
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from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power 
Parities in OECD Countries, 1985, Cat. No. 5226.0, p.3. 1985 PPPs of each country 
with the US were converted to 1980 prices using the GDP deflators, then the ratio of 
the resulting Australian figure to the Swedish figure was taken, which turned out to be 
identical to the 1985 PPP (0.15).
Per capita figures were obtained by dividing aggregates by population. Swedish 
population figures are from UN Demographic Handbook 1961, p.137 (1952-1959); 
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, pp.666-667 (1960-1987); 
and The Swedish-International Press Bureau Newsletter from Sweden, 11 January 
1989, p.6 (1988). Australian population figures are from IMF, In te rn a tio na l 
Financial Statistics Yearbook 1984, pp. 150-151 (1955-1978); and IMF,
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p.209 (1979-1987). Different 
series' all dovetailed neatly.
Figures as a percentage of GDP were obtained by dividing 1980 real figures by 
each country's constant GDP in 1980 currency.
It should be pointed out that if GDP is rising, a given rise in tax in absolute 
terms from a low base can lead to a bigger rise relative to GDP than a smaller absolute 
rise from a high base, which explains why central government taxation may in certain 
circumstances rise less in absolute terms than general government taxation but more 
relative to GDP. Consider a $20 tax rise in the following circumstances:
(1) GDP constant at $100 per capita:
(a) From base $10 a $20 rise = 30/100 - 10/100
= a 20% rise as a proportion of GDP
(b) From base $40 a $20 rise = 60/100 - 40/100
= a 20% rise as a proportion of GDP
(2) GDP doubling from ti to t2 from $100 to $200 per capita:
(a) From base $10 a $20 rise = 30/200 - 10/100
= a 5% rise as a proportion of GDP
(b) From base $40 a $20 rise = 60/200 - 40/100
= a 10% fall as a proportion of GDP
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Table A1.1 Variable means and standard deviations
Variables Sweden Australia
Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation deviation
Change in percentage of total vote 
since previous election in:
Government vote -0 .9 2 2.30 -2 .0 0 3.29
Left vote -0 .1 3 2.21 0.09 4.38
Right vote -0 .7 7 2.95 0.12 4.19
Change in 1980 $A over 12 months 
preceding election in real per capita:
Central government total tax 64.25 64.11 50.26 43.84
General government total tax 124.55 109.77 67.80 44.67
Central government direct tax 25.76 52.45 39.74 31.30
General government direct tax 54.92 56.28 39.74 31.30
Central government expenditure 65.72 77.63 69.10 62.88
General government expenditure 150.35 121.42 90.81 63.59
Change as a percentage of GDP over 
12 months preceding election in:
Central government total tax 0.14 0.72 0.30 0.52
General government total tax 0.51 1 .43 0.47 0.53
Central government direct tax 0.07 0.59 0.29 0.44
General government direct tax 0.15 0.64 0.29 0.44
Central government expenditure 0.27 0.80 0.59 0.90
General government expenditure 0.78 1 .30 0.79 0.92
Percentage change over 12 months 
preceding election in:
Consumer price index 6.05 2.54 6.85 4.78
Unemployment (percent of workforce) -0 .0 8 0.41 0.28 0.97
Real wages 2.46 1 .82 1.78 1.36
Sources
1. Voting figures:
Bengt Owe Birgersson, Stig Hadenius, Björn Moiin & Hans Wieslander (1984),Sverige 
efier 1900 - en modern politisk historia, Stockholm, pp.344-345 (Sweden 1958- 
1 982) .
Sören Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam (1987), Väljare och Val i Sverige, Stockholm, 
p.24 (Sweden 1985).
Statistiska Centralbyrän (Sweden 1988).
Malcolm Mackerras (1988), 'Election results', in Australia Votes: the 1987 Federal 
Election , ed. Ian McAllister & John Warhurst, Melbourne, p.273 (Australia 1958- 
1 987) .
Australian Electoral Commission.
2. Other variables: see preceding sections of Appendix 1.
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Table A1.2 Correlation matrix for Table 6.13 preferred model - Sweden
Correlation Matrix for Variables: X i ... X q
ALeft vo...A Right ... AT12 ADTG12 AEG12 AC12 AU12 %AW12
ALeft vote 1
A Right v... -.591 1
AT 1 2 -.188 .259 1
ADTG12 -.424 .067 .708 1
AEG12 .129 .366 .132 -.048 1
AC12 -.188 .235 .09 .1 1 1 .557 1
AU12 .55 -.101 -.316 -.292 .402 .213 1
%A W 1 2 -.568 .666 .35 .362 .001 -.412 -.324 1
Note: 20 cases deleted with missing values, 
(non-election years)
Table A1.3 Correlation matrix for Table 6.13 preferred model - Australia
Correlation Matrix for Variables: X-| ... X q
ALeft vo... A Right ... ATT12 ADT12 ACE12 AC12 AU12 %AW12
ALeft vote 1
A Right v... -.76 1
ATT 1 2 -.038 .173 1
ADT12 .027 .067 .89 1
ACE12 -.41 1 .332 .356 .177 1
AC12 -.165 .141 .41 .485 .45 1
AU1 2 -.109 .064 -.278 -.23 .356 .559 1
%A W 1 2 .355 -.335 .105 .048 .366 -.274 -.089 1
Note: 29 cases deleted with missing values, 
(non-election years)
Dependent variables:
ALeft vote Change in vote for Left government alternative % total vote
ARight vote Change in vote for Right government alternative % total vote
Independent variables: change over 12 months prior to election in:
AT 1 2 General government real per capita total taxation
ADTG12 General government real per capita direct taxation
AEG12 General government real per capita expenditure
ATT 12 Central government real per capita total taxation
ADT12 Central government real per capita direct taxation
ACE12 Central government real per capita expenditure
AC12 Consumer price index
AU12 Unemployment as percentage of workforce
%AW 1 2 Real wages
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Appendix 2: Major legislative changes to taxation
The changes to tax legislation listed below are grouped by the year of the 
subsequent election, and by the calendar year in which they took place. Asterisks 
indicate changes that took place in the 12 months prior to each election.
A2.1 Sweden 1958-1988
1 9 5 8
1 957 Income tax rates cut
1 958 Abolition of estate tax* 
Increase in inheritance tax*
1 9 6 0
1 959 Income tax rates raised 
Supplementary pension fees introduced
1 960 Company tax rates cut *
General sales tax of 4% introduced
1 9 6 4
1 961 Income tax cut
Regional income tax deduction raised and standardized to become basic 
deduction
Supplementary pension fees increased 
Sales tax raised from 4% to 6%
Petrol tax raised
Company tax reformed to allow losses to be set against profits for tax 
purposes
1 9 6 8
1 965 Income tax rates lowered for lower income earners 
Basic pension levy raised (by making it assessable on taxable 
rather than net income)
Child allowance raised
Local income tax deductions standardized
General sales tax raised from 6% to 9%
Excises on tobacco and petrol raised 
Sales tax on investment lowered 
Some excises lowered 
Wealth tax lower limit raised
1 966 Share profits made taxable
1 967 General sales tax raised from 9% to 10%
1 968 Profits from property made taxable *
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1 969 
1 970
1 972
1 973 
1 974
1 975
1 976 
1 977
1 978 
1 979
1 9 7 0
Social insurance fees transferred from employee to employer 
VAT introduced
Income tax rates cut and made more progressive*
Local tax deduction abolished and other deductions reduced or 
abolished *
VAT raised from 10% to 15% *
Wealth tax raised *
Inheritance tax raised *
1 9 7 3
Income tax rates for lower income earners cut and for higher income 
earners raised, that is, progressivity increased 
General employer levy raised from 2% to 4% of payroll 
VAT and excises raised 
Income tax cut *
Basic pension levy transferred from individuals to employers * 
Excises on petrol and motor vehicles raised *
1 9 7 6
Income tax rates raised for higher incomes and lowered for middle 
incomes, that is, progressivity increased 
Income tax deductions widened 
VAT temporarily lowered 
Property taxes raised on one-family houses 
Employer levies raised
Income tax rates for middle income earners lowered, and raised for 
higher income earners, that is, progressivity increased* 
Income tax deductions for savings increased *
Investment allowance introduced 
Energy tax reduced 
Employer levies raised*
Investment allowance increased*
1 9 7 9
Income tax rates cut 
VAT increased 
Energy tax raised 
Employer levy raised
Income tax rates cut
10% tax deduction introduced for business sector construction 
expenditure 
Petrol tax raised 
Employer levy abolished
Tax indexation introduced*
Income tax rates cut*
Income tax deductions increased for pensioners and child maintenance* 
Supplementary pension levy increased *
Occupational injury insurance levy raised*
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1 979 
1 980
1 981 
1 982
1 982 
1 983
1984
1985
1986 
1 987
1 9 8 2
Energy taxes raised
Income tax rebate introduced for medium income earners 
Marginal rates of income tax cut 
Pension allowance increased
Deduction for certain business investments introduced
Tax cut for dividends and shares
Child allowance increased
VAT increased
Energy taxes raised
Excises raised for oil, petrol
Basic deduction for local income tax increased*
VAT cut*
Energy taxes raised*
Alcohol tax raised*
1 9 8 5
Tax deduction of 40% for union fees introduced 
VAT increased
Tax raised on wealth, gifts and inheritances 
Excises raised
Payroll levy for unemployment insurance raised 
Apartments built before 1975 made subject to tax
Energy tax increased 
Alcohol taxes increased 
Sales tax on cars increased 
Property tax introduced
Capital gains tax increased via lowering basic deduction 
Corporate tax cut from 40% to 32%
Turnover tax on securities introduced 
Tax concession for R&D abolished 
Depreciation deductions reduced 
20% fee imposed on share dividends
Taxes on energy, alcohol, and vacations increased*
Wealth tax increased temporarily
Income tax rates cut*
Excises on cars increased*
New wealth tax on dwellings and business buildings introduced*
1 9 8 8
Energy tax increased 
Vacation tax increased
Once-for-all levy on insurance companies and pension funds
Basic deduction introduced for national income tax 
Income tax rates restructured 
Endowment insurance made subject to wealth tax 
Tax on endowment insurance interest increased 
Top rates for inheritance and gift taxes reduced
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Vehicle purchase and sales tax increased 
Energy taxes increased 
Turnover tax on securities extended 
Heavy vehicle tax increased 
Payroll charges cut*
Securities tax broadened*
Tax concessions for advance interest payments reduced*
1 9 88 Profit sharing made taxable*
Petrol tax increased*
Heavy vehicle tax increased*
Oil and coal tax increased*
Sources Enrique Rodrigues (1981), Den Svensk Skattehistorien, Liber 
Läromedel Lund, Stockholm
Nils Elvander (1972), Svensk Skattepolitik 1945-70, Raben & 
Sjögren, Sweden.
Axel Hadenius (1981), Spelet om Skatten, Norstedts, Lund.
OECD Economic Surveys - Sweden, June 1975, April 1976,
April 1977, April 1978, April 1979, April 1980, June 1981, 
July 1982, February 1984, May 1985, April 1987, 1988-89, 
OECD, Paris.
A2.2 Australia 1958-1987
1 9 5 8
1 956 Income tax concessions increased, especially for dependants
Excise on vehicles, petrol, alcohol, tobacco raised 
Company tax raised
1 9 57 Income tax concessions increased
Sales tax concessions increased 
Duty imposed on aviation fuel 
Estate duty concessions increased 
Company tax cut
1 958 Income tax concessions increased*
1 9 6 1
1 95 9 Income tax concessions increased
Fuel tax reduced
Company tax concessions increased
1 9 6 0 Income tax concessions reduced
Income tax concessions increased 
Sales tax rates raised 
Sales tax concessions increased 
Sales tax on cars increased 
Company tax increased
1961 Income tax concessions increased, especially for primary producers*
Sales tax on cars reduced*
Sales tax reduced*
3 34
1 962 
1 963
1 964
1 965 
1 966
1 967  
1968
1 969 
1 970 
1 971
1 9 6 3
Income tax cut
Income tax threshold increased*
Income tax concessions increased, for example for dependants, 
education, and medical expenses*
Sales tax removed from most food*
Sales tax concessions increased*
Estate duty exemption limits raised*
Business tax concessions increased, including introduction of an 
investment allowance*
1 9 6 6
Income tax rebate abolished
Income tax concession for aged increased
Sales tax increased
Excise on tobacco increased
Company tax increased
Taxation of superannuation funds increased
Income tax rates increased
Overseas service pay exempted from tax
Excise increased on fuel, alcohol and tobacco
Income tax concessions increased, especially for primary producers* 
Sales tax concessions increased*
Gift duty concessions increased*
Payroll tax concessions increased*
1 9 6 9
Income tax concessions increased for dependants, insurance, 
superannuation and the aged
Sales tax increased
Company tax increased
Tax on superannuation funds increased
Income tax deductions increased for the aged, primary producers, 
holders of convertible issues*
Subscribed capital deductibility restricted*
Estate duty exemption limit increased*
1 9 7 2
Income tax rates reduced 
Income tax aged allowance increased 
Sales tax increased
Customs and excise increased, for example on alcohol and fuel 
Company tax increased 
Receipts duty introduced
Income tax levy raised
Income tax deductions increased, for example for education 
Excise and duty raised on tobacco and fuel 
Lowest company tax rate increased
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1 972
1 973
1 974
1 975
1 975
1 976
Income tax levy reduced*
Income tax rates cut*
Income tax concessions increased, for example for self-education and 
dependants*
Excise introduced on LPG and shale oil*
Exemption levels for estate and gift duty doubled*
1 9 7 4
Income tax concessions for land tax and rates reduced*
Profits on property sold within year of purchase made taxable for 
income tax*
Duty-free concessions reduced*
Income tax concessions for various industries abolished, including 
for mining exploration, manufacturing plant depreciation, 
primary industry and life insurance companies*
Excise on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel increased*
Lower rate of company tax raised to ordinary rate*
1 9 7 5
Income tax rates cut for lower income earners and raised for higher 
income earners, that is, progressivity increased 
Surcharge on property income tax introduced 
Income tax concessions for education reduced 
Income tax concessions increased for low-income families 
and overseas dependants 
More fringe benefits made taxable 
Tax introduced for LPG for road vehicles 
Duty on imported vehicles increased 
Excise increased on tobacco and spirits 
Private company tax rate increased to public company rate 
Company tax rate cut 
Mining concessions reduced 
Accelerated depreciation scheme introduced
Income tax rates cut*
Income tax deductions introduced for housing loans*
Sales tax on motor vehicles cut*
1 9 7 7
Income tax system restructured and made more progressive
Surcharge on property income abolished
Excises increased on alcohol and tobacco
Company tax reduced
Levy introduced on crude oil production
Levy introduced on export of coal
(all 1975 measures are from the Hayden Budget)
Income tax concessions for children replaced by family allowances 
Investment allowance introduced 
Income tax indexation introduced 
Medibank levy introduced
Upper limits raised for exemption from estate and gift duty
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1 977
1 978
1 979
1 980
1981
Company tax concessions increased, especially for oil and mineral 
exploration
Crude oil levy on new discoveries abolished 
Coal levy reduced 
Meat export levy abolished 
Superphosphate bounty reintroduced
Tax indexation discounted*
Income tax cut for higher income groups and raised for lower 
income groups, that is, progressivity reduced*
Income tax concessions increased for gifts to the arts*
Income tax rebate abolished*
Company tax rate increased*
Coal levy reduced*
Crude oil levy and petroleum excise increased*
1 9 8 0
Income tax rates cut, then increased again 
Additional welfare payments made taxable 
Tax deductions abolished for home loan interest, overseas 
dependants
Health insurance levy abolished
Excise on alcohol and tobacco increased
Sales tax on cars reduced
Crude oil levy increased
Departure tax introduced
Customs duty replaces quotas on some goods
Income tax surcharge extended 
Income tax surcharge removed
Depreciation allowance introduced for income-producing buildings
Conservation tax concession introduced
Limit on car depreciation imposed
Duty imposed on most hitherto duty-free imports
Gift and estate duty abolished
Business tax concessions increased, including for oil exploration and 
development, and for grain storage 
Restrictions imposed on carrying forward of paper losses 
Coal levy reduced 
Crude oil levy increased*
Income tax concessions increased, for example for superannuation, 
dependants, and gifts*
Half-indexation introduced*
Income tax rates cut*
Tax deductions for self-employed superannuation introduced* 
Deductibility for gifts increased*
Business tax deductions increased, for example for primary 
industry,
manufacturing plant and equipment*
Crude oil levy increased*
1 9 8 3
Indexation ended
Income tax rebate introduced for health insurance 
Income tax concessions increased for isolated areas 
Income tax deductions restricted for mining equipment 
Sales tax rate increased
3 3 7
1 982
1 983
1 984
1 985
Departure tax increased 
Coal levy extended to black coal
Income tax rates cut*
Income tax rebates introduced for pensioners, home loan interest, 
dividend income, and employee shares*
Income tax concessions increased for dependent children and gifts* 
Depreciation allowances introduced for plant and non-residential 
income-producing buildings 
Diesel fuel tax concessions restricted*
Sales tax rates increased*
Sales tax base broadened*
Beer and tobacco excise increased*
Business tax concessions increased by allowing losses of one company 
of a group to be set against profits of others for tax purposes* 
Retrospective anti-tax avoidance measures introduced*
1 9 8 4
Concessional tax threshold increased
Concessions abolished for health insurance, home loan interest, 
dividend income, clearing, home insulation, Army Reserve pay, 
films, and gold mining losses 
Health insurance levy introduced 
Tax introduced on lump sum superannuation 
Excises increased on fuel and alcohol, and indexed 
New duty imposed on imported petroleum products 
Bank debits tax commences operation 
Crude oil levy reduced
Income tax rates cut*
Rebates introduced for social security beneficiaries*
Rebates extended to de facto spouses*
Rebates increased for pensioners and people in isolated areas*
Income threshold for application of health levy increased*
Excises increased for alcohol, tobacco, and refined petroleum 
products*
Excises reduced on LPG and certain electronic material*
Sales tax extended to wine and cider*
Excise on aviation fuel increased*
Excise introduced to encourage development of 'old' oil*
Business concessions increased for new non-residential income 
producing buildings, mining exploration, and primary 
producers*
Business tax concessions reduced for loss transfers between 
companies*
Resource rent tax introduced*
1 9 8 7
Deductibility abolished for entertainment expenses 
Income tax concessions restricted for debt costs on rental properties, 
education, medical expenses, superannuation, capital subscribed 
to films, water conservation, and petroleum and afforestation 
companies
Deduction for self-employed superannuation increased 
Deduction introduced for local government campaign expenditure 
and for racing
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1986
1987
Sources:
Health insurance levy threshold increased, and ceiling abolished
Sales tax system restructured
Capital gains tax introduced
Company tax extended to trading public unit trusts
Superannuation tax loophole closed
Lump sum superannuation tax increased
Income tax rates cut*
Superannuation deductions increased*
Excises increased on petroleum products 
Health levy increased*
Sales tax increased*
Rebates on free market sale of Bass Strait oil introduced 
Fringe benefits tax introduced 
Bank accounts debits tax increased*
Income tax rates cut - progressivity reduced*
Foreign income made subject to Australian income tax* 
Superannuation taxation restructured*
Corporate tax rates cut*
Corporate tax concessions cut*
Full imputation for company taxation introduced*
Australian Government Budget Speeches and Statements, 1954/55 to 
1986/87, AGPS, Canberra
OECD Economic Surveys - Australia, July 1975, December 1976, 
April 1978, June 1979, June 1980, January 1982, January 
1983, June 1984, June 1985, March 1987, June 1988
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives),
20 May 1976, 17 August 1976 (1976 tax information)
Peter Groenewegen (1985), Everyone's Guide to Taxation in 
Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
Peter Groenewegen (1987), Tax reform in Australia and New 
Zealand', in Australian Taxation Policy, ed. P.D. Groenewegen, 
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne
Political Chronicle of the Australian Journal of Politics & History, 
v. 1 (1955) to v.30 (1984)
Authors:
1 955 D.W. Rawson
1 956 D.W. Rawson 
S. Encel
1 957 S. Encel
1 9 58 - 1964 D.W. Rawson
1965 Ian Wilson 
L. J. Hume
1 966 L. J. Hume
1967 - 1968 Coiin A. Hughes
1 969 D.W. Rawson
19 70 - 1 9 72 Colin A. Hughes
1973 Colin A. Hughes 
M.N.B. Cribb
339
1 974
1 975-1 979 
1980
1 981 -1 984
Political reviews 
(1 987).
Authors:
1 984 
1 985 
1 986
1987
Colin A. Hughes 
Roy Forward 
D.W. Rawson 
P.L. Reynolds
Australian Quarterly, v.56/4 (1984) to v.59
Brian Galligan (No.4) 
Brian Galligan 
Brian Galligan (No.2) 
David Adams (No.3) 
Marian Simms (No.4) 
Christine Jennett (No.1) 
David Adams (No.2) 
Marian Simms (No.3-4)
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Appendix 3: Election manifestos and policy speeches
Mentions of tax in election manifestos and policy speeches are listed below by 
election year and then by party. Apart from the Australian Democrats, only parties that 
have been represented in the Lower House of Parliament in each country are included, 
namely the Social Democrats, Centre Party, Liberals, Conservatives and Communists 
in Sweden, and the Labor Party, Liberals and Nationals in Australia. The Democrats 
have been included due to their recent importance in the Senate, but DLP policy 
speeches were not available.
In a few cases manifestos are not available, and in some of these other sources 
have been used, the criterion being that the source is an official document of the 
national party, and that it contains enough detail to make it unlikely that any important 
tax promises have been omitted. These are The Right (Conservatives) 1956, Social 
Democrats 1960 and 1964, Centre Party 1964, and Liberals 1968. Information is 
completely missing only for the Liberals and Conservatives for 1964.
A3.1 Sweden
1 9 5 8
Social Democrats
Centre
Liberals
For compulsory levy for supplementary pensions
Against compulsory levy for supplementary pensions
Against compulsory levy for supplementary pensions 
Extra company tax to be removed in order to stimulate 
savings
Conservatives Against compulsory levy for supplementary pensions
Tax on vehicles and fuel to be cut 
Area deduction for certain expensive areas to be cut 
Introduction of tax concession for families with children 
10% rebate to be introduced on pay-as-you-earn income 
tax
Extra company tax to be abolished 
Income tax to be reduced for families and middle-income 
groups
Estate tax to be abolished
Communists For compulsory levy for supplementary pensions
Supports a just distribution of taxation
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Social Democrats 
Centre
Liberals
Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats 
Centre
19  60
Tax according to ability to pay 
A firm hand with tax dodgers
General sales tax has led to excessively high tax, and should 
be abolished to encourage savings and production 
Shrewd savings give lower taxes, and increased possibilities 
for production
The Conservatives' tax increases for families with children 
would hit the lowest income earners
General sales tax to be abolished
Tax to be reformed so as not to discourage new initiatives by 
individuals and corporations 
Joint taxation of spouses to be reformed 
It must profit one to work
Spending cuts are a precondition of tax cuts 
General sales tax to be abolished 
Savings to be made tax-free for homes, home loan 
repayments, children's education 
Cuts to pay-as-you-earn income tax for all, especially 
middle-income earners, involving considerable cuts to 
marginal rates
Deduction to be raised for families with children 
A low-tax society, with freedom of choice and reward for 
work
Cuts in national income tax up to incomes of SEK25,000, 
and exemption from national income tax of first 
SEK9.000 of family income
Increases in company tax, tax on speculation, and tax on 
large fortunes
Against raising of basic pension levy, general sales tax and 
excises
General sales tax to be abolished
Against lowering of company tax
More effective anti-evasion measures
Defence spending to be cut to make room for tax cuts
1 9 6 4
Nothing at all on tax
Taxes must be reduced, especially for low- and middle- 
income earners
Tax reforms proposed by investigation must be put through:
- raising of tax-free basic deduction
- cuts in tax rates
- abolition of energy tax and other excises
- introduction of deduction for women who work on spouse's
farm or business
- higher deduction for working married women and single
parents
- abolition of extra tax on business investment (a
consequence of shift to VAT)
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Liberals
Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats 
Centre
Liberals
- cut in social insurance levies on small business (although 
refused Centre demand for total tax-financing of basic 
pension)
Next year's property tax must not mean higher tax
Local tax should be equalized
Savings should be encouraged via tax breaks
Not available
Not available
Lower tax for smaller income earners via higher tax on big 
fortunes and profits
More just distribution of taxation according to ability to pay
1 9 6 8
"A tax policy which gives nation and local government the 
necessary resources"
Bourgeois tax policies transfer burden to those who can bear 
it least
Tax reform needed to simplify and rationalize the system 
Opposes the recent increases in indirect tax, which hit low 
income earners and families
General cuts in tax burden not possible at present, due to 
needs both in Sweden and in the world, but tax must not 
climb further
Tax policy goals: income equalization and economic growth 
(including managing the business cycle)
Standard deduction for local income tax should be introduced in 
order to cut direct tax for low income earners 
Taxation according to ability to pay regardless of civil status 
- that is, guarantees are needed against increasing tax on 
those who lack real opportunities to work outside the 
home
Measures are needed to combat the effect of inflation on tax 
Direct tax system must encourage savings 
Energy tax and other excises should be abolished unless 
there are medicinal or other special reasons 
There should be increased write-offs for buildings and 
farms in the first year
Introduction of the general employer levy should be
postponed if there looks like being deficient capacity to 
pay
Tax equalization between local government regions should be 
improved
Present tax system is too complicated, and hinders fight against 
tax evasion
Good that Social Democrats have finally accepted our 
proposal to replace the general sales tax with VAT, but 
why not put through a proper reform?
Our tax reform will mean that it profits one more to work 
and save
Marginal rates of income tax to be lowered, and the tax-free 
threshold raised, as a measured transition from direct to 
indirect tax continues
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Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats
Centre
Liberals
Joint taxation’s disadvantages will continue to be removed, 
to make it more profitable for married women to work 
outside the home, and to create justice for single people 
We don't promise less overall tax, due to the social
problems that need solving, but it must be a better tax 
system
Tax reform will facilitate wage negotiations and thus dampen 
increases in wages and prices
Area deduction to be raised, to advantage low-income earners 
proportionally most
All marginal rates of national income tax to be cut except 
lowest
Area deduction raised for people on basic pension, 
eventually to be tax-free
General aim to reduce progressivity, to stimulate work 
incentive, savings incentives, and enterprise, to 
improve tax morality, and to counteract inflation 
VAT to be raised to finance tax reform (in addition to 
expenditure cuts)
Proposed employer levy should be deferred 
Energy tax should be replaced by VAT 
25% investment tax should be abolished, to encourage 
investment
Higher tax on big fortunes and inheritances 
Higher company tax
Higher tax on profits from shares and land 
Lower tax burden on smaller income earners via lower local 
income tax (with national government taking over 
expenditure); less progressivity at bottom of scale; indirect 
tax made progressive (different rates on different items); 
and rejection of VAT and other indirect tax increases
1 9 7 0
Current tax reform will give two thirds lower tax, and 
women full tax justice 
Local tax equalization will be made effective 
Company tax to be reformed 
We want a tax policy that leads to greater equality 
Oppose Conservatives' attempt to shift tax burden from high 
income earners to low income earners 
Oppose middle parties' hypocrisy in both approving
government's tax cuts for lower income earners while 
promising future tax cuts for higher income earners, 
without financing
Tax system to be reformed so that burden on low income 
earners is lessened
Tax system to be indexed
There will be extra deductions for diminished taxable 
capacity at very low incomes 
It must profit one to work
3 4 4
C onserva tives Oppose Palme governm ent higher taxes 
Aim  of tax policy that it profits one to work and save, and 
creates resources
Tax to be cut on increases in income 
Increased allowance to be made for fam ilies' costs and for 
fam ilies where the w ife works at home 
Basic pension to be made tax-free
C om m unists Rejection of VAT
1 9 7 3
Social Dem ocrats No mention of tax at all in manifesto
Centre Tax system to be reformed to lower tax for low income 
earners and counteract the increase in taxation on 
m iddle incom e earners
Jo in t taxation to be abolished on spouses who work together 
in the ir own com pany
Tax and transfers to be coordinated in order to contro l 
m arg inal e ffects
Local tax equalization to be strengthened
VAT on essential food items to be reduced and ultimately 
abolished
L ib e ra ls Lower tax fo r people on ord inary incomes
Income tax to be indexed
New rules for fam ily assistance in o rder to stop
unreasonable m arginal e ffects due to in teraction with 
tax
Jo in t taxa tion 's  in justice w ill be abolished 
Changed rules for pensioners in order to enable them to keep 
more of the ir income
VAT on essential food items to be phased out 
Establishm ent of security funds by medium com panies to be 
t a x - f r e e
Tax evasion will be fought 
It m ust pro fit one to work
C onserva tives A just policy d irected towards lower tax in order to make it 
worthw hile  to w ork and save 
Econom y with taxation 
Basic pension to be made tax-free 
Tax regulations to be reform ed to create freedom o f choice 
between working and staying at home, and between 
d iffe ren t form s o f ch ildcare
C om m unists Low er tax fo r w age-earners
VAT on food to be abolished
H igher tax on com panies and big fortunes
Measures against tax cheating
National governm ent to take over large local governm ent 
expend itu re
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Social Democrats
Centre
Liberals
Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats
1 9 7 6
Agreement with unions on tax will give more peaceful wage 
negotiations
Asks what bourgeois tax policy would be if they won 
Mentions items that would need more tax
Tax system to be reformed to lighten burden on low and 
middle income earners and on the use of labour, and to 
end the automatic increases due to inflation 
Capital taxation to be directed towards stimulating the 
establishment of new firms and facilitating the transfer 
of family companies between generations 
Taxation of energy and essential raw materials to be directed 
towards conserving them
Tax according to ability to pay to be extended to company 
taxation
Tax reform to be used to combat inflation 
Local tax equalization to be improved
Lower tax for ordinary income earners, in order to reduce 
inflation
Tax system will be indexed
There will be no tax cuts that hit care for the weak in 
society
Tax burden should not continue to increase 
It should be made rewarding to work and save 
Marginal rates should be lowered, so that average wage- 
earners can keep half at least of extra income 
Tax deductions to be introduced for childcare, to create 
freedom of choice between different forms 
Lower taxation fights inflation by facilitating wage 
negotiations
Rapid rise of employer taxation must be broken
Unified income tax should be replace national and local income 
tax, with lower rates for low income earners than the 
present flat local tax rate 
Military spending should be cut to allow tax cuts 
VAT on food should be abolished 
Tax on profits and large fortunes should be raised 
Tax flight and cheating must be fought
1 9 7 9
Tax reform to contribute to more just distribution of 
income
Tax on production to be introduced, to make possible cuts in 
national and local income tax 
Tax evasion to be combatted
Centre No mention at all of taxation in manifesto
3 46
Liberals
Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats
Centre
Since 1976 income tax scale has been indexed, and marginal 
rates cut
Marginal tax to be cut further, as high rates drive inflation, 
stimulate tax avoidance, make wage negotiations more 
difficult, encourage tax flight and tax evasion, and 
weaken tax morality
Not presently possible to reduce total tax pressure, due to 
claims on the budget and to the deficit 
Tax indexation to be safeguarded 
Marginal rates to be reduced with the aim that people on 
ordinary incomes will keep at least half extra income 
Marginal effects of tax interacting with means-tested housing 
grants to be reduced 
House taxation to be rationalized 
Fight against economic crime to be intensified 
Law to be established against tax flight 
Deductibility for losses to be limited 
It must profit one better to work and save
Taxation must be lowered 
Work and saving must be profitable 
Tax policy must improve will to work and productivity 
Marginal taxes must be lowered so that ordinary income 
earners keep at least half of extra income 
Income tax deduction for childcare, in order to give freedom 
of choice to stay at home, and between different forms of 
childcare
Lower tax rates to be financed by savings in national and 
local government, not by extra tax elsewhere 
Tax and transfers for families to be coordinated in order to 
prevent unreasonable marginal effects
Unified income tax should replace national and local income tax 
VAT on food should be abolished 
Tax on production should be introduced 
Capital and profits should be more heavily taxed 
Profits from large fortunes should be transferred to a social 
fund
Military spending should be cut to allow tax cuts
1 9 8 2
VAT to be restored to 1981 levels in order to finance sickness 
benefits, unemployment insurance, pension indexation and 
grants to local governments 
Employer levy to be increased
Tax shall be designed according to ability to pay, and to 
encourage work
Agreed tax reform shall be carried out, which will dampen 
inflation
Further tax reform will be considered 
Marginal effects due to interaction of tax and transfers will 
be reviewed
In longer term, system of consumption tax should be tested, 
so that only income consumed would be taxed 
Local tax equalization shall be maintained
3 4 7
Liberals
Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats
Centre
Liberals
Tax reform needs to be completed in order to encourage 
work and savings
Marginal rates of income tax need to be cut further 
More action against tax evasion 
It must profit one to work
Tax burden must be lowered to encourage work incentive, 
savings and enterprise 
Attacks Social Democratic high taxes 
Marginal rate shall be at most 50% for overwhelming 
majority of taxpayers 
Inflation shall not raise tax by stealth 
There shall be the right to deduct losses 
Tax cuts to be financed by savings in government 
expenditure
A ceiling shall be placed on local tax and national tax 
shall be reduced, in order to reduce the merry-go- 
round of taxes and transfers 
There will be no extra tax on production 
Weak regions will be stimulated by lower tax, not increased 
grants
Family taxation shall take account of the extra costs of children 
Childcare shall be deductible, to give freedom of choice to 
stay at home, and between different forms of childcare
1981 tax agreement is unjust and should be cancelled 
VAT on food should be abolished
A turnover tax should be introduced on stocks and shares 
Government forces responsibilities and thus tax rises onto 
local governments 
Tax cheating must be stopped
1 9 8 5
Total pressure on tax to be kept more or less unchanged 
Tax system to be made simpler and more equitable 
Local tax equalization to be reformed 
Income tax objective that at least 90% of all recipients of 
earned income pay no more than 50% in marginal 
taxation
Further rises in tax burden must be opposed in order to 
prevent the risk of new price spirals 
Marginal tax must be reduced to what was agreed to in 1981 
Income tax scale to be indexed
VAT on basic food shall be reduced by redistributing VAT 
New property tax will be abolished 
Forest worth tax will be abolished 
Local tax equalization to be improved
Market economy should not be stripped by increased taxes 
There will be no tax rises
Top marginal income tax rate to be reduced to 70%, with a 
50% rate up to SEK200,000 
Income tax to be indexed 
Remaining joint taxation to be abolished 
New property tax to be abolished 
Environmental levies to be introduced
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Conservatives
Communists
Social Democrats
Centre
Public sector should be limited to sphere where households 
and individual enterprises can't operate well 
Too big and quick growth of public sector the main reason 
for Sweden's economic difficulties, as it restricts the 
private sector via high taxes, regulations, costs and 
prices, and thus reduces competitiveness and the 
incentive to work and save 
Tax burden should be lowered to that of comparable 
countries
Production taxes to be lowered first, to stimulate work, 
savings and business
Taxes will not be raised unless exceptional circumstances 
arise
A ceiling will be introduced on local income tax 
Marginal rates of income tax will be reduced to 40% on 
average, with a ceiling of 70%
Child deductions will be introduced in local income tax, 
according to ability to pay 
Childcare costs will be made deductible 
Corporate tax will be lowered to average income tax rate 
Double taxation on dividends will be abolished 
Taxation on shares will be harmonized, with profits on 
long-held shares made tax-free 
Wealth tax to be cut, to encourage investment, and abolished 
for working capital in small and medium business 
Inheritance and gift tax to be cut
There will be no increase in public spending, which may be cut 
Tax to be replaced by fees where possible, except where 
there are strong social reasons not to do so
Tax system should be more progressive 
Tax on ordinary people should be cut 
Tax should be raised on capital, big fortunes, speculation 
and high incomes 
VAT on food should be abolished
1 9 8 8
Tax to be made fairer
1989 income tax to be reduced as first step in a larger tax 
reform aimed at encouraging work and saving, 
counteracting tax evasion, and achieving a fairer 
distribution of the tax burden between labour and capital 
Reduction in income tax to be financed by increased
revenues from indirect tax and capital taxes, and a tight 
expenditure policy
Tax system will be altered by reducing tax on work and
increasing tax on raw materials and energy, with a goal of 
reduced tax levels for individuals 
The basic deduction on income tax shall be increased, and 
marginal rates cut, in order to lower tax for everyone 
Environmental levies on pollutants to be introduced 
Employer levies to be reduced for small business 
Local tax equalization to be improved
3 4 9
Liberals
Conservatives
Communists
Greens
Work and saving to be encouraged by letting people keep the 
greater part of what they earn 
Tax burden will be lowered
Marginal tax rates to be cut by 4% in 1989 for all full­
time workers
Income tax system to be indexed
Later cuts to marginal tax so that most people keep 60%, 
and all keep at least 50%
Tax cuts financed by lowering compensation level for 
sickness benefit from 90% of previous income to 80%
Wealth tax on working capital to be abolished for small and 
medium business
Social levies on dividends to be abolished 
Employer levy for Norrland inland to be cut by 10%
Alcohol tax to be increased 
Environmental levies to be introduced
Tax burden to be lowered by an average 1% of GDP per year, in 
particular income tax, cuts in which would be financed 
by stringent expenditure controls and not by tax 
increases elsewhere
1989 marginal rates of income tax to be cut by 4-5%, as 
the prelude to a larger tax reform so that the marginal 
rate for most people would be 35%, with a ceiling of 
5 0%
Income tax will be indexed 
Childcare will become deductible 
A ceiling will be put on local income tax
A basic deduction for children will be introduced in local income 
tax
Tax cuts open new possibilities and stimulate growth 
One must be able to live on one's income 
Tax burden on small business will be lessened by not taxing 
working capital
Inheritance tax to be reduced, to encourage family 
businesses
Tax on profits to finance wage-earner funds will be
abolished along with the wage-earner funds themselves
VAT on food should be abolished
Taxes should be raised on liquid resources held by
companies, as well as on the largest fortunes, speculation, 
and share trading
In the longer term a tax on production should be introduced, 
which would create possibilities for lower income tax 
for ordinary wage earners
Taxes and charges on labour should be reduced, but tax increased 
on energy, emissions, use of raw materials, and speculation 
Introduction of a tax-free basic income zone of SEK31.000 
for all incomes
VAT to be removed from home-grown staple food items and 
increased on other goods
Employment tax rates in rural areas must be reduced
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Sources
The manifestos and other sources below are produced by the party concerned 
except where indicated.
Social Democrats:
1 95 8 Första maj manifest, SAP Verksamheten 1958, pp.7-10
1 960 
1 964 
1 968
Pamphlet: 'Socialdemokratin vill...'
Pamphlets: 'Mot nya djärva mäP (2); 'Ditt val den 20 September' 
Partistyrelsens 6 augusti uttalande, SAP Verksamheten 1968, pp.26- 
27
1 970 
1 973
Valmanifest
'Arbete miljö demokrati: vi bygger vidare': partistyrelsens uttalande 
inför valet den 16 September
1 976 
1 979 
1 982 
1 985 
1988
Valmanifest, SAP Verksamheten 1976, pp.31-33 
Valmanifest: 'Sverige behöver en socialdemokratisk regering' 
Valmanifest: 'Fred och arbete'
Valmanifest: 'En inbjudan till alia väljare'
Valmanifest: 'Till valarbetarna'
Centre Party:
1 95 8 Valprogram vid nyvalet till riksdagens andra kammare 1958
1 960 
1964 
1968 
1 970 
1 973 
1 976 
1 979 
1 982
Pamphlet: 'Nägra politiska frägor'
Centerns valprogram 1964 
Valprogrammet 68
Programuttalande av Centerns partisytrelse den 7 augusti 1970
Framtidspolitik i 40 punkter
Centerns valprogram 1976
Program inför valet den 16 September 1979
Program inför valet den 19 September 1982: 'Gemenskap där alia
behövs'
1 985 
1988
Program inför valet 15 September 1985: 'Med Centern för framtiden' 
Valprogram 1989-1991
Liberals1:
1 958 
1 960 
1 964 
1 968 
1 970 
1 973
Valmanifest
Pamphlet: 'Möjligheternas ärtionde'
Not available
Pamphlet: 'Nästa rationaliseringsväg kommer att beröra...' 
Valmanifest 1970 
Valmanifest 1973
1 Manifesto sources for 1970 to 1982 are extracts sent by the Liberals.
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1 976 
1 979 
1 982 
1 985 
1 988
Conservatives
1 958 
1 960 
1 964 
1 968 
1 970 
1 973 
1 976 
1 979 
1982 
1 985 
1 988
Communists 
1 958
1 960 
1964
1968 
1 970
1 973
1 976
1 979
1 982 
1 985
1 988
Valmanifest 1976 
Valmanifest 1979 
Valmanifest 1982
Folkpartiets valmanifest 1985: 'Ny kurs för Sverige' 
Valmanifest 88: 'Det behövs bäde hjärta och hjärna i Politiken'
'H - att lita pä', Nr 1, 1958 
'Högeralternativet: ett alternativ att tänka pä'
Not available
'Det är Du som ska vinna pä valet'
Valmanifest 1970: 'Samverkan, rättvisa, ansvar'
Valmanifest 1973
Election Manifesto 1976
1979 Election Platform
Valmanifest 1982: 'Framtid i frihet’
Conservative election program 
Valmanifest 1988
'Trygga tjänstepensionen genom arbetarseger i valet', Vär Tid, Maj 
1958
Valmanifest, Ny Dag, 20 augusti 1960
'SKP:s valmanifest: Med Folket - mot storfinansen', Ny Dag, 24 augusti 
1 964
'För vänsterseger 1968', Socialistisk Debatt, Nr 2, 1968 
'Valappeir, Verksamhetsberättelse Vänsterpartiet kommunisternas 
kongress 1972, pp.45-46.
'Med vpk för vänsterseger', Verksamhetsberättelse Vänsterpartiet 
kommunisternas kongress 1975, bilaga 20
'Valmanifest', Verksamhetsberättelse Vänsterpartiet kommunisternas 
kongress 1978, bilaga 3
'Program för 80-talet: Radikal arbetarpolitik - Vagen till socialism, 
Verksamhetsberättelse Vänsterpartiet kommunisternas kongress 1981, 
bilaga 4
'10 punkter för vänsterseger', Ny Dag, Nr 26, 1982
'Politik för socialism pä svenska: Plattform för Vänsterpartiet
kommunisterna till valet 1985, Verksamhetsberättelse Vänsterpartiet
kommunisternas kongress 1987, bilaga 4
Till Sverige 1988. Vänsterpartiet Kommunisternas Valmanifest
Greens 1988 Valmanifest
3 52
A3.2 Australia
1 9 5 8
Labor Attacks government's 'ruinous taxation', especially sales tax 
increases and the 1956 'horror budget' tax increases on 
various goods
Payroll tax on wages paid by local authorities to be
abolished, due to its effect on costs, with the eventual aim of 
abolishing payroll tax altogether 
Sales tax on basic commodities to be eliminated 
No need for tax increases to finance benefits
Liberals and 
Country Party
We will reduce taxation when we can, but must resist inflation 
Aim to keep tax as low as possible 
Tax concessions have been given recently to resource 
investors, to facilitate economic growth 
We are prepared to let the States resume certain taxing 
powers
1 9 6 1
Labor Abolish payroll tax on local government undertakings 
Sales tax to be reduced, and abolished on essential food and 
household items
Verifiable transport costs of employees to be deductible
Implies big boys will be hit
No tax increase necessary to finance proposals
Liberals There will be increased tax reimbursements to States
Country (Nationals) No mention at all of tax (however page 1 of policy speech was 
missing)
1 9 6 3
Labor Taxation burden to be redistributed - implies big boys to be 
h it
Sales tax to be reduced, and abolished for essential food and 
household items
Transport fares for employees to be made deductible
Liberals Labor's promises will require higher taxes
Country (Nationals) Labor promises have not been financed
1 9 6 6
Labor Income tax to be reformed
- so that it is levied, and deductions allowed, in a more
equitable manner
- to reduce discrimination in favour of foreign capital
- to review double taxation arrangements
- to eliminate speculation in land and other assets
Liberals No mention at all of tax
Country (Nationals) Tax incentives will be improved for wool
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Labor
Liberals
Country
Labor
Liberals
Country
Labor
Liberals
1 9 6 9
Attacks increases in income tax due to inflation 
Income tax to be reviewed to ensure that there is 
progressivity in practice as well as in theory
Cost of Labor promises will leader either to increased 
inflation or to higher taxes
Australia must be protected against increased burdens of 
income tax
Recent tax changes included increases in concessions for 
wives and dependants, education and life insurance 
Tax reform is required because the progressive scale is 
shifting the taxation burden onto personal income 
taxpayers, in particular wage and salary earners, 
especially those on low and middle incomes 
Aim to reduce personal income tax over a 3 year period, to 
provide relief to low and middle income earners
(Nationals) Tax-free exemption level to be raised on estate tax on 
property transferred between spouses
1 9 7 2
Tax rates don’t need to be raised to pay for programs because 
huge and automatic increases in revenue are already 
occurring
Income tax rates for the wealthy are already high enough 
Tax will be reviewed:
- to close tax loopholes
- to retard trend whereby inflation has forced low and
middle income earners into high tax brackets
Since the last election the Government has cut personal income 
tax heavily, by nearly 10% on average in last two budgets 
Tax scale will be restructured periodically to ensure that it 
does not become a burden on taxpayers
(Nationals) Budget provided cuts in income tax
Exemption levels for estate tax to be doubled, with ultimate 
objective of abolishing estate tax altogether
1 9 7 4
Tax to be restructured, following the Asprey Report 
Roles of Commonwealth and States in taxation to be reviewed 
Board of Relief to be established to hear applications for 
exemption from estate tax
Reduction in estate tax concerning matrimonial home going 
to surviving spouse
Extension of tax deduction for overseas dependent relatives
Attacks Labor for having the highest taxes in history, for having 
increased taxes via inflation driving people into higher 
tax brackets despite having promised not to increase 
tax, and gives figures as to how much more tax Labor 
has taken and will take if not defeated 
We will cut tax by $600 million in next budget
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Country
Labor
Liberals
Country
Labor
Liberals
Country
(Nationals) Rising taxes have made you worse off
The tax deduction for superannuation is under threat 
The tax on insurance companies has reduced bonuses
1 9 7 5
Taxes were cut in the Hayden Budget
Labor took $2600 million more in tax last year, but we 
will reduce tax burden
Tax scales will be indexed over a 3 year period, which will 
aid wage restraint
Child care rebate will be introduced for single parents and 
families where one parent is an invalid 
Exemption limit will be increased for estate tax on property 
transferred between husband and wife 
Company tax will be indexed, and quarterly collection 
suspended
40% investment allowance and accelerated depreciation 
allowance will be introduced 
Retention allowance for small business will be increased 
Shareholders in private companies to be given option of 
being taxed as a partnership
(Nationals) Labor's taxes are crippling the country
Tax needs of small business will be reviewed 
Estate tax will be reviewed
There is a need for tax concessions to encourage good land use 
and conservation of fodder, soil and water
1 9 7 7
States will be compensated to abolish payroll tax, in order 
to reduce unemployment
Labor is the party of high tax, and under Labor tax more 
than doubled
Labor would spend over $3000 million more, and 
compensate States for abolishing payroll tax, and 
increase tax to pay
We have reduced taxes, saving income tax payers $3,300 
m illion
From February 1 additional tax cuts will mean that the 
average person will save $6 per week and more than 
225,000 low income earners won't pay any tax at all 
Taxation on estates and gifts between spouses abolished from 
today, and will be abolished altogether over the life of 
the Parliament
We have provided extra tax incentives for business
(Nationals) The recent tax reforms have been the biggest in Australia's 
history
The new standard rates will make the taxpayer better off, 
and indexation means inflation proofing
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Democrats
Labor
Liberals
Estate tax has already been eased, and will be abolished, 
starting with property transferred between spouses or 
between parent and child 
40% investment allowance has been introduced 
Tax averaging for farmers has been improved 
Tax rebate will be raised for local government rates
Not available
1 9 8 0
Tax-free threshold to be raised, to give everyone a tax cut of $3 
per week
General review of tax system
Resource rental tax or excess profits tax to be imposed on 
major resource developments 
Investment allowance to be abolished 
Legislation to eliminate tax avoidance, including 
retrospective legislation
Last 3 measures would bring in an extra $3 billion per year
Tax to be kept at the lowest level possible compatible with 
responsible economic management and community needs:
- distributed as fairly as possible, with particular
concern for low income families 
- providing incentives for initiative and enterprise 
Taxes have been cut since the 1975 Hayden Labor budget:
- on 1 July tax was cut by over $600 million
- top marginal rate has been reduced from 65% to 60%
- the number of tax brackets has been reduced from 7 to 3
- half indexation is in place
- the dependent spouse rebate and sole parent rebate have
been increased
- tax-free threshold has been increased
- concessions for self-employed superannuation have been
introduced
- taxes on estates and on gifts have been abolished
- investment allowance has been reintroduced and
accelerated depreciation allowance and private company 
retention rate increased
- primary producers have income equalization deposits, and
income limits on tax averaging have been abolished
- tax concessions have been improved for resource
development, oil exploration, and energy conservation 
Labor increased tax by 125% in 3 years, and their
promises add up to $2500 million or $8 per week more 
in tax: Labor would reintroduce high taxes and introduce 
capital gains tax
There will be a further tax cut of $500 million from 1 July 
1981 due to operation of indexation 
Nominates where revenue from oil levy is going 
Tax laws will be changed to facilitate the buildup of reserves 
by small businesses
There will be an inquiry into zone allowances 
There will be further legislation to tighten up on tax 
avoidance
356
Nationals
Democrats
Labor
Liberals
Nationals
Democrats
Labor
We stand for keeping the tax burden down by keeping 
spending down
Estate and gift tax has been abolished
Import parity pricing for fuel is necessary
New deductions will be introduced for fuel storage facilities 
for business, connection to mains electricity for 
rural properties, and soil conservation
New depreciation allowance to be introduced for primary 
sector machinery
Resources tax should be introduced
1 9 8 3
Tax reform shall increase the real value of the paypacket,
restore equity, ensure the tax burden is according to ability 
to pay, prevent erosion of after-tax income by inflation and 
so support the prices and incomes policy, and end tax evasion 
and avoidance
Tax reductions for low and middle income earners:
- new 6 step income tax scale to restore tax progressivity
- lift in tax-free threshold to $5000
- lift in tax-free threshold for pensioners to $5893
- increase in spouse rebate, sole-parent rebate, zone
allowance
No capital gains tax: existing laws to be applied to 
speculative gains
100% retention of profits by small business where these 
are to be used for genuine business operations
There will be a new preferential tax rate for small 
companies of 5 cents below the standard rate
We're not offering tax cuts, because we have made them, 
averaging $17 per week for the average family
Small business to pay 5 cents less per dollar in company tax 
than standard rate
Tax concessions will be introduced to help drought stricken
We voted against sales tax increases
Last budget put through many tax measures originated by 
Democrats, such as dropping the sales tax on necessities, 
making gifts to conservation organizations deductible, 
and eliminating the double tax on dividends
1 9 8 4
Taxes have already been cut
There shall be a major tax reform, to ensure that the benefits of 
growth are equitably shared so that the hard work of 
ordinary Australians is not unfairly penalized
9 principles of tax reform:
- no increase in overall tax as a percentage of GDP
- further major cuts in personal income tax
- must contribute to smashing of tax avoidance and evasion
- a simpler system
- a fairer, progressive system, according to ability to pay
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Liberals
Nationals
Democrats
- must not disadvantage welfare recipients, and should
reduce or remove poverty traps
- changes to indirect tax must be acceptable to groups whose
response will determine whether moderation in wage 
movements can be maintained
- must provide good climate for investment, growth and
employment
- must have widespread community support, including
support at a Tax Summit in 1985 
A 150% tax deduction will be introduced for research and 
development
Legislative attack on tax avoidance, which the Opposition 
obstructs, shall be continued
Taxes need to be kept down so that hard work, responsibility 
and success are rewarded
Labor is the highest taxing government in peacetime history, 
with average people being taxed at 46%
There shall be no overall increase in the tax burden as a 
proportion of GDP, which we aim to reduce over time via 
spending cuts and economic growth 
Reliance on direct tax will be reduced by broadening the 
indirect tax base
Limits will be placed on spending to allow tax cuts 
Tax on families with children will be cut, including via the 
introduction of income-splitting and a childcare tax rebate 
Tax on lump sum superannuation will be scrapped 
There will be no capital gains tax 
It will be possible to opt out of the Medicare levy 
Company tax will be cut for small business 
Taxation of dividends will be reviewed, and investment 
allowances maintained and extended 
There will be tax incentives for research and development 
The coal levy will be abolished
The income equalization deposit will be restored for the 
primary sector, the full excise tax rebate on diesel fuel 
will be maintained, and the wine tax will be abolished
Big spending means more taxes, and the high level of 
taxation is holding people back 
Tax on lump sum superannuation will be abolished 
There will be no capital gains tax, wealth tax or estate tax, 
which are on Labor's agenda
Income splitting for families will be introduced for income 
tax purposes, which will save the average family $8 per 
week; a tax rebate will be introduced for childcare; and 
the sole parent rebate will be adjusted 
The tax rate of private company income will be reduced to 
help fund small business growth 
Tax averaging will be maintained
We prevented the tax on lump sum superannuation from 
being even harsher, and prevented the sales tax on 
necessities
We will prevent estate tax being reintroduced, and will prevent 
the introduction of a capital gains tax on homes
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Labor
Liberals
Nationals
1 9 8 7
There will be no new taxes and no discretionary increases in 
taxes
Tax shall not increase as a percentage of GDP 
There will be a further crackdown on tax avoidance and 
evasion, including introduction of the Australia Card 
(identity card)
Liberals stand for lower taxation in order to create
economic prosperity and improve living standards via 
improving incentives
Big government, high spending and big taxes have got us into 
this mess
The Hawke government is the biggest taxing government in 
peacetime history: the average family paid $65 in tax each 
week in March 1983 but now pays $102, and the average tax 
rate has increased from 17.5% to 20.5%
We will lower the overall burden of taxation and reduce and 
restructure taxes, made possible by reducing 
government spending 
Income tax will be cut by $26 per week:
- top marginal rate down from 49% to 38%
- only one other marginal rate, at 25%
- there will be a bias towards families with children
- tax-free threshold will be increased
- dependent spouse rebate will be increased for childless
families
Family Allowance and childcare allowance will be paid by 
Tax Department
Capital gains tax and fringe benefits tax will be abolished
Negative gearing will be reintroduced
Bona fide entertainment expenses will be deductible
The taxation of lump sum superannuation will be modified
Corporate tax will be reduced from 49% to 42%, then 38%
The tax burden on farmers' fuel costs will be reduced
Labor is the biggest taxing government in peacetime
history, introducing new taxes such as the capital gains 
and fringe benefits taxes, but we will bring taxes down 
Eventual goal is to get the maximum rate of personal income tax 
down to 25%
- possible introduction of flat 23% tax rate for increases
in income from one year to the next
- childcare for working parents to be deductible
- deduction for up to the first $5000 of interest earned may be
practical
Capital gains and fringe benefits taxes will go 
Negative gearing legislation will be repealed 
Entertainment expenses will once again become deductible 
The lump sum superannuation tax will be reduced to 25% 
Corporate tax rate will be reduced to maximum personal tax 
rate
Coal export levy will be abolished
There will be a full rebate of excise on petrol and diesel used 
off-road by primary producers, and full deductibility 
will be reintroduced for Income Equalization Deposit 
Bonds
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Democrats We prevented the sales tax on necessities 
Attacks tax auction between other parties 
We supported the capital gains tax 
Sales tax should be removed on the freight component of 
goods
Negative gearing on takeovers should be abolished 
There should be an extra 10% duty on luxury imports, and 
on money leaving the country
Sources
All sources used were policy speeches using the same format and produced by 
the respective parties except where indicated.
Labor:
1 958 
1 961 
1 963
H.V. Evatt, Policy Speech of the Australian Labor Party 
Arthur Calwell, Labor's Policy - Blueprint for a Government 
Arthur Calwell, Labor’s Policy - How Labor Will Plan for 
Australia's Greatness
1 966 
1 969 
1 972 
1 974 
1 975 
1 977 
1 980
Arthur Calwell, Policy Speech for the 1966 Federal Election 
Gough Whitlam, Australian Labor Party Policy Speech 
Gough Whitlam, It's Time for Leadership 
Gough Whitlam, Australian Labor Party Policy Speech 
Gough Whitlam, Campaign 1975: an Address to the Nation 
Gough Whitlam, A Programme for Australia's Recovery 
Bill Hayden, Address to the Opening of Labor's Federal Election 
Campaign 1980
1 983 
1 984 
1 987
Bob Hawke, Policy Speech. Federal Election Campaign Launch 
Bob Hawke, 1984 Policy Speech 
Bob Hawke, Policy Statement
Liberals:
1 958 
1 961 
1 963 
1 966 
1 969 
1 972 
1 974 
1 975 
1 977 
1 980 
1 983 
1 984
R.G. Menzies, Federal Election 1958 Joint Policy Speech 
R.G. Menzies, Federal Election 1961 Joint Policy Speech 
R.G. Menzies, Federal Election 1963 Policy Speech 
Harold Holt, Federal Election 1966 Policy Speech 
John Gorton, Federal Election 1969 Policy Speech 
William McMahon, Federal Election 1972 Policy Speech 
Billy Snedden, Federal Election 1974 Opening Speech 
Malcolm Fraser, Policy Speech 
Malcolm Fraser, Policy Speech: Lead on, Liberal 
Malcolm Fraser, Policy Speech: Liberal, Doing the Job 
Malcolm Fraser, Policy Speech: We're not Waiting for the World 
Andrew Peacock, The Liberal Direction for Australia: Stand Up
1 987
For Your Family
John Howard, Liberal Party Policy Statement 1987: Get in Front 
Again
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Country Party/National Party:
1 958 
1 961
1 963
1 966
1 969
1 972
1 974 
1 975 
1 977 
1 980 
1 983 
1 984 
1 987
R.G. Menzies, Federal Election 1958 Joint Policy Speech 
John McEwen, Australian Country Party 1961 Federal Election 
Policy Speech
John McEwen, Australian Country Party 1963 Federal Election 
Policy Speech
John McEwen, Australian Country Party 1966 Federal Election 
Policy Speech
John McEwen, Australian Country Party 1969 Federal Election 
Policy Speech
J.D. Anthony, Australian Country Party Federal Elections 1972: 
The Country Party's Policy
Doug Anthony, Policy Speech 1974 Federal Election 
Doug Anthony, Policy Speech 1975 Federal Election 
Doug Anthony, Policy Speech 1977 Federal Election 
Doug Anthony, Policy Speech 1980 Federal Election 
J.D. Anthony, National Party of Australia Policy Speech 
Ian Sinclair, National Party of Australia 1984 Policy Speech 
Ian Sinclair, Election '87 Policy Speech
Democrats: 
1 977 
1 980 
1 983
1984
1 987
not available
D.L. Chipp, Australian Democrats Policy Speech 1980
D.L. Chipp, Australian Democrats Policy Speech 1983 Federal
Election
D.L. Chipp, Australian Democrats Policy Speech 1984,
Australian, 20 November 1984
Senator Janine Haines, National Campaign Launch
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Appendix 4: Economic voting
Over the past twenty years many analysts have sought to produce convincing 
models of economic voting, using both aggregate data and individual level survey data. At 
the aggregate level some have used a voting function as the dependent variable, which 
has the merit of focussing on the election results themselves but at the cost of limiting 
the number of cases in one's analysis. Others have used popularity functions based on 
opinion poll findings, which allow more cases but at the cost of statistical difficulties 
with autocorrelation.
In the following brief review of these studies, I focus mainly on those with a 
voting function as dependent variable, since election results are the focus of my own 
investigation. It is what actually happened at elections that interests me, rather than 
popularity between elections, and the net vote changes for particular parties or groups 
of parties are the best indicators that aggregate analysis can provide of the actual 
underlying vote streams to and from such parties.
The independent variables examined most frequently in the economic voting 
literature are various measures of inflation, unemployment, and real income, but 
findings have been mixed2.
Gerald Kramer, for instance, found in 1971 that real income in election years 
was positively correlated with the Republican share of the total vote at American House 
of Representative elections between 1896 and 1964, while inflation and 
unemployment were not significant3, but in 1973 George Stigler reanalysed this data 
using a weighted average of biennial changes in real income and found no such 
relationship, and although he did find income to be significant in one of the tests he 
reports (with change in the Republican share of the two-party vote as dependent 
variable), it was not significant for his preferred specification, which involved 
weighted lags4.
2For general reviews of this literature up until the end of the 1970s see Kristen R. Monroe 
(1979), 'Econometric analyses of electoral behavior: a critical review', Political Behavior 
v.1, pp. 137-173; and Martin Paldam (1981), 'A preliminary survey of the theories and 
findings on vote and popularity functions', European Journal of Political Research, v.9, 
pp.181-199.
3Gerald H. Kramer (1971), 'Short-term fluctuations in US voting behavior, 1896-1964’, 
American Political Science Review, v.65, pp. 131-143.
4George Stigler (1973), 'General economic conditions and national elections', American 
Economic Review, v.63/2, pp. 160-171.
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A null result was also reported by Arcelus & Meitzer in 1975, although they did 
suggest that changes in income had an effect on turnout5, while Bloom & Price found 
asymetrical effects of election year changes in real disposable income on both the 
Republican vote share and deviations from a moving average of the Republican vote 
share weighted by changes in party registration (as a proxy for party identification): 
governments were punished for downturns but not rewarded for prosperity6. This 
finding received some support from Moseley, who found that there was a connection 
between economic conditions and the vote in what he called crisis years, but not in 
other years7.
Also in response to Arcelus & Meitzer, however, Kramer, writing with Saul 
Goodman, reported that both inflation and real income were significantly related to 
government support8, although his methods were severely criticized in a rejoinder by 
Arcelus & Meitzer9. Positive results were also reported by Tufte, for real disposable 
income and the vote for the incumbent President's party in mid-term Congressional 
elections10, and by Fair, for the relationship between the Democratic percentage of the 
two-party vote in Presidential elections between 1916 and 1976, on the one hand, and 
election year changes in unemployment, the growth rate of real GNP per capita, and the 
growth rate of the GNP deflator11.
In another article published in 1975, Meitzer and Vellrath analysed the four 
Presidential elections from 1960 to 1972 at the state level using as dependent 
variables the percentage of voters participating in each election and the percentage of 
the total vote won by Democratic and Republican candidates, including as independent 
variables nominal per capita state tax and the deviation from the national average of the 
rate of change of each state's nominal per capita net taxes, as well as unemployment 
(rate and change), inflation, the rate of change of real income (taking into account both
5 F. Arcelus & A.H. Meitzer (1975), The effect of aggregate economic variables on 
Congressional elections’, American Political Science Review, v.69, pp.1232-1240.
6Howard S. Bloom & H. Douglas Price (1975), 'Voter response to short-run economic 
conditions: the asymetric effect of prosperity and recession', American Political Science 
Review, v.69, pp. 1240-1254.
7Unpublished paper cited in James E. Alt & K. Alec Chrystal (1983), Political Economics, 
Wheatsheaf, Britain, p.169.
8Saul Goodman & Gerald H. Kramer (1975), 'Comment on Arcelus & Meitzer, The effect of 
aggregate economic conditions on Congressional elections’, American Political Science 
Review, v.69, pp.1255-1265.
9F. Arcelus & A.H. Meitzer (1975), 'Aggregate economic variables and votes for Congress: a 
rejoinder', American Political Science Review, v.69, pp.1266-1269.
10Edward R. Tufte (1978), Political Control of the Economy, Princeton UP, Princeton.
1 1 Ray C. Fair (1978), 'The effect of economic events on votes for President', Review of 
Economics and Statistics, v.60, pp.159-173.
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personal taxes and transfer payments), the size and deviation from the national average 
of federal aid payments to state and local governments, plus controls for when an 
incumbent President runs for re-election, southern states (which have much lower 
participation rates), and states that lowered the voting age. Contrary to the results of 
Arcelus & Meitzer at the national level, both inflation and the level (but not change) of 
unemployment were found to be significantly related to electoral outcomes, with 
unemployment helping the Democrats and hurting the Republicans. The tax variables, 
on the other hand, had little effect, although increases in tax relative to transfers hurt 
the Republicans12. These results were similar to those reported in 1970 by Pomper of 
a simpler analysis of gubernatorial elections in 37 states between 1948 and 1972, 
which found correlation coefficients to be low, rarely significant, and with often 
inconsistent signs13.
Another study which focussed on tax was carried out by Niskanen on data from 
20 Presidential elections from 1896 to 1972, using as dependent variable the logit of 
the fraction of the major party vote cast for the party holding the Presidency. In his 
economic model Niskanen included the percentage changes from the previous election 
year to the current election year in real per capita net national product, the 
employment rate (rather than unemployment) as a fraction of the workforce, the 
consumer price index, the real stock price index, and the corporate bond rate (the last 
two as indices of sentiment and expectations), plus dummies for whether an incumbent 
President was running for re-election and whether an election took place during a war, 
plus the lagged dependent variable. His hypothesis was that the coefficients for changes 
over the electoral terms in real per capita federal revenue and expenditure should be 
negative, on the grounds that the interaction of the bureaucratic and legislative 
processes led to a public sector which was bigger than that desired by the median voter, 
and this was borne out by his results: the coefficients were negative for all of the 
versions of his model reported, with t-values that often exceeded 2. In addition, real 
per capita income had a strong positive effect, while employment and inflation were 
only significant if income was not included in the equation14.
12Allan H. Meitzer & Marc Vellrath (1975), The effects of economic policies on votes for the 
Presidency: some evidence from recent elections', Journal of Law and Economics, v.18, 
pp.781-798.
13Gerald Pomper (1970), Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics, 
Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, chapter 6.
14William Niskanen (1979), 'Economic and fiscal effects on the popular vote for the 
President', in Public Policy and Public Choice, ed. Douglas W. Rae & Theodore J. Eismeier, 
Sage, London.
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Across the other side of the Atlantic, however, Whiteley, using data from 
British elections between 1900 and 1974 and also for post-war elections alone, found 
no relationship between the Conservative share of either the total vote or the total 
electorate and changes over the 12 months prior to each election in net national 
income, unemployment, or inflation15. However in 1987 Hibbing found for British 
elections between 1945 and 1984 that inflation, unemployment, and changes in real 
per capita disposable income over the four quarters prior to each election were all 
significantly and negatively related to the government's percentage of the total vote, 
although not to the two-party (Labour + Conservative) vote16. But while the results 
for inflation and unemployment were as one might expect, the negative sign for real 
disposable income was rather puzzling, although Hibbing sought to explain this away by 
reference to the special circumstances of the 1979 and 1983 elections. Another study, 
by Mughan in 1987, found that while inflation in the year before each election 
adversely affected the government’s share of the total vote in British elections between 
1951 and 1983, unemployment in the year preceding elections did not have any 
impact, although the Labour share of the vote was adversely affected. However his 
parallel study of Australian elections between 1958 and 1984 found no effects from 
either unemployment or inflation either on the government's share of the vote or on the 
shares won by Labor or the Liberal-National coalition17.
Turning to Scandinavia, a study by Madsen in 1980 of election results in 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway between 1920 and 1973 produced mixed findings. Using 
as dependent variable the deviation from the mean vote share won by the Prime 
Minister's party over the previous three elections, Madsen found that the level of 
unemployment and the percentage increase in real GDP per capita had an effect in 
Sweden, but not changes in unemployment or price levels, or the percentage increase 
in tax revenue. No effects at all were found for Norway, and only a slight negative effect 
for inflation in Denmark18. In France over the same period, Rosa found that the Left 
vote was positively related to unemployment and negatively related to inflation and per
15Paul Whiteley (1980), ’Politico-econometric estimation in Britain: an alternative 
interpretation’, in Models of Political Economy, ed. Paul Whiteley, Sage, London, pp.85-99. 
16John R. Hibbing (1987), 'On the issues surrounding economic voting: looking to the British 
case for answers', Comparative Political Studies, v.20/1, pp.3-33.
1 7Anthony Mughan (1987), 'The "hip pocket nerve" and electoral volatility in Australia and 
Great Britain’, Politics, v.22/2, pp.66-75.
18Henrik J. Madsen (1980), 'Electoral outcomes and macro-economic policies: the 
Scandinavian cases', in Models of Political Economy, ed. Paul Whiteley, Sage, London.
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capita income'9. This is consistent with Rattinger's clientele hypothesis, and also with 
Rosa’s own view of the French Left as the parties of protest.
Studies based on opinion polls rather than elections also produced mixed 
findings. These are too numerous to review in full here, but a few related directly to 
Sweden or Australia.
In regard to Sweden, studies tend to conclude that unemployment and inflation 
had an impact on government popularity, but that income, variously measured, had 
little or no effect. This was the finding of Kirchgässner in 1976 (although real 
disposable income was statistically significant at the 10% level if the other two 
variables were not included in the equation)20; of Jonung and Wadensjö in 197921; 
and of Hibbs and Madsen in 198122. In addition, Hibbs and Madsen found that 
unexpected upwards movements of disposable income growth rates relative to market 
income growth rates (the 'tax gap') were associated with increases in government 
support in the electorate. That is, voters seemed to react favourably to increases in 
transfer spending if taxes were held level, or to cuts in tax if transfer spending was 
maintained. In 1983 Sigelman, too, found that government support was influenced by 
unemployment and inflation, and also that the degree of editorial criticism of the 
(Social Democratic) government was negatively related to government popularity23. 
The only jarring note was sounded in 1985 by Lybeck, who concluded that "government 
popularity is determined largely by specific political events, not by any systematic 
influence from the economy"24.
19Jean Jacques Rosa (1980), 'Economic conditions and elections in France’, in Models of 
Political Economy, ed. Paul Whiteley, Sage, London.
20 Gebhard Kirchgässner (1976), Rationales Wählerverhalten und optimales 
Regierungsverhalten, dissertation, University of Konstanz, cited in Bruno S. Frey (1979), 
'Politometrics of government behavior in a democracy', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
pp.308-322.
2^Lars Jonung & Eskil Wadensjö (1979), 'The effect of unemployment, inflation and real 
income growth on government popularity in Sweden', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
pp.343-353.
22Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., & Henrik Jess Madsen (1981), 'Public reactions to the growth of 
taxation and government expenditure', World Politics, v.33, pp.413-435.
23Lee Sigelman (1983), 'Research note - mass political support in Sweden: retesting a 
political-economic model', Scandinavian Political Studies, v.6/4 (new series), pp.309-315. 
24Johann A. Lybeck (1985), 'A simultaneous model of politico-economic interaction in 
Sweden, 1970-1982', European Journal of Political Research, v.13, pp.135-151.
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In Australia the picture was remarkably similar: studies by Douglas in 197525 
and by Schneider and Pommerehne in 198026 both found inflation and unemployment 
to be linked to government support, but not the rate of growth of real wages (Douglas) 
or of real disposable income (Schneider & Pommerehne).
While there has been agreement among most analysts of Sweden and Australia 
who use a popularity function as dependent variable about the importance of 
unemployment and inflation and the unimportance of income, this is inconsistent with 
the only studies of Sweden and Australia which use a voting function as dependent 
variable: Madsen, as pointed out earlier, found unemployment and percentage changes 
in real GDP per capita to be significant in Sweden, but not inflation, while Mughan 
found that neither unemployment nor inflation were important in Australia. Apart 
from possible problems with data (such as sampling error) and specification, these 
inconsistencies may be largely attributable to people reacting differently to opinion 
poll questions than to real elections (since voting is the 'real thing', and the level of 
political information available in an election campaign is greater than in inter­
election periods), and to the much longer time frame used by election studies 
(relationships between economic variables and the vote may vary over time). However 
Whiteley suggested in 1980 that the greater incidence of autocorrelation in opinion 
poll studies tends to lead authors to draw positive conclusions when these are not 
warranted, because the presence of autocorrelation has the effect of reducing standard 
errors and thus increasing apparent statistical significance27. This, then, provides 
another good reason to concentrate on vote functions rather than on popularity 
functions, despite the small N problem.
More generally, it is clear from these studies that findings are rather sensitive 
to which country is being studied, which period, how the voting function is 
operationalized, and the choice and operationalization of the independent variables.
25Roger Douglas (1975), 'Economy and polity in Australia: a quantification of common sense’, 
British Journal of Political Science, v.5, pp.341-361.
2^Friedrich Schneider & Werner W. Pommerehne (1980), 'Politico-economic interactions in 
Australia: some empirical evidence', Economic Record, v.56, pp. 113-131.
2 7 Paul Whiteley (1980), 'Politico-econometric estimation in Britain: an alternative 
interpretation', in Models of Political Economy, ed. Paul Whiteley, Sage, London, p.87.
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A p p e n d i x  5: A u s t r a l i a n  p u b l i c o p i n i o n  on ta x  1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 7
s u p p l e m e n t a r y  tab les
Table  A5.1 Opinion on tax progressivity, Australia 1986-87
Agree Disagree Balance agreeing
% % %
People with high incomes are taxed too much 36 47 - 1 1
High income earners should pay a larger part
of earnings in tax than low income earners 62 34 + 28
It is the responsibility of government to 
reduce income differences:
- between those with high and low incomes 4 1 39 + 2
- between rich and poor 51 44 + 7
When people die, property 
should go to children tax free 88 7 + 81
There should be heavy taxes on inherited wealth 1 1 77 -6 6
Source 1986-87 National Social Science Survey.
On the question of direct versus indirect taxation, an Age Poll found in 1985
that only 39% of respondents wanted to cut income tax by raising taxes on goods and 
services, compared to 50% who wanted to keep raising the same amount of revenue
from income tax28.
Other polls gave different answers according to the nature of the questions
asked, with little change since 1983/84:
Table A5.2 Opinion on direct versus indirect taxes, Australia, 1983 and 1985
Option: July April Change
1 983 1985
% % %
Increase indirect tax 46 46 0
Increase direct tax 45 43 - 2
Balance favouring increased indirect taxes + 1 + 3 + 2
Source McNair-Anderson Poll 03/4/85.
28Age Poll, Age, 8 May 1985.
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Table A5.3 Opinion on income tax versus sales tax, Australia, 1984 and 1985
Option: September February Change
1 984 1 985
% % %
Higher sales tax, lower income tax 40 40 0
Higher income tax, lower sales tax 1 3 1 2 - 1
Status quo 38 39 + 1
Balance for lower income tax, higher sales tax + 27 + 28 + 1
Sources Morgan Finding 1292, February 1985, Bulletin, 19 March 1985.
A McNair-Anderson poll carried out in April 1985 found that when asked what 
tax they would prefer most in the place of income tax if income tax were cut, 
respondents were divided: 29% nominated higher sales tax and other indirect taxes, 
27% a capital gains tax, 22% a value-added tax on goods and services, and only 7% 
death duties or inheritance tax29.
Table A5.4 Opinion on government's preferred tax package, Australia, June 1985 
(pre-Tax Summit)
Morgan 
May 1985 
%
Age Poll 
June 1985 
%
Approve 30 23
Disapprove 55 57
Neither/don't know 1 5 20
Balance in favour -2 5 -3 4
Would make me better off 1 1
Would make me worse off 58
Would make no difference/don’t know 31
Balance considering would be better off -4 7
Sources Morgan Poll Finding 1323, Bulletin, 11 June 1985; Age Poll, Age, 1 July
1 985.
29Ian McNair (undated), Australian Public Opinion Polls (the Gallup Method) 1973-1987, 
Quadrant Research Services, Sydney, p.29.
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Table A5.5 Opinion on government's preferred tax package, Australia 1985 (post- 
Tax Summit)
Overall package 
%
Consumption 
tax of 12.5% 
%
Capital 
gains tax 
%
Fringe benefits 
tax 
%
Approve 31 1 5 29 44
Disapprove 60 80 62 49
Don't know 9 5 9 7
Balance approving -2 9 -6 5 -3 3 - 5
Source McNair-Anderson Poll 03/7/85.
Despite the apparent unpopularity of the tax package, the government's lead of 
3-4% over the Coalition in opinion polls remained virtually unchanged between 
September 1985, shortly before the package was announced, and October and 
November30. However a poll taken in November 1986 found that the fringe benefits 
tax remained unpopular despite some alterations since its original announcement: only 
29% agreed with its introduction, while 53% disagreed (19% didn't know)31.
According to a Newspoll taken a month before the election, 33% of respondents 
saw tax as the most important issue, well ahead of the economy 16%, unemployment 
9% and welfare 8%32. Other polls found similar results:
Table A5.6 Opinion on main issues, Australia, July 1987
McNair Anderson 
(4-5 July)
%
Spectrum 
(9 July) 
%
Tax 25 30
Economy 27 21
Unemployment 1 8 5
Health 1 2 4
Other 1 2 1 8
Don't know 7 1 8
Sources McNair Anderson Poll, The Herald, 9 July 1987, p.2; Spectrum Poll, Daily
Telegraph, 11 July 1987, p.2.
Similarly, on a slightly different question an Age Poll conducted in early June 
found that tax cuts were considered to be the main personal issue by 19% of
30McNair Anderson Poll 01/10/85 and 01/11/85.
31 McNair Anderson Poll 04/11/86.
32Newspoll 5-7 June 1987, published in the Australian, 12 June 1987.
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respondents, behind unemployment with 31% but ahead of welfare/dole payments 
10%, cutting government spending 9%, and spending more on education and training 
9% 33.
Expressed attitudes to the Liberals' policy were sensitive to question wording: a 
Morgan poll found that while 41% preferred the top income tax rate to be cut to 38 
cents in the dollar as the Liberals proposed, with consequent spending cuts, 50% 
preferred to keep the top rate at 49 cents in the dollar and not cut government 
spending34, but a Newspoll found that 56% thought as did the Liberals that both 
expenditure and income tax should be cut, compared to 33% who considered that both 
should stay at 1 July levels35. Nevertheless, opinion polls before and after the tax 
launch did not show any leap in support for the Liberals, which implies that the 
media's generally negative reaction may have offset the appeal of the tax cuts. Indeed a 
Saulwick poll reported that "voters reckon Lib policy won't work"36.
33Age Poll, Age, 12 June 1987.
34Bulletin, 23 June 1987, p.17.
35Newspoll, Australian, 24 June 1987, p.13. 
36Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1987, p.1.
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